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Glossary of Key Concepts 
 
Beneficiaries of Legitimacy: Those who benefit from legitimate peace negotiations, hypothesized to 
be the general population. The beneficiaries play both a passive and an active role in the legitimisation 
process. 
 
Collective Concerns: A feature of legitimisation proposed by the heuristic model, which concerns what 
is being discussed in the negotiations (and included in the final agreement) as a reflection of collective 
grievances or concerns. 
 
Comprehensive Process-Tracing: A form of process-tracing developed for this research which, on the 
basis of a constructivist ontology and mixed epistemology, combines a constitutive analysis (i.e. what 
constitutes the legitimisation process) and a causal analysis (i.e. why do the constitutive components 
occur). 
 
Constitutive Components of the Legitimisation Process: The findings from the main analysis of the 
comprehensive process-tracing, which shows that six components constitute the legitimisation process. 
These are ending violence, a civilian counterbalance, feeling represented, recognised guarantors of 
legitimacy, feeling involved and ensuring implementation. 
 
Causal Conditions: These show why the constitutive components are possible in the first place and are 
part of the comprehensive process-tracing, see above. 
 
Guarantors of Legitimacy: Actors, especially civil society actors but also mediators, that act on behalf 
of the beneficiaries of legitimacy or the general population. According to the heuristic model, they seek 
to address collective concerns, be subjectively representative and communicate transparently. In reality, 
their role is more complicated. A recognised guarantor of legitimacy is one of the components that 
constitutes the legitimisation process.  
 
Heuristic Model of Legitimate Peace Negotiations: Developed as part of the abductive research 
process, three features are proposed as heuristic tools for developing an understanding of what 
constitutes the legitimisation process and the reasons for this: Collective concerns, subjective 
representation and transparent communication.  
 
Legitimate Peace Negotiations: Empirically, peace negotiations are more legitimate when the 
beneficiaries are satisfied with the process as such, because the six components that constitute the 
legitimisation process have been achieved. Theoretically, peace negotiations are more legitimate on the 
basis of three assumptions: The outcome and participation based-characteristics are fulfilled; civil society 
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actors are not ubiquitous in the legitimisation process and the legitimisation occurs both at the 
negotiations and in the public arena. 
 
Legitimation: Concerns the legitimation of individual actors (such as civil society representatives), i.e. 
how actors show or argue for their own legitimacy. This is one part of the legitimisation process and is 
related to the self-referential legitimation narratives (see below).  
 
Legitimisation Process/Process of Legitimisation: All the different components (see above) that 
together make the ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised process of peace negotiations more 
legitimate. 
 
Outcome-Based and Participation-Based Characteristics of Legitimisation: One of the defining 
assumptions of the theory of legitimate peace negotiations. The outcome is based on what happens 
during and after the negotiations with regards to ending violence, ensuring implementation and a civilian 
counterbalance. The participation-based characteristics include representation, but also recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy because of symbolic attachment and the involvement in the negotiations by the 
beneficiaries of legitimacy.  
 
Participative Communication: Participation in the legitimisation process through communication. 
This can be on a dualistic basis, where the guarantors of legitimacy engage the public within a 
communication process that contributes to circular information flows. Alternatively, one-sided 
participative communication occurs through the (artistic) expression of grievances or reflections of the 
negotiation process.  
 
(Recognised) Self-Referential Legitimation Narrative: A consistent narrative in reference to their 
own characteristics, which legitimates particular actors. These narratives legitimate the actors (and the 
roles they play) because they are widely recognised. 
 
Subjective Representation: A feature of legitimisation proposed by the heuristic model that considers 
who is taking part in the negotiations, looking at contextually relevant interpretations of representation, 
legitimation strategies of individual actors and forms of symbolic representation.  
 
Transparent Communication: A feature of legitimisation proposed by the heuristic model, which 
considers the efforts made by civil society to communicate with the population during the negotiations 
and afterwards, or how the civil society actors (and others) respond to those they believe to represent. 
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Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
1 Introduction 
 
‘Diplomats can generate an agreement, but without some form of public involvement it is not 
possible to know whether the agreement is legitimate’ (Ron 2010, 354). 
 
Setting out to conduct research on the link between participative or ‘locally owned’ peace processes and 
their link to peace sustainability, I was surprised with the first results of my empirical fieldwork. The 
literature to date had assumed that because of the participation of members of civil society, peace 
agreements become more sustainable (e.g. Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). This, the 
authors argue, is at least partly due to the fact that as a result of civil society participation there is ‘public 
buy-in’ ensuring the legitimacy and the implementation of the peace agreement. Nevertheless, during my 
fieldwork in Liberia, a case where civil society had a particularly proactive engagement throughout the 
entire peace process, I found that neither interview partners nor focus groups discussant knew much 
about the role of civil society actors or in fact the negotiations themselves. I began to question what 
public buy-in or legitimacy actually means and what this has to do with the knowledge of a process.1 
What had started out as a question of representation and local ownership was no longer feasible without 
taking a step back. How exactly does public buy-in work? And when does a process become more 
legitimate? The empirical findings let me on a hermeneutic research quest, where I had the chance to 
repeatedly revise my own thoughts and interpretations of even the very question I was trying to answer. 
The outcome is a dissertation that couples new and original empirical research data from Liberia and 
Kenya with extensive reflection on both methodological and theoretical foundations.  
The local ownership of peace processes and public participation has become a popular rhetoric amongst 
politicians, policy makers and development organisations. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and 
currently peace envoy in the Middle East for example, calls for the need to give the ‘ordinary population 
the sense they have a stake in the future,’ surmising a peace process to be the ‘curious symbiotic dance 
between the leaders and led’ (2013).2 International organisations call for ‘inclusive political settlements 
and conflict resolution’ (OECD 2011), the ‘importance of legitimacy in relation to … ending violent 
conflict’ (The World Bank 2011) or more specifically the necessity of civil society inclusion (UN General 
Assembly 2011; UN Secretary General 2012; UN Security Council 2009). Examples of peace talks that 
include civil society, be it explicitly or implicitly, exist all over the world from Columbia (Bouvier 2014) 
to Mindanao (Busran-Lao 2014) to the Basque Region in Spain (Rios 2014). So do those seeking out 
such inclusion, including one of the attempted peace talks on Syria conducted in Geneva in 2014 
                                                        
1 Elizabeth Wood describes new research questions as one of the benefits of conducting field research (2007). 
2 Note that his future in this role is unclear due to increasing criticism. See BBC (2015). 
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(WILPF International 2014; more generally see World Movement for Democracy 2008). Yet, inclusivity 
or the call for civil society inclusion becomes meaningless without a thorough understanding of how a 
process actually becomes more legitimate in the first place. 
As a result, this dissertation seeks to answer the question of how peace negotiations are made more 
legitimate through the inclusion of civil society in an empirically and methodologically abductive 
manner. This entails both the answering of what the constitutive components of a legitimisation process 
are and why they may be occurring. Two case studies - Liberia and Kenya - are considered in order to 
answer this question, using original empirical sources from fieldwork conducted between 2011 and 
2014.3 
 
The rest of this introductory chapter is organised as follows: the research question is positioned within 
the broader research on peacebuilding, negotiations and power-sharing agreements. The exact research 
gap is then presented before critiquing civil society research, in order to avoid conceptual assumptions in 
this research. Some key definitions are then introduced as well as the layout of the rest of the 
dissertation, detailing the structure and layout of the work to follow.  
 
1.1 Positioning the Research Question in Current Peace Research 
 
The research is to be understood in terms of current peace research, which looks at ways in which 
violent conflict is ended sustainably and conflict divisions can be transformed. There are three areas of 
research that are particularly relevant and provide the broader framework for the research question at 
hand: Namely communitarian peacebuilding and local ownership, negotiations research and the work on 
power-sharing agreements as a solution to ending violent conflicts. These are outlined in the next 
sections. 
 
1.1.1 Peacebuilding and Local Ownership 
 
In order to understand the framing of civil society inclusion in the debate on local ownership the 
differences between liberal and communitarian or emancipatory peacebuilding are outlined, before 
discussing ideas on local ownership more directly. Whilst peacebuilding as an idea was already discussed 
from the 1970s onwards both by Johan Galtung and later by John Paul Lederach, the idea gained 
popular prominence after UN Secretary General Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali’s Report entitled ‘An Agenda 
for Peace’ (1992). Oliver Richmond in fact discusses four generations of peacebuilding, namely: Conflict 
management (stopping violence at all costs); conflict resolution; liberal peacebuilding and what he calls 
emancipatory peacebuilding (2010, 19–30; see also Chufrin and Saunders 1993, 155–156). Whilst the 
                                                        
3 A preliminary version of this research has been published previously, though this focuses more on the practical 
repercussions for mediation (Zanker 2013) and provides a more basic version of the theoretical framework (Zanker 
2014a).  
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second generation of peacebuilding advocates for a role for civil society, the focus of this research is on 
the latter two generations. The end of the Cold War and the explosion of UN-led peacebuilding 
operations in the 1990s led to a plethora of academic work on what became to be known as the liberal 
peacekeeping paradigm. The idea behind the paradigm is to promote peace through the encouragement 
of political and economic liberalisation. Important elements are for example democratisation, 
institutional reform, good governance, human rights, development and free market reform (Krause and 
Jütersonke 2005, 454; Paris 2010, 341). Richmond4 argues that liberal peacebuilding is founded on the 
belief that ‘a universal version of peace is normatively possible through a scientific perfection of the 
strategies to be deployed’ and works towards a system of governance rather than a process of 
reconciliation (2010, 22–25).   
 
This liberal peacebuilding framework has been criticised for numerous reasons, most notably for the fact 
that (political) participation and locally driven reform does not fit in. At worst, this can mean that the 
end product is something that is not desired, affecting the chances for sustainable peace (Lidén, Mac 
Ginty, and Richmond 2009, 592). A consensus has grown that top-down liberal peacebuilders use 
technocratic blueprints which fail to incorporate the local context (Autesserre 2014a, 294). In addition, 
liberal peacebuilding risks conflating peacebuilding with statebuilding, resulting in the construction of 
‘empty shells’ of states or a ‘virtual peace’ (Richmond and Mitchell 2011, 5). The problem with 
statebuilding, argues Charles Call, is the focus on institutionalisation and professionalization of state 
organisations, downplaying ‘the role of civil society. The crucial vectors of state society relations and 
trust at the local level remain deemphasised’ (2012, 233). As a counter-framework to liberal peace, most 
notably Lederach promotes ‘communitarian peacebuilding’, emphasising the importance of traditional 
and social context and making a choice of peacebuilding irrelevant of international norms (1997). This 
type of peacebuilding also called bottom-up peacebuilding or peacebuilding from below has overlaps to 
the emancipatory peace of Richmond, which advocates a peace that moves beyond a replication of 
Westphalian forms of sovereignty and reflects the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, a new 
social contract, developed through discourse and participation (2010, 28–30). A ‘peace constituency’ is 
needed in order to attain a just and sustainable peace agreement (Lederach 1997, 94–95). The crux of 
peacebuilding is at the ‘everyday’, and necessitates the cultivation of understanding, empathy and trust 
(Bleiker 2012, 298; see also Call 2012, 223).  
 
As a result of this development in peace research, there have been several avenues of research: The more 
practical application of communitarian peacebuilding regarding levels of participation or ‘peace 
infrastructure’ or ‘architecture’ and the broader discussion of local ownership and participation. 
Concerning the former, the three-tiered peace architecture which Lederach developed as part of his ideas 
on communitarian peacebuilding, proposes a middle-out approach to peacebuilding, where mid-level 
                                                        
4 The full name will only be used the first time an author is mentioned. 
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actors influence peacebuilding through their interaction with top-level leaders and the grassroots 
(Lederach 1997; see also Paffenholz 2014b). I return to this below, but in fact much more attention has 
been paid to local ownership or participation more broadly. The impetus for local ownership or 
inclusion is that any peace process ‘not embraced by those who have to live by it is likely to fail’ (Donais 
2009, 3). In fact, ownership of a peace agreement needs to be created (Funk 2012, 408; Lederach 1997; 
Prendergast and Plumb 2002). Thus, the idea of local ownership is clearly rooted in communitarian or 
emancipatory peacebuilding. The message is that ‘local’ actors needs to be part of the solution, broader 
participation is required for the task of emancipatory peacebuilding. It puts agency to the forefront, 
moving away from passive victimhood (Donais 2012, 60; see also Clark 2014).  
 
Despite much policy work in this direction, the overall contribution of local ownership to peacebuilding 
in practice still remains scant. The general trend seems to be that local agency is proposed to either be a 
deficit or a problem to be overcome (Schroeder and Chappuis 2014, 137). Moreover, dissent from local 
actors about ‘the appropriateness of the liberal prescriptions … conversely … reinforce outsider 
perceptions that locals lack the maturity to be entrusted with real political authority’ (Donais 2012, 36; 
see also Paffenholz 2014b). As a result, the notion that local ownership is crucial to peacebuilding has 
been accepted per se, the meaning of local ownership - including who the actors are, where they are 
involved, how they are involved, the effects any involvement or exclusion has, the normative nature of 
participation models and so on - continues to be the subject of much discussion in what has become 
known as critical peacebuilding research (e.g. Autesserre 2014a; Bleiker 2012; Call 2012, 274; Richmond 
2010, 29–30; Richmond and Mitchell 2011, 12; Simons and Zanker 2014; Watson 2012). What merits 
underlining is that the peacebuilding process is argued to be ‘political not a technical process’ (Christie 
2012, 201–204).  
The conclusions that can be drawn from this very brief venture into the peacebuilding debates are as 
follows. Firstly, local agency is often equated to civil society: ‘The very idea of bottom-up peacebuilding 
is rooted in a conception of an active, organized, locally grounded civil society’ (Donais 2012, 11; 60; see 
also Paffenholz 2010, 189). Secondly, the nature of the dissertation is the civil society interaction at the 
national, formal level of peace negotiations. Others like Andries Odendaal for example, focus on local 
peace mechanisms as part of the broader peace architecture (2010). Critical peacebuilding scholars have 
pointed to the importance of going beyond the study of formal or national-level processes like 
negotiations in order to avoid only addressing ‘liberal’ peacebuilding. However, the question of what 
local agency actually is, how they interact and so on remains unclear with scholars taking on divided 
positions (see e.g. Peterson 2012; Richmond and Ginty 2014; Simons and Zanker 2014). In addition, 
focusing exclusively on the everyday will obscure important processes. I argue that in order to be able to 
question liberal notions of peacebuilding, a better understanding of what is actually taking place is 
required, taking into account both the everyday and more formal elements of peacebuilding like peace 
negotiations. The negotiations of peace agreements generally and power-sharing specifically are 
discussed in the next two sections.   
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1.1.2 Negotiations and Peace Agreements 
 
The tensions of inclusivity and exclusivity in negotiation practice as well as different tracks of 
negotiations are shortly discussed in order to further outline the context of the research in question.  
 
Increasingly, since the end of the Cold War a negotiated end to civil wars has become a norm (Call 2012, 
184). Yet, mediation research and negotiations - though it has evident importance for peacebuilding - 
has largely been the subject of a whole separate scholarship. Studies have focused on behavioural 
elements of negotiations, namely the skills of mediators and reactions of conflict parties and more 
generally the policy implications of negotiations and mediations (e.g. Bercovitch 1997; Bercovitch and 
Jackson 2001; Cunningham 2011; Sisk 2010). In addition, the conditions for negotiations have been 
analysed, most notably by I. William Zartman who developed the ripeness theory for negotiations, 
whereby the best time to conduct them is when there is ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (e.g. 2000).  
 
A major point of discussion has been the balance been inclusive and exclusive negotiations in multi-
party mediation (e.g. Wanis-St John 2008). The idea behind inclusive negotiations in a narrow sense is to 
avoid later ‘spoilers’ to a peace process, actors that are essentially bought off via their inclusion in a 
peace agreement (e.g. Stedman 1997). In a wider sense, this also means the inclusion of people beyond 
the conflict (and potential conflict) parties, relating also to the broader population in line with 
communitarian peacebuilding. Instead of the three-tiered peace architecture (Lederach 1997), the 
negotiation literatures speaks of different tracks of negotiations. A model for ‘multi-track diplomacy’ was 
developed to understand conflict resolution, wherein Track II specifies nongovernmental activities 
including the work of civil society. These Track II practitioners supplement formal negotiators (Track I) 
in a variety of ways, such as offering advice and possible solutions, engaging in public advocacy and 
mobilisation, or acting as temporary intermediaries by keeping the lines of communications open when 
Track I negotiations are failing (e.g. Fisher 1997, 261; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 19). All tracks of 
diplomacy are treated as equally important (see Hemmer et al. 2006, 136). The benefit of Track II 
involvement is to provide a representation of the broader interests of citizens which is discussed in more 
detail in the next section (e.g. Barnes 2002; Pouligny 2009; Ron 2010). Whilst much academic research 
has therefore favoured the inclusion of Track II actors or civil society (even as Track I actors), 
practitioners have still tended towards exclusion (Paffenholz 2014a, 70). This is also because academic 
scholars tend to focus on sustainability of peace arguments and mediators on issues of effectiveness 
(Paffenholz 2014a, 73).  
 
Reasons for the exclusion of civil society actors have to do with incentive structures, the practicalities of 
negotiation with too many actors (leading to a reduction in efficiency known as the vertical dilemma) 
and the tense nature of peace negotiations which often necessitates secrecy (e.g. Lanz 2011; Sisk 2010; 
Wanis-St John 2008).  One of the major dilemmas for mediators involved in peace negotiations is 
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therefore who gets a seat at the table and when? There is without a doubt a deep-founded tensions 
between inclusivity and exclusivity in negotiations (Lanz 2011; McClintock and Nahimana 2008). Call 
argues that norms are changing in peacebuilding, which means that ‘elites can no longer get away with 
cutting static deals amongst themselves without a recognition of the need to involve mass levels of 
constituents’ (Call 2012, 227). The literature on negotiations gives a foundation to the inclusion of civil 
society actors in the first place, though the exact repercussions that result from this are still the subject 
of much debate. The more relevant research is the literature on civil society in negotiations in relation to 
sustainable peace, which goes some way to combining the two strands of research of negotiations and 
peacebuilding. Before the involvement of civil society is discussed in particular, delineating the research 
gap, one type of negotiations or rather agreement is considered: Power-sharing. 
 
1.1.3 Power-Sharing Agreements 
 
Power-sharing agreements are particularly interesting for the discussion of local ownership because of 
their inherently elitist nature. To date the power-sharing literature has not been combined with the 
findings on civil society involvement in peace processes, despite the potential relevance this has because 
of a likely democratic deficit. The characteristics and critique of power-sharing are spelled out in the 
following.  
 
Power-sharing agreements have been increasingly used to end conflicts, especially in Africa, and 
examples include agreements in Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Nepal and Zimbabwe. A major reason for 
power-sharing agreements follows on the rationale of narrow inclusion, namely to avoid (violent) 
spoilers to the peace process emerging. In essence, conflict parties are given a reason to put down their 
guns. Walter proposes that parties are more likely to sign (a peace agreement) if they are guaranteed a 
position in the future, thus helping to overcome the commitment problem (2002, 80; see also Le Van 
2011, 37). Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie additionally found that the more elements of power-
sharing there are, the higher the likelihood of peace (2003, 319), though Anna Jarstad and Desiree 
Nilsson add that power-sharing pacts need to be implemented if they are to have a positive effect on 
durable peace (2008). Much research since then has focused on the different definitions of power-
sharing and their proposed effects (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Norris 2008) as well as more recently 
the effect on the local level and the informal dimensions of power-sharing (e.g. Simons et al. 2013; 
Zanker, Simons, and Mehler 2015).  
 
Nonetheless, power-sharing agreements have been criticised. Firstly, power-sharing can actually 
contribute to the reproduction of insurgent violence (Tull and Mehler 2005, 375; see also Spears 2013, 
42). Furthermore, the top-down orientation and perceived inflexibility of power-sharing agreements can 
reinforce ethnic, national or extremist tendencies (Jarstad 2008b). Thirdly, agreements fail to consider 
civilians’ grievances, which are side-lined in favour of attention given to rebels (Mehler 2009, 455). The 
implicit message becomes that violence pays (Barnes 2002). In addition, the long-term consequences on 
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democracy and peace are not always considered by advocates of power-sharing (Jarstad 2008b; Mehler 
2009, 453). Quick power-sharing agreements negotiated by outsiders, sometimes referred to as cheap 
diplomacy, are simply not enough. If we follow Call, there is a changing norm in line with communitarian 
peacebuilding which advocates for broader inclusion or participation (see above; 2012, 227). Whilst there 
is already a number of researchers looking at power-sharing agreements in terms of peacebuilding (e.g. 
Jarstad and Sisk 2008; Roeder and Rothchild 2005), the power-sharing literature has not been combined 
with the findings on civil society involvement in peace processes. This is despite the fact that previous 
research shows that on the one hand a democratic deficit occurs as a result of power-sharing agreements 
(Jarstad 2008b), and on the other hand civil society involvement becomes more important the less 
democratic a country is at the time of negotiation (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). In fact, 
a further shortcoming of power-sharing would therefore be the conflicting coupling of local ownership 
and participation with exclusive elitist peace negotiations.  
 
In conclusion, a brief introduction into several facets of current peace research shows that there is a 
foundation to the very idea of involving civil society at peace negotiations, but little research has been 
done on this especially in line with power-sharing agreements despite the potential importance of this. 
The precise research question is discussed in the next section. 
 
1.2 Presenting the Research Question: Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
 
The scholarship that this dissertation speaks to most directly is the literature that considers the role of 
civil society representatives during peace negotiations. The focus of this literature is on the effects of 
civil society inclusion, ranging from a formal Track I to a ‘classic’ informal Track II role, on the 
sustainability of peace, which for this dissertation serves as a starting point for the question of the 
legitimisation of peace negotiations. After outlining the key arguments, the shortcomings and gaps to be 
addressed are detailed. 
 
The major starting point for the discussion on civil society comes from Anthony Wanis St. John and 
Darren Kew, who show a correlation between high civil society involvement in negotiations and durable 
peace (2008), complemented by a statistical study from Desirée Nilsson (2012). She uses data from 83 
peace agreements to show that the inclusion of civil society actors increases the durability of peace. 
Nilsson concludes that ‘when wider spectra of civil society become involved in a peace process this can 
increase [the] legitimacy of the process, which in turn may contribute to durable peace’ (2012, 263).  
 
As a starting point, the literature is about broad participation. Because it is not possible to invite all 
members of the aggrieved population to participate in peace negotiations or peace processes more 
generally for that matter, civil society actors become the representatives of the population (Call 2012, 
269; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). Therefore, participation is (often implicitly) assumed to be ensured 
by civil society representation. There are both normative and practical reasons for the argumentation 
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that civil society leads to more sustainable peace, see Table 1.1 below. Normatively, the inherent right 
for the aggrieved population to participate through civil society representation is proposed (Barnes 2002; 
McKeon 2004; Paffenholz 2014a; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). There is in fact also a legal foundation 
to this normative idea. The universal right to take part in governance either directly or through 
representation is codified under Article 21 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since 
agreements often create new political structures and relationships, the right to participate can be argued 
as applicable in this instance (Barnes 2002; McKeon 2004). The participation of civil society actors is 
also argued to lead to a societal ownership of the peace agreements since people feel like they are 
included, which has a positive effect on sustainable peace (Barnes 2002, 11–12; Donais 2009; Edwards 
2009, 70; Jarstad 2008b, 127; McKeon 2004, 6; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 18; see also Prendergast 
and Plumb 2002, 328). 
 
Table 1.1: Overview of Arguments Made in Current Literature on Civil Society Involvement in 
Peace Negotiations 
 
 Reasons Why Civil Society Involvement in Peace Negotiations is Supposed 
to Have a Positive Effect on Sustainable Peace 
Normative Reasons - Right to participate  
- Create societal ownership of peace agreements  
Practical Reasons - Influence the conflict parties and holds them accountable  
- Avoid potential ‘spoilers’ to the talks 
- There is ‘public agenda’ included in the content of the agreement  
- Transforms relationships and re-orientates society 
- Public buy-in increases pressure for implementation  
 
Several practical reasons are additionally proposed by the literature on the topic, including the influence 
on the conflict parties and content of the agreement, the effect there is on the transformation of social 
relationships and the pressure for implementation which results because of civil society participation. In 
more detail, firstly, it is argued that civil society has a particular capacity to influence conflict actors so 
that they sign an agreement in the first place and holds them accountable (Belloni 2008; McKeon 2004, 
571; Nilsson 2012, 250; Paffenholz 2014a, 74; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 24). Related to this, the 
inclusion of civil society will avoid leaving out any potential ‘spoilers’ in the future (Nilsson 2012, 250; 
Nilsson and Kovacs 2005; Paffenholz 2014a, 73; Sriram and Zahar 2009, 23). Secondly, because of civil 
society participation a ‘public agenda’ is included in the agreement, improving the content of the 
agreement (Barnes 2002, 12; Odendaal 2010, 20; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 23). This also relates to 
the expertise and knowledge assigned to civil society (Paffenholz 2014a, 74). Thirdly, in the long-term 
societal relationships are transformed, which leads to a reorientation of society (away from violent 
conflict divisions) and as a result further improves the chances of sustainable peace (Barnes 2002, 12; 
Hemmer et al. 2006, 133; Jessop, Aljets, and Chacko 2008). Lastly, because of the participation of civil 
society actors there are greater chances for implementation (Bell and O’Rourke 2007, 301; Jarstad 2008b, 
127; McClintock and Nahimana 2008, 90; McKeon 2004, 5; Nilsson 2012, 247; Wanis-St. John and Kew 
2008, 23).  
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The likelihood of implementation, aside from the greater accountability to conflict actors, is primarily 
linked to the idea of ‘public buy-in,’ which is a side effect of greater participation and the inclusion of a 
‘public agenda.’ The idea of ‘public buy-in’ is interlinked to legitimacy whereby ‘engaging civil society… 
can promote … a sense that the negotiations have greater legitimacy, which can lead, in turn, to a shift in 
public opinion about the process’ (Paffenholz 2014a, 74; see also Belloni 2008, 199; Nilsson 2012, 247). 
This makes it a circular argument: Public buy-in results in legitimacy, and because of legitimacy there is 
public buy-in. In fact, links are made to legitimacy by several authors, yet the exact mechanisms of how 
legitimisation works in practice has been left unaddressed by this research. Instead, vague statements are 
made like ‘broader participations means more legitimacy’ (McKeon 2004), there is ‘increased legitimacy 
… through inclusion of civil society’ (Belloni 2008, 199) or ‘effective participation … made a difference 
in the legitimacy’ (Barnes 2002, 12). This dyad of participation (through representation) and legitimacy 
has become a common presumption not only amongst scholars looking specifically at the role of civil 
society in peace negotiations, but beyond. Most of the literature which has followed has concentrated on 
the degree and timing of involvement for civil society actors. 
 
This direction of research relates back to a second major finding in the civil society-participation 
research, which as previously mentioned argues that the less democratic the country where the peace 
negotiations take place is, the more important the role of civil society actors (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. 
John and Kew 2008, 12). Two research interests have followed as a result: On the vertical dilemma of 
inclusion (as a problem) and different ways of inclusion (as a solution). The vertical dilemma relates to 
the fact that inclusion enhances legitimacy (though how is unclear) but reduces efficacy (Jarstad 2008a, 
23; see also Belloni 2008, 183). At worst, including too many extra actors at negotiations can lead to a 
‘cognitive overload’ as effective communication deteriorates (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 21). In 
addition, it could result in a reduction in the number of concessions offered to conflict parties, giving 
them altogether fewer incentives to stop fighting (Cunningham 2011, 215–218). Accordingly,, the 
question of who gets a seat at the table and when has become a crucial one (McClintock and Nahimana 
2008, 75). Because of the vertical dilemma of inclusion and the democracy argument it has been argued 
that civil society does not necessarily need to be formally included in the peace negotiations, but can 
have multiple and alternative (types) roles, even after the peace agreement has been signed (e.g. Jarstad 
2008a). This research on the different types of roles has since been the focus of most of the recent work 
and has been repeatedly argued as an area for future research (Barnes 2002; Hemmer et al. 2006; Nilsson 
2012, 263; Paffenholz 2014a).5 The inherent contradiction is of course that the less democratic a country 
                                                        
5 The different ways and time periods of participation are also discussed in the peacebuilding process more broadly 
(Paffenholz et al. 2010; see also Kanyinga 2011, 88). A variety of different participation models have been 
proposed including: Consultations, representation /representative decision-making at the talks and direct 
participation (Nilsson 2012, 248) which is quite similar to representative participation (through political parties), 
consultative mechanisms (civil society has an opportunity to voice views and formulate recommendations) and 
direct participation (interested individuals involved) (Barnes 2002, 8) or monitoring, advocacy, socialization, social 
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is, the more difficult it becomes for a vibrant and strong civil society sector to develop and grow (Belloni 
2008, 208; see also Chabal 1994, 86). The practicalities of civil society activism in a war or post-war 
context further accentuate this problem (Christie 2012, 194; Donais 2012, 10; Spurk 2010, 18). In effect 
it becomes a chicken or egg situation - is civil society a source or a product of a well-functioning state 
(Donais 2012, 67)?  
 
There are several shortcomings in the previous literature that equally merit attention, related to 
theoretical and conceptual assumptions as well as methodological limitations. Firstly, there are serious 
theoretical assumptions being made between ‘public buy-in’ and legitimacy and sustainable peace as 
result of this. Secondly, and related to this, the current understanding of legitimacy and the legitimisation 
of peace negotiations is superficial. Amit Ron also problematizes that the public sphere in peace 
processes is under-theorized (2007, 3). There are further conceptual assumptions being made about the 
kind of civil society and levels of influence they potentially have, safe for some exceptions like a 
discussion on the different types of civil society in Burundi (e.g. McClintock and Nahimana 2008) or 
more broadly speaking the paradox of civil society in peacebuilding (Christie 2012, 194). Lastly, the 
literature to date has been methodologically limited to one basic correlation and statistical analysis 
(Nilsson 2012 respectively; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008), individual case studies and for the large part 
- grey literature and policy documents on the matter (e.g. Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014). Little 
attention has been paid to analysing empirical sources beyond the elite actors that are involved. As 
Andreas Mehler surmises ‘an effort to ask communities about their sense of the problems and the 
legitimacy of those sitting at the table … cannot be detected’ (2009, 472). Whilst he is speaking of the 
legitimacy of the conflict parties at the table, the same can be said about the question concerning the role 
of civil society actors and the effect this has on the legitimisation of the talks.  
 
In summary, whilst the research on the type of role for civil society and the link to sustainable peace is 
no doubt of great significance, without an understanding of peace negotiations become more legitimate, 
theoretical and conceptual assumptions are being made. This dissertation seeks to specifically address 
these.6 The focus of this dissertation is not on the link between civil society involvement and peace 
sustainability but rather on how peace negotiations become more legitimate in the first place. 
 
Before the layout of the rest of the dissertation and some definitions are detailed, the meaning and 
challenges of civil society research are outlined in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cohesion, facilitation, and service delivery (Paffenholz et al. 2010; Pearce 2011, 412). Most recently, Thania 
Paffenholz proposes nine models of participation: Direct representation of civil society groups at the negotiation 
table, observer status, official consultative forums that run parallel to official negotiations, less formal 
consultations, inclusive post-agreement mechanisms high-level civil society initiatives, public participation, public 
decision making and mass action (2014a; see also Spurk 2010, 24). 
6 The shortcomings in relation to current theoretical understandings of legitimacy are discussed in detail in the next 
chapter.  
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1.3 The Challenges of Civil Society Research: A Critique 
 
As argued above, the way that civil society is often used in this literature makes conceptual assumptions 
that do not always portray an accurate empirical picture. In order to avoid such assumptions, the major 
conceptual shortcomings of civil society as an idea are reviewed in the following. Civil society is not only 
badly defined more generally, but in the post-conflict context also frequently viewed from a western, 
‘civil’ and ‘representative’ perspective, which makes certain normative assumptions. Having a clear 
understanding of what civil society as a concept and phenomena to be studied entails, helps to use the 
idea in an appropriate manner. 
 
Mostly, civil society tends to be vaguely defined as the middle sphere (of ideas, values, institutions, 
organisations, networks) between the (free) market and the nation state (Anheier, Glasius, and Kaldor 
2001; Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 5; Lewis 2002, 570; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 15). Michael 
Edwards, who has done extensive research on civil society, speaks of ‘un-coerced human association … 
in which people undertake collective action for normative and substantive purposes, relatively 
independent of government and market’ (2011, 4). This is not the sole definition of civil society. 
Edwards differentiates between three types of definitions: Civil society as a part of society (the 
associational life model already described), civil society as a kind of society (namely characterised by 
normative norms and values in order to meet certain social goals) and civil society as the public sphere 
(2009, 10). The contested nature of the term, the ‘chameleon like qualities’ and difficulties in using it as a 
unit of analysis have been widely noted (e.g. Brühl 2010; Chabal 1994, 84; Christie 2012, 38; Edwards 
2009, 3; Lund 2006, 686–687; Spurk 2010, 20–21).  
 
A major difficulty that results from the associational life definition is the fact that three spheres are 
unlikely to be completely autonomous to each other and in fact overlap in different ways and are 
mutually constitutive of each other (Chandhoke 2001, 22; Christie 2012, 199; see also Utas 2012, 3). 
More often than not civil society organisations are dependent on state structures, and in a global context 
this includes funding from external states and state-related donors (Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 7). 
Because of the interdependence of these spheres, civil society is interpreted to be both reducing conflict 
with the state as local communities are empowered (especially in peacebuilding), as well as a check and 
balance on the state, hence being in tension with it (Christie 2012, 10). These overlaps and tension also 
makes intermediaries between the spheres difficult to classify, especially the media and political parties 
(Spurk 2010, 8). Does the media need to be independent from the state (and the market for that matter) 
in order to count as civil society? Are political parties always part of the state even when they are not 
part of any formal state institutions through elections or otherwise? In addition, the heterogeneous 
nature and organic nature of civil society actors and organisations, means they are likely to constantly 
evolve and change (Edwards 2011, 8; Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 9; Ron 2007, 5). 
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Related to the discussion of emancipatory or communitarian peacebuilding outlined previously, the type 
of civil society has also been a major point of discussion. Much of the discussion on civil society actors 
stems from a western notion of associational life inspired by the project of Enlightenment (Pearce 2011, 
407). Empirically, a lot of work has focused on anti-authoritarian activists civil society in Eastern Europe 
throughout and after the Cold War and the fight against military dictatorships in Latin American at the 
end of the 1960s (Kopecký and Mudde 2003; Spurk 2010). In the Middle East, civil society groups have 
been dependent on state patronage and in Asia such groups only became noticeable in the 1980s did 
such (Spurk 2010, 13–14). Both in Asia and in Africa, civil society has been linked to waves of 
democratisation and more generally is tightly linked to the concept of democracy (Ndegwa 1996). 
Nonetheless, in both Asian and African countries, associational life through communal networks has 
existed since before colonial times. As Mahmood Mamdani shows at length in his book, a small urban 
class of civil society developed in the colonial settings. However, even the rural population or ‘subjects’ 
can be seen as participants in civil society if we accept a broad understanding of the idea (1996). 
 
Such different understandings of civil society show for example, that these groups are not necessarily 
characterised by voluntary association, but rather are dominated by ascriptive groups controlled by a 
strong charismatic leaders (Lewis 2002; Obadare 2011, 185; Spurk 2010, 10–13). In conflict and post-
conflict settings, a mushrooming of non-governmental organisations offering basic public services is also 
documented (Donais 2012, 11; Pouligny 2009, 184). In addition, in these settings civil society is likely to 
be weak, divided and diffuse - just as much a casualty of the preceding violence as other agents, 
infrastructures or institutions (Donais 2012, 60–66; Orjuela 2003; Prendergast and Plumb 2002; Spurk 
2010, 19). Non-western types of civil society are likely to exist, even if weakened over time and by 
conflict, yet the question is whether these are the types of organisations that mediators actively engage 
with (Christie 2012, 193; Donais 2012, 69; Pouligny 2005; Watson 2012, 40). 
 
As Thania Paffenholz points out, civil society reflects characteristics present in society and as such it can 
be divided along lines of power, hierarchy, ethnicity and gender. In addition, civil society actors display 
moderate as well as radical images and behaviours (2010, 414; see also Donais 2012, 37 on the diversity 
of local actors; as well as Atuobi 2010; Hultin 2014; Schaefer 2010). In Burundi it has even been 
suggested that the inclusion of civil society would have made the peace process even more polarized 
(McClintock and Nahimana 2008; see also Odendaal 2010, 20). Civil society can in fact be partisan, non-
neutral and ‘uncivil’, and even use violent means to achieve their goals (Kopecký and Mudde 2003, 3; 
Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 32). Moreover, it has been suggested that uncivil society will tend to have 
more grassroots influence rather than larger international civil society organisations, which will have 
much less of an idea of what exactly the issues at stake are (Kopecký and Mudde 2003:4-5). Mary Moran 
and Anne Pitcher recognise that the role of civil society in a peace process is not only complex, but 
often contradictory (2004, 516; see also Hasenclever and De Juan 2009). What it comes down to, is that 
there is normative circumscription to the type of civil society which is discussed and in fact norms like 
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trust and cooperation will have different values for people in different circumstances (Bob 2011; see also 
Bolzendahl and Coffé 2011; Edwards 2009, 52). As a result, what counts as uncivil for one will not 
necessarily be so for others.  
 
The reality is that most of the civil society actors likely to be involved as Track II or Track I actors are 
urban elites who receive external donor funding (Paffenholz 2014b, 20–21). In this line of 
argumentation, civil society are part of and help to implement neoliberal peacebuilding (Christie 2012, 
195; Taylor 2010; Richmond and Mitchell 2011, 13; see also Schrader and Denskus 2010, 46). Regarding 
civil society involved in the peace process, normative expectations are frequently posited whereby civil 
society should be peace-oriented or civil as opposed to ‘uncivil’ (McClintock and Nahimana 2008; Orjuela 
2003). As a result, civil society actors are often criticised as elites who are more accountable do 
international donors than the grassroots they may or may not claim represent (Belloni 2008, 209; Brühl 
2010, 187; Calhoun 2011, 318; Daley 2006, 317; Edwards 2009, 99; Pouligny 2005; Spurk 2010, 15; 
Steffek and Hahn 2010, 11). Civil society is both civil and uncivil, in opposition to the state and helping 
the state, so broad that debates on what counts as civil society and what does not continue to be 
discussed, ranging from their emancipatory potential to being a further straightjacket tool of liberal 
peacebuilding. One thing is sure: Civil society is both a normative and an empirical concept (Pearce 
2011, 404).  
 
Despite all these problems of conceptualisation, voluntary associations have been shown to curb power 
of central institutions, and to nurture social norms like trust and cooperation (Edwards 2009, 7; see also 
Donais 2012, 77). For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition of civil society is seen as 
associational voluntary organisations as well individuals involved in them, which are broadly speaking 
not part of the state or the free market, and act in a public sphere. The civil society actors are assumed to 
contribute to the legitimacy of the talks because of their actions. In order to avoid any normative 
connotations, both the understanding of legitimacy and civil society is primarily an empirical one: Which 
organisations or actors were present, what did they do and what does this means regarding legitimacy? 
This empirical understanding of civil society is similar to Christoph Spurk who proposes using civil 
society as a descriptive rather than an analytical tool (2010, 23). This is based on the argument that, 
‘normative expectations about ... civil society should not derange our analysis of actually existing civil 
society’ (Chandhoke 2001, 5) nor should civil society be romanticised (Donais 2009, 14; Pouligny 2005).  
 
Some further definitions of concepts that are used throughout this dissertation are defined in the next 
section, as well as outlining the focus of the research question.  
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1.4 Key Concepts and Research Focus 
 
The aim of the research questions is to consider how peace negotiations become more legitimate, 
through (if at all) the participation of civil society actors. The two major areas of interest concern 
negotiations on the one hand and legitimacy on the other. 
 
Regarding negotiations, the focus is on power-sharing negotiations specifically, a sub-type of peace 
negotiations. Therefore, when the term ‘peace negotiations’ is used throughout the text it in facts refers 
to the specific type of power-sharing agreements that seek to end violence. This definition also includes 
agreements made to end post-election violence in Kenya, which I will include on the basis of a broad 
understanding of peace negotiations because the end result or aim is still to end violence through a 
power-sharing agreement. This definition allows a coupling of legitimacy to (sustainable) peace, which is 
the starting point for this research question, albeit not the focus of this research. In other words, the 
legitimacy of peace negotiations is reviewed as part of a question of peacebuilding and sustainable peace, 
but the focus of the research at hand is only on the negotiation process itself and how this is made more 
legitimate, not on the link to more sustainable peace.  
 
Two further points are relevant for the concept of peace negotiations. Such talks are usually facilitated 
by mediators and may include negotiators who either are the conflict parties themselves or act on behalf 
of the conflict actors. This distinguishes two types of actors involved in peace negotiations that are not 
civil society actors: Those who are trying to make gains by participating favouring their own group 
(negotiators) and those who are ensuring the smooth running of the talks (mediators). This does not 
mean however, that mediators do not have their own interests (e.g. Bercovitch 1996, 9). 
 
In addition, the negotiations refer to the actual talks themselves and the agreement that is signed at the 
end of the negotiations. This research focuses exclusively on negotiations with final signed agreements. 
More generally, peace processes involve several stages. This includes the pre-negotiations phase, hugely 
important in getting conflict parties to the table. The actual negotiations are followed - in the best-case 
scenario - by an agreement. After this, the open-ended process of implementation starts. All these stages 
have formal and informal dimensions. The focus of this dissertation is the actual negotiation stage 
coupled with the final agreement. Yet the other stages are reflected in the analysis whenever necessary. 
Thus, the terms peace negotiations or peace talks are used interchangeably throughout but refer to the 
negotiation period including a final agreement, unless stated otherwise.  
 
With regards to legitimacy, the concept is discussed at length in the next chapter but a few definitions 
are outlined here. The research questions looks at how peace negotiations become (more) legitimate. 
Legitimate peace negotiations are equated to a process of legitimisation. This is because peace 
negotiations are conceptualised as an ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised process. Peace 
negotiations do not simply become legitimate or not one day, when the peace agreement is signed, but 
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more or less legitimacy is achieved in a process of legitimisation. The legitimisation process considers all the 
different factors or components that together make this ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised 
process of peace negotiations more legitimate. Scholars working on procedures as advancing legitimacy, 
speak of the legitimation of procedures (e.g. Luhmann 1983). I differentiate between legitimisation and 
legitimation however, in order to contrast the legitimisation of a process with the legitimation of individual 
actors (such as civil society representatives). Individual actors will legitimate themselves, i.e. show or argue 
for their own legitimacy, but this does not on its own translate into the entire process of legitimisation. 
In other words, one part of the legitimisation process may be individual actors that are legitimate or can 
legitimate themselves, but this is not the whole process. Calling it a process of legitimation like other 
scholars do, would risk conflating a partial component with the overall process.  
 
The legitimation of the individual civil society actors gives way to two further accentuations - the 
beneficiaries and the guarantors of legitimacy. That is, the legitimisation process is not only in part made 
up of the legitimation of individual actors, or individually legitimate actors, but also the whole idea of 
considering how peace negotiations are made more legitimate is to consider the interaction with the 
general population. Accordingly, firstly, there are people who gains or benefit from the legitimate actors 
and the legitimisation process itself (the beneficiaries of legitimacy), mainly relating back to the general 
population, who as is shown throughout the research are both passive and more active in this role. This 
is a rather abstract definition, which is discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Secondly, there are 
those that act on behalf of the beneficiaries of legitimacy or the general population: The guarantors of 
legitimacy. This relates mainly to the civil society actors involved in the peace negotiations. These 
definitions are also summarised in the glossary of key concepts at the beginning of this dissertation. The 
structure and layout of the rest of the dissertation is outlined below. 
 
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to address the theoretical and conceptual assumptions, presumed by the 
current research on civil society involvement in peace negotiations regarding legitimacy, and is as such a 
theory-building exercise. The dissertation will in a final part describe a theory of legitimate peace 
negotiations, giving a theoretical foundation to the legitimisation of processes more generally. Seeking to 
answer the question of how peace negotiations are made more legitimate through the inclusion of civil 
society in an empirically and methodologically abductive manner, the research looks at both constitutive 
components of a legitimisation process are and why they may occur in two case studies, before deducing 
the theory from these cases. The layout is as follows: 
 
In the next chapter (Chapter 2), the current theoretical approaches on the topic of legitimacy are 
reviewed. This includes literature on the sources of legitimacy, a system analytic approach to legitimacy 
and normative and contextual notions of legitimacy. In addition, the ideas on deliberative democracy and 
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public sphere research are outlined. Drawing on this, a heuristic model for legitimate peace negotiations 
is proposed on the basis of two features, collective concerns and subjective representation.  
 
Following on from the heuristic model, the methodology and research design of the dissertation is 
addressed in the next chapter (Chapter 3). Discussing the constructivist ontology and mixed 
epistemology as a foundation, the method of ‘comprehensive process-tracing’ is adapted from other 
forms of process-tracing. The way this is applied using the heuristic model in an abductive research 
process is presented. In addition, the two case studies are introduced as well as reviewing the empirical 
fieldwork.  
 
The next section of the dissertation contains the two empirical case studies, which makes up the main 
part of the research. The chapter on Liberia (Chapter 4) covers the third and fourth step in the abductive 
process by applying and amending the heuristic model on the basis of one empirical account. A third 
feature of the heuristic model is shown as relevant – transparent communication. After outlining the 
details of the civil wars, the peace negotiations and the actors involved, the comprehensive process-
tracing is carried out for each of the features of the heuristic model. This analysis shows the constitutive 
components that make up the legitimisation of the process and explains the reasons why some of these 
components were possible through a causal analysis, before discussing the context factors that may 
affect and further explain the comprehensive process-tracing. The same is then applied in the chapter on 
Kenya (Chapter 5), except with regards to the three features of the revised heuristic model. After 
reviewing the post-election violence in Kenya, the negotiations process that was carried out to come to a 
political solution and the actors involved, the comprehensive process-tracing method is applied to the 
extended heuristic model.  
 
The final section of the dissertation concludes with a theory of legitimate peace negotiations following 
on from the case studies (Chapter 6) and makes final conclusions (Chapter 7). The theory of legitimate 
peace negotiations is based on three assumptions: The process is legitimised when outcome and 
participation based-characteristics are fulfilled; civil society actors are not ubiquitous in the legitimisation 
process and the legitimisation occurs both at the negotiations and in the public arena. In the conclusion 
chapter, the major findings of the dissertation are summarised, the contributions to literature is 
discussed along with practical implications and avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
A Heuristic Model for Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
2 A Heuristic Model for Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
 
Before presenting the research design of this dissertation in the next chapter, a heuristic model of 
legitimate peace negotiations is proposed in the following. In order to answer the question of how peace 
negotiations are made more legitimate, the current theoretical approaches on the topic of legitimacy are 
reviewed. This chapter is divided into three parts, two outlining the theoretical debates on the topic of 
legitimacy and one that lays out the heuristic model. The first section on theoretical debates considers 
the meaning of legitimacy by looking at the way it has been discussed in the literature on civil society 
participation in peace negotiations on top of outlining major theories of legitimacy, as well as the 
normative and contextual nature of legitimacy. The second section on theoretical debates looks more 
concretely at what makes a process considered as legitimate, focusing on the Habermasian public sphere. 
Using a broadly empirical understanding of legitimacy, the heuristic model conceptualises two features 
of legitimacy: Collective concerns and subjective representation. These features are introduced in the last 
part of this chapter.  
 
2.1 What is Legitimacy? 
 
This section considers the meaning of legitimacy more generally, as well the difficulty of the concept in 
social science research. The way it has been used (and under-conceptualised as argued in the 
introduction) in the literature on civil society participation in peace negotiations will then be considered, 
before spelling out the most prominent theories of legitimacy. In a final section, the contextual nature 
and normativity of legitimacy are discussed. 
 
What do we know about legitimacy? Critics have noted that little empirical examination of legitimacy 
tends to leave it as a concept which is ‘a magical one to be invoked when our power of explanation 
otherwise fails us’ (McEwen and Maiman 1986, 258). Theories of legitimacy - going back over centuries - 
are for the large part based in Western traditions, both political philosophy (Thomas Hobbes, John 
Locke, Edmund Rousseau) and political science or sociology (most notably from Max Weber and David 
Easton). Furthermore, ideas on legitimacy are mostly linked back to the authority of the state (or state 
leaders) as a unit of analysis, as well as the more recent focus on the legitimacy of international, 
transnational organisations or social movements (e.g. Brühl 2010; Lakitsch 2014). Further work on 
legitimacy based on system analysis considers how the idea functions for a complex system like the 
political integration of the European Union (e.g. Scharpf 1997, 2009). 
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Despite becoming the ‘master question of political research’ or ‘the key to politics’ (Jost and Major 2001, 
4; see also Beetham 1991, 41), legitimacy remains ambiguous and ill-defined (e.g. Easton 1965, 279; 
Steffek and Hahn 2010, 3–7). The often cursory approach to legitimacy in social science research 
(despite its importance) is related to its controversial and complex nature (Cook 2003, 124). Legitimacy 
is inherently difficult to measure (Levi 2006, 13) and as the sociologist Morris Zelditch notes, it is one of 
the oldest problems in the intellectual history of western civilisations, spanning twenty-four centuries of 
ideas (2001, 33). What is considered to be legitimate, will always vary between and within cultures, over 
time, and be continuously renegotiated. Nevertheless, a few major definitions and ideas have been 
proposed. 
 
According to the Oxford dictionary, ‘legitimate’ means to conform to the law or rules, or as a verb to 
make lawful or justify. This legalistic definition derives from the original Latin word legitimatus, ‘made 
legal’. David Beetham, in his work on the legitimation of political power, argues that legitimacy not only 
includes a consideration of the legal validity of the acquisition of power, but rather is a multidimensional 
concept which also includes the study of the moral justifiability of power relations (the favoured 
discussion of political philosophers) and consent derived from actions expressive of legitimacy (1991, 
12–13). Political legitimacy is thus tightly linked to ideas on authority and power or ‘the popular 
acceptance of political authority’ (Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014, 6; see also Beetham 1991, 3; 
Easton 1965, 278; Tyler 2006; Zelditch 2001, 38). Whilst it may be possible to exercise power without 
authority, it is much harder to do so. Authority itself is only possible with the acquiescence of those 
subject to it (see e.g. Chabal 2009; Gilley 2009). As Easton proposes, ‘if there is a strong inner 
conviction of the moral validity of the authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face of 
repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the authorities’ (Easton 1965, 278). More broadly 
speaking then, political legitimacy is thought to explain social order or citizen’s support for a policy, 
orders and regimes (Hanberger 2003, 274; Hechter 2009, 280). Before discussing the major theories of 
legitimacy in more detail, the literature on civil society actors in peace negotiations is briefly revisited in 
order to verify what has been said on the topic of legitimacy.  
 
2.1.1 Legitimacy and Civil Society Actors in Peace Negotiations 
 
As discussed in the introduction, since not all members of the public can be present at the negotiation 
table ‘civil society can offer … voices of the public interest that may prompt greater societal stakes in the 
deal that is reached’ (Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 33; see also Nilsson 2012). Scholars argue that 
sustainability or durable peace is achieved by the involvement of civil society actors (CSAs7) for several 
practical reasons, which have been previously outlined, including that the content of the peace 
agreement is improved, that conflict parties are held accountable and that spoilers to the peace process 
                                                        
7 The usual abbreviation is civil society organisations or CSOs but the focus in this dissertation is mostly on 
individual (or groups) of actors so the abbreviation used throughout the text is CSA. 
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can be avoided. In addition, there are normative reasons for arguing for participation, mainly related to 
the right of participation.  
 
One major ingredient frequently mentioned is legitimacy. Legitimacy it is argued is a result of more 
participation or public buy-in. The more public buy-in and legitimacy there is, the stronger the pressure 
for implementation. As a result, more legitimate agreements can be linked to more durable peace: 
‘engaging civil society … can promote … a sense that the negotiations have greater legitimacy, which 
can lead, in turn, to a shift in public opinion about the process’ (Paffenholz 2014a, 74; see also Barnes 
2002; McKeon 2004; Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). In other words, ‘all parties need to 
have trust and confidence in the legitimacy of a peace process. The slightest sense that the peace process 
is illegitimate, imposed or going against the grain of locality will mean it is unlikely to have a positive 
impact’ (Clements 2014, 15). Yet what legitimacy actually means, beyond the fact it results from 
participation and adds to more sustainable peace is not clear. As previously mentioned, the current 
explanations of the idea of legitimacy rest on vague statements including ‘effective participation … made 
a difference in the legitimacy’ (Barnes 2002, 12), ‘broader participations means more legitimacy’ 
(McKeon 2004), or there is ‘increased legitimacy … through inclusion of civil society’ (Belloni 2008, 
199). One of the only concrete definitions of legitimate peace processes - which comes from a policy-
orientated study of the peacebuilding organisation Conciliation Resources - considers the extent of 
popular support for both the process itself and the outcome, arguing for participation, inclusion and 
representation (Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014, 6–7).  
 
The theoretical understanding of the legitimacy of peace negotiations is still in its infancy. Even from the 
cursory overview of the meaning of legitimacy above, there is a disconnect to the presentation of 
legitimacy in this scholarship, which on the whole simply merges legitimacy with participation, and 
participation largely with representation. Rather than taking the idea of inclusionary measures as a direct 
translation of legitimacy at face value, the way (or how) this process actually works is questioned. This 
conceptualisation problem of legitimacy is also confirmed by Call, who argues for ‘legitimate 
peacebuilding’, noting however that ‘sustained peace requires more than legitimacy via either well-
articulated long-term state-society relations or broad calls for popular participation or simplistic 
prescriptions of democracy or elections’ (2012, 233). A theoretical understanding of legitimate peace 
negotiations is developed by proposing features as part of a heuristic model, based on the theories of 
legitimacy, which are in fact wide-ranging as they are extensive.  
 
2.1.2 Theories of Legitimacy 
 
As outlined above, the most frequent definition of political legitimacy concerns the validity of rule or 
authority. Muthiah Alagappa, writing on legitimacy in South-East Asia for example, speaks of the ‘right 
to rule, the belief in the rightfulness of the state’ (1995, 2; see also Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998, 
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413). Bruce Gilley, in his book ‘The Right to Rule’ defines rightfulness along three subtypes: Legality, 
justification within shared norms of conduct and consent (2009, 5). But where do these definitions come 
from? What do the theories of legitimacy that already exist help us to understand about the process of 
legitimisation with regards to peace negotiations? In the following, theories on legitimacy are discussed 
in terms of the foundation of the idea, sources of political legitimacy and the understanding of legitimacy 
in the study of system analysis. 
 
The consensus theory, one of the oldest theories explaining legitimacy, argues that legitimacy is ensured 
by consent. In other words, anything is legitimate if it is in accord with the norms, values, beliefs, 
practices and procedures accepted by a group (Kelman 2001, 55; Zelditch 2001, 33). Where consent for 
norms or values comes from continues to be a subject for debate both regarding its normative nature 
(more on this below) and the measurement of consent. Early theories on consenting to authority related 
back to divine authority and natural law. Later, rationalities for consenting changed to ones of public 
reason, as proposed by Immanuel Kant, or the theory of democratic approval initially put forward by 
Rousseau. The nature of consent continues to be under discussion though often the focus is on 
measurement. For example do elections count as consent and thereby as a legitimising tool? Some argue 
elections do not constitute consent (Alagappa 1995, 23), whilst for others voting displays the acceptance 
of the states right to rule (Gilley 2009, 7). Obedience or compliance is often used as a sign for consent, 
but this too has been criticised. It is a circular argument the critics claim, obedience is supposed to be a 
translation of consent, but consent is also used to explain obedience (Barker 2001, 10). Likewise, even if 
people do not comply or are not obedient (and by inference not consent), this does not necessarily mean 
they believe something to be illegitimate (Hechter 2009, 280; Zelditch 2001, 40, 48; see also Call 2012, 
42; Patberg 2013, 167).8  
 
Regarding the sources of legitimacy, one of the most prominent discussions comes from the sociologist 
Weber, who proposes that legitimacy can be derived from people’s (subjective) belief in it. He suggests 
that there are three ideal-types of legitimate rule; based either on rational norms (legal authority), or on 
personal authority, which includes both traditional and charismatic grounds (Weber 1978a, 215; 954). 
These three ideal-types are not to be seen as separate types of legitimacy, but simply elements that 
contribute to the overall belief in legitimate rule. As a result, legal authority derives from the rational 
belief in the ‘legality’ of patterns of normative rules and the right of authorities to issue commands, as 
the dictionary definition of legitimacy outlined above. Traditional authority is rooted in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under these traditional rules. 
                                                        
8 An alternative foundational theory on legitimacy is the conflict theory, focusing on the economy of legitimacy. 
Since pure power is unstable unless legitimated, legitimacy is a prerequisite of any social order (Zelditch 2001, 41–
42). Most scholars use a combination of these two foundational theories, speaking for example of consent based 
legitimacy alongside performance and procedural elements of legitimacy – i.e. the conformity to established rules 
and effective use of state power (Alagappa 1995, 24). 
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Lastly, charismatic authority, the antithesis of the other two, considers the ‘irrational’ exceptionalism of 
an individual, who is obeyed by the virtue of personal trust (Weber 1978a, 215–245).  
 
Since the work of Weber, scholars writing on legitimacy for the large part position themselves on these 
very influential sources. Both critique and defence of Weber’s ideas on legitimacy have been abundant. 
One typical critique has been that the threefold typology is ‘a straightjacket into which every definition 
needs to be forced into’ (Beetham 1991, 24). Weber however emphasised that his dimensions of 
legitimate authorities as ideal types (e.g. 1978a, 216). The reality is likely to be a mixture of these different 
sources, as for example Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel argue for their definition of neopatrimonialism, 
based on a mixture of the Weberian legal-traditional and patrimonial types of rule (2007, 104). Following 
Weber therefore, several conceptions of order and legitimacy will always overlap coexist and 
complement each other, whilst also competing for validity. 
 
Expanding the work of Weber, David Easton divides sources of legitimacy (for either regimes or 
authorities) into the ideological, structural or personal. Referring to the latter source, his definition of 
personal legitimacy is the extent to which members see the occupants of authority roles as personally 
worthy of moral approval, either through their behaviour and/or symbolism (Easton 1965, 302–303). 
This, he argues, is one of the basic grounds on which a belief in legitimacy is established or reinforced. 
He adds, it refers to more than what Weber includes in his conception of charisma (1965, 303).  
 
Because of the nature of this research question, which focuses on a negotiation process and CSAs, the 
ideological-structural (Easton) or legal-rational (Weber) sources of legitimacy hold less relevance. This is 
not least because they work on the basis of a functioning system, which the dynamic, ad hoc and short-
term peace negotiations simply cannot amount to. The sources of legitimacy based on personal authority 
are however more relevant, both based on tradition (more on this below) and charisma. Charismatic 
authority in Weber’s opinion is not a natural gift, but the freely given recognition of ‘followers’ towards 
someone they believe is ‘endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities’ (1978a, 241–242). One of the problems related to charismatic authority is that it is 
vulnerable to collapse because of everyday routines or problems: ‘In its pure form charismatic authority 
may be said to exist only in statu nascendi. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either traditionalised or 
rationalised, or a combination of the both’ (Weber 1978a, 246; see also Alagappa 1995, 46). This is 
however, unlikely to be a drawback in the fast-paced environment of peace negotiations where the 
charismatic source of authority only needs to last for a short time. Weber himself noted that charismatic 
leaders usually emerge in times of crisis and inspire people to action (1978a, 244–5; see also Steady 2011, 
5). Related to this, a newer field of study has emerged that looks at the legitimation of authority as an 
observable activity - the study of the self-justifying characteristics of rulers (e.g. Barker 2001). This 
understands authority not to be in possession of legitimacy but rather engaged on the activity of 
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legitimation, and thus moves from describing the elements of legitimacy to analysing how it is 
constructed. 
 
Easton considered the sources of legitimacy as part of his work on a system analysis of political life. This 
comes closer to describing a process of legitimisation by looking at why there would be a belief in the 
legitimacy of a political system. Easton argues that political life entails both inputs (demands and 
supports) and outputs (political strategies, actions, decisions etc.). Outputs will affect future inputs 
sequentially. Systematising Weber’s ideas on legitimacy, Easton also differentiates between specific and 
diffuse support, the former relating to interests in a particular policy, the latter in the belief of the system 
itself (1965, 278–285). More recently, Fritz Scharpf takes this as a basis for the proposition that 
legitimate democratic self-determination is a two-dimensional concept, referring to the legitimacy of 
decision-making processes in the European Union. Legitimacy, Scharpf argues, comprises of both an 
input and an output element (1997, 2009).  
 
The input side of legitimacy, ‘presupposes that, in principle, every citizen should have the ability to 
participate in ... public discourses’ (Scharpf 1997, 29). This notion of input-legitimacy is based on 
fairness, giving an equal opportunity for all relevant stakeholders to participate and influence the 
outcomes of policies (Boedeltje and Cornips 2004, 8; De Waal 2014, 20). Usually, input legitimacy is 
conceptualised as collective demands made by citizens or their representation via elections. In 
psychology this idea is also picked up and expanded upon, for example by the social psychologist 
Herbert Kelman who makes the case that the ultimate source of legitimacy is the extent to which a 
process reflects the identity, needs and interests of its members (2001, 55). Nonetheless, input legitimacy 
does not work on its own: ‘If interactive processes completely live up to the ideal of fairness but are not 
capable of producing effective outcomes, citizens might be disappointed’ (Boedeltje and Cornips 2004, 
13). 
 
As a result the other side, output legitimacy, is described by Scharpf as effective fate control, explaining 
that ‘democracy would be an empty ritual if political choices were without a high degree of effectiveness 
in achieving the goals ... citizens collectively care about’ (1997, 19). The broader idea here is that the 
results of processes rest on a common understanding of what is right, or the common welfare (Alagappa 
1995, 31; Gilley 2009, 5; Zürn 2011, 71). It is argued that output legitimacy should be measured both 
objectively, namely that a policy effectively solves a social problem, as well as subjectively - that citizens 
are satisfied with the actual content of a policy (Boedeltje and Cornips 2004, 6; see also Patberg 2013; 
Zürn 2013). Political psychologists also support this and find that substantive determinants of legitimacy 
are indicated by the effectiveness of government’s provisions of public goods, or government performance 
(Hechter 2009; see also Jost and Major 2001).  
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Other scholars working on the EU develop three principle dimensions of legitimacy that serve as a an 
analytical tool, namely participation, output and identity (Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998). The 
approach to legitimacy based on a system theory, and variations thereof, has not only been recognised by 
scholars of EU integration and psychologists, but also by development agencies and international 
organisations (e.g. Ingram 2010). In the recent policy brief on legitimacy in peace processes by 
Conciliation Resources, the editors also argue for a ‘legitimacy lens’, that considers both the process and 
its outcomes (Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014, 6–7).  
 
Whilst some of the sources of legitimacy may be appropriate for the analysis of the legitimation of civil 
society actors, current theories do not come close to enabling a detailed picture of how a process like 
peace negotiations may become legitimised. The two-sided notion of legitimacy gives some initial ideas 
as to what a process of legitimisation may entail. Nevertheless, for Easton the way that the inputs were 
transformed into outputs remains a black box, or the ‘black box of governance’ (Schmidt 2013, 5). 
Moreover, the way it has been used in the literature on the EU focuses on a system, which may be a 
complex one, but is nevertheless a larger long-term infrastructure, on a continuous trajectory of further 
establishment. The sociologist Niklas Luhmann, another system theorist, proposed a notable theory on 
legitimation by procedure. He makes the argument that procedures such as a court of law, elections or 
bureaucracies allow for many options to be narrowed down to one, where the legitimacy is established 
not by the content, nor the normative justifiability of the actors or decisions but a belief in the decision-
making process or procedure itself (Luhmann 1983).9 Similarly behavioural psychologists have written 
about procedural legitimacy, which consider why people belief in the legitimacy of not only government 
or leaders but also processes or procedures (e.g. Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). The difficulty here again is 
the fact that the procedure or process of peace negotiations is so short-lived and dynamic that such a 
system theory is unfeasible to apply as a theoretical framework. In other words, it relates to a non-
institutionalised setting. In addition, at the time of peace negotiations there will have been a rupture of 
long-term civil war or post-election violence beforehand, further moving away from the plausibility of 
studying the legitimisation in terms of a system. More useful as a result are theories on deliberative 
democracies, which are discussed in more detail below. Before this, the normative and contextual nature 
of legitimacy is presented.    
 
One of the biggest divisions amongst legitimacy scholars has been in arguing whether legitimacy stems 
from empirical reasons for believing in the legitimacy of something or the normative justifiability or moral 
appropriateness of what is happened. Empirical (or descriptive) legitimacy on the one hand, refers to the 
beliefs people hold about political authority. From this, the study of popular attitudes towards and 
supports for rulers has evolved (Barker 2001, 8; Steffek and Hahn 2010, 7).  Normative legitimacy on the 
other hand, refers to the reasons and justifications behind political authority. This has evolved into the 
                                                        
9 ‘Man kann Legitimität auffassen als eine generalisierte Bereitschaft, inhaltlich noch unbestimmte Entscheidungen innerhalb gewisser 
Toleranzgrenzen hinzunehmen’ (Luhmann 1983, 28). 
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study of normative assessments of the legitimacy of governments (Barker 2001, 8; see also Cook 2003, 
109–110). 
  
Weber is generally seen to propose an empirical understanding of legitimacy, since the sources of 
legitimate domination he describes come from being there for a long time (tradition), because people 
trust and believe in the legality of something, or have faith in the leader (e.g. Schrader and Denskus 
2010, 31). Beetham, who criticises Weber and his avoidance of normativity, offers a mid-way between 
the two, since for him power is deemed as legitimate when it conforms to established rules, that can be 
‘justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate’, along with evidence for 
consent (1991, 15–16; see also Alagappa 1995, 14).  
 
On the normative spectrum, scholars like the philosopher Jürgen Habermas propose a cognitive 
position, whereby legitimacy of laws and states can be accepted or rejected on the basis of ‘rational’ 
grounds (Cook 2003, 122; see also Crowell 2012, 151). Nevertheless, such ideas have been criticised for 
being based on a very particular reading of ‘rationality’, rooted in linear thinking of the enlightenment 
period (Edwards 2009, 67). This is the problem of normativity or normative legitimacy and is discussed 
in more detail in the next section. An empirical understanding of legitimacy will guide this work, though 
the ‘grounded’ nature of legitimacy means that certain values and beliefs are likely to play a role. Indeed, 
whether legitimacy can be judged without normative theories and is ever exclusively empirical continues 
to be under discussion (e.g. Patberg 2013; Zürn 2011, 2013).  
 
2.1.3 Normativity and the Contextual Nature of Legitimacy 
 
One of the most critical points in the study on legitimacy has been a perceived western bias in its 
development and normative understanding. This is despite the fact that alternative notions of legitimacy 
have advanced, including those related to traditional sources of legitimacy or the language and imagery 
of parents to children. These are reviewed in the following, in order to highlight the contextual nature of 
legitimacy and argue for an empirical understanding of legitimacy, though the ‘grounded’ nature of 
legitimacy, related to particular values and beliefs, is a part of this.   
 
In modern political discourse, (state) legitimacy is nearly always normatively linked - be it tacitly or not - 
to (western) political democracies.10 Related to this, when legitimacy of peacebuilding is discussed in 
terms of the ambiguous notions of local ownership ‘it is the local that is part of the western civil society 
imaginary, not the actual local’ that is preferred (Richmond and Mitchell 2011, 13; on Eurocentrism in 
                                                        
10 Though some empirical examples contradict this point. For example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way discuss the 
legitimacy and authority of leaders from successful liberation struggles in revolutionary regimes (2013, 9) and 
Alagappa notes that ‘even tyrannical leaders wish to appear legitimate’ (1995, 4). In addition, Johannes Gerschewski 
writes on the legitimising strategies of autocratic regimes for their own stability (2013). 
30 
 
peacebuilding studies more generally see Sabaratnam 2013). Yet, somewhat obviously western ideas of 
(democratic) legitimacy are not ubiquitous.  
Whilst a lot of research focuses on western contexts, exceptions do exist though they often focus on 
empirical understanding of legitimacy within a western normative framework (e.g. Alagappa 1995; 
Protopapas 2010).11 Traditional sources of legitimacy in the Weberian understanding can be read as 
contrasting the idea of democratic-consensus based legitimacy. For example, in patrimonial systems of 
governance people may not vote because they support specific programmes or manifestos, but because 
their patron demands it (Randall 2007, 86). As Weber understood the idea however, patrimonialism is a 
sub-strand of traditional authority (1978a, 231), which still includes notions of reciprocity and voluntary 
compliance (see also Moran 2008, 32–34). 12  Traditional authorities are of course historically very 
complex and seen differently by various sections of society. Accordingly, ‘the essential question is not … 
whether … traditional authority … is legitimate. Rather … who claims ‘legitimacy’, by what argument, 
who is persuaded and why?’ (West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999, 489). Examples of legitimacy based on 
cultural belonging, organisational skills or threat of violence have been noted (e.g. Förster 2010) as well 
as the illegitimacy of elected officials of peace committees in northern Kenya (T. Chopra 2009, 540).  
Another alternative understanding of legitimacy comes from the work of Michael Schatzberg. He 
considers political legitimacy in several African states, from Senegal to Kenya, which he calls Middle 
Africa. Schatzberg finds that political legitimacy rests on the tacit normative idea that the government 
and indeed the ruler of a country stand in the same relationship as a father to his children (2001). When 
political leaders behave like responsible fathers where they care, nurture and nourish, when they do not 
seek eternal power, when they respect and listen to their ‘mothers, wives and daughters’, and refrain 
from ‘eating’ too much, they are deemed to be unchallengeable legitimate actors (Schatzberg 2001, 203). 
This language and imagery of the father and family are widespread in the countries he investigates and 
are found in both the private and public realm (Ibid, 23). Interestingly, Filomina Chioma Steady found a 
similar metaphor in motherhood for female leaders. She explains that this concept of motherhood is not 
limited to reproductive and nurturing roles, but rather reflects normative values and humanistic 
ideologies: Motherhood is viewed as a metaphor for humanizing the state (2011, 22). She goes on to 
point out that the prominence of motherhood as the cornerstone of good leadership ‘deviates from the 
Eurocentric view and challenges a major plank of the Western feminist discourse which sees 
motherhood as a hindrance to leadership … From an Afro-centric perspective, motherhood empowers 
and does not subordinate women’ (2011, 218). Therefore, legitimacy can also be derived from a complex 
                                                        
11 That is not to say that similar normative framework do not play a role outside the western context. Examples 
may show the differences in the construction of legitimacy, but this does not mean similar normative frameworks 
are out of the question (see Sabaratnam 2013). 
12 Though this idea is often lost in the work on (neo-) patrimonialism, applying the concept to such a variety of 
contexts and purposes, it has arguably lost its meaning as an analytical concept (for this point see Pitcher, Moran, 
and Johnston 2009; Erdmann and Engel 2007, 103, 113–114). 
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and mostly unarticulated moral matrix of legitimate governance, which is abstracted from an idealised 
vision of authority and behaviour within a family (Schatzberg 2001, 23), be it paternal or maternal.  
These alternative visions of legitimacy are still broadly based on a consent based foundation, it is just 
that the justification for this consent is at times different to the norm that has evolved in western 
dialogues on legitimacy. On a side note but importantly, these differences should not be fetishized. Mary 
Moran for example cautions, ‘local authorities should not bear the blame for national presidents whose 
criminal, dictatorial, and repressive rule is bolstered far more by the economic and political agendas of 
western aid donors than by local constructions of legitimacy’ (2008, 34; see also Barker 2001, 120–121). 
Two further points can be made from this brief review. Firstly, that legitimacy is inherently contextual 
and not based on a universal understanding of legitimacy, but secondly that the context is also dynamic 
and changing. On the first point, legitimacy ‘is dependent on particular contexts, circumstances and 
communities’ (Clements 2014, 13; see also Arnault 2014, 13; Barker 2001, 25; Severs and Mattelaer 
2014). This is why Beetham focuses not merely on a belief in legitimacy, but also the reasons or 
justifications for such findings. However, these justifications are not to be sought out in theoretically 
constructed normative ideas, but rather in empirical standards of the citizens, what Beetham refers to as 
‘legitimacy-in-context’ (1991, 10: 14; see also Patberg 2013, 156–559). A more normative take comes 
from the policy-orientated study on legitimate peace negotiations from Conciliation Resources, where 
Kevin Clements argues for a ‘grounded legitimacy’ which is context sensitive and responds to values and 
beliefs (2014, 15).13 The problematic nature of normativity is the assumption of universality, rather than 
normativity per se (see also Zaum 2013). On the second point, the context where a peace process or 
negotiations are taking place is not homogenous, but is dynamic in relation to the cultural, social and 
political changes occurring (see also Hemmer et al. 2006, 157).  
In conclusion, the basis of this work is an empirical understanding of legitimisation in reference to the 
specific context of the peace negotiations. This means that specific beliefs or values (‘grounded 
legitimacy’) also play a part. In addition, both the empirical and normative nature of legitimisation is 
dynamic and subject to change. 
The research discussed so far focuses on the legitimacy of authority within the Westphalian 
understanding of nation states, governance, or on the basis of specific structures or procedures being in 
place. Newer research has also focused on the legitimacy of specific organisations or organisational 
structures (Steffek and Hahn 2010; Zaum 2013). Elements of this research are useful for the heuristic 
                                                        
13 This interplay between ‘grounded legitimacy’ and western understanding of legitimacy can also be found in the 
literature on hybrid governance. For example, in the context of the debate on ‘fragile’ states Volker Boege suggest 
that’s the legal-rational dimension of legitimacy is often overemphasised to the detriment of traditional and 
charismatic sources of legitimacy, which if considered can point to hybrid forms of governance (2006; see also 
Boege et al. 2009; Bagayoko 2012).  In more recent work the idea of hybrid governance - warned not to be a 
panacea for peacebuilding - has also become specifically relevant for legitimate peace processes (Clements 2014, 
13–15; Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014, 9).  
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model on legitimate peace negotiations, including the charismatic source of legitimacy and the discussion 
of legitimacy in context. Nevertheless, peace negotiations are neither a state nor an organisation, which 
is why before spelling out the heuristic model the next section considers what in fact makes a process be 
seen as legitimate.  
 
2.2 The Public Sphere: What Makes a Process Legitimate? 
 
A closer look at deliberative democracy and especially the ideas on the public sphere is useful in 
understanding what causes a process to be legitimate. Whilst this scholarship is not directly concerned 
with processes of legitimisation, it highlights relevant elements. The idea of the public sphere maintains 
the importance of free and fair participation and rational discourse for legitimacy. After outlining this in 
more detail, the participation criterion is considered in light of legitimate representation and the rational 
discourse is discussed in terms of inequality and power structures that affect it.  
 
2.2.1 Discursive Deliberation and the Public Sphere  
 
The scholarship on deliberative democracy helps us to marry the notions of consensual legitimacy with 
participation. The deliberative turn, which comes from critical studies on democracy, focuses on the idea 
that all citizens should take part in decision-making processes that affect them. It was increasingly 
discussed especially in the 1990s as a challenge to the liberal models of democracy, leading to innovative 
ideas about alternative institutional arrangements in a globalised world (Dryzek, Honig, and Phillips 
2008; Scheuerman 2008). Deliberative theorists proposes that the validity (and hence legitimacy) of any 
social norm or institutional arrangement is based on whether it came to place through open deliberation 
- agreed upon by those subject to it (Ron 2010, 355, 2009, 5). They equate political legitimacy with a 
complex system of consensus, which is arrived upon through open and critical discourse. Two major 
elements play a role in discursive democracy: Free and fair participation and discourse.  
 
One of the most important scholars on deliberative democracy, Habermas, suggests that the legitimacy 
of the modern state depends on guarantees of democratic discourse. His foundational work on the topic 
is inspired by the idea of a public sphere, based on the unconstrained discussions amongst equals in the 
coffee houses and salons in bourgeois European societies from the 18th century onwards, who together 
formed a conception of the common good (Habermas 1991).14 Habermas describes the public sphere, as 
‘… a forum in which the private people, come together to form a public, [and] readied themselves to 
compel public authority to legitimate itself before public opinion’ (1991, 25–26; see also J. Cohen 1997, 
73). Nowadays, the public sphere has fundamentally altered but remains an ideal as a place where 
citizens can debate and revise their various interpretations of the world. As a result, the idea of the 
                                                        
14 Though ideas date back to Aristotle’s vision of a good citizen who seeks the company of others and searches for 
the common good (Edwards 2009, 65). 
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‘public sphere as a site of legitimating practices was normatively ‘indispensable’ for democratic theory’ 
(emphasis in original; Crowell 2012, 147). With the transformation of the public sphere the emphasis 
moved from private individuals to the civil society, becoming a vehicle for creating new solutions where 
‘societal differences … are developed and debated’ (Edwards 2009, 64; see also Alagappa 1995, 29; 
Donais 2012, 37). Due to the inherently discursive nature of peace negotiations the ideas of the public 
sphere are of particular interest for the heuristic framework. These ideas of deliberation have also been 
described as the ‘social dynamics of legitimacy’ (Severs and Mattelaer 2014). Deliberate democracy, 
founded on the public sphere, stands for both free and fair participation as well as the reasoned 
reflection and discussion.  
 
Firstly therefore, as developed throughout his scholarly work including his later work on political theory 
(1996), Habermas argues that the criterion for legitimacy through deliberation is fair and free 
participation of all those affected by the decisions to be taken (1996, 110). Habermas may be guided by 
ideas of normative legitimacy, but behavioural psychologists working with empirical legitimacy make 
similar findings. Accordingly, procedural determinants of legitimacy maintain that a system or 
procedures within a government structure must be perceived as fair, so that no individual or groups are 
systematically disadvantaged (Call 2012, 226; see also Jost and Major 2001, 12; Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 
2009, 354). It has even been suggested that the perceived fairness of the decision making process is more 
important for legitimacy than the provisions of resources, opportunities or outcomes (Hechter 2009, 
281; Tyler 2006).15 As a result, Luhmann argues if everything runs according to procedures that are 
perceived as suitable, even outsiders and those who lose out from decisions taken by those procedure, 
will have to accept the outcomes (Luhmann 1983; though reliance on procedural legitimacy can be more 
difficult in developing countries see Alagappa 1995, 31; see also Schrader and Denskus 2010, 36). Since 
peace negotiations can never amount to a fairly perceived decision-making process, due to its ad hoc 
short-term nature as argued previously, the starting focus is on fair participation through representation 
by CSAs, which has been the assumption of most of the previous literature to date. I return to this 
below. 
 
Secondly, the Habermasian public sphere encapsulates more than mere procedural fairness, which in any 
case only exists in principle rather than in practicality (2005, 12). 16  It is the discourse within the 
deliberation, which becomes the means to determine what is rational (and ‘good’) in society. Such 
discourse can also set the limits of what is legitimate (Diez 2014). Hence, the political legitimacy of 
                                                        
15 Here Moran for example points to the US elections in 2000 which showed a rigid adherence to the procedure of 
holding elections that conferred legitimacy, despite the fact the outcome did not represent the will of the people 
(2008, 105). 
16 Whilst Habermas speaks of the participation in the public sphere as principled rather than practical inclusion (the 
bourgeois public sphere comprised male property owners) the argument of free participation in the public sphere 
has been the subject of debate, e.g. Fraser (1993). Habermas later revisits the patriarchal nature of the public sphere 
when commenting on his earlier work, which incidentally had been written over three decades earlier (1968) before 
it was translated into English (1993, 427). 
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deliberative processes is not only based on free and fair participation representing the will of the people, 
but also on collective reasoned reflection (Boyte 2011, 328; J. Cohen 1997, 74–75; Ron 2009, 5; 
Scheuerman 2008, 85; Valadez 2000, 32). The quality of discussions in the public sphere, where 
arguments are exchanged, examined and justifications given, plays a vital role in ensuring the legitimacy 
of the process (Ron 2010, 351–352). Only the better argument and most notably the ‘common good’ 
will survive deliberation (J. Cohen 1997; Valadez 2000, 5). This also relates to Habermas ideas on 
communicative rationality. When Habermas proposed that legitimacy is a rational venture that can be 
justified through reason, this is because he expects a process of discursive validation to create such 
reasoning (Cook 2003, 114–115). Discourse ethics and communication have as a result been the 
emphasis for most of Habermas work (e.g. 1996). If negotiations are conceptualised as deliberative 
processes, then another element of the legitimisation process is the input in terms of arguments and 
justifications.  
 
In peacebuilding literature the deliberative turn has received some attention, at least to the extent that 
the ideas have often been linked to local ownership considerations or a consensual process (Donais 
2012, 37; Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014; Ron 2010). Moreover, there is a supposed link between 
public participation and improved inter-personal relationships because of social-psychological benefits 
related to this inclusive interaction (Ron 2010). Furthermore, the idea has emerged that a more inclusive 
process creates societal ownership or legitimacy as outlined previously. More closely in line with the 
ideas on the public sphere, this would suggest that there should be equal opportunities for all 
stakeholders to present their views, participate and influence the outcomes of the given process in order 
to make it legitimate (see also J. Cohen 1997, 74).  
 
As Wanis-St. John noted however, it would be unfeasible to invite everyone to peace negotiations ‘as if 
they were a festival’ (2008, 4). There is also the problem of efficacy or the vertical dilemma of inclusion: 
Fairness through participation may also be counterproductive as more equality will decrease the chances 
of individuals effectively influencing ideas (Boedeltje and Cornips 2004, 16; see also Jarstad 2008b, 23). 
It perhaps comes to no surprise then that Habermas suggests that civil society, who in his later work he 
speaks of as the informal sphere which certainly overlaps with the public sphere as an idea, can in fact 
function as a filter of suggestions and a generator of communicative power in influencing political 
decisions. ‘Voluntary associations represent the nodal points in a communication network that emerges 
from the intermeshing of autonomous public spheres’ (Habermas 1997, 57; see also Edwards 2009, 63–
64; Ron 2010, 356).17  Having only CSAs present will allow for some counteraction of the vertical 
                                                        
17 Edwards’ distinction between the different understandings of civil society is interesting to revisit here. Civil 
society is seen either as a part of society (associational life outside state and market), or as a kind of society (characterized 
by normative norms and values) or as the public sphere .The latter stems from scholars like John Dewey and Hannah 
Arendt who took Gramsci’s ideas about civil society as an arena of contestation and developed around them a 
theory of the ‘public sphere’ an essential component of democracy, later taken up by Habermas. Civil society in 
this definition is seen as a vehicle for creating new solutions (Edwards 2009, 9–14). 
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dilemma (by reducing those present). This introduces the need for (civil society) representation, so that 
all relevant arguments and viewpoints are represented at the negotiations (see Boedeltje and Cornips 
2004, 8–10; Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014; Ron 2010, 356). Patrick Chabal already pointed out 
over two decades ago that without effective representation there is little legitimacy (1994, 142). The 
relevance and shortcomings of the public sphere, both with regards to free and fair participation and 
rational discourse is considered in more detail in the following two sections. 
 
2.2.2 Participating in the Public Sphere: Legitimate Representation 
 
The understanding of representation is outlined, before focusing on one sub-type, which has been noted 
as especially relevant in the African context – descriptive representation. Discussing the challenges and 
pitfalls of descriptive representation, the idea of the audience or beneficiary of legitimacy as opposed to 
the guarantor of legitimacy is introduced in more detail. 
 
One of the most classic definition of modern political representation comes from Hanna Pitkin, who 
explains that to represent is to ‘make present again’ (1967, 8). In other words, making opinions and 
voices present in their actual absence. The paradoxical nature of this definition underlines the 
complexity of the term. Pitkin argues that representation needs to be contextualised and as a result she 
distinguishes four types of representation: Formalistic, descriptive, symbolic and substantive 
representation.  
 
First, formalistic representation, taking into consideration ideas from Thomas Hobbes, looks at 
institutional arrangements that surround representation. This includes rules regarding where the 
authorisation to represent comes from, as well as the accountability those represented have in relation to 
their representatives. In his study of the legitimisation of power, Beetham had argued that the 
distribution of power needs to serve the interest of the subordinate also and not merely the powerful 
alone (1991, 82). A formalisation of this would lead directly to what Pitkin supposes to be formalistic 
representation (in the sense of accountability rules etc.). Second, symbolic representation concerns what 
the representative actually ‘stands for’, namely the meaning or created symbol the representative has for 
those being represented. This includes for example symbolic heads of states, like the Queen in Great 
Britain. Third, descriptive representation considers representation to be like a mirror or piece of art - 
resembling those being represented. This is one of the most discussed classifications of Pitkin, especially 
in relation to minority representation of race and gender. The idea is that ascriptive characteristics are 
shared by the representative, i.e. a woman representing women rights or someone from an ethnic 
minority representing those people from the same community (Piscopo 2011, 449; Runciman and Vieira 
2008, 111). Both symbolic and descriptive representation is sometimes called ‘standing for’. This is in 
contrast to the last category of substantive representation, which is also known as ‘acting for’. This is 
because the latter concerns the activity of the representatives, and whether actions taken or interest 
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presented, are ‘in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them’ (Pitkin 1967, 209). 
Vicky Randall refers to this as responsive representation (2007; see also Schrader-Rashidkhan 2011, 
34).18 
 
The assumption is that there is a link between those to be represented and those who claim to represent 
them, be it an organisation or a person. How would this work for civil society? As Cecilia Lynch spells 
out, civil society organisations are not answerable to the general public (like liberal governments), rather 
only to their own constituencies (2008, 713).  This makes the question of whom they deem to represent 
and in what ways a fundamental one. Moreover, it suggests that formalistic representation is not relevant 
for the research in question, putting the emphasis on descriptive, symbolic and substantive 
representation.  In his work on representation in Africa, Chabal notes that inter alia, representation ‘has 
to possess the identity markers of the group’, and ‘display those qualities … that are believed ... to matter 
most in material and symbolic terms’ (2009, 52–54, see also 1994, 146). Both Randall and Mehler argue 
in their work on African political parties and rebel groups in the Central African Republic respectively, 
that there seems to be more focus on ‘standing for’ representation (i.e. descriptive and symbolic) rather 
than substantive representation, or ‘acting for’ (Randall 2007, 84–85, 101; Mehler 2011, 134–135; see 
also Phillips 1994, 88). If descriptive representation is more important in the African context, as these 
writers suggest, a closer look at this type of representation is useful. 
 
Particularly feminist writers have seen the value in descriptive representation for two major reasons. 
Firstly, only as member of a specific group can you really understand the group, what philosopher Anne 
Phillips coined the politics of presence, as opposed to the politics of ideas (1995, 5). The descriptive 
characteristics introduced by Pitkin allow for the ‘rendering’ of the opinions, needs and interests of the 
constituents which the representatives resemble. This politics of presence argues Phillips is because 
‘shared experience ... takes precedence over shared ideas; more precisely, no amount of thought or 
sympathy, no matter how careful or honest can jump the barriers of experience’ (1994, 89; see also 
Moran 2008, 116). Secondly, descriptive representation is valuable as a means to correct a past or 
present injustice and serves as a valuable symbolic message (Randall 2007, 83). David Runciman and 
Monica Brito Vieira add that through this type of representation, previously overlooked interest may be 
addressed and democracy is revitalised, as formerly disempowered groups will recognise the political 
legitimacy of their institutions. Moreover, group members will also find it easier to trust their 
representatives (2008, 113–114). Interestingly procedural legitimacy scholar Tom Tyler also notes that 
the fairness of the decision-making process is linked to the notion of social identity. In other words, 
                                                        
18 Another definition proposes three idioms for thinking about representation: Pictoral representation (resembling 
and standing in the place of the represented); theatrical representation (speaking and acting for those represented) 
and juridical representation, (acting for the represented with their consent or in their interest) (Runciman and 
Vieira 2008, 7). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak distinguishes between Vertretung (‘stepping in someone’s place’ or 
speaking for the needs and desires of somebody), and Darstellung (‘placing there’ or to ‘proxy and portray’) (1990, 
108). The overlap of these alternative definitions to descriptive, substantive and formalistic representation is clear. 
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legitimacy is rooted in identity concerns (Tyler 2001, 432). Nevertheless, there are several challenges 
inherent in creating such a connection between identity and representation. This also is related to the 
separate discussion on the audience of legitimacy. 
 
The challenges of descriptive representation are as follows: First of all there is the issue of essentialising 
and constructing identities. Not every characteristic can be put into neat and clear ascriptive 
characteristic categories. Indeed, the idea of a single identity is in itself misleading. Chabal therefore finds 
it more useful to think of overlapping circles of identity (2009, 31). Essentialising identities can 
furthermore be misleading and deny internal heterogeneity of identity categories (Runciman and Vieira 
2008, 122). The argument of Phillips for example - that women uniquely share the experience and 
interest of childbirth - can easily be contravened: How can you for example find any substantive 
common ground between how middle class South African women and rural women experience 
childbirth (Randall 2007, 97)? In addition, trying to protect a group by formalising their identity19 - like 
gender or race - may also stifle internal diversity amongst the groups (Rebouché and Fearon 2005, 155). 
In a similar manner, it cannot be assumed that there are objective groups of people out there or self-
conscious, cohesive entities with clear understandings and perceptions of their own interests (Randall 
2007, 84; see also Donais 2012, 37 on the diversity of local owners). At worst, this can mean that the 
groups being represented are not aware of their interests, and those claiming to represent the respective 
groups in fact construct these. As such, Randall suggests that African political parties themselves create 
the ethno-regional groups they claim to present (2007, 85), and Mehler adds this could also be true for 
rebels in the Central African Republic (2011, 133).  
 
Second, Pitkin herself was sceptical about descriptive representation, since there is no guarantee that a 
representative will actually act in the interest of the group whose characteristics they share. In the 
Kenyan peace negotiations, female participation did not necessarily mean that gender concerns were 
being represented. Unsurprisingly, just because someone is a woman does not mean that she will 
represent gender goals (McGhie and Wamai 2011, 7; see also Runciman and Vieira 2008, 114; Pitkin 
1967, 226; Phillips 1994, 1995). This brings me to the related debate on the audience of legitimacy or 
what I label the beneficiaries of legitimacy. Individuals give consent in the dynamic process of legitimacy. 
Nonetheless, elite groups have a greater control of power resources and tend to be more engaged in 
political processes than the general population (e.g. Alagappa 1995, 23–28; Fishman 1990, 437; Gilley 
2009, 9). This may make them the primary beneficiaries of legitimacy. Nevertheless I argue, just because 
access is more difficult, does not mean that the general population plays no role at all, in fact the 
research in question aims to find out how the peace negotiations where made more legitimate for the 
                                                        
19 In (post) conflict settings underlining the representation of strict identities can also reinforce conflict divisions, 
of us vs. them.  
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general populations themselves. Who the population is, remains a question in itself.20 The beneficiaries of 
legitimacy are in a relationship of dependency with their representatives, the so-called guarantors of 
legitimacy.21 How the guarantors of legitimacy choose to represent the beneficiaries of legitimacy is likely 
to depend on the individual circumstances. The next section revisits the public sphere, regarding the 
discourse-element, in order to discuss the inequality and power structures that may hinder such (rational) 
discourse.  
 
2.2.3 Discourse in the Public Sphere: Inequality and Power Structures 
 
The discourse element of the public sphere translated to the legitimisation process would suggests that 
peace negotiations are based on a (rational) discourse concluding in a common good, counteracting the 
demands of conflict parties at the talks (as Track I participants) or coming up with alternative or 
additional post-conflict programmes besides power-sharing (as Track II participants). The aim of the 
research of this dissertation is not to carry out a discourse analysis, but to explore how the civil society in 
a public sphere contributes to the content of policy. Thus, the focus is on the end result of the discourse 
or the outcome. The way content, or substantive representation or ‘acting for’, is introduced to the peace 
talks by civil society actors however, is affected by the power dynamics at peace negotiations. Whilst 
such power dynamics do not necessarily directly affect the legitimisation of a process, they do so 
indirectly. Power imbalances will mean that open and free discourse from the civil society is at least 
partially impeded, not least by stipulating who exactly will attend (who are the guarantors of legitimacy) 
which can affect what is actually brought to the table (in terms of the content); thereby affecting the 
overall legitimisation of the process. 
 
It is unlikely that fair proceedings not predetermined by the use of power, stipulated as a prerequisite for 
legitimisation, are feasible criteria in peace negotiations (Menkhaus 2014, 76; Schrader and Denskus 
2010, 35). Public participation is inherently linked to factors of education, income, free time, information 
and interest (Hemmer et al. 2006, 142). Thus, a flaw of Habermas’ public sphere theory is that power 
resides with those that have the best communicative skills and immaterial resources like knowledge and 
reputation or - as he stated in his book on the public sphere - the unspoken conditions of participation, 
which are property ownership and education (Finlayson 2005, 12; see also Brühl 2010, 188; Edwards 
2009, 65; Scheuerman 2008, 100; Payrow Shabani 1998). As a result, scholars like Michel Foucault think 
                                                        
20 Does the population include all those living in Liberia or Kenya? What about the refugees living elsewhere? Are 
foreign investors or mercenaries also living in Liberia part of the population? Does this mean only those who are 
deemed as citizens of the two countries? What about the controversial policies of the Kenyan government 
regarding Somali refugees or that of the Liberian government in regards to citizenship (e.g. see Yarnell 2014; Pailey 
2013 respectively). For the purpose of this research, the population is argued to include all those who were either 
living in Liberia/Kenya or in the neighbouring countries or further abroad, who felt directly or indirectly affected 
by the civil wars/post-election violence in Liberia/Kenya and were not represented by the conflict parties at the 
peace talks. 
21 And the guarantors of legitimacy can also benefit from the legitimisation. The division between the two is 
arguably artificial, but necessary for analytical purposes.  
39 
 
of legitimacy as a social construct, characteristic, like every other relationship, of power and domination 
(e.g. Crowell 2012, 151). Those that succeed in gaining acceptance for their arguments are simply using 
adequate discourse or political strategies, constructing something as true, even in the face of conflicting 
claims. They then have to make this truth acceptable to all those concerned, via its reproduction and 
transformation (Schrader and Denskus 2010, 44).  
 
Whilst the power imbalances of government figures and rebels compared to the civil society actors 
might be easily reconstructed, the power-imbalances between the different civil society actors should 
also not be neglected (Brühl 2010, 183). Power and influence will undoubtedly play a role in the debate 
of who gets invited to attend in the first place as well as how they interact with each other. Whilst Ron 
considers small-scale microcosms of peace negotiations, or ‘mini-publics’ in his work, the difficulties of 
limited budgets and hostile environments he outlines are just as relevant for the formal negotiation 
context (2010, 348). As Tanja Brühl argues, civil society is not only a space of representation, but also 
one of exclusion and control, with internal conflicts about who is being empowered or what is being 
resisted (2010, 193). The honour of an invitation to the peace talks is likely to be - unsurprisingly - 
reserved for those organizations that can fund their place at the negotiations, especially likely to be those 
in the diaspora. According to the influential work of Gayatri Spivak, the subaltern are not only 
heterogeneous in their composition, but also removed from the lines of social mobility, and thus cannot 
‘speak’ (1988). As such, even NGOs from the global south are merely ‘old colonial subjects transformed 
into the new domestic middle-class urban radical’ (Spivak (2004) quoted in Brühl 2010, 193; see also 
Hultin 2014, 208; Richmond and Mitchell 2011, 13). This has been noted elsewhere, including on the 
literature more critical of the ‘authentic local’ as a panacea to peacebuilding (Menkhaus 2014, 74; Simons 
and Zanker 2014; see also Hirblinger and Simons 2014).  
 
Inequalities exist not only between the different negotiation participants or guarantors of legitimacy but 
also in a society at large, the beneficiaries of legitimacy. What Valadez says for minority groups is very 
relevant in conflict-ridden polarised societies:  
 
‘Low levels of formal education and lack of access to information technologies for example, can 
significantly hinder the capacity of some cultural minorities to compete on equal footing with 
other cultural groups in public deliberations’ (2000, 6; see also J. Cohen 2006, 160; Edwards 
2009, 66–67; Menkhaus 2014, 76).  
 
The potential inequality of access in turn affects the contribution to the discourse and its outcome. Even 
in a public sphere in ‘normal’ circumstances (i.e. non-war situations), inequality and domination will 
distort collective communication (Calhoun 2011, 312). Deliberations in the public sphere, relying on the 
capacity of abstraction for a neutral and impartial debate where the most rational argument wins, 
becomes increasingly difficult in conflicted groups with deep, incommensurable differences (Valadez 
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2000, 61–62; see also Calhoun 1993). Moreover, the fact that ‘it is the best ideas that will triumph, not 
the loudest … [is] somewhat quaint given the inequalities that characterise all contemporary societies’ 
(Edwards 2009, 66–67). The fact that emphasis in the public sphere is placed on not only who should 
participate, but also the quality of exchange therefore poses several challenges (see also Ron 2010, 357). 
Especially in the context of a highly polarised society and violent conflict, conditions for participation 
could not be further removed from those of a public sphere, especially when considered with regards to 
the 18th - century bourgeois coffee houses and salons (and the enlightenment era) that Habermas found 
to be no longer applicable to the modern political world. Discursive reasoning amongst potential 
enemies is likely to be difficult (Ron 2009, see also 2010, 359; Calhoun 2011, 319; Donais 2012, 63). That 
is not to say that scholars like Habermas and Joshua Cohen do not acknowledge that they are talking 
about ideal-type situations currently not taking place, but it seems especially unfeasible in the setting of 
peace negotiations. As a result, structural inequalities are likely to have at least an indirect effect on the 
legitimisation of processes. 
 
In conclusion, having agreed upon a largely empirical understanding of legitimacy, the ways a process 
can be seen as legitimate has been shown by considering the literature on deliberative democracy and the 
public sphere. The two sources of legitimacy for a process that follow from this research are free and fair 
participation (though representation) and the end result of (rational) discourse. These sources are 
empirically difficult to enact, due to the difficulty in representing a broad section of the population, the 
beneficiaries of the population and the inequalities and power structures inherent in the public discourse 
affecting who gets invited to be a guarantor of legitimacy. This is perhaps why Habermas distinguishes 
between the ‘strong public’, the formal political system, compared to the ‘weak public’, the informal 
(public) sphere. The political system is still required to make decisions, whilst the public sphere has the 
responsibility to identify, interpret and address social problems (Habermas 1996, 274–5). So even if we 
think of civil society participation in peace negotiations as the ‘weak’ public, how do we envisage a 
legitimisation process for peace negotiations? This is presented below. 
 
2.3 A Heuristic Model for Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
 
Whilst a lot has been written on legitimacy, most of the work looks at the authority of leaders or 
regimes, or the system analysis of well-established systems or procedures. A western bias no doubt 
exists, though a number of authors have also considered legitimacy in non-western contexts (e.g. 
Alagappa 1995; Förster 2010; Schatzberg 2001). The discussion on the public sphere goes some way to 
explaining why peace negotiations may become legitimate: There is free and fair participation (through 
representation) and involvement in the discursive negotiations process including in its output. From this, 
two features of legitimacy are deduced that make the basis for a heuristic model. On the one hand, civil 
society actors are involved in the discursive peace process and relating back to substantive representation 
(‘acting for’), they address specific collective concerns. On the other hand, free and fair participation is 
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ensured through representation by CSAs, which in line with the symbolic and descriptive elements of 
representation are subjectively representative for the beneficiaries of legitimacy.  
 
The heuristic model is built on an empirical understanding of legitimacy, though locally relevant beliefs 
of values are thought to affect the experience or construction of legitimacy, the ‘grounded legitimacy’. 
The process of legitimisation is dynamic, on going and started on an ad-hoc basis. Due to the dynamic 
nature of this belief on legitimacy, there is not a dichotomous belief in either legitimacy or illegitimacy. 
Rather, the belief in legitimacy is continuous on a scale of more or less legitimate and can change over 
time (see also Alagappa 1995, 25; 45; Gilley 2009, 10–11; Jachtenfuchs, Diez, and Jung 1998, 413). As 
explained previously, peace processes more generally involve several stages. This includes the pre-
negotiations phase, hugely important in getting warring parties to the table. The actual negotiations are 
followed - in the best-case scenario - by an agreement. After this, the open-ended process of 
implementation starts. All these stages have formal and informal dimensions. The focus of this 
dissertation is the actual negotiation stage coupled with the final agreement, though the other stages are 
also addressed. The two features of legitimacy that make up the heuristic model will now be introduced.  
 
2.3.1 Addressing Collective Concerns 
 
Using the output-side of legitimacy as a basis would suggest concentrating on the output of a peace 
negotiation, namely a stable peace agreement. Whilst this no doubt plays a role, it underlines an 
essentially tautological argument. Moreover, in line with the discourse element of the public sphere, 
addressing collective concerns also plays a role during the actual peace negotiations, and is not just a 
measurement to be made at the end. This is the basis for the feature of addressing collective concerns, 
which is now sketched out. 
 
In order for the negotiation process to be perceived as legitimate, from the previous discussion on 
substantive representation and the discursive element of the public sphere, it would follow that the 
population must feel like their grievances and concerns were included, and be satisfied with the outcome 
of the final agreement at the end of the negotiations. In Guatemala for example, a Civil Society 
Assembly ensured the development of the ‘broad national agenda covering a gamut of interests and 
issues, and in particular those ethnic, social and economic fractures that had plagued the formation of 
the Guatemalan society and state’ (Arnault 2014, 22). Negotiations (and ensuing agreements) will 
therefore be more legitimate when grievances are addressed that the public collectively care about. This 
is enhanced by ideas of substantive representation, or acting for, which also means acting in the interests 
of the population, in a manner responsive to them (e.g. Pitkin 1967; Randall 2007; see also Odendaal 
2010, 20).  
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The feature of collective concerns encapsulates what is being discussed in the negotiations (and included 
in the final agreement) as a reflection of collective grievances. Collective concerns are therefore made up 
of grievances from the populations. These issues in turn need to be addressed by civil society actors in 
the discursive process itself, and the actual agreement. In theory, addressing collective concerns is 
interesting because it does not necessarily follow that civil society needs to be directly included in the 
peace negotiations for collective grievances to play a role. In that sense, even track two or parallel 
negotiations could suffice if they provide an opportunity for a broad set of concerns to be heard and 
ultimately considered for the final agreement (Paffenholz 2014a, 81). Due to the inherent power 
imbalance in a negotiation setting, the civil society need to be influential in taking part in the discursive 
process (be it as Track I or Track II actors) for it to be effective as a legitimisation feature, in relation to 
a role for CSAs. 
 
Focusing on the output-side of legitimacy based on a system analysis, it has been argued that the output 
as regards policies, and acceptance by the affected population of these, is the key element to determining 
legitimacy, even at the cost of fair input into the decisions made (e.g. Boedeltje and Cornips 2004; Gilley 
2009; Kratochwil 2006). Anders Hanberger for example defines legitimacy as the ‘product of satisfying 
felt needs and solving perceived and observed local problems’ (2003, 270). This would mean that the key 
to legitimisation of peace negotiations is the output of a peace agreement, preferably one that lasts. The 
risk would be in creating a tautological argument: With a lasting peace agreement, legitimacy is ensured. 
When the peace agreement fails, then the process becomes illegitimate.  
 
Whilst no doubt an end to violence is a prominent collective concern or grievance to be addressed, it is 
arguably not the only one. In other words, the absence of violence is not thought to be the sole criteria 
for legitimisation. In a policy brief on legitimate peace processes, Jean Arnault argues that ‘a peace 
process cannot rely on legitimisation brought about by the unbearable cost of war; it is required to 
address squarely the task of constructing the legitimacy required to prevail over the supporters of the 
continuation of conflict’ (2014, 22). Thus, a peace agreement that lasts amounts to much more than 
simply ending violence. It also includes the participation in the discursive peace process itself. As a 
result, when a peace agreement fails this is likely to have an effect on the belief in the legitimacy of the 
negotiations, but does not entirely delegitimise the process either. The construction of legitimacy does 
not exclusively relate to the output of ending violence. This supports the idea of legitimacy as a 
continuous concept not a dichotomous one and the reason why the input/output models of legitimacy 
are not wholly appropriate. In summary, as shown in Figure 2.1 below, collective concerns are addressed 
during the talks, which includes the final peace agreement. 
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2.3.2 Subjective Representation 
 
In his book on why wars recur, Call considers legitimacy in peacebuilding arguing for ‘legitimacy-focused 
peacebuilding’ which depends on a state offering the main social groups acceptable levels of 
representation and participation (2012, 226). Whilst Call focuses on the post-war setting rather than the 
negotiations, the finding is still relevant. Building on what has been outlined on the public sphere, it 
reinforces the idea of free and fair participation through representation. It builds on the assumption, that 
at least in principle, ‘every citizen should have the ability to participate in ... public discourses’ (Scharpf 
1997, 29). 
 
Because elections are not possible in the setting of peace negotiations (or have limited influence 
regarding legitimisation as is discussed in the later chapter on Kenya) and there are no established 
procedures in place, the participation is ensured through the representation of civil society participants. 
This idea is no doubt widely accepted, but has as of yet been conceptually and theoretically understood 
only to a limited degree. Who is involved and what kind of relationships exist between the beneficiaries 
of legitimacy and their guarantors? What interpretations of representation are relevant in the different 
contexts?  
 
Considering the theories of legitimacy and representation, it has already been argued that Weber’s 
traditional and charismatic sources of legitimacy are likely relevant for individual civil society actors. This 
also includes any legitimation strategies of individual civil society activists involved in peace negotiations 
is also considered (see Barker 2001). Moreover, in line with Pitkin, it is not the formal representation 
that is plausibly replicated in the context of peace negotiations (much like Weber’s legal-rational source 
of legitimacy) but rather the symbolic and descriptive forms of representation. Substantive 
representation is already included in the feature of collective concerns alone. 
 
The feature therefore considers who is taking part in the negotiations, not least because of contextual 
interpretations of representation, legitimation strategies of individual actors and other forms of obvious 
descriptive and symbolic representation. This may include non-conventional representative qualities, 
such as maternal or paternal metaphors. Because representation depends on the relationship between the 
guarantors of legitimacy and their beneficiaries (or in other words representatives and those they deem 
to represent), the feature is labelled subjective representation. 
 
Whilst at first glance, the feature of subjective representation may seem to be a simple question of input 
legitimacy this is in fact difficult to apply so restrictively in the context of peace negotiations. Subjective 
representation certainly plays a role during the negotiations, after all this is where participation via 
representation takes place. But representation does not come out of the blue, thus the pre-negotiation 
stage is also relevant as well as after the talks. In other words the symbolic attachment or descriptive 
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identity is prevalent during the talks, but also plays a role before and after as part of an on-going process 
of legitimisation. The complete heuristic model based on these two features, is summarised in Figure 2.1 
below. 
 
Figure 2.1: Heuristic for Legitimate Peace Negotiations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Before the Talks 
Addressing Collective Concerns 
Subjective Representation 
During the Talks After the Talks 
 
Before the heuristic model is applied in two separate case studies, the research design of the rest of the 
dissertation is outlined in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Methodology and Research Design 
3 Methodology and Research Design 
 
Having presented the heuristic model in the previous chapter, the starting point to answer how peace 
negotiations are made (more) legitimate, this chapter sketches out the methodology and research design 
of the dissertation. On the basis of a constructivist ontology and a mixed epistemology a ‘comprehensive 
process-tracing’ method of analysis is developed, that includes both constitutive and a causal analysis for 
the theory building in question. This method uses an abductive research design to trace the features of 
the heuristic model in two cases of peace negotiations, namely in Liberia and Kenya. The 
methodological foundations of the research and the method of comprehensive process-tracing is 
addressed in the following, before considering the empirical fieldwork methods of the research in more 
detail. The next section concentrates on the importance and relevance of case study research today, as 
well as the methodological assumptions made for the dissertation.  
 
3.1 The Methodology of Case Study Research 
 
Case study research remains highly relevant and important, despite a trend that seems to state the 
opposite. This trend is in fact based on a flawed understanding of the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of case study research. A question concerning a notion like legitimacy, constructed on the 
basis of beliefs and highly contextual and dynamic, arguably works best with a constructivist ontology 
and a pluralist epistemology. The reasons for this are outlined by considering both causal and 
constitutive perspectives. First of all however, the relevance of case study research is reviewed.  
 
In social sciences, and political sciences especially, there has been a trend to view small-N case study 
methods as something akin to the younger unloved brother of quantitative research. Whenever possible, 
it is argued that a statistical analysis should be undertaken, at the very least to complement case study 
research (Lijphart 1975, 165). Case study research in fact has a long evolving history. What had started 
out as the study of single contextually embedded case studies was later changed to more comparative 
analysis with abstract theoretical concepts in mind. By the 1970s there was a trend towards ‘solving’ the 
small-N problem of single or a small number of case studies by focusing on a variable-centred logic of 
causality. Increasing the number of variables to be observed, it was argued, also increases the number of 
observations to draw inferences from (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 514; Blatter and Haverland 2012, 15). This 
was further cemented by a book, published in 1994, on qualitative research, which suggests that 
qualitative research should be built on the same logic of inference as quantitative science (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994). The ideas in the book have received so much attention, that they and the 
work itself are widely referred to simply as ‘KKV’, after its three authors, Gary King, Robert O. 
Keohane and Sidney Verba. As a result, qualitative work changed from being known as ‘meaning-
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focused or lived experience-focused research’ to ‘small ‘n’ studies that apply large ‘n’ tools’ (Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea 2006, xvi). Whilst the KKV book is still used as a corner stone in the training of political 
scientists, it has also faced significant critique (most notably Brady and Collier 2004).22 
 
Post-KKV work on qualitative case studies nevertheless only gives partial accounts of the full potential 
of case studies and conceivable epistemological and ontological foundations. This includes the 
effectively positivist account of John Gerring (2007) and the more critical realists work of Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennett, which also includes a chapter on process-tracing (2005). As a result, 
confusion about case study methods is pervasive, particularly regarding the method of process tracing. 
Moreover, there has been insufficient reflection on both the ontological and epistemological frames of 
the work discussed (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 9). As a result, case studies have a relatively low stature 
among positivists (see below), despite the fact they are one the most frequently employed research 
designs (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 132). 
 
More recently, there has been a new wave of methodological textbooks that seek to reconsider case 
studies (Blatter and Haverland 2012) and the particular method of process tracing more concretely 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013). They argue for the revival of case study research because of changes both in 
social reality as well as in the social sciences disciplines. On the one hand, with the advances of 
globalisation, social reality has become even more complex. On the other hand, considering all the sub-
strands of disciplines like International Relations means that political scientists need to account for more 
theories in their work (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 1–7; see also Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006). As a 
result, single case studies are thought to yield more insight than what is possible through cross-
comparison or larger statistical studies (della Porta and Keating 2008c, 4). Critics of KKV have long 
acknowledged the usefulness of case studies for exploratory work, theory building, testing and 
uncovering causal mechanisms instead of causal effects (e.g. Eckstein 1975; George and Bennett 2005, 
213; Gerring 2004, 349–350; Brady and Collier 2004, 277). In addition, the newer books have argued 
that case studies are especially useful for their ability to include both idealistic and material 
understanding of the world and a consideration of both structures and agency, essentially ‘overcoming 
the incommensurable difference between constitutive and causal approaches in explaining social reality’ 
(Blatter and Haverland 2012, 8).  
 
This dissertation looks to answer how peace negotiations are or can be made more legitimate related to 
the involvement of civil society. Because of the nature of current theories of legitimacy as reviewed in 
the last chapter (primarily focusing on the state as a unit of analysis) and the literature on participation in 
                                                        
22 Though Brady and Collier argue their work is founded on an ‘essentially similar epistemology’ (to KKV), and 
warn that an exploration of epistemology ‘may sometimes lead researchers .... to take sides and to engage in 
polemics’ (2004, 7). Bevir and Kedar counter however that the ‘absence of philosophical reflection has been filled 
by an over-emphasis or perhaps even fetishization of methodology’ (2008, 514).  
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peace negotiations with little theoretical rigour, the question is essentially one of theory building. Case 
study research, and more specifically process-tracing, are ideal for dealing with ‘complex, abstract 
phenomena’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 19) under which legitimacy certainly falls. Accordingly, case 
study research is important and insightful, not merely as a second-best additional method of inference, 
but in its own right. It is particularly useful for researching something as abstract yet complex as 
legitimate peace negotiations.  
 
The recent work not only strengthens the argument for case studies as a method, but also clarifies the 
difference between methods on one hand and epistemology and ontology on the other. Methodologies 
implicate certain ontological and epistemological foundations but this is not strictly speaking the case for 
methods. In other words, methods, especially qualitative ones, can - in theory - be used with any 
philosophical stance (Bevir and Kedar 2008). This qualification differentiates between methodology (as a 
well equipped toolbox) and methods (as tools) (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 4). Thus, before the method 
of comprehensive process-tracing is described further below, the methodology of the research is further 
explained in the next section. 
 
3.1.1 Causal and Constructivists Perspectives 
 
This section will outline three broad perspectives in the philosophy of science, namely positivists, 
(critical) realists and constructivists who work with different ontological and epistemological premises. 
Their ontological differences (as naturalists or anti-naturalists) and pursuant epistemological assumptions 
on causality is considered in order to show the relevance of a constructivist ontology and 
epistemological pluralism for this research in the next section. 
 
Different researchers have different views on causality, informed by their ontological and 
epistemological approaches, which will inform the research methods that they choose to follow. Whilst 
numerous groups of scholars exist, all with different perspectives on the philosophy of science (and 
degrees of willingness to discuss this), three broad perspectives that are widely used are particularly 
useful to explain the methodology of this research. These are the positivist, (critical) realist and 
constructivist schools of thought. They can also be divided - ontologically - into naturalists and anti-
naturalists camps (Bevir and Kedar 2008; Moses and Knutsen 2012).  
 
The first school of thought, the positivists are furthest along the naturalist spectrum. The ontological 
premise for this group is that an objective reality exists in the world, which means that law-like 
generalisations and the (probabilistic) establishment of causal relations is possible (Sil 2004, 314).  
Epistemologically, the aim is to discover and explain patterns that are assumed to exist in the real world. 
This research supposes that definitions are and must be value free and that concepts can be 
operationalised in a non-prescriptive manner (Hawkesworth 2006, 48; Moses and Knutsen 2012, 8).  
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The second group, the realists, still makes the ontological assumption that reality is objective (e.g. 
George and Bennett 2005, 131). Nevertheless, epistemologically speaking there is a degree of uncertainty 
with regards to knowledge gaining. Some elements in the social world, whilst they do exist, are not 
observable. Karl Popper was a critical rationalist who argued in his falsification theory that things can 
never be proven to be true but merely disproven (Hawkesworth 2006, 32). Causal knowledge may be 
possible for realists much like for positivists, but causal laws do not govern everything. Here, as 
elsewhere, the epistemological preference depends entirely on where on the spectrum the researcher 
finds herself in. A more critical variation of realists will propose that knowledge is socially conditioned 
and subject to challenges and reinterpretations (della Porta and Keating 2008b, 24). This includes some 
constructivist scholars.   
 
Usually though, constructivists prefer to be aligned to the constitutive philosophical approaches, which 
stand firmly in the anti-naturalists camp and is the third school of thought which is discussed. The 
ontological assumption for constructivist research implies that there is no independent objective reality 
that can be observed; rather such reality can only be accessed by seeking to understand its subjective 
construction. As a result, a constructivist looks at what constitutes the world. There is no causality per se; 
at best regularities of meaning that enable and constrain interpretations and actions can be uncovered. 
Epistemologically, the aim is to reconstruct meaning or understand (‘verstehen’) the meaning of human 
behaviour or actions within a certain cultural and social framework (della Porta and Keating 2008b, 26; 
see also Halperin and Heath 2012, 49; Sil 2004, 317). Note that understanding is arguably an inadequate 
term, as at best the aim is to reconstruct or deconstruct interpretations of meaning. At the most extreme, 
post-fundamentalists would even argue that the ‘subjectivity inherent in each and every human act makes 
it impossible to establish the ‘truth’ of even the most basic observational statement about the social 
world’ (Sil 2004, 317; see also George and Bennett 2005, 130).  Whilst there is a spectrum of different 
epistemologies amongst interpretivist researchers, a few epistemological characteristics are widely 
accepted: Knowledge is socially situated; closely associated to power and is inter-subjective, carried by 
individuals but anchored in the collective. Thus knowledge can be obtained, but only very carefully, and 
with great self-awareness and scepticism (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 194). 
 
Whilst it is argued that methods are in theory simply tools that can be used with any type of 
methodological approach, in reality ontological and epistemological preferences are usually inclined 
towards certain methods. As such, positivists are most known for using quantitative methods and on the 
other end of the spectrum constructivist researchers primarily for using qualitative methods, often based 
on textual analysis. This is also related to the assumptions on causal or constitutive logic, which work 
best in relation to certain research methods. In fact, the three schools of thoughts broadly relate to the 
three types of epistemological assumptions - Humean causality, mechanistic causality and a constitutive 
approach.  
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The ‘classic’ interpretation of causality - which positivists relate to - is based on the work of the 
empiricist David Hume who considered causality as a conjunction between factors regarding their 
regular association or regularity (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 24).23 Law-like generalisations are made 
through correlations and as a result causal relations are seen to be probabilistic. The idea is to make 
general or nomothetic statements about the world, rather than particular ones (Moses and Knutsen 
2012, 9). These positivist standards of causality have often been applied to qualitative work, largely 
because of the influence of KKV on research design (1994 see above). Only a decade later did scholars 
begin to criticise these assumptions, which hugely affected the perceived relevance of case studies.  
 
The critics from the realist camp argued that causal relations refer to more than just variables, as KKV 
depicted them. Instead, there are causal mechanisms that include the linkages between the variables, which 
thus requires an unpacking of the black box of causality to understand the entire process taking place 
(see e.g. Beach and Pedersen 2013, 37; George and Bennett 2005, 138–9; Sil 2004, 313–4). This critique 
has resulted in a return to a mechanistic understanding of causality. Incorporating ideas from René 
Descartes, the emphasis of knowledge creation is on understanding dynamic interactive influences of 
causes on an outcome - an entire mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 25). Spatial and temporal 
contingencies are of importance in order to gain deeper explanatory knowledge (George and Bennett 
2005, 140). These mechanisms are underlined by a deterministic causality, there are no error terms like 
with the probabilistic correlations in Humean causality, instead there are necessary and sufficient causes. 
George and Bennett define causal mechanisms as ‘ultimately unobservable physical, social or 
psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific 
contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information or matter to other entities’ (2005, 137). The 
renewed focus on mechanistic causality has been linked to process tracing and has also led to the 
differentiation between data-set observations, applicable to the frequentist logic proposed by KKV, and 
causal-process observations. The latter observations can offer their very own distinct leverage regarding 
causal inference and provides information about the context, process or mechanism (see Brady, Collier, 
and Seawright 2004, 12; Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004, 96; George and Bennett 2005, 147; 
Mahoney 2010). 
 
Both Humean and mechanistic causality assumes a naturalist ontology. For researchers that make anti-
naturalist assumptions neither a probabilistic Humean causality nor a deterministic mechanistic causality 
is feasible. Instead, the interpretive approach aims for a ‘rehumanized, contextualised … scientific 
                                                        
23 Though this was because Hume argued that only patterns and regularities could ever be observed, not causality 
per se. Causality, he argues, is based on our imagination not perception, thus making him quite a sceptic naturalist 
(Moses and Knutsen 2012, 25–28; 170). Methods of finding such associations - whether through induction or 
through falsification have also been discussed at length in the philosophy of science, especially after Popper 
(Hawkesworth 2006, 31). This is another area where positivists and critical realists begin to differ, despite both 
holding court in the naturalist camp. 
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practice’ (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, xii; see also Bevir and Kedar 2008, 503; C. Lynch 2006, 294). 
The roots of the interpretive approach can be traced back to the philosopher Kant, who although he 
believed in an objective world, noted that the patterns we study are of our own making and that social 
phenomena must therefore be interpreted in light of the relationships that surround it (Moses and 
Knutsen 2012, 165; 183; Yanow 2006, 10). Interpretive research focuses on reconstructing the meaning 
of subjective reality and deconstructing the power structures that are embedded in individual actors and 
actions. The end aim is to understand how events shape, and are shaped by actors and what the 
contextual meaning may be. Understanding is meant in the sense of meaning making through the 
reconstructing of interpretations. In other words, meanings - which cannot be reduced to allegedly 
objective facts - are constitutive of human actions (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 505; see also Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea 2006). Actions are evidence of beliefs and desires, meaning that the observer and society 
have an important role in constructing the patterns we study (Bevir and Rhodes 2004, 159; C. Lynch 
2008, 712; Moses and Knutsen 2012, 10).  
 
Building on Kant and others, Weber was one of the scholars who promoted such a line of thinking by 
arguing that causal explanation relied largely on interpretive understanding of the subjective motivation 
of individuals, or ‘verstehen’. This results in the need for ‘rational understanding of motivation, which 
consists in placing the act in an unintelligible and more inclusive context of meaning’ (Weber 1978b, 8).24 
This also means that any observations are theory dependent (Hawkesworth 2006, 31; Moses and 
Knutsen 2012, 182). Clifford Geertz, a cultural anthropologist develops his ideas, and cites Weber when 
he proposes, ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun.’ As a result, 
theory building concerns ‘think description’, in order to generalize within cases, not across them (Geertz 
1973, 5). For interpretivists, causal explanations are feasible - yet they are always singular in the 
contextually specific causes of historical incidents. Generalisations may still be possible across diverse 
cases, but only in the acknowledgement that this will result in a loss of a deeper understanding of a 
particular social phenomena (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 506; Yanow 2006, 11). Unlike for Humean and 
mechanistic causality, the aim is not to make probabilistic or deterministic predictions. Rather, the 
epistemological focus is on reconstructing and understanding the - socially constructed - patterns and 
regularities of the world (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 12; 192). In other words, institutions, actors and 
norms are constitutive of each other, rather than mono-causal relationships bounded by scope 
conditions (C. Lynch 2008, 709).  
 
                                                        
24 In a nod to the general overemphasis of a more positivist logic, Kristin Luker notes that ‘verstehen ... has 
connotations of tea and sympathy - a methodology not quite masculine enough for a ‘real’ science. ‘Rigorous’ 
training in the social sciences is now defined as quantitative, and the more abstractly mathematical, the better’ 
(2010, 25).  
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Having outlined these different schools of thought with regards to their ontological foundations and 
perspectives on epistemology, considering especially the possibilities of causality or constitutive logics, 
the assumptions made for this research are introduced in the following section. 
 
3.1.2 Constructivist Ontology and Epistemological Pluralism 
 
As the previous chapter on the heuristic model has shown, legitimisation is a dynamic continuous 
process, bounded by specific contexts. Though it is studied empirically, specific contextual values or 
norms are likely to play a role. Critical realists acknowledge layers of realities and thus epistemologically, 
they come close to interpretivist thought. Nonetheless, they still ontologically claim a natural world, 
which in light of the critique of a universal normativity applying to legitimisation makes this claim more 
difficult to uphold. Thus, ontologically, the research chooses to distance itself further away from a strict 
naturalist approach, acknowledging the constituted nature of at least parts of the ‘real’ world or the way 
it can be accessed (and hence a constructivist ontology). Epistemologically speaking, a mid-way between 
the two most extreme views is also best suited to the question at hand. Such an approach acknowledges 
that things we study can change in appearance when viewed from different contexts and perspectives 
and as a result, at least to a degree, social reality is constructed (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 147). 
Nonetheless, taking care to account for this construction of reality, knowledge can however also be 
generalised across cases. This is outlined further in the following, in order to show the pluralistic 
epistemology that allows for both a constitutive analysis and delineating the possibilistic causality of parts 
of the legitimisation process of peace negotiations. 
 
Inspiration is taken from the ‘pragmatist’ or ‘pluralist’ understanding of epistemology, as part of the 
‘spirit of eclecticism’ (della Porta and Keating 2008b; e.g. Sil 2004, 309). The onus for these pragmatists 
is on finding a middle ground, allowing for communication across the different research communities, 
and a rejection of fundamentalist views of the two extremes of positivism and constructivism. A ‘flexible 
middle ground’ is between ‘objectivism and relativism, and between causal explanations and interpretive 
understanding’ (Sil 2004, 317). Advocates for this pragmatic approach argue that this actually helps 
scientific progress as barriers are taken down to answer the question at hand (Moses and Knutsen 2012, 
163). Social factors may be too complex for parsimonious explanations and generalisations but only 
understanding the motivations of actors with no attempt of explanation or causation is also redundant 
(della Porta and Keating 2008c, 14).25 Hence advocates argue that reality is at least partly constructed, 
but we can still look at events, actors and mechanisms and interpret them according to our own 
                                                        
25 As is argued below, this division undertaken by Sil and others of either ‘objectivism’ or ‘relativism’ / either 
‘causal explanations’ or ‘interpretive understanding’ can be rather simplistic in its attempt to make a neat dualistic 
explanation of the ‘pragmatic approach’ or the ‘middle ground’. Depending on the individual researcher, they will 
argue that they are not carrying out relativism or also explain despite being constructivists, or as positivists also 
seek to understand etc.  As such these definitions are only used to establish the idea of a middle ground with the 
delineation of plural epistemology for the work in question being explained in more detail in the following sections.  
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conceptual understanding of time and proximity (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 14). This makes a 
pluralistic epistemology particularly relevant for the research at hand.  
 
Whilst an objective reality of legitimacy does not seem ontologically plausible, the construction of 
legitimacy can be assessed on the basis of different epistemological assumptions. The research seeks to 
answer the question of how peace negotiations are made more legitimate (through the involvement of 
civil society). This can be answered in two ways by considering a) what constitutes the legitimisation 
process and b) why these constitutive components were possible. For the first part, theoretically-framed 
interpretations of what was happening will help to understand what was taking place in the legitimisation 
process. The interpretation of meaning in communication, beliefs and ideas that give people reasons for 
action are essential to understanding political issues and, according to the philosopher Charles Taylor, 
especially legitimacy (Halperin and Heath 2012, 41). 
 
The causal analysis of why the constitutive components of legitimacy were possible, which refers to the 
second part of the question, looks to explain what is occurring and is inspired by mechanistic causality, 
albeit without a positivist ontology. Rather, for the purposes of this work, within certain time and space 
constraints, which can be called ‘natural’, certain knowledge of the social world is possible. Within a 
certain space and time generalisation are deterministic, resulting in possibilistic generalisations. 
Therefore, a causal analysis allows for the tracing of the interaction between different conditions that 
together can make possibilistic generalisations (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 82). In summary, the 
causality referred to in this work is inspired by mechanistic causality, based on the aim of making 
possibilistic generalisations, and therefore is labelled possibilistic causality. Even when seemingly framed in 
deterministic language of causality or causal pathways, the determinism is related only to a certain space 
and time, according to the ontological assumptions of this work. Causality does not paint the complete 
analysis, but in fact helps to explain why the constitutive components of the legitimisation process were 
possible or enabled. This approach of epistemological pluralism allows for the inclusion of both agency-
centred and structural reasons, as well as ideational and material accounts for explanations (Blatter and 
Haverland 2012, 13).  
 
Mark Bevir and Roderick Rhodes argue that there is a false dichotomy between understanding and 
explanation, and that the combination of both allows for not just understanding action, but also 
explaining it (2004, 159; see also Wendt 1998).26 In the same way, the plural epistemology is not a strict 
duality between the causal analysis as explanation and the constitutive analysis as providing 
understanding. Rather, the pluralist epistemological approach lets the question of how peace 
negotiations become more legitimate be answered in a comprehensive manner, through exploring the 
                                                        
26 Alexander Wendt also argues that ‘rather than engaging in gate-keeping against each other as the purveyors of 
false epistemological gods, positivists and post-positivists in IR would do better instead to focus on the respective 
logics, explanatory potentials, and truth conditions of those questions’ (1998, 117). 
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constitutive components of the legitimisation process and the causal reasons or conditions that enable 
these. Both of the different types of analysis in combination provide a better understanding and 
explanation of the legitimisation process. On the whole however, the constitutive analysis primarily 
contributes to an understanding (defined as meaning making through the reconstruction of 
interpretations) and the causal analysis provides explanation. In other words, the examination of the 
empirical data on the basis of the theoretical features of legitimacy from the heuristic model aims to 
provide understand what constitutes the legitimisation process (‘verstehen’), through a constitutive 
analysis of the peace negotiations to end war in Liberia in 2003 and to stop post-election violence in 
Kenya in 2008. Additional explanation (‘erklären’) can be given by a causal analysis of why the 
constitutive components came to be. This takes place in the temporal and spatial bounds of possibilistic 
causality. The causal analysis allows for both an idea of how specific conditions interact as well as 
weighing the importance of different factors (see also Vennesson 2008).  
 
Having outlined the methodological assumptions being made in this case study research - of both a 
constructivist ontology and a pluralistic epistemology - the next question is what type of methods to 
apply. The underestimation of case studies as a qualitative research method in recent years, alongside 
only limited discussion on the topic, means that the current work on process tracing does not adequately 
suit the elaborations on methodology as outline above. Hence, a new variation of the method of 
process-tracing is proposed, which is described in the next section. 
 
3.2 Research Design 
 
The research considers legitimacy of peace negotiations and the role of civil society actors, trying to 
uncover the ‘black box’ of their legitimising effects, ultimately answering how negotiations become more 
legitimate. What follows below is a description of the methods used to carry out the work, as well as the 
introduction of the two case studies that are considered in this research.  
 
3.2.1 Comprehensive Process-Tracing 
 
Having described the constructivist ontology and epistemological pluralism, the methodological 
assumptions will now be put into practice. No current method adequately covers these assumptions, 
which is why I develop a variation of process-tracing which I label comprehensive process-tracing. This 
adaption of process-tracing encapsulates both a constitutive analysis (i.e. what constitutes the 
legitimisation process) and a causal analysis (i.e. why do these constitutive components occur). After 
reviewing current ideas on process-tracing, the understanding and two parts of comprehensive process-
tracing are sketched out, before showing how the process-tracing is carried out as part of a process of 
abduction.  
 
54 
 
Process-tracing, initially formulated by Alexander George is conceived as a within-case study method 
whereby the research can get closer to the ‘mechanisms or micro-foundations behind observed 
phenomena’ (George and Bennett 2005, 149). For others, process-tracing means linking events to 
outcome (della Porta and Keating 2008c, 13; Vennesson 2008, 231) or the tracing of causal mechanisms 
(and chains) between the independent and dependent variable (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 2; George and 
Bennett 2005, 206). It allows for ‘gaining deep insights into the perceptions and motivations of 
important actors’ (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 25; see also Vennesson 2008, 233). Whilst KKV saw 
process-tracing as a useful instrument to increase the number of observations (variables), in their eyes it 
does not on its own yield causal inference. As such, it is only plausible in combination with other 
methods (1994, 227–228). The work of their critics, including David Collier and Henry Brady, however 
propose the use of ‘causal process observations’ instead of ‘data-set observations’. The former, as 
previously discussed, will give much more detail about specific context and mechanisms, allowing for 
‘distinctive leverage in causal inference’ (Brady, Collier, and Seawright 2004, 12; see also Mahoney 2010, 
123).  
 
Process-tracing as a method has nevertheless long been underestimated at best, if not outright 
misunderstood, despite its usefulness in social science research. Apart from its description in the seminal 
textbook on case study research by George and Bennett (2005), which only gives a partial account, there 
has been little methodological consensus or interest. When applied or described, the conceptualisation 
has been much more standardised than the original formulation intended it to be, focusing mostly on 
causality, deduction and causal mechanisms (Vennesson 2008, 232). In the last few years however, in line 
with a revivalism of case study research more generally, there has been a renewed interest in process 
tracing. One of the key developments in the area comes from the book on the topic by Derek Beach and 
Rasmus Pedersen. They differentiate between theory-testing; theory-building and explaining outcome 
process tracing (2013, 9–22). 27  Only the latter two versions of process-tracing are relevant to the 
research question at hand, which is both outcome-oriented (explaining and understanding what 
constitutes a legitimation process) as well as trying to build (on) theory considering the broader research 
question: How exactly to peace agreements become more legitimate? The ‘explaining outcome’ type of 
process-tracing favours a case specific explanation with limited theoretical ambition beyond the case 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013, 15–19). The aim is to pinpoint conditions, which in the words of the authors 
requires an ‘eclectic conglomerate mechanism … [whereby] it is usually necessary to include non-
systematic parts in the causal mechanisms, defined as a mechanism that is case specific’ (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013, 19). The process-tracing that emphasis theory-building is indubitably more theory-centric 
and generalizes beyond the question at hand, albeit to a spatially or temporally bounded context (Beach 
and Pedersen 2013, 16).  
                                                        
27 These different versions of one method also broadly speaking overlap in terms of the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions with the types of case studies as outlined by Blatter and Haverland: co-variational cases; 
causal process-tracing and congruence analysis (2012, 23–31).  
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As discussed previously, a rigid epistemological approach can constrain research work. This is why 
Vennesson proposes that ‘combining a positivist and interpretivist perspective in process-tracing is a 
stimulating opportunity, both theoretically and empirically’ (2008, 235). Trying to balance both 
explaining an outcome and building a theory is possible when using a pluralist epistemology. The 
process-tracing which is carried out in this research is comprehensive because it includes both a 
constitutive analysis of the legitimisation process and a causal analysis that considers why the constitutive 
components came to be in the spatial and temporal context of possibilistic causality. Neither of the two 
types of process-tracing suggested by Beach and Pedersen adequately respond to both of these types of 
analysis (though they do admit potential overlaps 2013, 16). If we consider the overarching research 
question once again - how are peace negotiations made more legitimate through the involvement of civil 
society actors - we can further break this down into two parts that mirror the plural epistemology in the 
way it has been argued above. Firstly, what constituted the legitimisation process (mostly ‘verstehen’) and, 
secondly, why were these constitutive components possible or enabled (mostly ‘erklären’)? 
 
The first question is the central question in the case studies to follow. Using the features from the 
heuristic model, the components that constitute the legitimisation process are traced. A constitutive 
analysis depends very much on the subject matter, seeking to interpret and understanding the socially 
constructed patterns and regularities of the world. Therefore, the constitutive process-tracing is based on 
the theoretical features introduced as part of the heuristic model in the previous chapters. For collective 
concerns, the different collective concerns from the population are considered as well as more 
specifically any collective concerns addressed by civil society actors during the negotiations. For the 
theoretical feature of subjective representation, the focus of the constitutive process-tracing is on the 
interpretations of representation, legitimation strategies of individual actors and other forms of obvious 
descriptive and subjective representation. The aim for the constitutive analysis is not to show whether 
the process was legitimate or not, nor to trace out the degree of legitimisation, but rather to expand on 
the understanding of legitimisation by postulating what seem to be the components that constituted the 
legitimisation process in the respective cases. In that sense, perceptions are traced but these should be 
understood as interpretations of perceptions. 
 
The interpretation and tracing of the constitutive components relies heavily on empirical data. Necessary 
to such work is serious and trustworthy empirical evidence, a thorough ‘soaking and poking’ and a 
research who acts like a detective and not a statistician (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 105). Intensive 
(open-ended) interviewing, participant observation and document analysis can help to uncover 
previously unknown factors in process tracing (Vennesson 2008, 234). The empirical sources for the 
constitutive process-tracing come primarily from my own interviews and focus groups which are detailed 
below. In addition, some newspapers, books, reports and academic work is also reviewed. Process-
tracing manuals often speak of tests to be carried out to evaluate the strengths of certain mechanisms. 
More appropriate to a constructivist ontology are empirical observations which Joachim Blatter and 
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Markus Haverland propose in their discussion on process-tracing. One of these empirical observations is 
relevant for the constitutive process-tracing, namely what they call confessions (Blatter and Haverland 
2012, 117–119). Tracing confessions is done in order to gain deeper insights into the perceptions and 
motivations of the beneficiaries and guarantors of legitimacy, including explicit statements that reveal 
motivations or anticipated consequences. When perception-based analysis is carried out, this is to be 
understood as a reconstruction of meanings given by persons that can give indications on how the 
legitimisation process may work. Just as much as perceptions and motivations can only be reconstructed 
with regards to the specific meanings found in the context, the ideas of collective concerns interpreted in 
the analysis are not to be taken as universal, but are reflections of an interpretation. 
 
The second part of the comprehensive process-tracing seeks to explain why the constitutive components 
are possible. In other words, what are the causal conditions that enabled the constitutive components of 
the legitimisation process, or why did the legitimisation, via the components, occur? This uses the 
different epistemological framing in an advantageous manner whereby further depth is given by 
considering a (further) explanation of what occurred regarding the legitimisation process. Because the 
causal analysis is linked to the constitutive analysis it is not possible to carry it out for all aspects. Some 
of the constitutive components are not feasible to explain causally, especially perception related-
understandings of legitimacy. In the heuristic model, subjective representation is by definition perception 
based. Since the constitutive analysis for this feature will focus on reconstructing the meanings in 
relation to representation, epistemologically a causal analysis does not make sense. Because, as argued 
above, there is not a strict dualistic choice between ‘understanding’ (from the constitutive analysis) or 
‘explaining’ (from the causal analysis), it is not essential to carry out a causal analysis in order to have 
explanatory elements to the question of how peace negotiations become more legitimate with regards to 
the feature of subjective representation. 
 
The same is not true for collective concerns. As discussed in the previous chapter, there is an inherent 
power imbalance in the public sphere more generally, but especially during peace negotiations. Because 
of this and the fact the research question not only considers the process of legitimisation but also the 
actors who contribute to this - especially whether and in what ways this entails civil society actors - the 
second part of the comprehensive process-tracing considers especially what the constitutive components 
mean in relation to the actors. For the feature of collective concern, this is the influence of the actors. 
Hemmer et al. make the argument that the success of Track Two negotiations ‘depends on reaching 
those powerful enough to impose peace’ (2006, 134). In the same way, the legitimisation process may 
further be explained by the influence the civil society actors had in addressing the collective concerns.  
 
The causal analysis is considered in terms of possibilistic causality, but draws from the assumptions 
made for mechanistic causality in light of the plural epistemology. As a result, several steps are taken in 
the causal process-tracing of the influence of actors. First of all, what are the causal conditions, or can 
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anything be traced as being particularly relevant for the causal analysis? Here the empirical observations 
from Blatter and Haverland are revisited. This includes potential critical moments in the process that 
show the potentially relevant causal conditions, focusing on macro structural factors, what they call a 
‘comprehensive storyline’. Moreover, so-called ‘smoking guns’ allows for the observation of causal pathway or 
conjunctions (or the relationship between the causal conditions). This type of observation denotes a 
central piece of evidence within a cluster of observations at a central moment with which inductively 
strong causal claims can be made, strength being gained through a temporal and spatial connection 
between a cause and an effect. The focus here is more generally on the behaviour and capabilities of 
certain actors, in order to complement the structural focus of the comprehensive storyline (Blatter and 
Haverland 2012, 110–117).  
 
Second, in order to show how the different causal conditions work together in a mechanistic 
understanding of causality, do the different conditions have a specific amount of causal power 
individually (additive configurations) or do they depend on the other conditions (interactive 
configuration) (Blatter and Haverland 2012, 94)? Third, do these additive or interactive configurations 
work in a specific sequence, related to path dependency, and form a causal chain? Or are they causal 
conjunctions, whereby the configurations work together in the specific time period? The temporal and 
spatial boundaries will also be traced as part of the causal-process tracing. The reasons for this also 
comes from Blatter and Haverland, who make the argument that causality plays out in time and space, 
which is in turn reflected in different contingencies that are relevant to this work. A space-time 
contingency is supposed or the structural environment in crucial moments allows for causal inference, it 
is the ‘natural basis’ for such inference (2012, 95) 
 
Supplementing these two components of the comprehensive process-tracing, the context factors will 
also be detailed in order to enhance the explanation, relating back to both the constitutive and causal 
parts of the comprehensive process-tracing. Blatter and Haverland also argue for a multi-level 
contingency of causality. Accordingly, there are different types of mechanisms, both structural (material, 
ideational and institutional ones) as well as actor-centric mechanisms. This is also embedded into ideas 
of social mechanisms - situational, action-formation and transformational mechanisms (2012, 95). This is 
pertinent because the argument follows that - beyond merely the causal analysis - neither exclusively 
structural reasons (what Emile Durkheim would argue) nor exclusively agency-related reasons (what 
Weber would claim) matter. Rather, much like in the direction of what Bordieu and Giddens proposed: 
The mixture of both kinds of reasoning is relevant (see Alagappa 1995, 16). Clark makes a convincing 
case of how this may be the basis in a peacebuilding process of sorts, namely the Gacaca courts in post-
genocide Rwanda (2014). He finds that the ‘complex interaction between the state and citizenry in 
Gacaca highlight the importance of dialectical approaches to structure and agency’ (Clark 2014, 208). 
Without going into further details about these foundational theories, it suffices to say that context 
conditions, relating to both structure and agency add further explanation and understanding to the 
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comprehensive process-tracing. This is also very much in line with the constructivist ontology of the 
research process. Table 3.1 below summarises the different elements of comprehensive process-tracing, 
which is essentially an analysis carried out in three - constitutive, causal and contextual - steps. 
 
Table 3.1: A Summary of Comprehensive Process Tracing 
COMPREHENSIVE PROCESS-TRACING 
Constitutive 
Process-
Tracing 
Analysis: What components constitute the legitimisation process? 
Sources: Interviews and focus groups along with secondary sources 
Empirical Observations: Confessions (individual perceptions and motivations) 
 
 
Causal 
Process-
Tracing 
 
Analysis: Why did the constitutive components that led to legitimisation occur? 
What are the causal conditions that explain this? 
Sources: Previous constitutive analysis 
Mechanisms: Causal conditions; additive or interactive configurations; causal 
pathways or conjunctions; temporal and spatial boundaries 
Empirical Observations: Comprehensive Storylines (critical moments indicating the 
structural factors) and Smoking Guns (causal relationships between two conditions 
relating to behaviour and capabilities of actors) 
Context 
Factors 
Structure and agency-related context factors that further explain the constitutive 
components and causal conditions 
 
As shown above, the comprehensive process-tracing is based on the heuristic model of the previous 
chapter. This is because the theory-building research question of this dissertation is based in a process of 
abduction. This is detailed in the next section. 
 
3.2.2 Research Design: Process of Abduction  
 
In the previous chapter the heuristic model was presented covering two features of legitimate peace 
negotiations, namely addressing collective concerns and subjective representation. How to move from 
that to a theory of legitimate peace negotiations through the method of comprehensive process-tracing 
is the subject of this section. Considering the benefits of using both inductive and deductive reasoning, 
the abductive nature of the research is presented. 
 
One of the major bones of contention behind the different approaches to epistemology and ontology 
(and in turn methodology) is whether to work inductively or deductively. It is generally assumed that 
both the explaining-outcome and theory-building type of process tracing as described by Beach and 
Pedersen are more inductive, especially the latter (2013, 16). Blatter and Haverland also describe their 
causal process tracing case study as largely inductive (2012, 30). Process tracing is however lauded on the 
basis, that the method can be used to disclaim presumed causal mechanisms, thereby adding to theory 
development (Vennesson 2008, 234; see also Blatter and Haverland 2012, 141). Whilst this is also an 
inductive process, such theory development actually works best in combination with deductively 
working from a theoretical framework. Keeping this in mind, along with the added value of more than 
one case study (not in the sense of more n increasing the validity but because it can test the relevance of 
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specific factors in other individual cases), an abductive process is be carried out in this dissertation. This 
is based on a research model proposed by Frank Schimmelfennig (1995, 18–25).  
 
In a first step, a heuristic model was deduced from pre-existing theories on legitimacy. A literature 
review, considered existing research on civil society actors in peace negotiations as well as some more 
general theories on legitimacy in order to outline the features of legitimacy (Chapter 2). In a second step, 
this heuristic model is deductively applied to the first case study, the Liberian case of peace negotiations, 
in the comprehensive process-tracing as outlined above. In a third step, the heuristic model is revised 
inductively on the basis of the empirical observations in the first case study. An empirical puzzle is 
shown that is not adequately covered by the two features in the original heuristic model, pinpointing to a 
third feature (Chapter 4). In a fourth step, an updated heuristic model is applied to the second case 
study, the Kenyan case, again carrying out the comprehensive process-tracing (Chapter 5). In a final step 
of the abductive process, the findings from this case study (as well as building on the previous step) is 
inductively used to propose a theory of legitimacy (Chapter 6).  
 
This process of abduction is summarised in Figure 3.1 below. All deductive steps are shown with black 
arrows and the inductive steps with dotted arrows.  
 
Figure 3.1. Proces of Abduction Towards A Theory of Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
Current Theories 
of Legitimacy 
Comprehensive 
Process-Tracing 
Case Study 1 
Comprehensive 
Process-Tracing 
Case Study 2 
 
Heuristic Model 
Theory of 
Legitimate Peace 
Negotiations 
Updated Heuristic 
Model 
 
The final two sections of this chapter introduce the case studies as well as giving an outline of the 
empirical fieldwork methods. 
 
3.2.3 Introduction to Cases 
 
Much has been written about case selection and the possible repercussions of bias surrounding this 
difficult task (e.g. Geddes 1990; George and Bennett 2005, 83–84; Gerring and Seawright 2007). Since 
the basis of causal inference (or the constitutive process-tracing for that matter) is not based on the 
comparison of cases, but rather on within-case analysis, the case selection or potential bias is less 
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problematic (e.g. Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004, 95; see also Blatter and Haverland 2012, 101). 
For an abductive research design there is therefore no case selection in the traditional sense (choosing a 
case from a universe of cases). Rather a case is chosen because of its inherent interest for answering the 
question at hand. 
 
Interpretive social scientists also choose cases for what they can tell us about complex social processes 
(della Porta and Keating 2008a, 29; see also Blatter and Haverland 2012, 102; Moses and Knutsen 2012, 
132). Since the interest is in explaining the legitimising process of peace negotiations through the 
involvement of civil society actors, it makes sense to find a case where there was a strong active role for 
civil society actors. History seldom gives as such cases, argues Eckstein, which is why ‘most-likely’ cases 
are the solution (1975, 158). That is, if a theory is true at all, than this would be the case where the theory 
would fit (Bennett 2004, 29). The ‘most likely’ or interesting case for this research is chosen according to 
certain conditions. Firstly, the research in question focuses on power sharing agreements to end violent 
conflicts as introduced in the first chapter. This is related to the inherent elitist nature of power sharing 
negotiations, making the question of legitimacy and participation especially interesting. Secondly, the 
focus is on African cases. This is because power-sharing agreements have been particular prominent in 
sub-Saharan African, with mixed results (e.g. Tull and Mehler 2005; Lemarchand 2007). If we consider 
prominent work on the involvement of civil society actors in peace negotiations, Wanis St. John and 
Kew, divide civil society involvement in peace agreement into intensity of involvement, there are four 
cases with high civil society involvement (2008). These are Guatemala, Liberia, Mozambique and Sierra 
Leone. The Sierra Leonean and Mozambican agreements date back to earlier time periods, making it 
even more difficult to gauge the perception regarding the legitimisation of the agreements, as memories 
are likely to fade over time. The Liberian example however, dating back to 2003 makes a good case 
where enough time but not too much has passed in order to study the legitimisation of process. The 
Liberian case has also been used by numerous studies as an example of the involvement of civil society 
actors having a positive effect on the legitimacy of a peace process (e.g. Dupuy and Detzel 2008; Hayner 
2007; Hultin 2014, 205; Nilsson 2009, 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). The Liberian 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in Accra in 2003 was signed inter alia by 18 political parties and 
five civil society witnesses. If we consider one of the most recent collections of power-sharing 
agreements in Africa, collected by Mehler in 2009, only two of the agreements contain civil society 
signatories, even when the list is extended from 2007 to 2010 (see Appendix Table 1).28 The Liberian 
case also shows particular social significance and complexity due to its lengthy civil war prior to the 
signing of the comprehensive peace agreement. 
 
                                                        
28 The Sun City Agreement in the DRC also includes the signature of 19 political parties and 45 civil society 
representatives but the role is not widely acknowledged or often criticised, e.g. ‘… by eventually aligning 
themselves with certain armed groups, the ‘forces vives’ and the political parties gave up the peacebuilding role 
they were expected to play by polarising further and reducing the scope of the talks’ (Rogier 2003, 39). 
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Blatter and Haverland suggest that whilst choosing a case that shows a strong positive result with respect 
to the outcome of interest, a second step can be taken by looking at another case to test the relevance of 
specific factors that have been identified in the first study (2012, 25). This is similar to the building block 
technique, as suggested by Eckstein, and fits with the abductive process as outlined above. The building 
block technique works by confronting preliminary theoretical constructs with another case, allowing 
ways for amending and improving the initial findings, and hence a ‘gradual’ unfolding of a better 
interpretation (Eckstein 1975, 105). George and Bennett find the building-block technique of case 
studies particularly useful in emerging research projects, since the ‘process can outline an increasingly 
comprehensive map of all the causal paths to an outcome’ (2005, 262). Though the aim is not merely to 
show causality, but also constitutive components of the legitimisation process as outlined above, looking 
at another case does increase the relevance and potential generalizability of the theoretical findings in the 
case study.  Differences in levels and duration of conflict prior to the signing of the power-sharing 
agreement might make a difference in the components of legitimisation, making for an interesting theory 
building-block.  
 
The second case was chosen with the aim of broadening the applicability of the insights derived from 
the first case, by looking at a case where the level of violence preceding the peace negotiations was lower 
and the civil society did not have a direct Track I role in the negotiations. Since the current literature 
states that the more democratic a country is, the less important the role of civil society actually is, this is 
also a consideration in choosing the second case study of the building-block (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. 
John and Kew 2008). Power-sharing agreements are not only used as a tool to solve civil wars, but also 
other violent crises, such as instances of post-election violence. Research on power-sharing agreements 
regarding mitigating post-election violence is not as frequent as the studies on power-sharing after civil 
war (notable exceptions include Le Van 2011; Mehler 2009). This is despite the fact that ‘[power-sharing] 
agreements ... bestow external legitimacy on elite bargains that drive a wedge between politicians and 
citizens’ (Le Van 2011, 32). Because such dynamics of actors involved in the negotiations of power-
sharing agreements may have profound implications for the research question at hand, such an instance 
is used. Notable cases of power-sharing post-election agreements in the given time frame include 
Zimbabwe and Kenya. Since Kenya is particularly known for its vibrant civil society, it makes for a good 
second-step case study in order to refine the implications from the Liberian case. Unlike the Liberian 
case, civil society did not play a direct role in the negotiations, but in accordance with Wanis-St. John 
and Kew, a direct role for civil society is less import and will suffice to have a positive correlation to 
durable peace because of the higher levels of democracy in the country (2008, 30). Therefore, Kenya is 
something of a most likely case of an example of power-sharing agreements after a political crisis with 
short-term violence (and is more democratic than Zimbabwe). The Kenyan negotiations in 2008 have 
also been noted as an example of a positive contribution of civil society actors to such a process (e.g. 
McGhie and Wamai 2011). For both of these cases considerable fieldwork was conducted, which is 
outlined in the next section.  
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3.3 Empirical Fieldwork  
 
According to Blatter & Haverland, data generation is the most important step for case study research 
(2012, 26; see also Wood 2007 who makes a similar argument for the importance of fieldwork data for 
process-tracing). Furthermore, inspired by an ethnographic approach, a researcher must focus on 
meanings that actors give to their actions and consider the contextual setting, giving the study a holistic, 
in-depth, framing (Bray 2008, 298; della Porta and Keating 2008a, 31). Therefore what is sometimes 
called ‘thick description’, the aim of which is ‘studying a phenomenon in its own dynamic context’ is also 
deemed relevant in this research. This is because allowing for elements of thick descriptions means that 
‘more can be intrinsically understood about it than by simply examining it in isolation’ (Bray 2008, 302). 
For this dissertation, a total of seven months fieldwork was conducted in Liberia and Kenya, between 
2011 and 2014.29 Empirical evidence used in this dissertation comes from a total of 60 interviews and 6 
focus groups in Liberia and 55 interviews in Kenya along with 6 focus groups.  
 
3.3.1 Local Level Research: Introducing the Local Arenas 
 
In a first phase in 2011, field research was conducted in Liberia and Kenya with the aim of 
understanding the motivations of civil society representation in peace negotiations. Though a number of 
elite-interviews were conducted in the respective capitals, the focus of the research was in so-called ‘local 
arenas’. Kathrin Heitz argues that the local political arena is the key for a better assessment of the 
political strategies that are decided at the national level (2009, 110; see also Neumann 2011, 50).  
 
Especially in the sub-Saharan African context it is argued that the ‘local’ level, or sub-national, plays a 
significant role in legitimisation. Discussing popular legitimacy in multi-ethnic states in sub-Saharan 
Africa, Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg find that there has often been a system of ‘virtual 
representation’ to gain popular legitimacy, partially through for example the practice of receiving 
petitioners from different regions and localities in the country, encouraging rural people to bring their 
various needs and grievances to the personal attention of the rulers in question (1984, 193–4). Political 
weight of an individual actor is thus often related back to the mobilisation capacity she or he has at the 
local level, rather than on any social and ideological basis. As such, Chabal argues that there are two 
different types of legitimacy in the African context, the national and the local, which are governed by 
different rules. Even when politicians lose national legitimacy, they seek to retain local legitimacy (Chabal 
2009, 52). If this line of argumentation was followed, there would be a theoretical basis to differentiation 
between local and national understandings of legitimacy. As I will show in the empirical chapters, whilst 
the beneficiaries of legitimacy (the population) is surely heteoregenous, the differentiation between ‘local’ 
and ‘national’ level is perhaps not as clear-cut as this would suggest. In fact, more artificial or obvious 
                                                        
29 The fieldwork was conducted simultaneously alongside research for the ‘Local Arenas of Power-Sharing’ project 
and funded by the German Research Council’s Priority Programme 1448 ‘Creativity and Adaptation in Africa’. 
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reasons (mainly related to infrastructure) will affect the perception of legitimisation, but this is not 
necessarily because of theoretical differences as the outlined literature suggests. Regarding the empirical 
research and the methodological approach however, it makes sense to conduct research at the so-called 
‘local’ level. This is outlined in the following, albeit not as a theoretical argument but rather as a method 
of research. Local-level research as part of an empirical research method allows taking into consideration 
particular context conditions and previous conflict dynamics that may be harder to detangle in urban 
capitals. 
 
The study of the so-called local level is in line with more recent developments in peace and conflict 
studies known as the micro-theoretic turn. According to one of the major proponents of the micro-
theoretic turn, Stathis Kalyvas, ‘urban bias is a serious problem because it distorts data and 
conceptualizations of civil war dynamics; it tends to privilege written sources, ‘top-down’ perspectives, 
ideological or normative motivations of participants, and fixed, unchanging identities and choices over 
oral sources, ‘bottom-up’ perspectives, non-ideological motivations of participants, and fluid identities 
and choices’ (2006, 42, see also 2003). Recent years have seen a significant increase in studies 
characterised by a focus on sub-national dynamics and disaggregated conflict data projects. 30  The 
method-based argument for local level research does not mean, however, that the so-called ‘local’ level is 
easily defined. The idea of the local level has faced increasing attention not only because of the micro-
theoretic turn, but also due to the local turn in critical peacebuilding (e.g. Mac Ginty and Richmond 
2013). Building on the earlier work of Lederach on communitarian peacebuilding, this critical research 
endeavour tries to take the emphasis away from the national top-down liberal peacebuilding (often in 
line with external interventions) and focus on the bottom-up, ‘every-day’ and ‘authentic’ peace (e.g. 
Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; Paffenholz 2014b). Nevertheless, the idea of the local tends to 
remain fuzzy and pertain to essentialised characteristics, harming its analytical value, as I have argued 
elsewhere (Simons and Zanker 2014; see also Hirblinger and Simons 2014). 
 
Despite these shortcomings, assuming this local level or local arena to be a basic administrative unit at 
the sub-national level, an internal within country case selection was made. In each country, two cases or 
local arenas were therefore chosen elected on the basis of being former hotspots during the preceding 
violence, one being peaceful since the conflict has ended, and one less so, with recurring conflict or 
tension.31 Fieldwork showed that this differentiation was somewhat artificial. This is not really surprising 
since a clear dichotomy of peaceful and non-peaceful former hotspots is not likely; arenas are much 
more likely to maintain levels of peacefulness on something akin to a continuum (Autesserre 2009). 
                                                        
30 The idea of subnational comparison is of course not entirely new. See for example Lijphart (1971, 689) and 
Snyder (2001, 104). 
31 The reason for such a case selection (and challenges related to this) was related to the other research being 
conducted simultaneously on the local arenas of power sharing. In term of the process of legitimisation, this 
differentiation is not argued to make a difference. 
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Again, theoretically the differentiation is not argued to make a difference with regards to the 
legitimisation process, but as a research method helps to give broader context factors more generally. 
 
The case selection of the local arenas was carried out using a combination of conflict location data sets, 
further secondary sources and expert advice. It has been described at length elsewhere (see Simons and 
Zanker 2012). The case selection led to finding a total of four local arenas for the two countries, where 
most of the interviews as well as the focus groups were conducted. 
 
In Liberia, the final case selection led me to two towns in central and north Liberia. Both former rebel 
strongholds, Gbarnga is in the centrally located Bong County and Ganta in northern Nimba County. 
Both the towns of Gbarnga and Ganta played prominent roles and were severely affected by violence 
throughout the Liberian conflict. The former, Gbarnga, became the headquarters of Charles Taylor, 
when he named it the capital of greater Liberia in 1990 (Ellis 2007, 92). The town was destroyed in the 
various phases of the civil war and continues to be fragile in the aftermath (for more on Gbarnga, 
especially after the war see Simons et al. 2013, 690–691). Ganta, a bustling border town, a short distance 
from the border to Guinea, was particularly affected by the second period of violent conflict (e.g. 
Munive 2010, 15). Persons associated to former pro-Taylor rebels still control the town, together with a 
high concentration of former ex-combatants and increasing urbanisation has led to post-war land 
conflicts (for more details see Simons et al. 2013, 691).  
 
In the very different setting of Kenya, one region particularly affected by the post-election violence was 
the Rift Valley. Amongst the worst affected areas were those surrounding the towns of Nakuru (Nakuru 
District) and Eldoret (Uasin Gishu District), the two local arenas of research. The rural communities 
surrounding Eldoret were the scene of roadblocks, property looting and houses being burnt down. Most 
infamously, dozens of people were killed when a church in Kiambaa village close to Eldoret where they 
had taken refuge was set alight by an angry mob. Whilst most of the destruction and killings in Eldoret 
involved predominantly Kalenjin supporters as the perpetrators and Kikuyus as the victims, roles were 
reversed in Nakuru (see CIPEV 2008 Chapter 3). Further south in the Rift Valley Province, this town 
became the scene of violence perpetrated by Kikuyus against Kalenjins. The Kikuyu population boomed 
in Nakuru as Internally Displaced People came there fleeing from violence in other places.  
 
3.3.2 Fieldwork Methods 
 
In each of the two arenas in the countries, focus group discussions were conducted with market women, 
teachers and youth, with a total of 12 focus groups being carried out and analysed for this research. 
Focus groups are an important tool to study attitudes, perspectives and experiences, and ‘the contrasting 
and comparing among the participants help to better elucidate motivations and reasoning’ (Söderström 
2011, 147; see also Lloyd-Evans 2006). The focus groups were conducted with groups of about six to 
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ten participants, and were organised and carried out with the help of moderators and research assistants 
in each of the countries.32 The discussions groups usually lasted a few hours and included questions 
concerning what collective grievances were perceived during the violence and if these were addressed or 
not in the peace negotiations, and by whom. Participants were also asked if they feel these grievances 
remain today. The focus group discussions additionally acted as a more general forum to test whether 
there is knowledge about civil society representation in some of the areas which were most affected by 
the conflict. Whilst focus groups are not representative of a population, they are a useful method to 
develop an understanding of a concept as well as unusual or different angles that might be of 
importance. This makes it particularly conducive to be used as part of the comprehensive process-
tracing method as outlined above, especially with regards to the constitutive analysis. 
 
Semi-structured interviews with local stakeholders (as well as the major civil society actors usually based 
in Nairobi and Monrovia) supplemented the focus groups, allowing for a better understanding of any 
other grievances that may exist in the area, legitimacy of civil society actors and other issues involved in 
the negotiation process. Interviews are particularly useful in combination with other research methods 
such as focus groups. Furthermore, interviewing ‘offers a unique method and source of information 
since it provides research with depth, detail and perspective on a certain research question, and at a 
certain moment in time’ (Brounéus 2011, 131). A combination of both specific targeting as well as the 
snowball sampling technique was applied to choose interview partners who included local government 
officials, civil society representatives, religious leaders and other locally relevant stakeholders (for non-
random sampling selection of interviewees see Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004, 269; for the usefulness 
of snowballing in a volatile setting see Vlassenroot 2006, 195). In order to gain a better understanding of 
the proceedings of the negotiations and the role of civil society, civil society members were also asked 
about how much influence they think they had, whether they felt that their involvement increased 
legitimacy (and why/how), as well as what efforts were made to bring the content of the peace 
negotiations and agreement to the grassroots level. Both the focus groups and the interviews were later 
analysed and coded using Max QDA software. An overview of the question template for both the 
interviews and appendix are provided in the appendix. 
 
To a lesser degree, participatory observation was also carried out. Whilst of course this was not done at 
the time of the peace negotiations, I attended major civil society stakeholder events in order to observe 
their function and behaviour in the peace implementation process. More closely linked to the research 
was the attendance at a follow-up conference organised by Kofi Annan for the Kenyan peace talks, the 
‘Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation: Building a Progressive Kenya’ Conference, held in 
                                                        
32 In Liberia Moderators were Felesu Swaray (Youth and Teachers in Gbarnga), Beatrice Duana (Market Women in 
Gbarnga and Ganta), Claudius Mehtua (Youth and Teachers in Ganta) and Magnus Marvey (research assistance). 
In Kenya, Dr. David Okeyo was the moderator and Leah Ngugi and Silas Kipchumba were research assistants in 
Nakuru and Eldoret respectively.  
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Nairobi in December 2011.33 Less closely linked to the actual peace process, but equally illustrative of 
Liberian civil society was the participation at several meetings including one on Security Sector Reform 
(Monrovia, September 2013) and a civil society organisation Stakeholder Meeting with the Governance 
Commission to discuss decentralisation (Monrovia, January 2014). In a second phase of fieldwork 
(2013/14), which was carried out only in Liberia, the initial analysis and ideas were discussed with the 
major civil society stakeholders that had been part of the peace process. This was done in order to gauge 
whether the theoretical developments and heuristic model had any relevance for those who had taken 
part in the actual process. Lastly, the empirical analysis also uses secondary literature and newspaper 
sources wherever relevant.  
 
3.3.3 Reflecting on Fieldwork in Post-Conflict Countries 
 
Reflecting on fieldwork has garnered increasing attention in peace and conflict studies in the last decade. 
As a result there are a number of text books and articles discussing personal reflections related to issues 
of trust, access and ethics (e.g. Smyth and Robinson 2001; Sriram et al. 2009; Vlassenroot 2006). Others 
have focused on the usefulness of specific research methods in conflict or post-conflict settings (e.g. 
Höglund and Öberg 2011). Moreover, some have focused specifically on Africa (e.g. Thomson, Amsons, 
and Murison 2013) and include an entire panel dedicated to the subject at the European Conference on 
African Studies in 2013 (e.g. Henry 2013). Whilst all these make important contributions and prove 
invaluable learning tools for newcomers to the field, there is more generally speaking a fine line between 
reflecting on one’s own research with regards to what this may mean for the interpretation of the 
research and putting too much emphasis on the reflection of the self. Particularly in the conflict or post-
conflict setting, this can result in an overemphasis of the uniqueness of the researcher, trying to struggle 
with the emotional and sometimes physical toll of fieldwork. Ultimately, an over-emphasis of the 
researchers own role can potentially lead to a fetishisation of these very conflict settings, reinforcing a 
division between researcher and research subjects. Additionally, it can further add to the vicious circle of 
fear-creation of working in certain settings (see Autesserre 2014b, 223–226 for more on this). 
 
Nevertheless, at least a degree of reflection is necessary in line with the epistemological assumptions of 
anti-naturalists, whereby the researcher cannot abstract themselves from their prior web of beliefs. As a 
result, social science will ultimately take place within a particular linguistic, historical and normative 
standpoint (Bevir and Kedar 2008, 506–7; see also Creswell 1998, 5). Other scholars have expanded on 
this, pointing to the existence of the hermeneutic circle in constructivist research (see C. Lynch 2008, 
709; Hermann 2001, 78). This line of thinking supports the idea of the researcher’s own role in 
interpretation. The hermeneutic circle stands both for the ‘circular, iterative sense-making … [in order 
                                                        
33 For a detailed programme see 
http://www.dialoguekenya.org/conference/kndr%20building%20a%20progressive%20kenya%202011.pdf  
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to] revises one’s initial, provisional interpretation’ over time (a method of interpretation) and the ‘reading 
back and forth between text and context … the ever-circular process of meaning making’ (the context of 
interpretation) (C. Lynch 2008, 709–710 citing from Yanow). In summary, the hermeneutic circle asks 
the research to think contextually and to interpret any results in a circular manner.  
 
Therefore, applying the hermeneutic circle as a method begs for a constant interpretation and re-
interpretation in light of the researchers own biases. Long before one sets out into the field, the 
worldviews and opinions of the researcher are likely to affect the research agenda (C. Lynch 2008, 708). 
Once in the field, sensibilities, interest and characteristics will make certain stories seem more plausible 
or their authors more sympathetic (see also Armakolas 2001, 171; Vlassenroot 2006, 197 for similar 
points). For my part, at the outset of this research was a political and personal belief that the idea of 
‘local ownership’ - whatever this may mean - is of essence in any type of peacebuilding. The starting 
point was therefore a normative belief that civil society inclusion per se was a ‘good thing’ to be 
supported. This did not mean however, that I assumed research on civil society or local ownership or 
their definitions to be straightforward. Moreover, underlying this was the stronger commitment that only 
well founded, balanced research could ultimately contribute to the knowledge creation of this rather 
fuzzy topic. As Bevir and Asaf Kedar note ‘an encounter with the beliefs or meanings of social actors 
always has the potential to send out ripples through a scholar’s own beliefs, altering their understanding 
of, say, their research agendas, the traditions in which they work, or their normative commitments’ 
(2008, 507). As my findings in later chapters ultimately show, my worldview was continuously 
challenged, which led me to re-think and re-analyse the findings over and over again, ultimately pushing 
me along in this hermeneutic circle. 
 
In order to facilitate this ‘two-way channel of knowledge construction’ (C. Lynch 2008, 719), I was lucky 
enough to revisit the Liberian context on two further occasions after some time had passed, which gave 
me an opportunity to further discuss and contextualise my preliminary findings. This helps in 
contributing to the hermeneutic circle in its understanding as the context of interpretation. Abstaining 
from all reflections and taking empirical data as fact - especially data as subjective as the one presented 
here - would obfuscate the knowledge making process. When using empirical data the aim is to give an 
‘authentic insight into people’s experiences’ (Vlassenroot 2006, 194). Therefore the context matters. On 
one level this is addressed throughout the dissertation, which follows a multi-epistemological design 
exactly for this purpose. On another level, the context refers to the qualitative data collection process 
itself, transparently presenting any challenges that may affect the interpretation of the data or its context. 
This includes questions of access, trust and the narratives of respondents. Tamar Hermann suggests that 
the data-collection part is the hardest for ‘outsiders’ as supposed to ‘insiders’ (2001, 82). This is also why 
Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea speak of ‘accessing data’ rather than collecting it (2006).  
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Despite the history of extreme conflict intensity in Liberia compared to Kenya, research was more 
challenging in Kenya. My fieldwork in the wake of the arrest warrants from the ICC against - at the time 
six - persons accused of crimes against humanity during the 2007/8 post-election violence, translated 
into a highly politicised and ethnicised research setting. This resulted in some thinly veiled threats to not 
to talk to certain people, persistent phone calls to the same effect and some refusals to talk to me. It 
meant that in some parts of the focus group, participants felt too uncomfortable to speak openly. It also 
ensued that one of my research assistants overheard participants in another focus group debating in a 
local language in their lunch break, whether I was a spy for the ICC (see Vlassenroot 2006, 197 for a 
similar experience).  
In post-conflict settings, like in many others, the often highly fraught political nature of events makes 
researchers immediately seem suspicious. Moreover, the question of neutrality - and whether it should be 
maintained at all costs - is a difficult one. The careful balancing act of listening to all sides and trying to 
remain neutral can be challenging. For the most part, I refrained from voicing my own opinions. 
However at times, I could not leave opinions and statements uncommented, especially when they 
second-guessed my own purposes. I also chose very deliberately not to talk to some people. For 
example, the Senior Senator of Nimba County, Liberia in 2011, Prince Johnson, could have been an 
interesting person to interview regarding his opinions on the social and political peace process that has 
unfolded in Liberia and also his very own attendance at numerous peace talks. I had talked to his 
counterpart, the Senior Senator of Bong County, Jewel Howard Taylor. I had several options and points 
of access to contact him. Nevertheless, considering his very publically known involvement in the torture 
and murder of former President Doe, I deliberately chose not to. It was after all not necessary for my 
research, so I made that choice that my personal opinion would allow me, in this case, to refrain from an 
interview.  
Concerning access, my biological and sociological characteristics undoubtedly affected the respondents I 
could talk to and the way they interacted with me. Being a young woman made the entrance into 
patriarchal societies that are also built on age hierarchies challenging at times. Power hierarchies can also 
work in favour of research feasibility. Being a young women was therefore sometimes an advantage as 
some interviewees felt this meant they could talk particularly freely and openly as they did not feel 
threatened by me (see also Autesserre 2014b, 286).  I found in addition, that my outsider status - being a 
white European - meant that I was nevertheless given a surprising level of access. This was especially the 
case in Liberia, where white Westerners walking around on foot or taking any forms of public transport 
were quite a novelty, so there was an interest in talking to me. At the same time, this underscores that 
power hierarchies are still firmly in place in many of the settings I worked in (see also Hermann 2001; 
Autesserre 2014b, 286). Ultimately, flexibility according to the context remains the best option, for 
example whilst most conversations were recorded in Liberia, due the politicised nature as described 
above this was not possible in Kenya. Nevertheless, the elite nature of most of those interviewed cannot 
be denied. In response to the post-colonial thinker Spivak - who noted the subaltern does not speak - 
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this regrettably remains true for much of this research. To a certain extent, conducting focus groups 
counterbalances this, but more extensive research would be needed in order to completely counter an 
inherent elite bias (and arguably the subaltern cannot speak by definition see Simons and Zanker 2014, 
14) 
I did not come across major problems with gatekeepers preventing me access to talk to people (Gokah 
2006, 67). Not being tied to any on-the ground organisation or formal network helped me greatly in that 
sense, as I could seek out whomever I thought of as an interesting interviewee and make my own case as 
to why I would like to talk to them. More than gatekeeping, I faced problems of attempted 
manipulations from those I talked to. This of course underlines the importance of interpretive sciences 
that allow the analysis of the given context of any interview or focus group answers (see also Berckmoes 
2013).  
A number of points relating to the contextuality of the content of the conversations I had must be 
made. Firstly, at least to a degree those I talked to used what Autessere calls ‘canned responses’, or  
‘discourses manufactured for passing journalists or researchers’ (2014b, 281). This meant that certain 
frames of references were used, often in the hope that this would ensure access to funding and help 
(Autesserre 2014b, 107; 123). On numerous occasions I was asked whether I know of any donors to 
fund certain projects or ‘to tell your country’ about certain situations. Secondly, people I talked to of 
course chose what aspects of their experiences, thoughts and ideas they wanted to share with me. Mats 
Utas shows that the narratives told depend on the given situation, in his case highlight the story of a 
woman who had a variety of roles during the war including as a perpetrator chooses to focus solely on 
the representation of her victimhood in interactions with external actors (2005). Thirdly, many of the 
most telling answers or clues are unspoken ones (see Fujii 2010). Thus for example the focus group with 
market women in Nakuru, Kenya insisted repeatedly that “tribalism was over” or that they “no longer 
thought in those terms” (of ethnic groups). Nevertheless, during the lunch break the group broke down 
into smaller ones to sit down and eat their meal - and the research assistant noted in surprise that they 
sat together according to their ethnic groups.34 
Whilst these issues are of course all notable enough issues to mention, none were detrimental to my 
research. This is because the kind of question I am asking for example does not necessitate a holistic 
narrative of all angles of personal experience from those interviewed. Manufactured responses are more 
of an issue when tackling the legitimisation of a process like peace talks, but care was taken to explain 
the point of the research to try and get as varied responses as possible. I made my position as researcher 
clear at all times (see also Armakolas 2001, 169).  
 
                                                        
34 We never asked the participants to state their ethnic group but tried to recruit from different groups whenever 
appropriate in order to get views from varied perspectives. The moderator and assistants were usually able to 
ascertain the ethnicity from the name and accents of the participants. We preferred this method to asking the 
participants outright, especially since this was not necessary to know for the research question.  
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Lastly, the timing of the interviews will also affect the type of responses I was given. The original 
fieldwork in Liberia took place eight years after the peace agreement had been signed, in Kenya four 
years after the National Dialogue. Asking people about any event directly will of course guarantee a 
more detailed and reliable description than many years later (see also Beach and Pedersen 2013, 135). 
However, this builds on the presumption that these people took part in the first place and thus only 
applies to the civil society actors themselves. Generally, asking years after the process means that 
accounts and narratives are based on memories. Many studies on these kind of memories - the relation 
to trauma and the way information is stored and passed on - have been conducted by a variety of 
disciplines ranging from anthropologists to psychologists (for a good overview see Argenti and 
Schramm 2010). The point is to acknowledge that the explanations are memories only and therefore a 
certain type of information. Yet again, asking in the immediate aftermath of the end of the talks has its 
own drawbacks such as misinformation. In addition, especially elite informants may feel more 
comfortable speaking of sensitive events after some time has passed (on this point see Grauvogel 2014; 
Vorrath 2013). Because the legitimisation process is seen as fluid and on-going, a reflective-memorial 
account is particularly useful. As a result, the memory of the process is a particularly important point of 
entry.  
 
In conclusion, taking part in this hermeneutic research experience - both as a method throughout the 
research and as part of acknowledging the context of interpretation - has been a long and difficult 
process. Time and time again assumptions that were made - both scientific and personal - were 
questioned or completely undermined. Nevertheless, this made the process and the ‘end product’ all the 
more interesting and valuable. Hermann summarises that in setting of discussing violent conflicts - 
which I see just as relevant in this research - ‘both the positivistic demand for objectivity and the 
hermeneutic requirement for honest reflexivity, are extremely difficult to meet’ (2001, 79). Without 
further deconstructing my own role and perceptions it suffices to say that enormous care has been taken 
to reflect on all methodological and epistemological angles that can arise from the outsider conducting 
research in a particularly sensitive setting and what this may mean for knowledge creation. 
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Chapter 4 
A Voice for the Voiceless: Civil Society Activism in the Liberian Peace Negotiations 
4 A Voice for the Voiceless: Civil Society Activism in the Liberian Peace Negotiations 
 
Describing a part of the women’s movement, which was involved in the Liberian peace negotiations, 
another civil society actor characterises their role as “representing the voiceless” (L3_13).35 This chapter 
accumulates the third and fourth step in the abductive process, applying and amending the heuristic 
model on the account of the first case study of the Liberian peace negotiations. Resulting from the 
comprehensive process-tracing of the first two features, a further feature is shown to be inductively 
relevant from the empirical analysis. This feature, transparent communication is detailed by returning to 
theoretical debates on participation and transparency in the later part of this chapter.  
 
The chapter will first give an overview of the background of the civil war in Liberia and major actors 
relevant to the peace negotiations, before considering the first two features of the heuristic model, 
namely collective concerns and subjective representation. The chapter then expands the heuristic model 
after outlining an empirical puzzle and shows the relevance of the third feature, transparent 
communication. For each of the features, up to three analytical steps are taken as has been outlined in 
the chapter on methodology. Firstly, on the basis of an interpretative overview of what took place in line 
with the heuristic model features, the components that constitute the legitimisation process are traced. 
Secondly, why these constitutive components came to be is traced causally. The causal analysis is only 
carried out for the feature of collective concerns and transparent communication (which is shown later), 
since the perception-based components of subjective representation cannot be explained causally. Lastly, 
the context factors for each of the features are discussed, which further accentuates the entire 
comprehensive process-tracing.  
 
4.1 Background and Actors 
 
In order to situate the analysis, a brief overview of the Liberian civil wars, the peace negotiations in 2003 
and the major actors involved, including from the civil society sector, are outlined in the subsequent 
sections.  
 
 
 
                                                        
35 NB: all quotes that come from the original empirical data is cited in double quotation marks in order to 
differentiate them from the literature citations throughout the text. For all the interviews in relation to the codes 
used see the List of Interviews and Focus Groups in the Appendix. 
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4.1.1 Liberian Civil Wars 1989-2003 
 
Two separate wars plagued Liberia between 1989 and 2003, caused by a number of reasons including 
access to resources, the opposing of exclusionary politics and the role of regional actors. These will now 
be detailed in the following. 
 
Liberia, a small country in West Africa, was the founding project of the ‘American Colonization Society’ 
as a refuge for former (now freed) slaves, gaining independence in 1847. In an ironic twist of fate, the 
former slaves, known as the Americo-Liberians or Congos,36 went on to rule the country through the 
apparatus of the True Whig Party for more than a century by suppressing the indigenous population, 
despite comprising no more than 5% of the population. The details of the earlier political development 
in Liberia cannot be touched upon here (see for example Levitt 2005), however by the 1970s political 
opposition was growing in line with radical movements of Pan-Africanism and socialism mirrored 
elsewhere on the continent (Ellis 2007, 50; Pham 2004b, 75). President William Tolbert made some 
superficial changes in the 1970s in order to ease access to political and economic life for indigenous 
Liberians, but discontent grew.  
 
Following the so-called ‘rice riots’ in Monrovia in 1979, as the price of this stable product was artificially 
increased in order to discourage its import, a military coup in 1980 ended the era of exclusive rule by the 
True Whig Party (Sawyer 2005, 17). Samuel Doe, an indigenous sergeant in the Armed Forces of Liberia 
(AFL) overthrew Tolbert - killing him along with other high-ranking government officials, including the 
infamous execution of 13 cabinet ministers on a beach in Monrovia. Though Liberian ethnicities should 
be seen as social constructions, rather than objective entities (Bøås 2005, 77; Moran 2008, 16), the 
different groupings are widely used in daily discourse and were reinforced through the conflict years as 
symbolizing either the exclusion or inclusion of entire groups of people. Doe led the country for a 
decade in the turmoil of political violence, corruption and economic decline, continuously favouring his 
own ethnic group, the Krahn. Following a failed coup attempt in 1985 by Thomas Quiwonkpa, from the 
Gio tribe,37 reprisals including the killings of thousands of Gio and Mano people took place in Nimba 
County (Adebajo 2002a, 601, 2002b, 29–30). Seeking at least partly to revenge themselves against the 
killings of Gio and Mano people, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor 
entered Nimba County from across the Ivorian border on Christmas Eve in 1989.  
 
                                                        
36 As slavery was abolished British and US naval ships intercepting boats full of enslaved people from the Congo 
River Basin area would redirect them to Liberia, where the locally based freed slaves from the US named these 
‘newer’ settlers the Congos. The term is now merged to be mostly interchangeable with Americo-Liberians, as the 
social significance of the different origins has diminished (see e.g. Ellis 2007, 41; Pham 2004b, 54). 
37 ‘Gio’ is a description for this group used only in English and ascribed by the state. The people who belong to 
this group refer to themselves as ‘Dan’. Since Gio is commonly used in English, the scholarly literature on Liberia 
and even by Dan people themselves when they speak in English, it will also be the one used throughout this work.  
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Rapidly moving towards Monrovia, growing in numbers along the way, the group soon splintered into 
various rebel groups from 1990 onwards. The first splinter group, the Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (INPFL), led by Prince Johnson, captured, tortured and murdered Samuel Doe upon 
reaching Monrovia. The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
peacekeeping forces intervened in 1990, with mixed results. By early 1993, Liberia was effectively split 
into two parts: Monrovia ruled by the ECOWAS-backed Interim Government of National Unity, and 
the rest named ‘Greater Liberia’ ruled by Taylor with his capital being in Gbarnga, as the NPFL now 
controlled 80% of the country (Ellis 2007, 88). A series of peace agreements were signed and broken as 
more rebel groups emerged. These groups included Taylor’s NPFL; United Liberation Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia Kromah faction (ULIMO-K); United Liberation Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia Johnson faction (ULIMO-J); Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and the Lofa Defence Force (LDF). 
The INPFL had disbanded in 1992. By 1996 a final peace agreement was signed, by most counts the 14th 
peace agreements since the war began six years earlier (see Table 2 in Appendix), cumulating from ‘as 
many as fifty separate peace talks or peace conferences’ according to Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (2009, 208).  
 
In 1997 Charles Taylor won elections by a landslide. The international community described the 
elections as largely free and fair. Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that voting for Taylor was done out 
of fear that return to war would be imminent if he lost (Lyons 1999, 59–61). The elections were carried 
out prior to complete demobilization and the opposition was suppressed. Both UN and ECOWAS 
peacekeeping troops left within a year of the elections. Intimidation, violence and abuses became part of 
everyday-life, along with corruption (Sisk 2010, 118–120). ‘Minimal progress … was reversed by Taylor’s 
return to neopatrimonialism, shadow-statism and warlordism’ (Ismail 2008, 268).  
 
A second wave of war started in 1999, this time from the rebel groups Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and later the Movement for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(MODEL).38 What had initially started as border skirmishes, quickly escalated into another civil war with 
LURD taking control of Lofa County with ease and from there drawing closer to Monrovia on several 
occasions, with the most extreme shelling of Monrovia taking place at the same time as the peace 
negotiations in the summer of 2003. The intertwining of the second war and the negotiations is 
considered in the next section, before which a few words is said on the conflict roots, namely access to 
resources, exclusionary politics and involvement of regional actors. 
 
Firstly, the Liberian wars are an infamous example for a conflict that is inter alia fought about access to 
resources. Thus, both Liberian wars are often portrayed as classic ‘new wars’ over greed - installing 
client-patron networks of bloodthirsty combat units that fought to access resources and other economic 
benefits (e.g. Reno 1999). In this line of thinking, LURD is said to have little ideological principles, or at 
                                                        
38 MODEL is minimally discussed due to their much shorter life span, only emerging in the last months of the war 
in 2003. 
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least to be just as driven by economic incentives as anything else (Reno 2007, 72; Sisk 2010, 115). Whilst 
access to resources without a doubt played a role for all of the conflict parties involved, including the 
then government of Liberia ruled by Charles Taylor, it was not the only one, or at least a more 
superficial reason.39  
 
There is, secondly, the much more deep-rooted problem of exclusion or exclusionary politics, partially 
related to ethnicity as outlined. Even though the ethnicity of the different groups can be seen as 
constructed, they are widely used and were further reinforced during the wars. Whilst a major conflict 
root to begin was fighting the general indigenous exclusion of the central state, this later led to a 
polarisation between different ethnic groups as different rebels supported one group at the cost of others. 
The LURD rebellion can therefore also be interpreted in light of the tit-for-tat conflicts between the 
different ethnic groups in Liberia. Since Doe’s coup there had been a shift in the conflict cleavages 
between formerly the Americo-Liberians versus the indigenous Liberians to intra-indigenous 
contestations (see also Bøås 2005, 76; Ismail 2008, 266). Thus, Taylor had always unleashed his rebels on 
Krahns and Mandingos (who were also known to support Doe) and the Krahn and Mandingos in turn 
formed their own militias (ULIMO-J/MODEL and ULIMO-K/LURD, respectively) (Bøås 2005; see 
also Nilsson 2009, 19). Though the rebel groups were not ethnically exclusive, one of the stated goals of 
LURD was to fight exclusion of Mandingoes in the Liberian security forces (Call 2012, 79). Therefore, 
grievances of the rebellions were argued in terms of ethnic groups, which reinforced these at least 
partially constructed groups and further polarised them. A bigger conflict root however can be linked to 
an overly centralised state, resulting in the discrimination of a majority of the population, social 
exclusion and a lack of access to basic services outside of Monrovia (see Zanker 2014b).  
 
Regional factors also played a role, or were an escalating factor, not least with the involvement of 
Charles Taylor in the conflict in neighbouring Sierra Leone. Moreover, other regional actors were also 
embroiled in the conflict, including Guinea’s President Lansana Conté who was said to support LURD 
(in retaliation for Taylors support of Guinean rebels) and the later MODEL who were allegedly backed 
by the Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo (Nilsson and Kovacs 2005).  
 
After some intense fighting and drawn-out peace talks (see below), the war finally ended in August 2003. 
Although figures are disputed (Bøås 2005; Ellis 2007, 312–16), during the fourteen years of intermittent 
war an estimated 200,000 people were killed and 1.5 million people were displaced, either internally or as 
refugees (e.g. Sawyer 2005, 43; Gilgen and Nowak 2011). More than 20,000 child soldiers are likely to 
                                                        
39 Looting and economic benefits were not just exclusively sought out by the conflict parties. The ECOMOG 
peacebuilding forces in the 1990s were locally known as ‘Every Car or Moving Object Gone’ (see Tuck 2000). In 
another focus group conducted by the author in Monrovia in February 2014, participants expressed the opinion 
that they did not understand the purpose of UNMIL retaining a presence ten years after the peace agreement had 
been signed. Therefore the group concluded that the peacekeepers must be “in the bush digging for diamonds and 
doing other things” (LMT).  
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have been recruited (International Crisis Group 2003, 18). UNSC Resolution 1509 established the UN 
Mission to Liberia (UNMIL) together with the interim government in October 2003, with initial 15,000 
peacekeeping troops. As of 2015, after two rounds of largely peaceful elections and over a decade since 
the signing of a peace agreement, just under 6,000 uniformed UN personnel remains in Liberia.40 
 
4.1.2 The 2003 Peace Negotiations 
 
Both regional and international actors played important roles in the run up to the peace negotiations that 
were conducted between June and August 2003. Fighting between LURD and the Taylor government, 
and to a lesser degree MODEL, continued right up to and during the peace talks as even a ceasefire 
agreement was broken by some of the most severe shelling of Monrovia during both wars. This event, 
which was because the rebel groups tried to receive more interim government positions, along with the 
arrest warrant for the Liberian president Taylor were to significantly shape the negotiations. This is 
outlined subsequently, after first discussing the regional and international leaders. 
 
As previously noted, the rebellion took place inside an intricate net of regional supports, with Guinea’s 
President Conté said to support LURD (in retaliation for Taylors support of Guinean rebels) and the 
later MODEL backed by the Ivorian President Laurent Gbagbo (e.g. Nilsson and Kovacs 2005, 400; 
Call 2012, 76–77). Thus, it was to no surprise that the Mano River Union (MRU), which had originally 
been created in the 1973 between Sierra Leone and Liberia and later Guinea to foster economic 
cooperation between the countries, was reactivated. Under the auspices of the MRU the Moroccan king 
Mohammed VI brought together Taylor with the leaders of Sierra Leone and Guinea in February 2002 
(Levitt 2005, 220; see also Femmes Africa Solidarité 2005, 589). Whilst the leaders ‘lunched’ and ‘dined’, 
not much came out of this meeting in the long run (see for example UN Security Council 2002). LURD 
was not present (and MODEL did not exist yet).  
 
ECOWAS then stepped up their mediation role, organising a meeting together with members of the 
Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL) in early 2003. ECOWAS tried to urge Taylor and LURD to 
sign a ceasefire, which the former rejected repeatedly. By April 2003, an ECOWAS report stated that 
rebels (by now both LURD and MODEL) controlled about 60% of the Liberian territory. UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan called on the UN Security Council to look for a solution for the conflict. 
An extensive sanctions regime that had been in place since 1997 and included arms embargoes, travel 
bans and asset freezing, was further expanded in May 2003 to include timber exports (Resolution 1478).  
 
                                                        
40 UNMIL is currently seeking to draw down their mission, but between 2014 and early 2015 the deadly Ebola 
Virus ravaged through Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone with 10,042  infected with the virus in Liberia and 4,486 
deaths by the 15th April 2015 (see World Health Organisation 2015). Whilst the virus now seems to be under 
control, the social, political and economic repercussions are likely to affect the peacebuilding process for many 
years to come.  
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New talks to start in June 2003 were organised by the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL). 
The UN had set up this group in 2002, comprising of the United Nations, ECOWAS, African Union, 
World Bank, United States, Ghana, Nigeria, United Kingdom, Germany, Spain and Sweden. ECOWAS, 
was given the role of the chief mediation team and Ghana became the host country for the negotiations. 
The ICGL appointed former Nigerian President Abdulsalami Abubakar as the main mediator from the 
ECOWAS team. Preliminary talks were scheduled to take place in Sierra Leone but representatives of 
MODEL failed to attend. Both MODEL and LURD leaders insisted that they did not want to negotiate 
with Taylor. Nonetheless, all groups attended the opening of the talks in Ghana.  
 
A game changer for the negotiations was a warrant for the arrest of Charles Taylor by the Special Court 
for Sierra Leone for war crimes he had committed in the neighbouring country. The warrant was 
unsealed on the day of the opening ceremony of peace talks on the 4th June 2003. Whilst the Ghanaian 
hosts decided to allow Taylor to return to Monrovia without arresting him, the absence of Taylor at the 
trial is said to be the single most important factor to influence the peace talks (Hayner 2007, 9). Two 
weeks into the negotiations, on the 17th June, a ceasefire was signed, which was broken immediately. By 
this point, Colin Waugh argues it was obvious that the war was soon over so the negotiation parties 
concentrated purely on who would get the most lucrative government positions (2011, 325). Reports 
confirm that in order to gain concessions, rebel leaders called their troops to shell Monrovia, on the 
outskirts of which both LURD and MODEL were now fighting Taylor’s government forces. By 
watching the ghastly scenes, of what was dubbed ‘World War 3’ on CNN, more and more concessions 
were made by the mediator and his aides (Nilsson and Kovacs 2005, 401; on World War Three see also 
Steinberg 2011, 111). In the weeks that followed, thousands more lost their lives in Monrovia. Positions 
in the transitional government for rebel actors were not even foreseen by the initial drafts. After the 
failed ceasefire and intensive fighting, however, increasingly more positions were promised to the 
conflict parties (Hayner 2007, 14; see also Hensell and Gerdes 2012, 158).  
 
The final agreement, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), was signed after 76 days of 
negotiations on the 18th August 2003 in Accra (Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003). A few days 
prior to this Taylor went into exile in Nigeria. The CPA was a four-way power-sharing arrangement 
between the Taylor government, LURD, MODEL as well as political parties and CSAs. In the bloated 
cabinet Charles Taylor’s party, the National Patriotic Party (NPP), were given five ministries, as were 
LURD and MODEL. In addition, six ministries were given to civil society organizations and political 
parties (for a complete overview, see Table 3 Appendix). The 76 seats of the unicameral National 
Transitional Legislative Assembly were divided in a similar manner. Supporters of the outgoing NPP 
government, LURD, and MODEL were each given twelve seats; the eighteen registered civilian political 
parties were allocated one seat each. Seven seats were reserved for representatives to be designated by 
civil society groups; and less than a quarter of the parliamentary seats - fifteen - were to be filled by an 
(internal) election, with one representative chosen from each of Liberia’s counties (Article XXIV CPA). 
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Publicly owned corporations (as well as autonomous government agencies and commissions) were 
handed over to the conflict parties, though in this instance most of them were given to CSAs and 
political parties. The distributions of ministries and corporations to conflict parties to such an extensive 
degree led to widespread corruption and misuse during the interim government between 2003-2005, 
prior to the first post-war elections.  
 
As a LURD spokesman said in September 2003, positions in the para-statal sector were more sought 
after than government ministries, as international donors too closely scrutinized the latter. In the ports 
or telecommunications sectors ‘one was free to ‘accumulate resources’ without oversight’ (Hoffman 
2004, 211). One civil society participant noted rather dryly in an interview to the author: “we just prayed 
and waited for it [the interim period] to be over.”41 Nonetheless, the Interim Chairman was not from a 
warring faction - one concession the rebels had not been able to enforce. In addition, a thorough 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process was put into place, including the 
construction of an entirely new army and police forces (Article VII and VIII CPA). A Truth, Justice and 
Reconciliation Commission was also to be drawn up, with members coming from cross-section of 
Liberian society (Article XIII (4) CPA). Then still the President of Liberia to-be, Johnson Sirleaf 
comments in her autobiography that the talks were slow, frustrating and unstructured with few plenaries 
and many ad hoc group meetings (2009, 239). 
 
4.1.3 The Negotiation Actors 
 
Apart from the major conflict parties, political parties and civil society actors also played a role in the 
talks. The Taylor Government of Liberia, LURD and MODEL as well as 18 political parties signed the 
final CPA. Six civil society groups also signed the peace agreement as witnesses. In the initial phase when 
the ceasefire was negotiated, only the three warring factions took part. At the opening ceremony, civil 
society actors were not present as official delegates, only as unofficial observers (unlike political parties), 
though this later changed after lobbying on behalf of civil society actors (see below). Both political 
parties and civil society actors became official observers. Whilst these groups did not hold a direct 
negotiation mandate they still had a significant impact on the talks as is shown throughout the chapter. 42 
 
The opening (and closing) ceremony, as well as initial ceasefire talks were held in Accra, but most of the 
actual proceedings took place in Akosombo. During the move to Akosombo, many of the additional 
groups were added as delegates. During the first two weeks the negotiations were predominantly 
undertaken between the mediators and conflict parties, the other actors becoming more prominent after 
                                                        
41 L18; though the Interim Chairman speaks of the enormous difficulties and challenges of a post-war interim 
government, denying all the corruption allegations he faced afterwards (L12_13). 
42 I will use the terms observers and delegates interchangeably. Even though the official status was as observers 
without a negotiation mandate, the civil society actors (and the political party representatives) were still generally 
perceived as their own rightful collection of delegates at the talks. 
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the ceasefire had been signed. Taylor remained influential throughout the negotiations, continuing to be 
in close contact with his representatives and even choosing the mediator himself from a list provided by 
ECOWAS (Hayner 2007, 7; Nilsson 2009, 21). According to a report by the International Crisis Group, 
‘the persistent focus at Accra on jobs, cars and money rather than the challenges confronting Liberia 
gives a clue to the character of the transitional government’ (2003, 4). 
 
The political parties that signed the agreement are frequently accused of being motivated in participating 
in the talks in the interest of gaining jobs. At worst, the political parties were in fact acting in the interest 
of the conflict parties, best illustrated by the large number of ‘briefcase parties’ set up by Taylor.43 The 
parties initially organised themselves in a ‘group of seven’ of independent parties,44 the remaining ones 
primarily aligning themselves to Taylor’s NPP (Hayner 2007, 11; L28). Nevertheless, one by one the 
parties were convinced to align themselves under the same goals “until there were no more Taylor 
friendly parties left, apart from the NPP” (L5_13). There is some merit in interpreting the political 
parties under the same classification as the civil society groupings. It is undeniable that in the Liberian 
setting civil society actors and political parties have always been interlinked and blurred at least to some 
degree. Both groups face dialectic attributions of on the one hand only furthering their own interests and 
on the other hand advocating for real change and making a difference (L1_13; L3_13; L6_13). 
Furthermore, the role played by political parties was by definition similar to that of civil society actors - 
playing the neutral non-conflict party position or “representing the civilian side” or “one and the same” 
in the words of Interim President Bryant (L12_13). Nonetheless, it is the role of civil society actors 
regarding the process of legitimisation that is the primary research question here. Therefore, the focus is 
on the CSAs rather than political parties (others combine the two groups in their analysis, see e.g. 
Nilsson 2012). In addition, within the proceedings of the talks, the two groups conducted separate 
meetings to discuss strategies and key concerns under their respective secretariats (see below, L5_13). 
The civil society sector is discussed in more detail in the following section.  
 
4.1.4 Civil Society Actors in the Negotiations 
 
In order to best contextualize the role had by civil society actors during the 2003 negotiations, a brief 
history of five different types of civil society groups (political, religious, emergency relief and 
peacebuilding, women and diaspora groups) is given, as well as the climate these groups worked in over 
the years.  
 
                                                        
43 Elections had been scheduled to take place in October 2003, so the National Election Committee had certified 
all these parties the year before. Technically therefore they were not created to influence the talks per se, but rather 
elections that never ended up taking place (Interview Interim Chairman Gyude Bryant L12_13). 
44 These include the Liberian People Party, United People’s Party, Progressive People’s Party, New Deal 
Movement; Liberia Action Party; Labor Party and the Unity Party. 
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Civil society, at least the way it is understood in the western context, does not have a long history in 
Liberia. Traditional social gatherings have a much longer history and are hard to generalise as they vary 
regionally and are often highly secretive (at least to the degree that only initiated can gain internal 
knowledge see Ellis 2007, 228) though not necessarily unpolitical (Moran 2008). Some of these 
traditional groups were expressively forbidden by the settler government, whilst the Poro and Sande 
group - the most prominent of these groups - was brought under government control with the President 
of Liberia named as Head of the Poros (Liebenow 1987, 84).  Following from the more standardised 
definition of civil society to which the legitimisation literature speaks to, different civil society 
organisations that exist in Liberia can be broadly speaking categorised into five groups.45  
 
Firstly, there are political groups, historically the oldest category.46 Civil society groups in Liberia are 
generally seen to have started emerging in the 1970s in-line with radical visions of anti-colonial pan-
Africanism. Earliest groups include the Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA), founded in 1973 by, 
inter alia, Amos Sawyer and the Progressive Alliance of Liberia. The latter was created by Gabriel Baccus 
Matthews in 1975, and was actively involved in the rice riots a few years later (Pham 2004a; Toure 2002, 
9). The link between these early groups and political parties is strong, with both its leaders/members 
easily becoming politicians (i.e. Baccus Matthews who still campaigned in the 2005 elections, shortly 
before his death in 2007) or having sister political parties, like MOJA who participates in elections as the 
Liberian People's Party.47 In fact, the roots of this interaction between political life and civil society 
actors was recognised by J. Gus Liebenow as being part of ‘Americo-Liberian public life’ since ‘[along 
with religious participation] … membership in such organisations ... advanced and reinforced a political 
career’ (1987, 83). The groups that emerged in the 1970s however, were known as agitators for reforms 
and making demands on the state (Atuobi 2010, 9). As such these Liberian civil society organisations are 
political ones. By the time the negotiations took place, these groups (or rather: Persons) were 
represented by the political party section and are therefore not included in the analysis.  
 
A second important group began to emerge later, becoming a significant group especially during the 
early conflict in the 1990s, namely religious groups. Here the most important one is the Inter-Faith 
Mediation Committee (IFMC), bringing together Christian and Muslim leaders. The IFMC led some of 
the earliest negotiation and mediation attempts, initiating the first talks between the NPFL and Doe in 
1990. Their efforts of ‘shuttle diplomacy’ continued through the 1990s, and they held observer status as 
                                                        
45 This applies if we take the definition of civil society as organisations between the market and the state as the 
fitting one of course. Since this illustrates best the type of civil society included in the negotiations, it is the working 
definition used in this dissertation, see Chapter 1. 
46 Prior to this, a number of largely faith-based organisations that were involved in health, education and agriculture 
existed, amounting to something like a partnership in development (Atuobi 2010, 8). Social and credit groups were 
also historically permitted provided they were not used ‘as a vehicle for political pressure’ (Liebenow 1987, 84). 
47 For a similar point see Byron Tarr, who argues that ‘civil society organisations are virtual appendages of 
government institutions’ (2007, 224). 
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well as significant influence at the ECOWAS meetings (Armon and Carl 1996, 91; Kieh Jr 2009).48 Later 
the IFMC distanced itself from the official negotiations, as it became clearer from Cotonou Agreement 
(in 1993) onwards, that the agreements were rewarding rebel groups with power (see above). As a 
response to their growing displeasure with the way the talks were going, the IFMC also organised sit-at-
home strikes, starting in March 1995 in order to protest the agreements. This eventually led to the 
creation of the Civic Disarmament Campaign (Sesay 1996, 25; Toure 2002, 10). Religious groups were 
also highly important in providing solace and trauma counselling to the war-aggrieved population, as 
well as advocating for human rights (Sawyer 2005, 71). Human rights groups like the Catholic Justice 
and Peace Commission were indispensable in meticulously recording all the human rights violations 
taking place during the years of conflict, which they continue to do to this day (L6; Pham 2004a; see also 
Backer and Carroll 2001). These type of human rights and pro-democracy religious groups first emerged 
under the interim governance of Amos Sawyer in the early 1990s (Atuobi 2010, 9). 
 
Emergency relief and peacebuilding groups are a third group of civil society active in Liberia. Since the 
1990s, local NGOs have proliferated all over Liberia, ranging from short-term groups addressing specific 
emergencies to long-term professional bodies (Sawyer 2005, 75; see also Atuobi 2010, 2). Many have 
little human rights experience (Backer and Carroll 2001, 6). The vacuum of public goods during the war 
as well as a large number of international NGOs looking for local partners encouraged the creation of 
these groups (Atuobi 2010, 10). To this day they continue to serve many of the needs and public goods 
that the post-conflict Liberian government cannot adequately provide.  
 
A fourth group of civil society activists - though they certainly overlap with the other groups but are 
significant enough to mention separately - are women groups. Most notably the Liberian Women’s 
Initiative (LWI), founded in 1994 drew attention to the plight of women and explained their needs to 
mediators to the negotiations (Armon and Carl 1996, 93; Sesay 1996, 26). Other efforts included making 
contact with women in rebel territories by the Concerned Women of Liberia and training sessions on 
conflict resolution by the Federation of Liberian Women (Moran and Pitcher 2004, 507). Nevertheless, 
early activism was largely uncoordinated, fragmented and conducted in an ad hoc manner (Alaga 2011a, 
10). From the beginning of the war, women activists fought hard for a seat at the negotiation table, 
which they were able to successfully lobby for when they gained participant status at the Accra 
Clarification Conference in 1994 (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 24; Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and UNESCO 1997, 12). They were nevertheless 
overlooked by the final peace agreements in the 1990s, despite their active peace work and side-lined in 
favour of the warlords (Sisk 2010, 117; Toure 2002, 1).  
 
                                                        
48 For a similar role played by International Alert in neighbouring Sierra Leone see Osaghae (2001, 26). 
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US-based diaspora groups form the last important group of civil society, whose significance grew due to 
ever growing numbers of refugees to the USA from the military coup in 1980 onwards. Consisting of 
highly educated elites, the diaspora continues to have a heavy influence on Liberian politics to this day, 
most notably shown by the consecutive election of one of its members, Johnson-Sirleaf, in post-war 
Liberia (Antwi-Boateng 2011, 2012). 
 
During the 1980s, intellectual gatherings were banned by then President Doe, on the grounds that they 
were used to breed socialism (Alaga 2011a, 6–7; and other CSA were co-opted into the government, at 
least initially, see Liebenow 1987, 214). Later, in the Taylor years in the late 1990s civil society groups 
became increasingly persecuted and endangered. Many key civil society advocates had to flee the country 
in fear of persecution, in what was now virtually a police state (Fomunyoh and Hofman 2004; Toure 
2002, 13; Loden 2007, 302; Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 138; see also Backer and Carroll 2001, 4; L7_13; 
L12_13). The government of the time had an adversarial and antagonistic attitude towards civil society 
actors whilst at the same time setting up a few state-sponsored civil society groups (Atuobi 2010, 3, 11). 
Nonetheless, some independent groups remained active in their opposition despite difficulties of 
remaining in contact with members outside of Monrovia during the worst fighting when war broke out 
again. The women’s movement, including the Women in Peacebuilding (WIPNET), LWI and the local 
chapter of the regional Mano River Women’s Peace Network (MARWOPNET) were tireless in their 
demand for the immediate departure of Taylor in order to enhance the peace process. The religious 
community, notably the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL), the successor of the IFMC, also 
played an active role, mobilizing civil society groups in expressing a common message of peace and 
national reconciliation to Liberian society (Toure 2002, 16). The IRCL continued to have talks with all 
sides, in order to initiate further peace talks. As a result, IRCL organised earlier talks in 2003 held in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone together with ECOWAS. Another initiative the Liberia Leadership Forum met 
in 2002 and called for a peace conference in 2003, with ECOWAS as a mediator (Hayner 2007, 7). 
 
Civil society actors were involved in the negotiations in a variety of ways - as official observers or 
unofficial observers as well as pressure group activists. Those invited as official observers included 
MARWOPNET, the IRCL, the Liberian Bar Association and members of the Liberian diaspora. They 
had been invited as official delegates because of the role they had played in previous conflict resolution 
efforts. A ‘Civil Society Secretariat’ was set up at the talks which was there to send representatives to 
working groups and committees, whilst meeting up regularly to come up with joint statements on 
specific issues (L5_13). Representatives from the IRCL, MARWOPNET, Liberian Bar Association, 
Liberians in Diaspora, Liberia Leadership Forum and Civil Society Organisations in Liberia all signed the 
CPA as witnesses. Whilst civilian members like women delegates such as the journalist Victoria Redell 
took part even in the earliest talks in the 1990s, this was later stopped and thus did not set a permanent 
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precedent for involvement (African Women and Peace Support Group 2004, 23,27).49 During the 2003 
talks however, there was a more extensive and formal role for civil society members. The 2003 peace 
negotiations were remarkable because of the direct participation of civil society in the negotiation 
process as official observers and the provision of a formal role for civil society in the transitional 
government. The role and impact of CSAs has thus been widely lauded or at the very least acknowledged 
for their unusually intimate role in the Liberian peace negotiations (Hayner 2007, 13; McKeown and 
Mulbah 2007, 6; Call 2012, 90–91; see also African Union 2003, 8). 
 
Unofficial delegates, who partly risked their lives attending the talks by travelling by road (because of 
potential ambushes by rebels on the road there, directly passing through rebel territory), also proved to 
be important players. Most notably WIPNET picketed the conflict parties from outside the conference 
centre, sometimes confronting the leaders directly and forcefully, mobilizing women from a nearby 
refugee camp to attend the talks. WIPNET (amongst other groups) had started as a women’s anti-war 
demonstrating group, known as Mass Action for Peace, which included women from all sections of 
Liberian society and rallied around the message ‘we want peace, no more war’ (Ekiyor and Gbowee 
2005, 135). 50  Members would dress in white and rally together in Monrovia and Totota in their 
hundreds, congregating to pray for peace (both Christian and Muslim women taking part), in all weather 
conditions. Members were also involved in shuttle diplomacy, meeting with major stakeholders prior to 
the negotiations including LURD, Taylor, members of the Liberian parliament and the International 
Contact Group (Alaga 2011a, 12, 2011b, 79). At one point the WIPNET activists blocked the entrance 
to the meeting room. When security forces got involved, Leymah Gbowee (and others) threatened to 
undress unless the security forces backed off. This is seen as a turning point, since it is considered a 
curse for a ‘son’ to see their ‘mother’ (see Hayner 2007, 13; Nilsson 2009, 23; L44). What these activities 
mean for the legitimisation of the peace talks, with regards to the two features of the heuristic model and 
following the method of comprehensive process-tracing, is shown in the rest of the chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                        
49 Even though in the 1990s groups like LWI were never formal observers they were continuously asked for the 
opinions from all the delegates (L7_13). 
50 WIPNET was part of the regional West Africa Network for Peacebuilding WANEP organisation. In light of UN 
Resolution 1325 on the involvement of women in peace process, some members had received specific training on 
the topic. The Liberian chapter of WIPNET, under the leadership of Leymah Gbowee, then went on to form the 
Mass Action Campaign. Nevertheless, WIPNET and the Mass Action (for Peace) Campaign will be used 
interchangeably. Whilst strictly speaking not all activists in the campaign were members of WIPNET (it also 
technically included MARWOPNET and LWI) they were nevertheless the organisational force behind the 
movement, and the Mass Action campaign has in turn been their most important and successful action to date. 
Later the group known as WIPNET wanted to loosen ties with their mother organisation WANEP, but the latter 
did not allow it. Therefore the independent Women Peace and Security Network Africa (WIPSEN-Africa) was 
created in 2006. A few former members of the Mass Action Campaign are still part of the WIPNET group 
however. According to these WIPNET members “Mass Action for Peace was under the banner of WIPNET, they 
were organising it” (L8_13).  
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4.2 Addressing Collective Concerns 
 
Having spelled out the details of Liberian civil wars, the negotiations and the major actors involved 
including the CSAs, the first step in answering how negotiations become more legitimate is by carrying 
out comprehensive process-tracing of the first feature in the heuristic model. As indicated previously, 
the feature of collective concerns suggests that negotiations as a process become legitimatised if 
collective grievances or concerns are discussed and addressed by CSAs and included in the agreement. 
As part of the comprehensive process-tracing, three analytical steps are taken. In a first step, on the basis 
of an interpretative overview of what took place, the components that constitute the legitimisation 
process are traced. This is done by analysing any empirical confessions for motivations or perception 
related to the legitimisation of the negotiations. Second, the causal conditions that enabled these 
constitutive components are traced, looking for smoking guns and comprehensives storylines as empirical tools 
to uncover causal relationships. In a third step, the context for the comprehensive process-tracing is 
discussed. 
 
Giving testimony to the US House of Representative Subcommittee on International Relations, Nohn 
Kidau in her role as civil society activist states:  
 
‘The document [the CPA] is in no way a panacea for addressing the atrocities that have been 
perpetrated on an innocent populace; however, within the framework of this agreement lay the 
desire of the Liberian people to rise up from the ashes of destruction and rebuild our country brick 
by brick’ (emphasis added 2003). 
 
In what ways does the CPA reflect the desires of the Liberian population? The next section discusses 
collective concerns in Liberia and what was addressed during the negotiations, showing that ending 
violence and a civilian counterbalance constituted (parts of) the legitimisation process.   
 
4.2.1 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Ending Violence and a Civilian Counterbalance 
 
The constitutive process-tracing includes two sections, namely a discussion of what the general collective 
concerns were as well as what collective concerns were addressed by CSAs. 
 
4.2.1.1 What are the Collective Concerns? 
 
There is overwhelming evidence to show that one of the major concerns expressed in Liberia was to put 
an end to violence, making it a constitutive component of the legitimisation process. In addition, the 
Liberian case shows that whilst it was perceived that ‘local’ concerns did not play a particularly important 
role during the peace talks, this was not necessarily to the detriment of the peacebuilding process. This 
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finding however was often voiced in rather contradictory manners and is to be interpreted in a very 
particular context. This is outlined in the following.  
 
“The paramount thing was to stop the war” (LGT). 
 
This confession, which is one amongst many, shows the general sentiment of appreciation towards the 
2003 peace negotiations bringing an end to the fighting. Violence and war had continued on and off for 
over a decade. An influential politician, Senior Senator of Bong County, Jewel Howard-Taylor even 
explains there were no local grievances per se; rather the end to hostilities was the key ingredient (L42). 
The importance of ending violence was reiterated across the social spectrum by every single focus group 
as well as local government officials,51 political party activists (L27; L33; L34), politicians (L5; L16; L18; 
L28; L38), human rights and peace building civil society members (L5; L16; L18; L28; L38), women 
leaders (L12; L31), youth leaders (L14; L24; L37), religious leaders (L9; L36) and even disadvantaged 
communities in today’s Liberia like the Mandingo leader in Ganta (L39). 
 
Peacebuilding scholars talk of indicators of ripeness for the peace talks (being successful) including 
‘public exhaustion factors’, meaning that society exhausted by war mobilises themselves to demand 
peace (Sisk 2010, 125). Accordingly, it is perhaps not surprising that when a peace agreement was signed, 
that seemed to last “we were happy, we celebrated … it was good” (L12) or “we were ready, we wanted 
peace to come to Liberia. It made everyone happy, we were rejoicing” (LGbM).52 The effect of the peace 
agreement was felt by everyone, even those who were not elites or outside of Monrovia, left in the war-
torn countryside: “It was good, especially for those of us who never left Liberia. We were desperate for 
peace” (L21). 
 
The message of the civil society movement acting for the cessation of violence was loud and clear, 
according to WIPNET activist ‘… [we] reminded everyone at the talks and in the world that an entire 
population was waiting for the outcome, and wouldn’t settle for anything less than peace’ (Ekiyor and 
Gbowee 2005, 138; see also Alaga 2011b, 81). Quite a number of interlocutors cautioned however that 
whilst the peace agreement was very comprehensive, it had stalled in its implementation.53 Some also 
commented on the power-sharing aspect, concluding that “we needed them [the warlords] otherwise 
peace would not have come. There is a Liberian saying: if you are sick and you are given a bitter pill 
better swallow it to get well again” (L15: see also L6; LGbT ).  
 
In addition to ending violence, there is the question of ‘local’ concerns. While previous research focusing 
on the national level would perhaps conclude then that the negotiations addressed (all) major concerns, 
                                                        
51 L8; L15; L17; L21; L29; L30; L34; L40. When there are more than five interviews or FGD references they will 
not be cited in the text due to reasons of readability.  
52 Johnson Sirleaf comments, ‘everyone was sick of war. Everyone except the warmongers’ (2009, 230) 
53 L14; L20; L24; L25; L27; L38; L40 
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the micro-level perspective of this dissertation highlights that not all grievances were addressed during 
the negotiations, especially not local ones, but that this was not necessarily detrimental to the peace 
process as a whole. During the interviews conducted for this research one of the topics broached was 
about the discussion of ‘local’ concerns. The aim was to discover whether there was a feeling that locally 
important concerns were included in the negotiations because of civil society involvement. This relates 
back to the peacebuilding scholarship on inclusion and local ownership (e.g. Call 2012; Donais 2012). 
Generally there was a widespread sense that local concerns had not been taken into consideration during 
the peace talks.54 For some, the lack of including local concerns was to the detriment of the peace 
process. 55  Reasons given for wanting to include local concerns was firstly that it leads to more 
sustainable conflict management efforts (L7; L36; L34). One religious leader explained: 
 
“If there was a problem between two siblings and this was not dealt with then it would spill out 
to the whole family. If something is going wrong in one sector from Liberia, then we should do 
something about it” (L9).  
 
Secondly, a sense of entitlement to including local concerns was drawn from the idea that these locals 
were the most affected by the conflict (L14; L26; L29). This relates back to the normative right to 
participate which previous literature has already proposed (Barnes 2002; McKeon 2004). Furthermore, 
due to the lack of local actors taking part in the talks, specific concerns were left out according to 
interviewees, including land problems (L10; L38; L22), the management of natural resources (L13) and 
reparations (L20). What came up time and time again (especially in Ganta) was the question of land - 
both its distribution and resettlement.56 Since this continues to cause post-war tensions in places like 
Ganta (where the land issue quickly takes on ethnic narratives) it is unsurprising that many interlocutors 
argue that this should have been addressed by the peace agreement (see also Simons et al. 2013, 691). 
 
In the focus groups, participants listed grievances they perceived to have emerged in Gbarnga and Ganta 
during the war and discussed whether they felt that these grievances had been addressed or not at the 
negotiations.57 Most groups found that the majority of concerns had been addressed at the CPA, an 
average of 69% of grievances stated, see Table 4.1 below. The list of grievances included for example 
forceful recruitment, killing of people, violence against women and children, difficulty in finding food, 
homelessness, property destruction, looting, rape, the closing schools and widespread diseases (LGT). In 
fact only the Teachers in Gbarnga felt like only three of the major grievances had been addressed. 
Nonetheless, the latter discussed that though few of the grievances they felt existed had been addressed 
                                                        
54 E.g. L19, L21, L23, L24, L28, L32, L34, L35, L36, L39 L42; LGbM 
55 L11; L12; L17; L22; L27; L29; L38 
56 L22; L25; L26; L30; L36; L38. The mayor of Gbarnga also brought up the issue of land in that area (L10; see also 
L3; L11).  
57 “What were the most important local issues during the war?  Were these issues addressed in the negotiations of 
the peace agreement?”, see also Appendix for an overview of the questions discussed in the focus groups. 
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by the talks, they were not of the highest priority either (‘the issues could be addressed by the 
government after the war is over’ LGbT; see also LGY; LGM for similar reasoning). 
Table 4.1: List of Concerns and the Number Perceived to have been addressed during the Peace 
Negotiations According to Focus Group Discussants (Liberia 2011) 
 
Focus Group Number of Concerns Addressed 
Market Women Gbarnga (LGbM) 8 out of 13 
Teachers Gbarnga  (LGbT) 3 out of 10 
Youth Gbarnga  (LGbY) 8 out of 13 
Market Women Ganta (LGM) 8 out of 13 
Teachers Ganta (LGT) 10 out of 10 
Youth Ganta (LGY) 10 out of 10 
 
Questions of local concerns and grievances were additionally often answered in contradictory ways, 
illustrated for example by the discussion held by the youth in the focus group in Ganta (LGY). There 
was a general consensus that the talks focused on the elites in Monrovia and was therefore not 
meaningful to the focus group participants, especially since it did not consider what was happening in 
Ganta at the time. However, one participant later conceded “it was still good because it brought peace” 
(LGY). It could be argued that this underlines the preponderance of the peaceful end result as the most 
important outcome, but also shows the rather inconsistent approach to the discussion of including local 
grievances. An even concreter example of contradiction comes from a political party activist who claims 
“I can’t think of any issue concerning Ganta that should have been discussed” but later adds “if you 
overlook the local problems things can get worse” (L34).   
 
In contrast stands the entire list of grievances being addressed. Many interviewees reciprocated the 
general feeling of the importance of national concerns over local ones, noting it was entirely justifiable 
that the items discussed were of national importance, since these “were common to everyone in 
Liberia”.58 Including local matters would simply be too complicated (L21) or even dangerous. It might 
have led to an inclusion of concerns relating to the Sande and Poro, and this could have resulted “in 
people who were not members (going) into the bush and (destroying) the traditions” (L8). Local matters 
were better discussed at the local level argued some (L3; L30; L40).  
 
This initial analysis on the basis of the feature of collective concerns allows for two conclusions. First, 
whilst opinion was divided, there was an idea that the lack of inclusion of local issues was permissible 
considering the extraordinary situation, the protection of traditional values and the fact local issues could 
be discussed locally. Accordingly, the lack of local issues did not necessarily detrimentally affect the 
legitimacy of the talks. This can be put into a (historical) socio-political context. Whilst the pre-war 
government of Liberia had gradually began to increase their presence in the so-called hinterlands, there 
                                                        
58 L36; see also L5; L10; L26; L27; L35; L39; L40 
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was and continues to be something like a system of indirect rule - which results in the divesting the 
countryside of goods and labour (Utas 2009, 278). The over centralised nature of the Liberian state has 
led to a lack of civilian empowerment (Sawyer 2008; Zanker 2014b). This means that it is no surprise 
that not addressing local issues does not immediately have a de-legitimatising effect on the negotiations 
(see also Simons et al. 2013; Zanker, Simons, and Mehler 2015). In the very specific Liberian context, the 
inclusion of local concerns seems to hold little importance with regard to contributing to the 
legitimisation of the talks - at least at this stage of the peace process. This is seems to be rather in 
contradiction to much of the current academic work on local ownership, though this often refers to 
national ownership (e.g. Donais 2012) and when on the local-level, on the impacts this has on local level 
peace (e.g. Odendaal 2010). The (non-) importance of addressing local concerns is picked up again in the 
following chapters. 
 
Secondly, all confessions stressing how important ending the war was as an outcome of the negotiations, 
shows that the peace negotiations were perceived as more legitimate by addressing some major concerns 
including the ending of violence, but also human rights, development, reconciliation etc. This is 
highlighted by the major argument that was put forward on the cessation of violence: “[the CPA] meant 
we could be safe, and sleep and wake up in peace without hearing the sounds of guns.” 59 Several 
interviewees stated that the CPA had a directly positive effect in their localities including in the Gbarnga 
and Ganta areas. 60  More than merely ending the violence (on its own a potentially tautological 
argument), the peace agreement was said to have had direct repercussions by improving human rights 
(L27; L35), development (L17; L27; L37; LGbT), freedom of movement (L8; L14; L20; L38; LGbY), 
reconciliation between the different groups (L30; L35; L36) and allowing elections to take place (L16; 
L17; L36; L40; LGbT).  This underlines the fact that the risk of tautology is not only irrelevant in light of 
a more expansive understanding of (more) legitimate peace negotiations than ending violence, but also 
that even when speaking of an end to violence, the peace that follows is spoken of not merely as a 
negative peace (i.e. the absence of violence), but rather as a positive one which includes human rights, 
development and the freedom of movement etc. In summary, the first constitutive component of 
legitimisation is ending violence (and positive peace) as an outcome of the negotiations. Because the 
primary aim was still expressed as ending violence, the constitutive component is labelled in this way. In 
the next section, the specific collective concerns addressed by civil society actors are analysed.  
 
4.2.1.2 Civil Society Actors Addressing Specific Collective Concerns 
 
The involvement of civil society in Liberia is noted in the relevant literature to have been beneficial for 
the peace process, at least partly because of their active involvement in the plenary sessions, giving 
specific inputs and pressing certain points (Hayner 2007, 11; Nilsson 2009, 42). Because of the civil 
                                                        
59 L34; see also L5; L7; L8; L9; L13; L14; L24; L37; LGbY; LGM 
60 Gbarnga: L9; L18; LGbY and Ganta: L22; L28; L30; L33; L34 
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society actors, a civilian chairperson was chosen to the interim government, major human rights bodies 
ended up being included in the peace agreement, as well as a newly created Ministry of Gender. The 
motivations and confessions traced in the following indicate that a civilian counterbalance to the otherwise 
militarised process constituted a part of the legitimisation process.  
 
A Civilian Chairperson 
The composition of the political power-sharing government that followed the talks is one of the major 
aspects where civil society claim to have had a direct impact in addressing collective concerns, 
specifically regarding the role of the Chairperson. The position of the rebel parties MODEL and LURD 
was initially that in light of recent power-sharing agreements elsewhere in Africa (most notably the Sun 
City Agreements from the DRC which had been signed a year earlier) there should be one president and 
two vice-presidents from each of the conflict parties. The two rebel groups in time became open to the 
idea of having a president from civil society, as long as they retained the positions of vice-president. 
LURD’s delegate Kabineh Jabeh argued at the time ‘it is important that the government be open to 
allow a wider participation so that the root causes of the war be extracted once for all’ (Dukulé 2003). 
This call for participation, according to their position, meant everyone but Taylor’s government forces. 
The Taylor loyalists on the other hand wanted a new interim president to be a simple replacement of 
Taylor by his deputy Moses Blah, calling this a ‘constitutional’ transition (Dukulé 2003). ‘The whole 
process has been very frustrating. We have been here for a whole month’, writes a newspaper reporter at 
the time commenting on the leadership question (UN IRIN 2003). On this difficult question, civil 
society members had several lines of influence.  
 
Firstly, CSAs, especially Sheikh Kafumba Konneh, insisted that the head of the interim government be 
named Chairperson not President (L43; see also L18). This was of high symbolic importance in a 
country were presidency had long been associated with a corrupt, kleptomaniac, autocratic mode of 
governance: “We said no. Liberians like to exploit the word president” (L43). The naming of the interim 
leader as a chairperson was to clearly show that this was simply a caretaker government, prior to 
elections taking place.  
 
Secondly, whilst it was acceptable for Moses Blah to lead the current and immediate interim period since 
Taylor had stepped down, he was not to continue on as leader of the interim government. Most notably, 
and thirdly, there would not be three vice-presidents as hoped for by the rebel parties, but rather there 
would be an interim chairperson and deputy chairperson nominated by the civil society and political 
parties present at the negotiations.61 After much negotiation on this part (the conflict parties were not 
happy with this changed course of direction) it was agreed that the civil society sector and political 
                                                        
61 This idea came from the international community according to Interim Chairman Bryant (L12_13).  
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parties would nominate three candidates as possible chairpersons (as well as deputy chairpersons62), and 
from these the conflict parties would be allowed to choose one (documented under Article 7 African 
Union 2003, 2). This finally led to the nomination of the businessman Gyude Bryant as Interim 
Chairman, who was present at the negotiations as the representative for the Liberia Action Party. The 
other candidates included Ellen Johnson Sirleaf from the Unity Party (who describes her ordeal of being 
rejected as Chairman by the conflict parties in her book Sirleaf 2009, 242; see also L16) and Rudolph 
Sherman from the True Whig Party (who was rejected by MODEL; L16). Other potential candidates 
from initially 42 names included Theresa Leigh-Sherman (from MARWOPNET) and Togba Nah 
Tipoteh, a veteran politician from the Liberian People’s Party (Dukulé 2003; IRIN News 2003).  
 
The interesting factor to note is that despite the fact it was sometimes mentioned that the interim leader 
came from civil society, or at the very least, was merely ‘a respected business leader’ (Fomunyoh and 
Hofman 2004, 7), this is not strictly true, since the final three nominations were all from political parties. 
It does illustrate however the often politicised nature of civil society actors in Liberia, often overlapping 
to political parties as previously noted. The interim Chairman himself called all political parties and civil 
society actors as “the civilian actors” explaining it to be unnecessary to differentiate amongst them 
(L12_13). The major influential point or turning point was that the Chairman did not come from a 
conflict party. In addition, Gyude Bryant was at the time perceived as a somewhat neutral politician, a 
businessman closer to being part of civil society than an active politician (L18: “No one knows much 
about him so he is ok”). Notable also was that members of the IRCL were asked to lead the interim 
government, but as part of their strict policy on independence it was clearly stated that any member 
wishing to go into politics would have to resign from the group (L41).  
 
Furthermore, again argued to be because of the input from civil society, was the fact that both the 
Chairman, speaker and deputy speaker (to be elected by the legislature where the conflict parties were 
dominant, hence the speaker was from LURD and the deputy speaker a Taylor loyalist) could not run in 
the next elections (L18). Whilst few people mentioned the composition of the interim government as a 
vital collective grievance to be addressed, the general reasoning behind the action of CSAs in this regard 
can still be deemed to be in the interest of the general population, by trying to reel in the power of some 
of the conflict parties. The efforts in influencing the composition of the interim government have in fact 
been noted as a key success of the CSAs involvement at the talks (Nilsson 2009, 41; see also L45). What 
constituted the legitimisation of the process however, was not so much the particular issue (a civilian 
chairperson not called a president) but the overall ‘civilian’ counterbalance that was created at the 
negotiations in contrast to an otherwise very militarised process. The same goes for some of the human 
rights mechanisms, which were also addressed by the CSAs. 
 
                                                        
62 Nohn Kidau was one of those nominated for deputy chairperson but was relieved not to be part of the final 
selection because she had left Liberia at the age of 17, and felt in no position to help rule the country (L5_13).  
91 
 
Major Human Rights Mechanisms  
 
A number of mechanisms were set up and appointed to civil society groups and the political parties in 
the implementation of the peace agreement. Civil society actors claim to have had a role in advocating 
for the inclusion of these mechanisms in the peace agreement. Since human rights were referred to as 
collective grievances as shown previously, the addressing of these mechanisms is easily linked to a 
perceived legitimisation. However, as above, more than anything what counted was an overall civilian 
counterbalance to an agreement otherwise concentrating on demobilisation, ceasefires and divvying up 
para-statal companies. The human rights mechanisms which ended up being included in the final 
agreement was firstly the Independent National Commission in Human Rights (INCHR), which was set 
up to monitor the compliance of human rights in the implementation period (Article XII b CPA). 
Furthermore, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was also set up ‘to deal with the root 
causes of the crises’ and ‘address issues of impunity’ (Article XIII CPA).  
 
The membership of these mechanisms was stipulated in the agreement. The INCHR was assigned to 
political parties and civil society actors in accordance with the power-sharing deal, as previously outlined 
(see also Appendix). The membership of the TRC was left open ‘to be drawn from a cross-section of 
Liberian society’ (Article XIII 4 CPA), but like the INCHR it was assigned to the political parties and 
civil society actors (see Annex 4 Article 12 x. CPA). Whilst the agreement certainly included detailed 
provisions for these mechanisms (Paffenholz 2014a, 83) this was not necessarily enough as the 
institutions were not well implemented. 
 
As regards being a collective concern, aside from the inclusion of human rights in the concerns 
addressed as shown above, most widely discussed was the proposal of a TRC. Of interest is that 
especially the IRCL insisted that a war tribunal should not be installed (like in neighbouring Sierra 
Leone), since otherwise “Monrovia would be destroyed and civilians would suffer … this is one of the 
ways we acted to ensure what would be the best for the population” (L43). It was argued that it would 
be better to talk about the establishment of a war crimes tribunal after the next elections, in the interest 
of a peace that is “realized, nurtured and sustained” (L43; see also L44; L45; The Perspective 2002). 
Whilst it would be implausible to enter a discussion here about the merits of transitional justice (see e.g. 
Sriram 2009, 2011), it suffices to say that there are indicators to suggest that the idea of a TRC was well 
greeted. According to a major population survey carried out by the University of Berkeley in Liberia in 
the post-war period, 76% of respondents believed the truth as important in order for history to be 
known. Of those who disagreed only 7% said it was better to forget and slightly more feared it would 
bring back bad memories - 11% (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011, 69–71). 63  Other civil society 
advocates at the talks preferred a war tribunal, but let themselves in for the compromise of a TRC 
                                                        
63 Though in the same survey whilst 73% respondents claimed to have heard of the TRC, 46% added they had 
some knowledge of it, and a further 46% no knowledge about it at all 
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together with a human rights commission to ensure implementation (L45). Perhaps unsurprisingly Jewel 
Howard-Taylor64 herself notes the TRC as a positive element in the CPA (L42), but so do others 
including CSAs.65 It was directly for the benefit of the general population, as “people needed a clearer 
idea of what really happened. A lot of what happened in the wars was just rumours” (L5; see also 
L2_13).66 On a side note, the TRC is by now heavily criticised, since the final outcome of the TRC 
process has been disappointing, as recommendations have yet to be implemented.67 The IRCL has stated 
their disappointment with the final recommendations which included prosecution lists, feeling that this 
broke the promises they had made in their personal mediations (peace at the cost of justice). In the end, 
they refused to sign the TRC recommendations (L41).  
 
Ministry of Gender 
 
One last specific issue that was addressed through civil society activism was the creation of a Ministry of 
Gender for the interim government, created to improve the dismal conditions for women and children 
in all areas of life (L44). The Ministry was additionally, at least in part, also formed in order to challenge 
patriarchal structures (see Pedersen 2011). The idea was to ensure that women’s concerns would be 
addressed in the future within a legislative framework (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 139; Femmes Africa 
Solidarité 2005, 590).68 This also cumulated into a final declaration of all the demands from the women’s 
groups, a few days prior to the signing of the final peace accord, known as the ‘Tulip Declaration of 
Liberian Women Attending the Peace Talks’, named after the hotel after the hotel (Golden Tulip Hotel) 
where the meeting took place. The activism towards such a Ministry of Gender was possible partially 
because of the strengthened position of two of the women’s groups working together, the official 
delegate MARWOPNET and the unofficial delegate WIPNET. Whilst this meant women’s rights were 
on the top of the agenda, the primary goal of the women groups was ending the fighting, not the 
inclusion of women per se. Nevertheless, addressing various ‘human rights’ mechanisms, including a 
Ministry of Gender designed to improve women’s rights in the long-run, legitimised the talks through a 
civilian counterbalance regarding the discourse at the talks and in the final agreement.  
 
The question regarding the specific concerns being addressed does not focus so much on their collective 
acceptance than on the fact that they are being addressed in the first place. In other words, with regard 
                                                        
64 Due to her relationship (ex-wife) to Charles Taylor 
65 L2; L6; L25. Though the Taylor camp itself was for a war tribunal because by then Taylor had been indicted by 
the Special Court for Sierra Leone and did not want others ‘to be let of the hook’ (L2_13). This put some civil 
society actors and Taylor loyalists in an unlikely union. 
66 Interestingly one theory goes that Johnson Sirleaf would have insisted on a war tribunal, which is why the rebels 
refused to nominate her as an interim leader (L18). 
67 L2; L9; L20; L25; L32; L45 
68 How and if this actually challenges patriarchal structures is debatable. Nadine Puechguirbal finds that the CPA 
only superficially addresses women, for example including women in terms of the rehabilitation of vulnerable 
groups that also includes ‘children, elderly and disabled.’ The use of sex as a sociological variable undermines the 
‘potential of women as independent actors’ (2005, 3; see also Theobald 2012, 5). 
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to understanding what constitutes the legitimisation process it does not matter whether the TRC or the 
Ministry of Gender are in fact collective in their nature, which is likely to vary amongst the beneficiaries 
of legitimacy, but rather on how the nature of the talks and agreement themselves changed. The 
counterbalance to the otherwise power-obsessed conflict parties described to be present at the talk, 
offers a collective interest-base, especially compared to the classic power-sharing which at times is highly 
personal. 69  From the confessions previously outlined (especially related to advocating for a civilian 
chairperson), the motivation behind these concerns was to give a civilian counterbalance to an otherwise 
very militarised process. In other words, the emphasis is on changing the focus from pure gains for the 
conflict parties towards other aims, including the development of women’s rights or more generally 
human rights mechanisms both during the actual talks as well as in the final agreement. In summary 
therefore, the civilian counterbalance at the talks and in the agreement also contributed to a part of the 
legitimisation process. 
 
4.2.2 Causal Process-Tracing: Influence from Civil Society Actors 
 
As was discussed previously, there is an inherent power imbalance at an event like peace negotiations. 
Because of this and the fact the research question not only considers the process of legitimisation but 
also the actors who contribute to this, the second part of the comprehensive process-tracing considers 
the causal conditions and their relationships leading up to and enabling the constitutive properties of 
legitimisation. Put differently, it has been shown that a civilian counterbalance and ending violence 
constitute parts of the legitimisation process, but what made them possible? What role did CSAs play in 
ensuring that these collective concerns came to be addressed and a part of the legitimisation process as 
shown above? 
 
News reports from the time speak of influential actors or organisations like the UN, ECOWAS, the 
mediators; but what about civil society? Some analysts pointed out for example ‘[the women’s 
movement] systematic and sustained peace activism contributed to broader initiatives and efforts that 
facilitated a ceasefire and the deployment [of peacekeepers] … this culminated in the signing of the 
CPA’ (Alaga 2011b, 68; see also Lederer 2010). The ending of violence and civilian counterbalance 
during the talks and in the agreement were shown to be constitutive properties of the legitimisation 
process above, but they did not come from nowhere. Whilst they constitute legitimisation, the reasons 
they came about can be considered by looking at the civil society actors and the influence they had more 
closely. Such a causal analysis shows several ways in which the civilian counterbalance and ultimately 
ending violence as part of the legitimisation process were achieved. There are in total three clusters of 
                                                        
69 If there was a form of power-sharing - let’s say territorial - which reassigned certain territories it could be argued 
to of a more collective interest (see for example Crawford and Hartmann 2008, 18 for a similar argument 
concerning decentralisation), however this is not the case in the Liberian context. For the effect of power-sharing 
at the local level in Liberia see Simons et al. (2013). 
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causal conditions that together enabled the constitutive components. The first relates to getting the 
negotiations running in the first place and conflict parties to attend the talks. The second cluster of 
causal conditions is about getting a seat at the actual negotiations for the CSAs. The third cluster of 
causal conditions relates to the maintenance of pressure on the conflict actors during the actual talks. 
These causal conditions are now discussed in turn.  
 
The first cluster of causal conditions of lobbying conflict parties, the mobilisation of citizens and gaining 
international and regional attention led to the parties attending talks and the negotiations to start up in 
the first place, which pre-empts any collective concerns being addressed. For a start groups like 
WIPNET or IRCL lobbied the conflict groups to come to the table in the first place. The Mass Action 
Campaign had spent months prior to the peace talks protesting about the war, by sitting in an open field 
and praying at Fishmarket, Monrovia, come rain or sunshine. The group managed to get a meeting with 
Taylor urging him to attend peace talks. Some members also met with LURD asking them to commit to 
talks. One of the WIPNET members recalls ‘they [LURD] said ‘we decided not to take part in the peace 
talks. But because of the women of Liberia, what you’ve been doing, sitting in the sun crying for peace.’ 
They said, ‘because of you people, we will go to Ghana’ (quoted in Pedersen 2008, 12). WIPNET 
members explain this in more detail, noting that LURD had held talks with other women groups, but 
felt dissatisfied feeling they were all Taylor loyalists. It was only when WIPNET send some Muslim 
women to talk to (predominantly Muslim) LURD factions’ leaders, “they said these are my Muslim 
sisters so I am safe” (L8_13). This empirical observation indicates a smoking gun between the WIPNET 
members talking to the LURD members and LURD agreeing to attend talks in the first place.  
 
More generally, especially WIPNET group representatives were able to use personal networks to both 
directly and indirectly encourage the different conflict parties to participate (Paffenholz 2014a, 80). For 
example, because one of the LURD faction leaders happened to be a former classmate of the Muslim 
spokesperson for WIPNET, Asatu Bah Kenneth, this significantly heightened her ability to put pressure 
on him and his factions’ colleagues (L11_13). Of course it would be unrealistic to assume that the only 
reason that LURD attended (or any of the other conflict parties) was because of the pressure from 
WIPNET or other groups, but this at least partially contributed to getting the conflict parties to the table 
as the smoking gun above has shown. Thus, a first causal condition that pre-empted the discussion of 
collective concerns in the first place, was the pressure on the parties, or the lobbying of conflict parties, 
to attend talks in the first place. This was not only done by the CSAs lobbying the conflict actors 
directly, but also in additive configuration with mobilising citizens. 
 
This additive configuration of the two conditions is because pressure was also exerted on the conflict 
parties to attend talks in the first place by CSAs additionally mobilising citizens and protesters. The 
mobilisation of protestors therefore was a form of exerting pressure in the run up to the talks, raising 
awareness of what was happening in Liberia. Citizens were mobilised to call for peace in order to get a 
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momentum going. Mobilising across potential factional lines (amongst the population) was useful in 
moving the peace process forward (McKeown and Mulbah 2007, 7). Charles Taylor famously drove past 
Fishmarket every day, conveniently located between his residence and office, and could observe the 
growing discontent displayed by the Mass Acton Activists. The women involved in WIPNET also learnt 
how to use the media more effectively in order to reach a wider audience during this time (Ekiyor and 
Gbowee 2005, 135). Both the lobbying of conflict parties and the mobilisation of citizens had individual 
causal power in getting the conflict parties to the table - thereby working in additive configuration.  
 
The mobilisation of citizen also helped to get the negotiations to start up in the first place as the 
momentum grew. This in turn, worked in additive configuration with the lobbying of international and 
regional actors. WIPNET for example additionally picketed and were able to hold meetings with the 
UN, International Contact Group and the parliament (Alaga 2011b, 79; see also Theobald 2012, 53). 
MARWOPNET also alerted the regional and international community to the situation in the region 
(Femmes Africa Solidarité 2005, 589). International and regional actors took these groups seriously, not 
least because of the movements they had managed to mobilize and put together. Summing up the role of 
civil society in 2003 one interlocutor puts it like this: “Mobilizing people, pressuring people who were 
very influential in ensuring … there was an agreement in the first place” (L45). International and 
regional actors were essential to getting the negotiations started in the first place and consequently as a 
causal condition hold its own causal power. As a result, the mobilisation of citizens together with 
maintaining international attention in an additive configuration enabled the negotiations to start in the 
first place.  
 
Both these sets of additive configurations (mobilising citizens and lobbying conflict parties; mobilising 
citizens and lobbying international actors) can be summarised as individual causal chains to getting 
conflict parties to the table and starting negotiations in the first place, respectively. Nonetheless, many 
other factors (beyond this study’s remit) also affect this, which is why these causal pathways are only 
partial explanations for the end result. Moreover, in a way this first cluster of causal conditions is 
somewhat banal, considering if conflict parties do not attend talks or negotiations do not start, there are 
no negotiations to be legitimised. Still, it is important to show that the influence CSAs in addressing 
collective concerns, which contributes to the legitimisation process, started at a very early stage in 
Liberia, even before the talks even started. The cluster of causal conditions is illustrated in Figure 4.1 
below. 
 
The second cluster of causal conditions led to the CSA getting an actual seat at the negotiation table, 
which pre-empts the civilian counterbalance especially. Prior to the talks some individual civil society 
actors in fact lobbied to actually get a place at the table. As Nohn Kidau recounts, when she first got to 
Ghana she was told that she will only have a limited (unofficial) observer role. As a result, she explains: 
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 “… I blasted. I told the Deputy Director of ECOWAS Secretariat on camera that the political 
parties have their policy interests to fight for; the warring parties are interested in getting what 
they can for themselves. Who is going to be there for the rest of the people? … That’s how we 
got involved.” (L28; see also L5_13; L1_14).  
 
This shows another smoking gun. Her input changed her personal course of involvement and that of 
others. The status she and others were eventually given was that of official observers, albeit without a 
formal negotiation mandate. This role was nonetheless effectively beyond a mere observer status, not 
least because of the nominations that came from the group for the interim Chairmanship. WIPNET also 
managed to get two representatives invited to relevant committee meetings on political and security 
matters with rebels and mediators during the talks, after their lobbying activities put significant pressure 
on the rebels (described below) (Alaga 2011a, 13; Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 43; Pedersen 2008, 14). 
Leymah Gbowee however turned down a more general seat for WIPNET in order to keep up the 
pressure on the talks from the outside (L8_13). The seat at the table for CSAs was at least in part 
responsible for the civilian counterbalance, as without it the discussions and nominations for the interim 
Chairmanship would have been less plausible for example. In this sense, the seat at the table is also an 
empirical observation of a comprehensive storyline, where the structural basis of the negotiations changed, 
with direct consequence for the later constitutive components of legitimisation. Thus, there is a rather 
direct causal chain, from lobbying the international actors to getting a seat at the table, maintaining 
pressure on conflict actors during the talks, to enabling the civilian counterbalance (as well as ending 
violence as an agreement was eventually signed), see Figure 4.1 below. Nevertheless, as is explained in 
the next section the pressure on conflict actors was not exclusively because of the seat at the table, 
which suggests that there was a causal conjunction rather than a causal chain. This is now discussed in 
more detail. 
 
The third cluster of causal conditions concerns the maintenance of pressure during the actual 
negotiation talks. This happened in a number of ways, with the CSAs adding pressure at specific 
moments and more generally reminding the conflict parties of the atrocities occurring back at home. A 
Liberian scholar working on various post-conflict issues notes that civil society actors played a key role 
keeping up the pressure during impasses at the talk, but that they “were enforcers rather than caring 
about the quality of the agreement”(L2_13). At the very least, this interpretation underlines the element 
of pressure that the CSAs maintained during the talks. WIPNET, who was kept up-to-date with what 
was happening inside the mediation room by MARWOPNET, felt frustrated by the lack of progress 
concerning the leadership question. Members of the group thus took the drastic measure of blocking the 
conference centre. This included blocking all the doors (and windows when they saw someone jump 
out) so that the negotiation members could not physically leave the conference room. They then 
escalated the pressure by threatening to undress.  
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As previously iterated, since it is considered a curse for a ‘son’ to see a ‘mother’ naked, this was very 
controversial. In hindsight this action is seen as a defining moment in the negotiations, the ‘straw that 
broke the camel’s back’, allowing for a change in the pace and content of the talks (Alaga 2011a, 1,13; 
Hayner 2007, 11–13; Nilsson 2009, 23; L44). Empirically, this can be interpreted as a smoking gun, their 
lock-in action directly led to a concretisation of the civilian counterbalance and ending violence because 
of increased pressure on the conflict parties. Furthermore, the reason this particular incident was 
possible was because of the inter group communication between the two groups MARWOPNET and 
WIPNET, delineating a comprehensive storyline. Their interaction enabled WIPNET to have detailed 
knowledge on the progress of the talks, which in turn meant WIPNET was able to intervene at the most 
significant point in time. This in turn backed up the claims to the civilian counterbalance those on the 
inside were making. Paffenholz also concludes ‘this pressure gave civil society representatives on the 
inside greater leverage to push for an agreement’ (2014a, 80). As a result, the intra group communication 
worked in interactive configuration with the pressure on the conflict actors during the talks.  
 
Whilst there is some disagreement over the effects the lock-in ultimately had,70 the effective maintenance 
of pressure on conflict parties by the CSAs during this time can also be shown through other empirical 
examples. Apart from this watershed moment, pressure was in fact exerted at other times in a more 
general fashion. WIPNET was able to meet up with the rebel parties, mediators, government 
representatives and media, putting pressure on all sides (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 136–8). 
MARWOPNET member Amelia Ward talks of even following some of the conflict parties to the 
bathroom and talking to them in there, leading to her conclusion that the “warring factions had 
confidence in us as mothers” (L44; see also L7_13). Nohn Kidau reminisces:  
 
“I was really involved in talking to the warring parties; I would go to their hotels. Sometimes they 
would slap me in the face - not physical slaps - more like why are you coming here? You people 
were sitting here and we fought, and now you want our positions? I told them I don’t want the 
positions, all I want is for you to stop killing people. I was effective in talking to them” (L28).71 
 
Lastly, civil society actors - both inside and outside the negotiation room - put pressure on the 
negotiations by insisting on the seriousness of events back in Liberia “reminding … delegates of the 
issues at stake” (L46; see also Hayner 2007, 13, 27). Nohn Kidau remembers, “at the conference centre 
they [the rebel group LURD or MODEL] would come to me and say ‘Taylor has attacked us!’ and so I 
would say ‘so Taylor has gone and killed people, are you going to go and kill more people?” (L28). All 
                                                        
70 Nohn Kidau for example explains the incident as having only a “momentary effect ... some people think they 
forced us in there until we signed the agreement but that was not true. The peace was achieved later” (L5_13; see 
also L7_13). This criticism must be seen in the context of jealousy and rivalry however, whereby the Nobel Peace 
Prize was won only by a single activist, Leymah Gboweeh, despite the active role of many others women activists. 
71 She also kept up the pressure of important international stakeholders like the US by for example emailing all her 
contacts in the diaspora in the US to urge them to contact their senators and to flood their inboxes’ (L5_13). 
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the heads of states, conflict parties, mediators and international communities were greeted every day 
with the sight of around 100-150 women protestors standing and outside with placards. Towards the 
end of the talks, messages became more poignant including ‘Butchers and murderers of the Liberian 
people stop!’ and ‘How many babies do you intent do slaughter?’ This maintenance of pressure 
throughout the talks enabled the civilian counterbalance and the ending violence to happen in the first 
place, both parts of the legitimisation process, as civil society ensured a prominent role for themselves.  
 
In summary, what ultimately enabled the components of ending violence and the civilian counterbalance 
was the seat at the table for the CSAs (argued to amount to a comprehensive storyline and a smoking gun) and 
the pressure on the conflict actors during the talks. As has been shown above, one of the major types of 
pressure was not from one of the CSAs directly at the table, but the lock-in and threat to get naked by 
WIPNET, who lobbied the talks from an informal position. They managed to have such an impact not 
least because of the inter group communication with MARWOPNET at the table, working in an 
interactive configuration. This shows that there is not an exclusively linear pathway between getting a 
seat at the table, maintaining pressure on the conflict actors and the civilian counterbalance / ending 
violence, but rather that there was also pressure from groups who did not have a seat at the table. These 
groups were able to exert pressure as effectively as they did because of the intergroup communication as 
has been shown previously. Therefore there was a causal conjunction between the seat at the table and 
the intergroup communication that together in conjunction with each other result in pressure during the 
talks which enabled the civilian counterbalance and ending violence to occur, see Figure 4.1 below.  
 
Figure 4.1: Causal Conditions and Constitutive Components of Collective Concerns 
 
The specific smoking guns (getting a seat at the table, getting LURD to the table not least because one of 
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the leaders was a former classmate, threatening to get naked) are all events, which happened on an ad-
hoc circumstantial basis, and would be difficult to artificially re-create elsewhere. They are very much 
dependent on specific actors. The comprehensive storylines on the other hand, firstly the communication 
between the groups portray a more general structural causal condition surrounding the negotiations 
process. Getting a seat at the table also makes for a comprehensive storyline, altering the structural 
frameworks of the negotiations. Nevertheless, the reason this occurred was at least in part related to the 
demands of CSAs like Nohn Kidau (argued as a smoking gun) and is thereby also dependent on the actors, 
including the mediators, which is discussed in more detail in the next section on context factors.  
 
With regards to the temporal boundaries of the possibilistic causal analysis, the constitutive components 
of legitimisation already show that the legitimisation process occurs not only during the talk, including 
the final agreement (a civilian counterbalance during the talks and in the agreement) but also after the 
talks have ended, as is reflected in ending violence as a component, which usually occurs only after the 
talks have ended, as was the case in Liberia. The causal analysis, also shows that by further trying to 
explain why this may happen, that important events also occur prior to the talks even starting, especially 
the lobbying of citizens, conflict parties and international and regional actors alike by the CSAs. 
Regarding the spatial boundaries, the analysis shows that the causal conditions illustrating the influence 
occur at the formal peace negotiations (e.g. a seat at the table), outside the formal peace negotiations 
(e.g. the actions of WIPNET; talking to the conflict parties) as well as completely apart from the 
negotiations, including back in Monrovia (e.g. mass mobilisation). 
 
Beyond these temporal and spatial boundaries of legitimisation, which is revisited throughout the next 
two chapters and discussed at length in the chapter of theory of legitimate peace negotiations, there are 
also several context factors that help to understand and explain how and why the constitutive 
components and the causal conditions that enabled them came to be. These are discussed in the last 
section on the feature of collective concerns. 
 
4.2.3 Context Factors 
 
The context of the non-importance of local concerns has already been previously discussed, relating this 
back to the centralised nature of the Liberian government and state history. In addition, further context 
factors also contextualise the constitutive components and the causal conditions that enable them. These 
context factors both positively impact the role that the CSAs were able to have (namely the personal 
relationships, own legitimation, openness of the mediator and their previous reputation) but also 
restricted them. The latter is due to the overall politicised nature of the civil society sector in Liberia and 
alleged self-interested nature of the CSAs, best exemplified by the emphasis from many on receiving 
jobs. These factors will now be outlined. 
 
The strong personal networks, own legitimation, openness of the mediator and the reputation of the 
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CSAs all had a positive effect on the involvement of the CSAs and thus contextualises the legitimisation 
process through the constitutive components and the causal conditions which enabled them. First, the 
personal relationships are shown in the example of the WIPNET member Asatu Bah Konneh 
recognising one of the LURD rebels as her former classmate. The close network of relationships in a 
small country of Liberia, where strong personal networks count for a lot is not surprising (see for 
example Liebenow 1987, 105–115). Through family and friends connections can quickly be made, 
enabling unique access to conflict parties. Second, the inputs throughout the negotiations (including the 
lock-in by WIPNET, but also more generally the input made by the official observers as above) lead to 
these actors being seen as more legitimate themselves in the eyes of the mediator and international 
community as such reputation is linked the legitimacy of the group themselves (Paffenholz 2014a, 80). 
This adds to the next two points of the encouragement of the mediator and the general reputation of the 
CSAs. 
 
Namely thirdly, contextually important was the fact that there was a mediator who encouraged such 
inputs from CSAs. The mediator had an open door policy, keen to hear opinions from both civil society 
actors and political party representatives on the proceedings of the plenaries (L5_13; L12_13). 
MARWOPNET members held meetings after the official sessions had ended which the chief mediator 
Abubakar, as well as with the American and EU representatives, who regularly asked them for their 
opinion on the day’s proceedings (L44). Abubakar gave Nohn Kidau a car at times instructing her “go 
and talk to your people” (L28). As a sign of their influence, certain responsibilities were delegated to the 
civil society groups (L45). Consultations conducted by the mediator with civil society groups were also 
recognised in a report from the African Union representative present at the talk (Section 11; African 
Union 2003, 3). WIPNET were also able to influence the mediator as well as all of the conflict parties, 
since they were seen as ‘ordinary Liberians’ (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 136). 
 
Lastly, and returning to the reputation of the civil society actors themselves there is also a trust in the 
actors themselves (that also comes from the conflict parties). This is best exemplified by taking another 
look at the IRCL. Considering these religious actors during the 1990s (then known as the IFMC), Kieh 
Jr discusses the fact that the IRCL did not have the proverbial sticks and carrots to induce compliance of 
the then major rebel group, the NPFL. Whilst he argues the religious leaders were held in high esteem - 
a major asset - they had no way to punish and reward rebel groups (2009, 12–15). By 2003, the IRCL 
seemed to have more influence as was illustrated by some of their inputs above including on the civilian 
chairmanship. On the one hand, this is most likely related to the increasing pressure they exerted in the 
run-up to the talks on the different conflict factions to finally attend talks. On the other hand, Sheikh 
Kafumba Konneh understands the growing influence on the warring factions to have built up from the 
first meetings in 1990 onwards as “everyone … could see we were impartial, so they had confidence in 
us” (L43). By advising ECOWAS, and making judgement calls on agreements from the mid-1990s 
onwards that they felt would not work, ECOWAS (and the conflict parties) realised that IFMC/IRCL 
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was “fair, foresighted in … [their] decision making … [giving them] influence” (L43). Such an image of 
the civil society actors as an honest broker plays a role in the legitimisation process since it legitimates 
the actors themselves (see also Paffenholz 2014a, 79). This is considered in more detail in the next 
section on the feature of subjective representation. 
 
Before this, the context factors which are likely to have a negative effect on the overall impact of civil 
society actors involving themselves in addressing collective concerns is the generally politicised 
environment and alleged self-interested nature of the CSAs. According to this argument, many of the 
civil society actors were more interested in gaining jobs than actually addressing the collective concerns. 
The historically political nature or interlinkage of elite civil society actors to political life has already been 
pointed out (see also Liebenow 1987, 83–84). The politicised nature of civil society activism during the 
talks was pointed out, best illustrated through the alleged interest of CSAs in getting jobs. This arguably 
has a negative effect on the legitimisation through the feature of collective concerns as it reduces the 
capacity to influence the inclusion of collective concerns and negatively effects the CSAs own 
legitimation, the subject of the next part of the chapter.  
 
A Liberian newspaper editor pointed out ‘there is a deep-seated animosity among all Liberian political 
actors. Somewhere along the line, they have all offended each other politically. Who can be said to be 
neutral when everybody is a stakeholder in this conflict?’ (UN IRIN 2003). Several interviewees stressed 
that they believed that the civil society which took part in the talks, were either politically motivated, 
sponsored by politicians, or at the very least manipulated by them (L4; L7). US-based diaspora civil 
society groups for example are said to have been directly linked to the outbreak of civil war, later simply 
going through a paradigmatic shift by then contributing to the peace-building process (Antwi-Boateng 
2012). Thus, whilst ‘formalized participation in the peace process provides a certain degree of legitimacy 
to civil society, it has sparked a heated debate among civic leaders themselves’ (Fomunyoh and Hofman 
2004, 10). Members of WIPNET address the tendency towards partisanship by civil society directly, 
arguing that WIPNET was new to the process and their intentions ‘pure and selfless’ in contrast to other 
civil society actors (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 139). In addition, Taylor not only chose Abubakar from a 
list of potential mediators, but he also chose which civil society actors were allowed to attend as 
delegates (Hayner 2007, 28; Nilsson 2009, 42).72 This makes the presence of CSAs potentially very 
biased, safe for the fact others attended anyway, albeit without an invitation.  
 
The best illustration of the politicisation and self-interested nature of the CSAs at the talks is the 
                                                        
72 David Backer and David Carrol argue that the tendency of NGOs to be seen as a de facto (political) opposition 
in developing states (whether they want to or not) means that the state sees them as a threat to state sovereignty 
and legitimacy (2001, 13; see also Atuobi 2010). This may in part, explain why Taylor insisted on choosing the civil 
society groups attending. According to one source the only independent civil society groupings were the Diaspora 
group and the WIPNET (“but they were not really part of it”), L4_13. Nohn Kidau explains she paid for her own 
ticket, but since the mediator had invited her to participate as an official observer, food and lodging was then 
covered (L5_13). 
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expressed fear that “representation may not be genuine for the interests of the people, but just to further 
themselves” (L14; see also L2; L6_13; L10_13). At worst, participation therefore is seen in light of 
getting jobs (L22).73 This is particularly elucidated by two factors: Firstly the leadership contest for the 
head of the interim chairperson and secondly places in the actual interim government. Over 42 names 
were suggested to replace Taylor as an interim chairperson, including Theresa Leigh-Sherman the leader 
of MARWOPNET or Marcus William Jones from the Liberian Bar Association, leading a diplomat to 
observe ‘every pressure group now wants to take the Presidency’ (Ocansey and Garblah 2003; UN IRIN 
2003). 
 
Secondly, the provision of a formal role for civil society in the transitional government was not immune 
to criticism either. While there was a certain logic to having representatives of civil society groups 
assume responsibility for such agencies as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the National 
Human Rights Commission, which are less involved in the day-to-day business of direct public 
administration, as well aid agencies such as the National Food Assistance Agency, the rationale for civil 
society-run banks, lotteries, and rubber plantations - to say nothing of government ministries - is less 
apparent (Pham 2004a; see also Tarr 2007 who sees the co-optation of civil society into the interim 
government as “betrayal”). The idea was for civil society to hold formal positions within the 
government, whilst keeping a watchdog role at the same time (Sayndee 2009, 173; L12_13). It is even 
argued that the civil society actors merited these positions in the interim government ‘in recognition of 
their work’ and that after the end of the transitional period ‘civil society groups continued their roles as 
advocates and watchdogs’ (Paffenholz 2014a, 84; see also Atuobi 2010, 12). Interim Chairperson Gyude 
Bryant puts it like this: “[the idea behind having the civil society in the interim government] was to get 
some wisdom and rationality … to help strengthen my hand as to what was right and fair, as opposed to 
the greed and biases of the warring factions” (L12_13).74 MARWOPNET for example were assigned to 
the Ministry of Gender (L44).  
 
Nevertheless, perhaps unsurprisingly, there was confusion about the actual role these groups should 
then play, which was used by some as a launch pad to political office (Fomunyoh and Hofman 2004, 11; 
Pajibo 2007, 293). Another civil society member of the interim government described the interim 
government “like a grab and go … we just [held] our breath and wait[ed] for the two years to pass so we 
can rebuild the country then” (L18). The (alleged) rampant corruption of the interim government (see 
e.g. Fomunyoh and Hofman 2004, 13; Pajibo 2007, 288; Salih 2012, 177; Sawyer 2008, 180–181)75 is not 
improved by the fact that civil society squabbled to get a place in the government either. Samuel Atuobi 
                                                        
73 Not an entirely new phenomena either. Writing about the Banjul Talks in 1990 (see Table 2 in Appendix) Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf portrays her decision of stepping back from the talks as ‘I had not come to Banjul looking for a 
job’ (2009, 185)  
74 Professor Debey Sayndee agrees to this: “We have to look at where Liberia was at that critical time – there was 
no government technically speaking, nobody had legitimacy by 2003 ... it was like a team of managers putting 
things into place”(L10_13). 
75 Which Gyude Bryant wholeheartedly denies (L12_13). 
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summarises the time like this ‘while this dual role was supposedly to enable the CSOs to monitor 
government from within, in practice, it led to further division of their front and confrontation with the 
warring factions and political parties with whom they competed for government posts’ (2010, 3). Within 
a year, many were frustrated with the interim government, though it was a religious group (the Catholic 
Archdiocese of Monrovia) who fulfilled the watchdog role, by criticising the ‘unprecedented wave of 
social and economic injustices abundant in the interim period’ (The News 2004; see also Sayon 2004). A 
notable exception also comes from the IRCL who declined any seats in the interim government, advising 
its members if they wanted to join the government they would have to resign from the group first (L43).  
 
Even in post-war Liberia, the debate over the depoliticisation of civil society is still relevant, since a strict 
separation between state, market and civil society is at best not always so obvious (see also Atuobi 2010; 
Bashua 2005, 127; McKeown and Mulbah 2007, 6–9). The competition for jobs in the interim 
government (and for the position of Interim Chairperson) for some of the civil society participants 
meant that perhaps their work was less effective than it could have been. A narrow focus for some 
groups and fewer common positions between the groups probably affected the impact they could have 
had (see also Hayner 2007, 12). But of course civil society groups are heterogeneous with different 
agendas, ideas and hopes. What this means for their representativeness is considered by looking at the 
second feature of the heuristic model in the next section. 
 
4.3 Subjective Representation 
 
The second feature from the heuristic model is subjective representation. As part of the feature, which is 
drawn from the participation in the public sphere argument, symbolic and descriptive forms of 
representation are considered by interpreting ways in which representation was spoken of and 
legitimation strategies of CSAs themselves. This time the comprehensive process-tracing encompasses 
two analytical steps. Firstly, an interpretive overview of subjective representation reveals that feeling 
representing and recognised guarantors of legitimacy constitute two further components of 
legitimisation. Secondly, the context factors that play a role for the constitutive analysis are discussed. 
There is no causal analysis as epistemologically this is not plausible for something as perception-related 
like the feature of subjective representation. 
 
Most of the interviews and discussion in the focus group from the first fieldwork trip in Liberia do not 
indicate outright feelings of inclusiveness in relation to the negotiations (apart from some exceptions, 
including the Senior Senator of Bong County, Jewel-Howard Taylor, who commented “no one was 
excluded ... everyone was there” L42; see also L5). Nonetheless, there was still the idea that participation 
is important, as it is the ‘duty and responsibility of the people of a country to determine their own 
destiny, to resolve their own problems’ (L43). Theoretically it has been argued that participation or 
inclusion is guaranteed through representation (e.g. Chabal 1994, 142), which is the subject of the 
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analysis in this section. It is shown that feeling represented and recognised guarantors of legitimacy both 
constitute components of process legitimisation.  
 
4.3.1 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Feeling Represented and Guarantors of Legitimacy 
 
The interpretation of the constitutive components related to subjective representation is carried out in 
three sub-sections, considering the interpretation of representation, the perceived importance of CSAs 
and the legitimation strategies or narratives of CSAs. 
 
4.3.1.1 Interpretations of Representation in Liberia 
 
Focusing especially on the example of the religious leaders as part of the CSAs, it is shown that two 
major interpretations of ‘legitimate’ representation were the understanding of suffering and shared 
experiences as well as neutrality. Together these two elements show that feeling represented (according 
to the specific interpretation this took) constitutes a component of legitimisation. This is also shown by 
the fact that feeling represented is reduced by a sense of exclusion, to the detriment of the legitimisation 
process.   
 
According to a news report at the time ‘civil society representatives, who said they represent the views and 
aspirations of the about 3.5 million Liberia's [sic], were said to be conferring among themselves’ 
(emphasis added, UN IRIN 2003; see also L1_14). But how do we know they represented the Liberian 
population? A starting point is to look at the own definitions of representation from the point of view of 
the CSAs. One of the civil society activists who took part in the negotiations said “we had the people in 
the back of our minds … we knew what was needed” (L13). To take a more specific example, the IRCL, 
combining both important Muslim and Christian leaders, felt that they were adequately representative of 
the general population because of their independence and travelling throughout the country. Passing on 
information and grievances through networks of religious leaders to the higher echelon based in 
Monrovia gave them a unique position in being able to represent the population (e.g. L41). Expanding 
on this idea, Sheik Konneh explains:  
 
“Are we ignorant of what was going on so we could not represent the civilians? No we were 
affected by the war the same way as … the civilians. We knew the problems of our people … 
we never had the time to go to mosque and church anymore. Women had no time to go to the 
market to get food; the business leaders could not open their business. So we were all affected, 
maybe not in the same way, but still affected” (L41). 
 
For the CSAs at the very least, they claim to be in a position to represent the population because of 
shared experiences. The Mass Action Campaign for example was interpreted as so successful because it 
was ‘central in bringing a human face to the crisis’ (Alaga 2011a, 16) or ‘a human face to the conflict’ 
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(Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 138). Whether this interpretation of representation was in fact perceived as 
relevant depends on the audience or beneficiaries of legitimacy. In the focus group discussion conducted 
with teachers in Ganta in 2011, the group concluded that religious leaders and women groups had 
addressed their major grievances, and that “they were in the best position to know how we felt and 
suffered” (LGT). Teachers in Gbarnga similarly explained that ‘CSOs’ had addressed local grievances at 
the talks, since “they know what was happening here before they went [to Ghana]” (LGbT). Thus, the 
focus group participants accept the interpretation of representation by the religious actors, as sharing 
their experience or understanding their suffering. Accordingly, the beneficiaries of legitimacy felt 
represented because of shared experience and understanding of suffering, of those at the peace talks 
representing them.76 As a result, feeling represented constitutes (one part) of the legitimisation process. 
Empirical confessions from both civil society actors and focus group discussants ‘from below’ have 
confirmed this.  
 
This interpretation of understanding or shared experience of suffering contrasts with other civil society 
actors, who were deemed to be much more out of touch, such as the diaspora civil society ‘who did not 
suffer like the rest of Liberians who lived through the civil war’ (Antwi-Boateng 2011, 19–21). On this 
point, one of the diaspora representatives, Nohn Kidau, explains, “of course we didn’t know what they 
had gone through, but they also didn’t know what we had gone through either. We sent money, millions 
of dollars, we also went through hardships” (L5_13). It is arguable, that the diaspora were able to 
understand the suffering or offer shared experiences, just from a different perspective, considering the 
large diaspora residing especially in the USA. This has not been the subject of further research for the 
time being however, and thus stands only on the account of the individual CSA.  
 
A further interpretation to support the representativeness of the CSAs (and because of this feeling 
represented constituting a part of the legitimisation process) was their own neutrality. Thus, the 
involvement of the Mass Action campaign was ‘perceived to be genuine and neutral’ (Alaga 2011a, 2). 
This is explained by members of the Mass Action to have been the case because their ‘intentions were 
pure and selfless’ (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 139). Returning to the religious groups, the Church in 
Liberia specifically had become more critical throughout the 1990s, though historically they had been a 
defender of all government regimes, holding on to status quo (Kieh Jr 2009, 6–7). Over time however, 
all religious leaders (mainly Christian or Muslim - the two prevalent religions in the country) became to 
be held in very high regard (Toure 2002, 15–16). The focus groups discussions appear to support this. A 
series of questions that were asked are relevant in that respect. Firstly, discussants were asked to list the 
most powerful actors in their local area (today and during the war). A follow-up question then 
considered whether these actors were positive or negative for local peace. In a separate section of the 
                                                        
76 In the framing literature, it is also argued that frames must be empirically credible (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000, 
620). 
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focus groups, after listing perceived local concerns and whether they had been addressed (see Table 4.1 
above), participants were asked who had addressed these concerns at the talks.  
 
Most of the groups mentioned religious leaders as powerful actors in their area. Whilst this was slightly 
more often referencing to Christian than Muslim leaders, this is not surprising considering that the latest 
census in Liberia find 85.5% of the population to be Christian, compared to 12.2% being Muslims 
(Republic of Liberia 2009, 85 Appendix 4). Furthermore, all these religious actors mentioned were seen 
to be positive for local peace. The only exception was for a Muslim youth leader, who was considered as 
disputed in his contribution towards local peace. Nonetheless, the primary characteristic given to him 
was his youth leadership rather than religious affiliation, which is why he was not included in the Table 
4.2, see below. Lastly, both the teachers and youth in Ganta mentioned religious leaders as specifically 
having addressed their concerns at the peace talks (more is said on this below).  
 
Table 4.2: The Importance of Religious Leaders according to the Focus Group Discussants 
(Liberia 2011) 
 
 List of Most Powerful 
Actors includes 
Religious Leaders?77 
Religious Actors 
Positive/ Negative 
or Disputed for 
Local Peace78 
Who addressed the Grievances 
(listed) at the Peace Talks?79 
Market Women 
Gbarnga (LGbM) 
No n/a Market Women Association; UN; 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf 
Teachers Gbarnga  
(LGbT) 
Yes (Pastors and 
Imams) 
Positive CSOs and international community 
Youth Gbarnga  
(LGbY) 
Yes (Head of Muslim 
Council) 
Positive ECOWAS; UN 
Market Women 
Ganta (LGM) 
Yes (Local Christian 
Pastor and Imam) 
Positive ECOWAS; UN 
Teachers Ganta 
(LGT) 
Yes (Local Christian 
Pastor) 
Positive UN, warring factions, Council of 
Churches 
Youth Ganta (LGY) Yes (Local Christian 
Pastor) 
Positive Muslim and Christian Community, 
CSOs, Political Parties, UN, Health 
Sector 
 
The respect for religious leaders is evident and was - by their own admission - also ensured by their 
claim to neutrality and independence. Working both to mediate between conflict groups and negotiate 
when possible from 1990 onwards, IRCL and its predecessor organisations stayed neutral by talking to 
everyone and anyone. They also showed this by turning down any positions in the interim government, 
which many other civil society groups accepted. Their proven impartiality gave them more confidence in 
                                                        
77 “Who are the most powerful actors in Gbarnga/Ganta?” 
78 “Which actors are positive or negative with regard to local peace?” 
79 Following on from “What were the most important local issues during the war?  Were these issues addressed in 
the negotiations of the peace agreement?” (see Table 4.1) the next question was “Who addressed them?” 
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their abilities to be fair representatives.80 Whilst some commentators have continued to criticise the close 
association between the state and the church, questioning their independence (Kieh Jr 2009; Pham 
2004b, 56), other sources support the idea of a more balanced role being played by the religious leaders 
(see for example Sengbeh 2013 commenting on the recent funeral proceedings for Archbishop Francis 
in June 2013). At the very least, the active role held by the IRCL throughout the 1990s (as documented 
by Conciliation Resources see Armon and Carl 1996) and their efforts together with ECOWAS to 
conduct preliminary talks in 2002 and 2003 supports the idea of their independence. This independence, 
alongside the view that religious actors are powerful, positive with regards to local peace and at least by 
some of the focus groups interpreted as addressing their grievances during the talks, further supports the 
that feelings of representation constitute an important aspect of the legitimisation process and that this is 
related to the characteristics of neutrality.  
 
The constitutive nature of feeling represented is also shown by the fact that a sense of exclusion was 
perceived as detrimental to the legitimisation process. Asking interviewees if they felt like anything was 
left out from the peace negotiations, and if yes then what, this response is particularly illustrative (if 
scathing): “…they never asked the local people what they wanted, (there was) no local representation. 
What they said there it was all right for them but not all right for some of us. It was not a genuine peace 
agreement” (L27). This lack of voice or representation of ‘the local people’ or ‘ordinary people’ at the 
negotiations was mentioned by many.81 One interviewee went as far as to state that whilst civil society 
was represented, locals were not (Interview L17), clearly questioning the ability of CSAs to represent the 
local. All these feelings of not being represented come from interviews conducted in Gbarnga and 
Ganta.  
 
Admittedly, this self-identifying nature of the local - which surely is a rather obscure conceptualisation – 
comes at least partially from the emphasis of the research methods (in ‘local arenas’). Moreover, a 
critique of liberal peacebuilding models focusing on emphasising local agency and ownership is 
underlined as lacking by many agencies in the Liberian context (Bøås and Stig 2010; Mac Ginty 2010; 
Richmond 2009a). Whilst using the ‘local’ is arguably essentialising, homogenising and belittling to 
diversity amongst and within individuals and groups, it is accepted as an analytical category, referring to 
inhabitants of certain geographic areas (see Hirblinger and Simons 2014). Especially in the context of 
Liberia, where the neglect of the so-called hinterlands plays a significant role in explaining the conflict, 
the local can thus be pretty much anywhere outside Monrovia, including the peri-urban areas of 
Gbarnga and Ganta.82  
 
                                                        
80 Mary Brownell of LWI also urged her members never to take “a cent from the warlords, if we take a bribe the 
respect is gone” (L7_13). 
81 LGT; LGbM; LGbT; L2; L7; L9; L11; L13; L20 
82 Though parts of Monrovia are also neglected by government authorities and could therefore express similar 
‘local’ concerns 
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Interviewees went on to mention certain groups of people that they felt out were excluded from 
negotiations, but should have been included. This included women (L2; L13), traditional leaders (L6; 
L20; L25; L32; L40), and lastly local chiefs.83 The chiefs were the most frequently mentioned actors seen 
as having excluded, by a wide-range of persons interviewed. This is perhaps at odds with the outside 
perspective of chiefs being historic instruments of the oppressive governments. Reasons given for 
proposing their inclusion are their knowledge of locally relevant grievances, e.g. “I think John Gbatu 
should have been there, he was the Chief who knew everything about the history of this place” (L37). As 
for the authority and related legitimacy of traditional leaders - this is relatively unknown because of the 
secrecy of the organisations they run and the inability to talk to outsiders about them, though the loss of 
their authority due to their incapacitation during the war years is documented (Moran 2008, 155; 
Richards et al. 2005). Ethnicity played an insignificant part in perceptions of exclusion, being mentioned 
only by one government official, who happened to belong to the Mandingo minority group (L8). 
Interestingly, one of the youth leaders interviewed lamented that there had been no representation of 
youth, despite “their driving force in the war” (L14, see also L13, L20). Someone else noted that the 
youth representative only represented his or her own position (L2). This side-lining of youth is according 
to some commentators still a problem in the post-war era (McKeown and Mulbah 2007, 34; see also 
Moran 2008, 143).84 As such, there is a perceived exclusion, to the detriment of the legitimisation 
process as the confession “it was not a genuine peace agreement” [because of] “no local representation” 
underlines. 
 
Reiterating that “feeling represented” constitutes a component of legitimisation, it also raises the fact 
that when this only incorporates national organisations this may lead to a sense of exclusion at the local 
level. This contradicts the earlier finding that the exclusion of local concerns were not detrimental to the 
peace process overall, showing that local representation may be important for constituting the 
legitimisations process as regards subjective representation. This is discussed in more detail in the 
chapter on the theory of legitimate peace negotiations. The next section shows that the 
acknowledgement of the importance of certain groups also contributes to the component of feeling 
represented as well as for recognised guarantors of legitimacy.  
 
4.3.1.2 The Acknowledgement of Importance 
 
The feature of subjective representation in the heuristic model is also made up of descriptive 
representation. Nonetheless, the Liberian case shows that there was no descriptive representation, rather 
                                                        
83 L2; L7; L11; L15; L17; L18; L24; L36; L37. An NPP Party member also complained that warring factions were 
also left out of the negotiations and that it was merely the highest echelons that were present, leaving the foot 
soldiers behind (L3). 
84 Moran argues that youth and women have always supported each other. For example when student leaders were 
arrested by Doe, the Market Women’s Association in Monrovia, threatened to shut down the food supply of the 
entire city, if ‘our children were harmed’, related to a recognition amongst structural subordinates, she argues, that 
they need to support each other (2008, 50). 
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there was the acknowledgement of the importance of CSAs as grassroots representatives and other 
actors more generally, confirming feeling represented as well as a recognition of guarantors of legitimacy 
in constituting a part of the legitimisation process.  
 
Distinguishing between the two groups of WIPNET and MARWOPNET adds further analytical value 
to the interpretation of representation. Though members of MARWOPNET made sure they briefed the 
WIPNET women after every negotiation day (L43), accusations of elitism (discussed below) were voiced 
against MARWOPNET. WIPNET counted more than 5,000 members from all the counties, and 
claimed to represent the ‘ordinary Liberians’ or ‘common women’, mobilizing women from all levels of 
society including students, doctors, lawyers, disabled women, rural women, girls and security officers 
(Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 135; Fuest 2009, 119, 132; Pedersen 2008, 7). Thus, participants cut across all 
categories of age, class, education etc. One CSA remembers: “… back then there was unity [amongst the 
women groups]. There was no race, there was no poor, there was no literate or illiterate - it was a matter 
of life and death.” (L9_13). The grassroots organizational structure of WIPNET rejected a hierarchical 
structure, adopted a collective decision making approach (via phones for those groups outside of 
Monrovia) and discouraged the use of ‘big English’ (Alaga 2011b, 80–81; Fuest 2009, 119). Identifying 
collectively to show their solidarity across social divisions the women peace activists all wore white t-
shirts and lappas (material worn as skirts) from the same fabric. They refrained from wearing make-up or 
jewellery. Ecoma Alaga argues that the campaign was a ‘culturally specific grassroots-based strategy’ 
(2011b, 73). Not only was this movement therefore culturally organic, and inclusive by both its 
membership and decision-making processes, it is also widely admired for its activism during the war.  
 
“The women very very clearly represented the grassroots”, explains one peacebuilding practitioner 
(L1_13).85 The image of the women in white sitting at the Fishmarket with their banners and public 
praying across religious divides brought them international recognition (e.g. Clinton 2011). Closer to 
home, the Mass Action Campaign was widely appraised by a range of persons including members of civil 
society organizations (L6; L20; L22; L46), government officials (L10; L40; L15; L21), and the focus 
groups participants (e.g. LGT). A decade after the signing of the peace agreement their role was 
celebrated once again in a Liberian newspaper, under their daily photo caption of ‘This, too, is Liberia,’ 
see Image 4.1 below.  
 
The support for ‘the women’ and WIPNET especially was so prevalent that one confession or statement 
from a Woman Muslim Leader stands out: “The women at the peace agreements did not represent me 
because they only looked at Christian women, they did not represent me. No Muslim woman was there” 
(L12). This is so surprising because it is factually untrue, considering WIPNET was built on a platform 
of interreligious cooperation, not least illustrated by the fact that one of the key leaders was Asatu Bah 
                                                        
85 C.f. also “Leymah Gbowee and the WIPNET were representing the voiceless” (L3_13). 
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Kenneth, a Muslim police officer. Though if we contextualise this statement (acknowledging also that it 
was the only one of its kind) it can be interpreted in light of the perception of many Muslims in Liberia 
who feel discriminated against, for example by living in a country that might be secular but still 
celebrates Christian holidays (Shilue 2011).  
 
Mostly, there is widespread support and appreciation for WIPNET and not only from women but also 
men. Many of those who brought up and discussed the role of WIPNET with regard to bringing the 
peace talks closer to them and being symbolically attached to them (and thereby constituting a part of 
the legitimisation process) were also men. In fact the majority were men, though this must be put into 
context of most elites in government and civil society positions still being male, hence most interviews 
were conducted with men. This suggests that symbolic attachment to the women groups, especially 
WIPNET, is not on the basis of descriptive representation of womanhood per se. In fact, it can be 
related back to their grassroots nature, which is shown in the following. 
 
Image 4.1: WIPNET as Recognised Guarantors of Legitimacy;  
Newspaper Clipping New Democrat; 19th August 2013 
 
 
 
The difference between the more grassroots group WIPNET/ Mass Action for Peace and the formally 
invited MARWOPNET becomes relevant. There were clear tensions between the various women 
groups, notably WIPNET, MARWOPNET and LWI. WIPNET repeatedly invited the latter groups to 
attend their protests at the Fishmarket, but the groups rarely came. When they did come to one protest, 
they brought chairs with them and placed them at the front. Considering that the basis of this protest 
was women sitting on the field in all weather conditions, this action was difficult to understand as 
anything but hostile to the peace movement. WIPNET activist Gbowee notes ‘the class tensions were 
pronounced. They were the educated elite; we were the indigenous poor’ (Gbowee 2011, 144; see also 
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Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 138). Veronika Fuest even concludes that elites instrumentalised the 
uneducated and ‘common women’ to perform the tedious task of the daily peace demonstrations (2009, 
132). Both LWI and MARWOPNET were seen as committed activists, ‘at some risks to their lives’, but 
nevertheless as educated elites (Alaga 2011b, 80; Gbowee 2011, 115), criticised by WIPNET as having 
‘wined and dined’ with the rebels in their role as official delegates, preferring the status quo (Pedersen 
2008, 8). WIPNET members further explained: “those women … were in the plane going from country 
to country. They did not come down to the people” (L8_13). Moreover, the civil society delegates were 
said to have been predominately from Monrovia to the exclusion of local representatives (L45; L12; L16; 
L25). This, it was suggested, may mean they do not know the needs of the people (L2; Sharpe 2012, 
362). It links back to the idea of ‘understanding of suffering’ as outlined above. 
 
LWI however, prides itself on its 1994 inception as a non-partisan and class transcending group, 
including from all sectors ranging from ‘farmers and traditional healers to medical doctors and 
journalists’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and UNESCO 1997, 10; 
Theobald 2012, 50). Founder of LWI and long-term human right activist Mary Brownell also denies 
these allegations of elitism, especially reiterating the diverse membership of the LWI throughout the 
1990s (L7_13; see also L1_13). Whilst perhaps then this accusation of elitism is unfounded, it does seem 
to be problematized frequently in the Liberian context. Even in post-war Liberia, explain McKeown and 
Mulbah: 
 
‘Civil society takes the form of elitism that is heavily centralized and has little connection with 
rural organizations. The legitimacy of civil society is greatly undermined because they do not 
have constituents so it is difficult to assess whose interest civil society is representing’ (2007, 39). 
 
This notion of elitism is also reflected in a particular class-based discourse of Liberian elite women, who 
with a very culturalist message call for the Liberian system of patriarchy and a culture of violence against 
women to be dismantled, without paying attention to the historical legacy of Liberian women in 
authority (Abramowitz and Moran 2012, 132). Focusing on the specific time frame of the peace 
negotiations these class tensions were however weakened (even if only for a certain time period). The 
mediators and the international community knew of WIPNET because of their activities of rallying in 
protest in front of the talks (as well as in the run up to the talks, see above). This also motivated the 
mediator Abubakar to invite WIPNET to the table as official observers at one point during the talks. 
They declined the seat, arguing they felt adequately informed to the proceedings from MARWOPNET - 
and did not want to undermine their role in representing the women of Liberia - and that they could play 
a better role pressurizing the parties from outside the official setting (Gbowee 2011, 156). This move 
helped improve relationships between the two groups as the respective roles were cemented and they 
could help each other to have a positive influence. This was previously discussed as a comprehensive 
storyline in ensuring a civilian counterbalance in the addressing collective concern feature of the heuristic 
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model. In her own conclusion on the matter, Gbowee notes ‘perhaps the members of MARWOPNET 
were elites, but they still represented the concerns of all Liberian women as observers of the talks, just as 
we represented our country’s women in protest’ (2011, 125).  
 
Accordingly, it was not so much the self-identification with the civil society actors with regard to them 
being women, but rather the organisational framework of WIPNET and the actions they carried out 
which made them so well known. If anything then, WIPNET were representative of the grassroots. 
Grassroots representation is not really a descriptive representative quality, but is rather a symbolic form 
of representation by showing the acknowledgement of the importance of the CSAs. The resulting 
symbolic attachment to the actors confirms feeling represented, albeit on a symbolic basis. In addition, 
more than feeling represented, the symbolic attachment shows that groups or actors are recognised as 
guarantors of legitimacy, which also constitutes a component of the legitimisation process.  
 
This recognition of importance also holds for other actors who are not in fact CSAs themselves. 
Returning to the focus groups and the discussions of who represented the grievances of the participants 
(see Table 4.2) international actors were mentioned a few times (in interviews also), usually under the 
agglomeration of ‘the UN’. As such the “UN looked at how best we can hold our peace” (L23) and “the 
UN was for us, the youth, representing our concerns” (L1; see also FGD LGbM; LGbY). Another focus 
group mentions “international NGOs as addressing their grievances” but also noted the mediator as the 
“one who is making peace” (LGT; L43). This shows that the nature of representation contributing to the 
legitimisation process encapsulates far more than mere descriptive representation, and also goes beyond 
the CSAs to include other actors. As such, recognised guarantors of legitimacy and feeling represented 
contributed to the legitimisation of the process. The former will be confirmed in the next section on 
self-referential legitimation narratives. 
 
4.3.1.3 Self-Referential Legitimation Narratives 
 
An interpretive analysis of the CSAs also reveals a legitimation strategy on behalf of the women groups 
more generally, who described themselves as mothers and daughters. This form of self-referential 
legitimation was widely recognised. It resembles the notion of personal (as charismatic or traditional) 
sources of legitimacy as described by Weber (1978b; see also Schatzberg 2001; Steady 2011) and the 
legitimation strategies from Barker (2001). This legitimation strategy results in a perception of legitimacy 
and thus constitutes a part of the legitimisation process through the recognition of specific actors as 
guarantors of legitimacy, which is similar but goes beyond feeling represented. Again, despite specifically 
referring to womanhood the self-referential legitimation narrative cannot be interpreted in terms of 
descriptive representation but is much more symbolic than anything else. 
 
According to the gender specialist Alaga, ‘womanhood’ in traditional African society amounts to ‘an 
identity for people who are born female and share similar life experiences relating to their physiology 
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and gender roles of being mothers and wives’ (2011a, 10). This does not mean that members of women 
movements in Liberia do not have multiple identities along the lines of class, religion, and ethnicity - 
some aspects of which may have deepened during the conflict - but transcending these divisions actually 
gave women a more powerful position (Pedersen 2008, 7). Lobbying under the banner of being mothers, 
wives, daughters, aunts and sisters helped give the women access to government officials and rebels, in 
view of the self-imposed stereotyping as ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-threating’ traditional female roles (Alaga 
2011b, 80). As Amelia Ward from MARWOPNET puts it: “the warring factions had confidence in us as 
mothers, they talked to us” or “even the troops of ECOWAS, we got information from them because 
they confided in us. They were our children, we met with them” (emphasis added, Interview L44).  
 
Though such self-referential reasoning can be contested on many levels, not least because it does not 
necessarily recognise multiple femininities (Okech 2011, 59), an interpretation of the empirical data 
portrays a prominent symbolic attachment to the ‘mother/daughter’ role in the Liberian peace 
negotiations context. Founder of LWI Mary Brownell speaks of a meeting trying to pressure Guinean 
President Conté into talks with Taylor (arranged through his wife): 
 
“So I put up my hand and I told him ‘you said you would never talk to Taylor, but you and 
Taylor are in your mansions you don’t know what is happening to the people. You are playing 
with the lives of millions of people. I come to you as a mother, a sister - when you and Taylor 
meet I am going to lock the two of you in one room and sit on your key until you come to your 
senses.’ He was pretending not to understand English, but when I said that he said ‘ohhhh. 
How can the woman speak to me like this?” (L7_13, emphasis added).  
 
Other sources describe this meeting as successful, with the Guinean statesman later laughing ‘only a 
woman could do such a thing … and get away with it … today I accept (to meet Taylor) because I 
believe in you’ (Femmes Africa Solidarité 2005). This idea of the relationship between motherhood and 
leadership in the West African context - relating back to the legitimation of authority - is explored at 
book length by Filomina Chioma Steady (2011). She interviews several women leaders in the region, 
including President Sirleaf Johnson who explains ‘… an added characteristic [of leadership qualities] for 
women is the ability to reach out, to be a caring and sharing person. To some extent these qualities are 
related to motherhood, which are not automatically part of a man’s nature’ (Steady 2011, 120). Further, 
both Jewel Howard-Taylor and Amelia Ward, also interviewed for the book make similar claims. Thus, 
‘… there is a link between motherhood and leadership … if they can put into practice all characteristics 
of motherhood; they can better perform duties …’ (Howard Taylor in Steady 2011, 123) and ‘women are 
more committed and dedicated’ (Ward in Steady 2011, 127). Here it is important to note that especially 
in times of conflict the idea of ‘heroic’ motherhood is often used in nationalistic discourses that 
emphasize the ideological conquest of the nation (Puechguirbal 2005, 8). In the Liberian case however, 
motherhood seems to have been used to legitimate the CSAs with regard to their leadership qualities.  
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A critique of such narratives shows that this self-referential process of legitimation not only assumes 
essentialist identities but that it also depicts a one-sided manner of involvement for women in 
peacebuilding processes. The equation of women as ‘natural’ peacekeepers can restrict them to the 
private realm, preventing a role in the public world run by men (Puechguirbal 2005, 4–5; for the positive 
effect of women involvement see Stone 2014). Moreover, ‘the association of femininity with peace lends 
support to an idealised masculinity that depends on constructing women as passive victims in need of 
protection’ (Ann Tickner cited in Puechguirbal 2005, 6; see also Okech and Olonisakin 2011, 5; 
Schroven 2011, 14). As Alaga warns, the bifurcation of roles between women and men based on their 
gender roles can actually be counterproductive in reducing them to a position of limited agency (2011a, 
18). This is additionally highlighted by the fact that considering peacebuilding practices, women 
representatives are often interpreted in light of their representativeness of the grassroots, whilst this is 
not asked of their male equivalents (Puechguirbal 2005, 8–9). It is from this problematic finding that 
women (usually as ‘women and children’) are introduced as a sociological category - also in the CPA - 
much like refugees or combatants that need to be protected or demobilised (Puechguirbal 2005, 3). In 
fact, Mats Utas shows through his extensive research in both Liberia and Sierra Leone that many women 
had multiple roles during the war - including as caregivers, victims and in more direct or indirect fighting 
roles. Depending on the given situation, narratives and representation of victimhood is the focus of their 
interaction with external actors (Utas 2005). No doubt the role of women in the Liberian conflict and 
peace negotiation context was a multi-faceted one - including victimhood, perpetrators and agents of 
change (Alaga 2011a, 9). As such, the ‘inherent’ peacemaker role of women can be critiqued. 
 
The self-referential legitimation narrative - in this case of motherhood - is however not only widely 
accepted by women but also men, as exemplified by the Guinean President Conté recalling his meeting 
with Mary Brownell cited above. This indicates that rather than a descriptive representative effect there 
is an important symbolic process, recognising these women as guarantors of legitimacy. The widely 
recognised nature of the self-referential legitimation narratives in fact marks the importance of 
‘recognised guarantors of legitimacy’ in constituting (part of) the legitimisation process, besides feeling 
represented. Arguably, the two components are interlinked, yet the component of recognised guarantors 
of legitimacy is more than just feeling represented, because a symbolic attachment is shown. In other 
words, the recognition of the guarantors of legitimacy provides for a symbolic attachment that goes 
beyond feeling represented. Someone can feel represented without a symbolic attachment to the 
representative. Recognised guarantors of legitimacy surely contribute to feeling represented, but also on 
its own signifies a component of legitimisation. The symbolic attachment is shown because of the 
narrative of legitimation are not an externally imported categorisations, but one repeated on numerous 
occasions by those interviewed (e.g. L44; L7_13). What is important to take from this analysis is that 
there was a recognised self-referential legitimation narrative and this was widely recognised. When Leymah 
Gbowee threatened to disrobe this worked because it was ‘an act that would be a sign of defiance and a 
weapon symbolizing the power of motherhood and meant to shame men into compliance’ (see also 
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Steady 2011, 105). Without wider acknowledgment of the legitimating construct of motherhood the 
action would never have been as successful. Consequently, this self-referential legitimation is more than 
just a strategy of authoritative leadership since the legitimation narrative is widely accepted. Anyone 
could technically stand up and construct self-legitimating narratives about themselves, but if these were 
not widely recognised then they would do little to impact the belief in legitimacy constituted by 
recognised guarantors of legitimacy.  
 
Lastly on a side note, the recognised element of this self-referential legitimation narrative addresses some 
of the criticisms previously outlined. Feminist scholar McCall points to the importance of the ways that 
identity categories are produced, experienced and reproduced (2005, 1783). The categorisations and 
constructions of such narratives therefore have reasons and repercussions, beyond the role they play in 
the component of recognised guarantor of legitimacy. Whilst the narrative may amount to an 
essentialisation of characteristics of feminity, the self-referential narrative leads to the legitimation of the 
women activists, ultimately resulting in agency. In fact, this self-referential legitimation narrative was in 
itself therefore a strategy to build consensus and strengthen the group’s activism (Petersen makes the 
same argument, see above). The idea behind this, being that a re-inscription into a patriarchal logic (i.e. 
by emphasizing womanhood) ultimately allows for the women activists’ own differentiation, albeit it 
through integrating into the hegemonic logic first. In other words, without using this narrative the 
agency and position of these women in a patriarchal society may have been limited or non-existing.86  
 
As stated from the beginning, there is no causal analysis undertaken as both feeling represented and 
recognised guarantors of legitimacy are something inherently subjective that epistemologically makes 
little sense to trace causally. Nevertheless, explanations for these two components of the legitimisation 
process were shown in the constitutive analysis, included shared experiences and understanding and 
neutrality for feeling represented and symbolic attachment and acknowledgement of their importance 
for the recognised guarantors of legitimacy. This also suggests that both what happens prior to the actual 
negotiations (i.e. the reputation of the actors) and afterwards (i.e. is their importance recognised?) 
matters for the legitimisation process, making the temporal context a continuous one. If a spatial context 
were to be drawn up, the perceptions regarding representation and these actors occurs very much 
outside all of the negotiations, in the more public arena. This is further discussed in the chapter on the 
                                                        
86 I owe this point to anthropologist Maarten Bedert (MPI Haale) who finds the construction of landlord-stranger 
reciprocity amongst the Dan in Northeastern Liberia shows ways or processes of dealing with alterity that are 
constantly performed and re-invented. Anthropological research on kinship in the region generally seems to 
underline the plausibility of this self-referential legitimation framework including work on the partial centripetal 
logic (of identification and unification) in Loma political organisation (Højbjerg 1999, 550–551), the use of 
avunculate idioms as a structuring discourse (McGovern 2012, 748) or the strategies of Kpelle women in gaining 
power (by emancipating themselves from their superiors – as do men for that matter – but keeping others bound 
to them in ties of obligation) (Bledsoe 1976). Considering the women’s movements united many different people 
from a variety of regions and cultural settings a more profound analysis of this relationship to kinship is not 
possible here. Suffice to say that anthropological research does not seem to – broadly speaking – contravene this 
finding. Of note is also the importance of family ties in power-relationships amongst the elite in Liberia (Liebenow 
1987, 110).  
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theory of legitimate peace negotiations. Further explanation is given by discussing the broader context 
factors in the next section.  
 
4.3.2 Context Factors 
 
Aside from the fact of the elite nature of many of the CSAs and cultural relevancy of womanhood as a 
narrative for self-referential legitimation, which was already discussed above, the feature of subjective 
representation is further affected by both a practical and a structural context factor. Practically, not 
everyone was able to be involved, especially some of the local representatives, because of the state of the 
country at the time the talks started, with much of the infrastructure no longer in place and the violence 
still taking place. This is likely to affect the levels of ‘local’ representation and therefore the constitutive 
component of feeling represented. Structurally, a lack of political empowerment and the marginalisation 
of certain groups will mean that not everyone is as included or will reflect on their representation to the 
same degree, due to their own marginalisation. This also means that there will be fewer recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy. These factors are discussed in turn. 
 
The practicality of travelling to Ghana from Liberia at the time is a significant contextual factor, which 
explains why not as many local representatives were able to attend. By 2003 the rebel groups LURD and 
MODEL were encroaching on Monrovia, making much of the rural area a no-go war zone. Residents of 
Monrovia (who had the funds to do so) could fly to Ghana, but those residing outside would firstly have 
to travel either to Monrovia or to a neighbouring country, through what were at times extremely 
dangerous territory: “Outside Monrovia there was no personal security, there was war” (L46). One 
politician, who was active in several of Liberia’s interim governments and was invited to come to Ghana 
explains, “when the war came to Ganta I was hiding in the bush. A car came for me, which was on its 
way to Ghana, but I did not meet it, as I was scared of being ambushed.” 87  
 
The constraints of funding particularly affected the WIPNET activists, who struggled to maintain their 
presence in Accra and Akosombo (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 135–6,139; Femmes Africa Solidarité 
2005, 592). In order to cover their initial travel costs WIPNET gathered funds in their own group as well 
as using personal funds. When the group had met Charles Taylor a few months earlier he had handed 
over a donation of $5,000. Whilst initially the group did not want to touch this money out of principle, 
they finally decided to use some to help pay for their travel costs when it came to attending the talks 
(Gbowee 2011). The emotional burden of being separated from their families in war-torn Liberia during 
the activism at the negotiations was also too difficult for some participants who returned home, to be 
replaced by others from the nearby refugee camps (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 136). All these practical 
matters reduced the chances of constituting the component of feeling represented. 
                                                        
87 L33, similar observations were made by L6; L11; L13; L23; L28; L34; L37; L43; L46 
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On a structural level, many Liberians were (and continue to be) simply too poor and focused on living 
each day as it comes to worry about such things as their representation at the negotiations (L45). 
‘Citizens struggle to survive daily and have little time or energy to attempt meaningful forms of citizen 
participation … extraordinary efforts are required to engage citizens at all levels of society’ (Sayndee 
2009, 185). Social upheaval, political instability and violence impeded associational life more generally 
from the 1990s onwards (Backer and Carroll 2001, 6). Thus a major structural problem is the lack of 
political empowerment in Liberia. The belief in legitimacy, in the sense that guarantors of legitimacy are 
recognised, is also a sort of political engagement, which is detrimentally affected when such engagement 
is not feasible. 
 
The marginalisation of certain groups, especially women, young people and some ethnic groups, is 
deeply entrenched in the Liberia culture argue McKeown and Mulbah (2007, 34; see also Sharpe 2012, 
362). In informal conversations in the breaks or after the focus group, discussants often told me that 
they had never spent as much time thinking about issues of representation. Nohn Kidau even explains 
Liberians as non-partisan people as a reason for needing to be represented by civil society rather than 
political parties (L28). Most political representatives have little direct contact to their constituents and 
offer little benefits to anyone except when personal connections are present. This can also be observed 
when considering the technocratic and non-politicised narrative of decentralisation reform (Zanker 
2014b). In highly centralised arrangements like Liberia, those participating in public affairs will always 
constitute a small core (Sawyer 2005, 185).  
 
A major problem is a lack of information and transparency - one youth activist adds that there is such an 
extensive lack of information that much of Liberian society would find it hard to consider who should 
represent them; “if people had a forum to express their opinions … [and] heard a variety of opinions 
then it would be easier to pinpoint who should represent them” (L14). There is furthermore an urban-
rural divide, between literate and illiterate, the former as stakeholders in societal processes and the latter 
those that are side-lined from this (see e.g. Antwi-Boateng 2012, 106; Sharpe 2012, 360; L46). Sawyer 
notes ‘empowerment for those who have not had opportunities or cannot imagine being in control of 
their own destiny is the greatest challenge’ (2005, 200). This is not to deny agency to all persons in 
Liberia. As Clark argues in relation to the understanding of gacaca courts in Rwanda, it is exactly these 
kinds of actors (the ‘peasants’) who are denied political agency (or it is misunderstood) in the analysis 
given from many academics (2014). Indeed Moran shows in her book that there are strong ‘democratic 
values’ embedded in governmental structures of local communities in Liberia, that there is a history of 
organised groups in Liberia and even pre-war accounts of dissent, resistance and opposition (2008, 29). 
The same goes for values of feminism (Abramowitz and Moran 2012). Especially in various indigenous 
societies, it is not unusual for women to hold leadership positions that continue to have a legacy today 
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(see also Steady 2011, 107; 160).88  Nevertheless, due to reasons of poverty, conflict and an overly 
centralised political system the questions of representation and legitimisation are simply not at the 
forefront of many people’s minds. This means that it may act detrimentally to the component of 
recognising guarantors of legitimacy as part of the legitimisation process.  
 
This discussion of political empowerment as contextualising factor which makes the legitimisation of the 
process overall more challenging brings me to another finding. If there is absolutely no knowledge about 
societal processes going on or the representatives that are available and willing to participate does the 
link to legitimacy become weaker? Does the component of feeling represented and symbolic attachment 
suffice in inferring the ‘free and fair participation’ element of the public sphere? Do the components of 
the civilian counterbalance and ending violence shown in the previous section on the feature of 
collective concerns adequately exemplifying the discourse element of the public sphere? The Liberian 
case in fact reveals an empirical puzzle: There was very little knowledge of the role of the CSAs and the 
negotiations themselves. What does this mean for legitimisation process and the heuristic model? 
Following on from the abductive process introduced in the methodology chapter, the empirical puzzle is 
outlined in the following section, after which another look at theories of legitimacy is taken, showing 
that a third feature - transparent communication - also plays a role in the legitimisation process.  
 
4.4 Revised Heuristic Model: Transparent Communication  
 
The two features of subjective representation and collective concerns were deduced from the literature 
on legitimacy, especially from the ideas on the public sphere. Together these two features formed the 
heuristic model, on the basis of which comprehensive process-tracing has been carried out looking for 
constitutive components of the legitimisation process and the causal conditions that enable them related 
to the influence of actors as part of the feature of collective concerns. As is shown below there was a 
lack of knowledge concerning the details of either the peace talks or the role played by CSAs which is 
puzzling. This lack of knowledge is argued to have been detrimental to the legitimisation process in a 
way not covered by the previous two features of the heuristic model, thereby revealing a further feature. 
 
Showing that participation is likely to be more than mere representation and also means participation in 
the discourse element of the public sphere, the feature of transparent communication is proposed. Using 
this third feature from the revised heuristic model, the interpretative analysis shows that feeling included 
and enforcing implementation constitutes two further components of legitimisation.  
 
 
                                                        
88 This will of course vary across the different regions of Liberia. Moran worked primarily in the in the southeast 
with - for the most part - Kru communities. 
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4.4.1 An Empirical Puzzle: Knowledge of the Peace Talks 
 
During the fieldwork one observation that kept recurring was the astounding lack of knowledge when it 
came to the proceedings of the negotiations and the role of civil society. One example is particularly 
illustrative. Nohn Kidau, a parliamentary representative for Ganta (2005-2011) played a considerable role 
at the peace negotiations for the Diaspora Group, as previously mentioned on several occasions. She 
was even considered as a candidate for the Interim Vice Chairperson, though she declined this. Her role 
is internationally known, as she related her experiences back to the Committee on International 
Relations in the US House of Representatives in October 2003. Furthermore, she set up a peacebuilding 
committee in Ganta to address land-related conflict after the CPA had been signed.  
 
Nonetheless, in the three focus group discussions in Ganta not one participant was able to name Kidau 
as someone who had addressed their grievances or concerns at the negotiations, or who was in fact at all 
present. Indeed only half the discussion groups held in Liberia concluded that civil society groups played 
a role at all during the peace negotiation (see Table 4.2). Furthermore, several groups mentioned that 
they were unsure who represented them since they had not received any information to date (at the time 
of fieldwork, this was eight years after the agreement had been signed). Market women from the 
discussion group in Ganta even went so far as to suggest that, whilst civil society actors were praying for 
peace, they played no active role at the peace negotiations (LGM).89 Most of the interlocutors in Ganta 
were also unaware of Kidau’s participation in the negotiations (e.g. L25; L30; L31; L40). The only 
exceptions were those working closely with Nohn Kidau, like the administrative assistant of the town 
council (L35), the district commissioner (L29) or the mayor of Ganta (L32). One religious leader, who 
also knew of Kidau’s attendance, explained that people did not know anything about her role, as she was 
then living in the diaspora, and flew straight to Ghana from the US (L36).  
 
Similar findings were made on further occasions. For example returning to the Muslim Woman leader 
already discussed, she did not feel that her Muslim voice was represented at the talks at all despite the 
work of the IRCL and WIPNET that per definition were interreligious. In another instance, by fluke in 
three interviews conducted on the same day, both a political party activist and administrative assistant 
explained that Zawolo Zuagele, a civil society activist and politician, had attended the talks (L34; L35 
also L23), whilst Zuagele himself explained he could not make it as he was hiding in the bush (L33). This 
also happened in another instance where focus group members mentioned a particular human rights 
activist who they felt should have attended the talks, ignorant of the fact he had actually attended the 
talks (LGbT; L13). Despite these examples of not knowing the representatives present (or even the 
general role of civil society) there was at least some acknowledgment that civil society, especially 
                                                        
89 When asked who should have been at the peace talks some participants in this group mentioned Nohn Kidau. It 
could of course be the case that they misunderstood the question and thus knew she was at the peace talks. 
Nonetheless, through working with Liberian colleagues as facilitators the likelihood of such a misunderstanding is 
minimal.  
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WIPNET, had somehow been involved.  
 
Even worse however, was the knowledge of the content of the CPA. On this point, many interlocutors 
posited that they did not know what happened during the negotiations, what was part of the agreement 
and that they lacked information on the topic, or at the very least it was very flaky (L12; L14; L26; L31). 
Even when it came to the groupings of civil society groups, who had signed the agreement, such as the 
‘Liberian Bar Association’ and the ‘Liberia Leadership Forum’, there was uncertainty as to which 
individuals had actually signed or represented these groups, even amongst those that had attended the 
talks themselves (L4_13). 90  When discussing the peace talks, it was also noticeable how many 
contradictions were made in interviews (e.g. L15) or in the discussions in the focus groups (e.g. FGD 
LGT). Going back to Nohn Kidau, even her colleague and by the latter’s own admission, close friend, 
District Commissioner Shirley Brown, explained that she had little idea of what happened at the Accra 
talks (L29). How does this affect the legitimisation of a process? Is it necessary to know about a process 
in order for it to be legitimate? 
 
Once again, there is a return to the question of the audience of legitimacy, or the beneficiary of 
legitimisation. The legitimisation of the peace talks as well as the legitimation of individual actors will 
depend on who you talk to. Externally, the role of civil society is well known. This is illustrated by 
Kidau’s contribution to the House of Representatives committee in October 2003 (where she explained 
the role she and other CSAs had taken on during the talks) and the fact (the regional) MARWOPNET 
won a UN prize in the field of human rights in December 2003 and the Nobel Prize for Leymah 
Gboweeh (Femmes Africa Solidarité 2005, 591; see also Antwi-Boateng 2011, 13). But, and this relates 
back to the previous discussion on political empowerment, this does not mean that the general 
population perceives the process to be legitimate. Amos Sawyer comments: ‘Participation is critical to 
citizenship, but participation cannot meaningfully enhance individual and societal well-being and 
demonstrate ownership prerogatives without enlightenment’ (2005, 184). This suggests that information 
and knowledge is part of participation, calling us to reconsider our understanding of participation and 
legitimisation so far. On this point, Hemmer et al. were previously cited as extorting that Track II 
depends on reaching those powerful enough to impose peace. They further argue however, that a 
‘critical mass of support for peace’ must also be created (2006, 134). Neither participation through 
representation nor addressing the collective concerns has resulted in a critical mass being created to 
participate in the legitimisation of the peace talks. This suggests that the idea of participation should be 
revisited in line with thoughts on transparency. 
 
 
                                                        
90 The copy of the peace agreement publically available does not have the actual signatures on it. 
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4.4.2 Transparency and Participation: A Revised Heuristic Model 
 
The following quote from an interview with one of the leaders of the IRCL Sheikh Kafumbah Konneh 
indicates the importance of participation: 
 
“My understanding is that it should be exclusively the prerogative, duty and responsibility of the 
people of a country to determine their own destiny, to resolve their own problems, to correct their 
own mistakes” (L43). 
 
Whilst the constitutive components shown to be part of subjective representation cover some sort of 
participation via representation (feeling represented; recognised guarantors of legitimacy) and the causal 
conditions which enable the constitutive component of ending violence and the civilian counterbalance 
include the mobilisation of citizens, juxtaposed to the lack of knowledge the overall legitimisation in 
relation to participation can be questioned. More specifically, the heuristic model that introduced the 
two features considers the public sphere in order to argue for free and fair participation (or subjective 
representation) and taking part in the discursive process of negotiations (through addressing collective 
concerns). Nevertheless, this representation and collective concerns is not enough to adequately address 
both the factors of participation or discourse elements of the public sphere. Reiterating the assumption 
of participation in a legitimisation process, it is shown that beyond representation the way that 
participation is understood is far from being properly conceptualised. It is shown that making the talks 
more transparent renders the process open to public scrutiny and as a result, further enhances the 
legitimisation process. This has to do with the fact that transparency enhances participation with regard 
to accountability and information distribution, linking both the free and fair participation element and 
(rational) discourse of the public sphere as the basis for further constitutive components of process 
legitimisation. This third feature is labelled transparent communication and is introduced below. 
 
In peacebuilding theories, which were introduced in the first chapter, the importance of participation has 
long been underlined. Returning to one of the major pillars of peacebuilding, the UN Agenda for Peace: 
 
‘Peace in the largest sense cannot be accomplished by the United Nations system or by 
Governments alone. Non-governmental organizations, academic institutions, parliamentarians, 
business and professional communities, the media and the public at large must all be involved ...’ 
(emphasis added, Section 84 UN Secretary General 1992; Kofi Annan also advanced ideas of 
“participatory governance” see J. Chopra and Hohe 2004). 
 
Whilst in peace studies a lot of the debate on public participation focuses on the social-psychological 
benefits of improving inter-personal relationships, in democratic theory participation is understood as a 
prerequisite for achieving legitimacy (Ron 2010, 349). In line with communitarian or emancipatory 
peacebuilding, the conception of participation has been further expanded, primarily by showing that 
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‘local’ actors need to be part of the solution. This is especially because of their role in ‘participation, 
stakeholders and ownership … [and] … its legitimizing effects’ (emphasis added, Richmond and Mitchell 
2011, 12; see also Bleiker 2012; Watson 2012; and for a critique of the local see Simons and Zanker 
2014). In their research on the effects of development, Mary Anderson et al. in fact claim ‘participation 
leads to ownership [which] leads to sustainability’ (2012, 68).91 Participation is linked to legitimacy of the 
agreement, no doubt about this. But what in fact does participation really mean beyond representation? 
 
In development studies, the conception of participatory development has been widely recognised and 
debated (for a critical review see Cooke and Kothari 2001). In development projects, however, a clear 
target audience can mostly be identified and as a result the critique focuses primarily on the ways of 
participation and the effects this can have, rather than on questioning the meaning of participation per 
se, regarding the legitimisation of processes. In peace negotiations, this debate is entirely side stepped in 
favour of the civil society as representatives’ discussion. Nevertheless, considering the lack of knowledge 
about the peace talks in Liberia a deeper understanding of participation is necessary in understanding the 
construction of legitimacy. Even the participation with regards to parallel forums or Track II 
participation - whilst much more advanced than the literature on direct involvement - remains an 
arguably rare occurrence in practice and is not well demonstrated as to how it actually works (Hemmer 
et al. 2006, 135). In summary, ‘the idea of participation … is still at the stage of labels or headlines, and 
the notion lacks clear definition, any kind of effective strategy’ (J. Chopra and Hohe 2004, 291). One 
useful starting point to understanding how participation can contribute to legitimisation of a process 
beyond the feature of subjective representation, comes from Paffenholz and the modes of participation 
she developed in her most recent work (2014a). 
 
Out of the nine modes of participation, what she calls public participation seems to be particularly 
relevant (2014a, 85). Broader than mere Track II participation, she considers activities that seek to 
‘connect large segments of the population with Track One peace negotiations … [including] … public 
hearings, citizen panels, and opinion polls’ (Ibid). A provision in the Somalian peace agreement from 
1993 is a prime example, stipulating that civil society actors would travel all across the country in order 
to educate people about the agreement (Bell and O’Rourke 2007, 301; Paffenholz 2014a, 83). 
Considering the continuous state of insecurity in much of Somalia this provision was in all likelihood 
never fully implemented, but it is interesting from the point of view of a legitimisation process. Had the 
civil society groups in Liberia travelled all across the country educating about the peace process would 
this have made a difference concerning the overall legitimisation of the process and participation?  
 
                                                        
91 Mac Ginty argues that participation is at the heart of liberal peacebuilding and argues for the political value of 
non-participation (2012, 170). He is talking about local-level peacebuilding processes however, rather than 
something large-scale like peace negotiations. 
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Returning to the debate on European integration, Vivien Schmidt argues for a third dimension of 
legitimacy, namely ‘throughput’ legitimacy (2013). Combining efforts from previous research of system 
theories (including from a much narrower definition by Easton) she proposes that throughput legitimacy 
considers democratic legitimation of a process with regard to its efficacy, accountability and transparency 
on top of the inclusiveness and openness to consultation with the people. This throughput legitimacy is 
not merely an input or output form of legitimacy but plays a role throughout the entire process. Making 
the talks more transparent renders the process open to public scrutiny, which enhances the legitimisation 
process. Or as Schmidt argues, without throughput legitimacy the public perception of legitimacy is 
undermined (2013, 2). Habermas notes in addition: 
 
‘… Participation of non-governmental organizations in the deliberations of international 
negotiating systems would strengthen the legitimacy … insofar as mid-level transnational 
decision-making processes could then be rendered transparent for national public spheres’ 
(emphasis added, 2001 quoted in Schrader and Denskus 2010, 41; see also Scheuerman 2008, 
101). 
 
In order for a public to be able to assess the legitimacy of a process, a process of reflective scrutiny by 
those affected by an agreement needs to be undertaken (Ron 2010, 349, 359). Since the usual checks and 
balances of accountability such as elections are evidently foregone in such a process, other forms of 
creative reflective scrutiny are likely to be an important element to assess legitimate negotiations (on this 
point see Jarstad 2008a, 23; Ron 2010, 349; Runciman and Vieira 2008, 160; Steffek and Hahn 2010, 8).  
 
Anna Jarstad for example already suggests striving for public support after a deal has been drafted, 
through public forums, albeit as an alternative or additional approach to broad inclusion during peace 
negotiations (2008a, 23; see also Ron 2010). Transparency allows for participation through not only 
holding the civil society actors accountable92 but also making the entire process and promises made by 
the parties to the agreement more transparent.93 Accountability through transparency in fact also has 
relevance for the process legitimisation of peace talks. Such accountability through transparency helps to 
put pressure for implementation, which is highly likely to be an additional constitutive component of the 
legitimisation process considering the role played by the component of ending violence. In fact, the link 
between participation of CSAs and chances for implementation has already been made (e.g. Bell and 
O’Rourke 2007, 301; Nilsson 2012, 247; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 23), but not yet theorised with 
regard to the legitimisation process. Transparency adds another feature to participation more than mere 
                                                        
92 Though Brühl argues the accountability of civil society actors is not necessary as they only seek to influence 
decisions and not actually make them (2010, 187). 
93 ‘If civil society actors become involved this could result in increased transparency and make it easier to hold the 
signatories accountable for their commitments, which in turn may affect their incentives to stick to peace’ (Nilsson 
2012, 250). 
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subjective representation, which is rather one-sided, rendering all the responsibilities of the beneficiaries 
of legitimacy (the population). This brings me to the second point. 
 
Transparency is also an act of information distribution. Such a distribution of information leads to a 
sense of inclusion/participation in the (rational) discourse of the public sphere. In other words, ‘when 
(the claim to legitimacy) has not been discursively redeemed, (it) remains an unstable one’ (Cook 2003, 
115). Open discourse and contestation as well as the deliberation towards a common public good is after 
all the corner stone of deliberative democracy (see also Zürn 2011, 72). From Habermas and the 
discussion of deliberative democracy, the importance of communication for the legitimisation of 
processes is already evident. This becomes particularly apparent in the later work from Habermas on 
communicative rationality and discourse ethics where he argues communication and discourse help to 
establish and maintain social integrity (Crowell 2012, 152; Finlayson 2005, 47). The bottom-line is that ‘a 
legitimate … consensus [can only be met if] … all relevant information is available for all’ (Edwards 
2009, 69). As a result, participation in the discourse - even if only through the distribution of 
information, means that there can be a feeling of inclusion, which the collective concerns by themselves 
do not permit. In summary, arguing for transparency resulting in participation in terms of accountability 
and information distribution, links both the free and fair participation element and (rational) discourse of 
the public sphere as the basis for further contributing to the legitimisation of the peace talks.  
 
This third feature is labelled transparent communication.94 It concerns all efforts made by civil society to 
communicate with the population during the negotiations and afterwards, and therefore looks at how the 
civil society actors respond to those they deem to represent. For the feature of transparent 
communication the focus of the constitutive process-tracing is on the distribution of information and 
other modes of communication. A causal analysis is additionally feasible for considering why different 
ways of communication enabled the legitimisation process by causally tracing the different roles played 
by actors in this. If we take the basic initial heuristic model previously introduced, this is amended in 
relation to transparent communication. The feature is argued to primarily take place during and after the 
negotiations, see Figure 4.3 below. This is applied to the Liberian case subsequently.  
 
It should also be noted that the feature of addressing collective concerns has also been amended from 
the original heuristic model as it was shown in the comprehensive process-tracing that the constitutive 
component of ending violence takes place after a peace agreement has been signed, and the causal 
conditions relating to the influence of the CSAs also occurs in the build-up to the peace talks. 
 
                                                        
94 My thanks to Professor Thomas Diez for suggesting summing up this feature in terms of communication, PhD 
Colloquium Tübingen, December 2012. 
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Figure 4.3: Revised Heuristic Model for Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
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4.4.3 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Enforcing Implementation and Feeling Included 
 
As carried out in the previous sections, the comprehensive process-tracing encompasses three analytical 
steps. Firstly, an interpretive overview of transparent communication shows that - as expected - feeling 
included and enforcing implementation constitute two further components of legitimisation. Secondly, 
the causal conditions that enabled these constitutive components are then be traced, looking for the 
ways of communication. Thirdly, the context factors that play a role in the comprehensive process-
tracing of transparent communication is discussed, namely the structural disparities of Liberia at the 
time. Because some of the empirical observations have been presented as the puzzle above, this analysis 
is shorter than the previous ones. 
 
As illustrated in the empirical puzzle, in numerous interviews and the focus group discussions it was 
mentioned that there was no nation-wide forum for discussion, even after the CPA had been signed. As 
a result: “This is our number one challenge: creating awareness” (L44). Creating awareness could have 
enforced transparency and lead to some form of accountability for civil society actors, especially for the 
official delegates. Without feedback, the grassroots population is not informed, and as a result may not 
understand the terms of their peace, nor be able to hold their leaders accountable for what they have 
signed. A staff member of International Alert sees the lack of information outside the capital as a 
conflict root (L45) and Amelia Ward from MARWOPNET notes creating awareness and dissemination 
of information as the number one challenge (L43; L1_14). But why is it so important to have this 
knowledge?  
 
Discussing the usefulness of potentially having a council representative at peace talks, a city councillor 
explains, “he needs to listen carefully and explain to the people afterwards what has happened” (emphasis 
added; L26). This distribution of information as a benefit (and reason for) having local representatives 
was reiterated elsewhere (e.g. Interview 230611; 280611.1; see also Sayndee 2009, 172). It led some 
interlocutors to conclude that a national conference should have been conducted after the talks were 
completed (L8; L13). Knowledge of the agreement is necessary, it was argued, in order to allow the 
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population to make sure (and put pressure on the government if necessary) the agreement is 
implemented (L6; L13; L35; L38). Moreover, if the population is unaware of a peace agreement they may 
allow violent conflict to continue or restart (L6). This is because ‘where there is an information gap, rural 
dwellers are susceptible to rumours and perpetuation of myths by unscrupulous people who seek to take 
advantage of them’ (Antwi-Boateng 2012, 106).  
 
Amelia Ward from MARWOPNET elaborated on this in another interview in 2014, explaining that after 
the agreement had been signed it was the responsibility of those who had been present “to educate what 
the CPA was about”, in order to make sure that implementation can take place. She refers back to the 
Tulip Declaration, calling it an “organisational plan” for women (L1_14). Indeed, Article 3 of the 
Declaration calls for “awareness and sensitisation meetings by rural and urban woman…” (Golden Tulip 
Declaration 2003). LWI and WIPNET also joined forces to organize a two-day workshop in September 
2003, with 80 participants, in order to ‘demystify’ the CPA and to provide a shared understanding the 
agreement. They also set benchmarks and timelines for the implementation (Alaga 2011a, 2; Gbowee 
2011, 168). Moreover, WIPNET continued to organise sensitizing forums for women after the 
agreement in order to raise awareness of the content of the peace accord and the responsibilities for the 
parties to move towards implementation (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 137). Gbowee explains: ‘we 
disseminated that information in all of the rural areas, challenging women, saying that, ‘you have to be 
on your toes. Every day you see these things happening in your community, come to town and let us 
take it up’ (Alaga 2011a, 14). These confessions underline the importance of ensuring implementation as a 
component constituting the legitimisation process.  
 
Secondly, “if feedback wasn’t provided to the grassroots community than their participation can be 
questioned” (L6; see also L2). Thus the crux of the matter is that the distribution of information allows 
for a feeling of inclusion or without it, people feel excluded from the process. It all comes back to the 
idea that without the involvement of the general population, including debates on the future and past of 
a country, sustainable peace becomes a more distant likelihood (Richmond 2009b, 73; see also L6). 
Transparency and communication ensures this type of participation, resulting in the feeling of inclusion. 
Though in this case the evidence is weaker, the feeling of inclusion can still be inferred as constituting a 
part of the legitimisation process. In the discussion of subjective representation, the lack of local 
representatives was already shown. The confession above questioning participation because of a lack of 
knowledge underlines the link between information distribution and feeling included.  
 
The next section, on the casual analysis, considers the ways in which communication enabled the feeling 
of inclusion as well as ensuring implementation in order to further concretise how peace negotiations 
can be made more legitimate. 
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4.4.4 Causal Process-Tracing: Ways of Communication 
 
The aim of the causal analysis as a part of the comprehensive process-tracing is to further an explanation 
of why the constitutive components were able to happen. In other words - to causally trace the ways of 
communication that enabled the ensuring of the implementation and the feeling of inclusion.  
 
To start with, elements of communication can be identified at all stages of the negotiations. In 2002, civil 
society groups and political parties already met with LURD creating a ‘Liberian Leadership Forum.’ 
Central to the group was the Ouagadougou Declaration, a plan to restore peace and stability in Liberia. 
A system of dissemination of proposals from earlier meetings (the Abuja Agenda) led to the adoption by 
a majority of the stakeholders present (see The Perspective 2002). WIPNET created awareness about the 
dynamics of the Liberian conflict amongst citizens; including sensitizing rural communities about the 
kind of roles they could play (Ekiyor and Gbowee 2005, 137–138).95 Nevertheless, no direct links can be 
made to ensuring implementation or feeling included, as this prior communication does not pertain to 
the transparency of the negotiations themselves. If anything, it contributes to the legitimacy of the actors 
themselves, which was discussed previously, relating back to the constitutive component of feeling 
represented. It also makes a first point, showing that the temporal boundaries of legitimisation in 
relation to the feature of transparent communication refer to the period during the talks and after them, 
as suggested by the heuristic model previously.  
 
There is one major causal condition that enables to ensuring of implementation and feeling included 
after the negotiations have started, namely the distribution of information. It interacts with other causal 
conditions in a number of ways. 
 
Firstly, the distribution of information is directly linked to the feeling of inclusion and ensuring 
implementation. For example WIPNET communicated daily with the women left behind in Monrovia 
to report back on the developments of the talks (L8_13). This ‘high level of accountability and 
transparency … was essential for building trust and confidence in both members and the larger society’ 
(Alaga 2011a, 16). This smoking gun shows the importance of the factor of information distribution in 
relation to feeling included by building trust and confidence. Towards the end of the talks, WIPNET 
held a parallel Forum with other groups, resulting in the Tulip Declaration (Accra Mail 2003; L7_13; 
L1_14). In addition, meticulous recordings of the daily activities of WIPNET would allow, WIPNET 
members argue, generations of women to share and learn from their experiences at the talks (Ekiyor and 
Gbowee 2005, 140). After the CPA was signed, the IRCL distributed thousands of copies of the CPA, 
both as a full version as well as a simplified, abridged version (L41). They tried to make sure there were 
distributed in all of the counties, and held more intense discussions surrounding these issues in several 
                                                        
95 LWI also had massive information campaigns throughout the 1990s, especially with the international media, 
informing them what was happening in Liberia (L7_13). 
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districts in Bong County (Ibid). MARWOPNET shared all their information regarding the negotiations 
and final agreement signed with the women protestors WIPNET lobbying from outside the table, as 
well as conducting a larger meeting in the town hall on their return to Monrovia. They invited a cross-
section of women and explained the agreement step-by-step via each provision, as well as what must be 
done to ensure implementation (L44; see also Femmes Africa Solidarité 2005, 591). The link of the 
distribution of information to the feeling of inclusion and also to ensuring implementation is illustrated 
in Figure 4.4 below. Regarding the spatial boundaries the distribution of information occurs primarily 
outside of the negotiations, though because of group interaction the negotiations also play a role. This is 
discussed next. 
 
Secondly, as previously mentioned, intra and inter group communication further enhanced the 
possibility of the distribution of information, showing a distinct causal chain from group communication 
to distribution of information which enabled the constitutive components of legitimisation, in this case 
the feeling of inclusion and ensuring implementation. This is illustrated by the following: During the 
actual negotiations, MARWOPNET had regular briefings with WIPNET as they “felt that if one woman 
was invited she should represent the women of Liberia not MARWOPNET (only)” (L44). This was then 
later used in the recordings of the meetings by WIPNET, as well as in their calls with Monrovia, as 
explained above, suggesting a comprehensive storyline. Moreover, throughout the entire process the Liberian 
diaspora communicated in vibrant discussions in Internet forums (Antwi-Boateng 2012, 99). They also 
communicated what was happening to each other using emails and urging members of the diaspora to 
keep the pressure on the international community, in this case especially the US Senate members 
(L5_13; L1_14).  On a side note, this communication with the international community also links the 
distribution of information, via intra group communication, also to the lobbying of international actors 
previously discussed as a causal condition of influence in the addressing of collective concerns as shown 
in Figure 4.4 below, by a dotted arrow.  
 
Figure 4.4: Causal Conditions and Constitutive Components of Transparent Communication 
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Nevertheless, the causal link to the constitutive components is rather weak. This is at least in part 
because this part of the legitimisation process was inductively developed on the basis of an empirical 
puzzle, whereby the lack of information was the very reason for inference. The feeling of inclusion 
especially, is proposed on the basis that the lack of transparency and communication seemed to have led 
to feelings of exclusion. Inversely, it is therefore argued that due to transparency through the distribution 
of information there is the feeling of inclusion. Overall, the empirical evidence for this tends to show the 
detrimental effect on legitimisation rather than the positive effect. As a result, the causal relationships 
can be shown, but lacks extensive empirical proof. These examples portray more than anything that the 
groups communicated with each other, 96  writing peace plans, debating current politics in Internet 
forums and conducting workshop for the most part with other elite stakeholders. When copies of the 
CPA were distributed or workshops held this seems to have been limited to Monrovia, and some other 
counties, usually the more central ones like Bong. The second case study of Kenya allows for a more 
elaborate analysis of transparent communication, not least because of the very different context factors. 
The Liberian context factors are briefly outlined in the next section. 
 
4.4.5 Context Factors 
 
Regarding the context factors, the discussion links back to the divide between literate and illiterate, 
urban and rural (L46). Tammi Sharpe talks of a disconnect between elites and the general public, part of 
generally weak national dialogue, whereby wealth determines access to information (2012, 358). 
According to survey data collected by the University of Berkeley, access to information has improved 
since the end of the war for a majority of the population (66%), but many respondents still rely 
predominantly on informal sources of information, for example friends or family, due to poor access to 
media, especially in south-eastern parts of Liberia (Vinck, Pham, and Kreutzer 2011). One of the biggest 
problems is therefore a structural one, namely the poor access to the media.  
 
Indeed, when discussing this finding with Nohn Kidau in a follow-up interview two years after our first 
conversation, she agrees fully “I haven’t told the people in Liberia what happened in Accra or the role I 
played” (L5_13). She goes on to explain that she is intending to write a book about her experiences. 
Whilst admitting that this might also not be widely read, she does insist that most people are unaware of 
all the troubles she went to, including talking to the UN and US State Department on numerous 
occasions. In a very real application of the abductive process, asking her about the idea of transparent 
communication or knowledge of agreement, she agrees to the importance of this component for 
                                                        
96 Though this is not always clearly evident. When discussing the talks with members of WIPNET who had 
remained behind in Monrovia during the talks, they explained that they were not aware of the details of the 
agreement (L8_13). 
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legitimacy (L5_13).97 The feature of transparent communication will be detailed more extensively in the 
next chapter. The overview of the findings from this chapter is discussed below. 
 
4.5 Overview of Findings from the Liberian Peace Negotiations 
 
The original heuristic model applied in this chapter considered the two features of subjective 
representation and collective concerns which were previously deduced from the literature on legitimacy, 
especially from the ideas on the public sphere. In an abductive research process, the lack of knowledge 
was shown to have been detrimental to the legitimisation process in a way not covered by the previous 
two features of the heuristic model, thereby revealing a further key feature of the legitimisation process 
labelled transparent communication.  
 
On the basis of the heuristic model, which was extended to three features, comprehensive process-
tracing was carried out looking for constitutive components of the legitimisation process and the causal 
conditions that enable (part of) them, including especially the influence and ways of communication of 
the actors. In total, six components were shown to be constitutive of the legitimisation process: Ending 
violence, a civilian counterbalance to the negotiations and in the agreement, feeling represented, 
recognised guarantors of legitimacy, feeling included and ensuring implementation. Together, these 
components further the understanding of what takes place in a legitimisation process. 
 
An additional interesting finding is that the lack of addressing local concerns was generally perceived as 
not having affected the legitimisation process. The same does not hold for ‘local’ representation, whose 
exclusion seems to act in detriment to the legitimisation process. Moreover, representation went far 
beyond descriptive representation, and did not necessarily exclusively speak to CSAs, which is why the 
component of recognised guarantors of legitimacy was delineated in addition to feeling represented, 
both of which are not exclusively found for CSAs.  
 
A casual analysis was carried out for two of the features considering the influence of actors and the ways 
of communication and the enabling of respective constitutive components. This was most feasible for 
the feature of collective concerns, because there was fewer empirical evidence for transparent 
communication. Some important explanations were drawn from this analysis, especially with regards to 
the temporal boundaries of legitimisation, which was shown to extend beyond the specific negotiations 
also to the time period after the conclusions had come to an end, especially for transparent 
communication. The spatial boundaries were shown to be partially in the negotiations, formally or 
informally, and partially in the spatial setting of the broader public, though this is difficult to 
                                                        
97 Another human rights activist that had attended the Accra negotiations also conceded this point in a follow-up 
interview, stating that few people know anything about the proceedings, that he had only sometimes discussed it 
when people asked him specific questions about his experiences at the proceedings (L6_13). 
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conceptualise in spatial terms. Mobilising citizens for example occurs amongst refugees, the diaspora and 
citizens in Liberia. These findings are considered in the theory of legitimate peace negotiations, which is 
developed later on, after first presenting the second case study of Kenya. The major causal conditions, 
constitutive components and context conditions from the Liberian case are summarised in Table 4.3 
below.  
 
Table 4.3 Major Findings from Comprehensive Process-Tracing from the Case Study of the 
Liberian Peace Negotiations 
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Chapter 5 
Silencing the Choir Masters:  
The Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
5 Silencing the Choir Masters: The Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation  
 
Discussing the post-election violence (PEV) that brought Kenya to the edge of civil war, a prominent 
community member in the town of Nakuru explains what happened: 
 
“… Common people had no deep-seated hatred for their neighbours. People on the ground 
only emulate what leaders are doing. I always say leaders are like choir masters, if they say 
nothing the choir will sit quietly for hours. If they tell them to sing they will sing, if they tell 
them to stop they will stop” (K14).  
 
A major task in order to put an end to the violence during the Kenyan PEV was therefore to ‘silence the 
choir masters’. What role did the Kenyan CSAs play in this and what does this mean for the 
legitimisation of the negotiations in Kenya? This chapter presents the fifth step of the abductive process, 
whereby the revised heuristic model now including the three features of collective concerns, subjective 
representation and transparent communication is used to conduct the comprehensive process-tracing. 
As previously, after introducing the background to the PEV and the major actors involved including the 
civil society actors, each feature is analysed in up to three steps. Firstly, on the basis of an interpretative 
overview of what took place, the components that constitute the legitimisation process are traced. This 
is done by inter alia analysing any empirical confessions for motivations or perception related to the 
legitimisation of the negotiations. Secondly, why these constitutive components came to be is traced 
causally looking for smoking guns and comprehensives storylines as empirical tools to show the causal 
relationships between the causal conditions, specifically, the causal conditions showing the influence of 
actors and the ways of communication for collective concerns and transparent communication 
respectively. Lastly, the context factors relevant for the comprehensive process-tracing are detailed.   
 
5.1 Background and Actors 
 
In order to situate the analysis, a brief overview of the Kenyan post-election violence, the peace 
negotiations in 2008 and the major actors involved, including from the civil society sector are outlined in 
the following.  
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5.1.1 The Kenyan Post-Election Violence 2007/8 
 
The background analysis lays out the political run-up to the flawed elections and post-election violence 
as well as the types and roots causes of violence. The root causes beyond the flawed elections, include 
the personalisation of presidential powers, the system of land distribution, ethnicity as well as socio-
economic disparities and media aggravation.  
 
Kenya gained independence from Great Britain in 1963 and for most of its existence was ruled by a 
single party, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU). Moreover, until 2002 only two presidents ruled 
the country: Jomo Kenyatta up to 1978 who was replaced by Daniel Arap Moi, his repressive regime 
lasting until 2002. Though multiparty elections were introduced in 1992, it was only in 2002 that KANU 
and Moi lost their stronghold over Kenyan politics. It was also the first time since the eve of multiparty 
politics in Kenya in 1992, that there were no incidents of election-related violence. By 2002 a strong 
opposition coalition had formed under the name of the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) with Mwai 
Kibaki at its helm, winning elections that year. At the time the electoral victory was interpreted as a 
turning point in the democratisation process of Kenya. Despite gains in economic growth, the NARC 
soon became fragmented, rifts worsening after a failed constitutional reform process in 2005. The 
presidential elections in 2007 promised to be a tight race between Kibaki of the Party of National Unity 
(PNU) and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). When election results were 
announced in favour of Kibaki, he was hurriedly sworn in for his second term by the Chairman of the 
Electoral Commission Samuel Kivuitu, three days after the elections on the 30th December 2007. 
Allegations of electoral fraud were immediate (see e.g. Throup 2008).98  
 
An unprecedented level of violence swept the country bringing Kenya to ‘the brink of civil war’ (see e.g. 
International Crisis Group 2008, 9). The violence that took place has been the subject of much debate 
especially because of the involvement of the International Criminal Court (ICC) with trials for crimes 
against humanity ongoing against todays Vice-President of Kenya, William Ruto and President Uhuru 
Kenyatta - though the latter collapsed in early December 2014.  
 
Three types of violence took place in 2007/8. Firstly, there were riots, looting, destruction and attacks 
from ODM supporters (primarily in the Rift Valley, Nyanza and the Coast) against government 
representatives as well as alleged PNU supporters and especially persons belonging to the Kikuyu and 
Kisii communities. Organised Kalenjin gangs in the northern Rift Valley for example attacked and drove 
out Kikuyus living there. The most infamous incident was the burning down of a church close to 
Eldoret in early January 2008 with women and children hiding inside, around 35 of whom are thought to 
have died as a result. Secondly - thought to have been planned by politicians and businessmen who 
                                                        
98 The factual outcome of the 2007 election outcome will probably never be known. In the parliamentary elections 
ODM won 91 parliamentary seats compared to the 43 seats of the PNU.  
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employed criminal gangs - there were revenge attacks against alleged ODM supporters and especially 
persons belonging to the Luo, Luhya and Kalenjin communities in Nakuru and Naivasha districts as well 
as in Nairobi. This took place towards the end of January 2008. Lastly, police and security officers - such 
as from the General Service Unit and the Administrative police - were also involved in the violence, by 
shooting citizens as well as high rates of sexual and other gender-based violence (see e.g. CIPEV 2008; 
Human Rights Watch 2008; Jepson et al. 2014, 9; McGhie and Wamai 2011, 13).  
 
In total 1,133 people were killed, the majority in the Rift Valley Province, and 350,000 people were 
displaced (CIPEV 2008, 305; 346; 351). The reasons for this violence and to what degree it was planned 
or spontaneous have been hotly debated (Murunga 2011). Several root causes of violence can be pointed 
out. The flawed election results and the hasty swearing in of Kibaki can be seen as a definite trigger. 
Since the opposition party, ODM and their leader Raila Odinga felt that they had won the elections, 
there was the perception that the election results were faulty (Barkan 2008; Jepson et al. 2014, 8; KEW). 
The elections were however simply the last straw in a series of long-standing institutional dimensions 
that resulted in long-term grievances, including most notably the personalisation of presidential power, 
land distribution and ethnicity. 
 
Firstly, the political system in Kenya favoured the personalisation of presidential power. This was a core 
condition for the development of a system of patronage whereby only the President’s ethnic community 
is seen to benefit from the state. This resulted in the creation of a ‘mostly exclusionary and ethno-
conscious public sphere, [and a] predatory elite’ (Kanyinga, Okello, and Akech 2010, 15; see also CIPEV 
2008, 28; Horowitz 2008, 2; Jepson et al. 2014, 16; Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 4; Maupeu 2008a, 196; 
K18; KNY). As a result, the Luo constituency of Odinga found the election rigging particularly bitter, 
arguing that a Luo had never ruled the country.  
 
Secondly, the system of land distribution and related debates on regionalisation/federalism (or 
majimboism) 99 accounted for much of the violence. When colonial settlers left the country in the run-up 
to independence, they sold their farms primarily to members of the Kikuyu community, partly because 
this group had also been the beneficiaries of the colonial divide and rule policy. This pattern continued 
after independence. Because of this system of land distribution, the Kalenjin and Maasai who 
traditionally have lived in those areas feel like their land has been taken away from them. The Kikuyu 
owners of land nonetheless bought their land titles and have lived there often for generations by now, 
and thus feel just as entitled to the land (Hornsby 2013, 766; Kanyinga 2009; Maupeu 2008a, 188; 203; 
K21; KNY; KET). Both the personalisation of power and historical land disputes were about exclusion 
and a long-term grievance. Thirdly, as this overview already suggests, ethnicity permeated these 
institutional characteristics, resulting in general antagonism. Hasty comparisons to Rwanda and ethnic 
                                                        
99 For more on this see Anderson (2010) and Zanker et al. (2015).  
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cleansing were made at the time (Jepson et al. 2014, 102). The ethnic undertones were however very 
clearly linked to the manipulation of identity for political power and thus can at least in part be 
interpreted as socially constructed (Horowitz 2008, 3; G. Lynch 2010; Noor 2014; Wainaina 2008).  
 
On top of these deep-rooted factors, further catalysts of the conflict were socio-economic disparities 
and the media. Socio-economic disparities were entrenched, not least because of high poverty levels, 
regional income inequality and high youth unemployment (Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 3; 
Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 3; Maupeu 2008a, 195; Ngunyi 2008, 5; K7; KNY). Lastly, the media also 
played a negative role and thus became a catalyst of conflict, especially because of hate speech broadcast 
on local radio stations (CIPEV 2008, 295; K7; K9).100 
 
As part of a mediation process led by Kofi Annan, a power-sharing agreement was signed on the 28th 
February 2008. By then the violence had mostly stopped. The power-sharing government with Kibaki as 
President and Odinga as Prime Minister managed to work on the implementation of the agreement until 
the next elections in 2013. Several new institutions of inquiry and reform were set up as a direct result of 
the agreement, most importantly a new Constitution, which was written and promulgated in August 
2010 after a nation-wide referendum. The power-sharing government however was instable at times, 
with frequent cabinet reshuffles. Infamously, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted four 
cabinet members for crimes against humanity during the post-election violence (along with the police 
commissioner and a radio DJ).101 Though elections in 2013 were largely peaceful, perhaps at the cost of 
democracy (Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2014), Kenya remains highly volatile today. President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and Vice President Ruto got themselves elected on an anti-western anti-ICC ticket (G. Lynch 
2014). Since then restrictions on civil society have worsened (Opalo 2013; K55). Stalled implementation 
of institutional changes, communal violence and the rise in terror attacks further threaten the stability of 
the country. The subsequent analysis focuses only on the period between 2008 and 2011, when the 
fieldwork was conducted. The negotiations are detailed in the next section. 
                                                        
100 Though importantly, the media had a mixed role. According to Freedom House the media at the time ‘enjoys 
one of the liveliest press environments on the continent’ and therefore was also a voice of criticism and 
transparency (Freedom House 2007). 
101 In 2011 six persons were indicted by the Pre-Trial Chamber II of the ICC for crimes against humanity: Uhuru 
Kenyatta, Henry Kosgey, Francis Muthaura, William Ruto, radio executive Joshua Arap Sang and former police 
commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali. This is reflected in the cabinet reshuffles - for example in March 2012 the 
Justice Minister Kilonzo - an outspoken supporter of the ICC indictments - was removed from his post (Africa 
Confidential 2012). As for the cabinet members that were indicted: Between 2008-2010 cabinet member William 
Ruto was suspended twice from the cabinet due to corruption charges in 2010, and then formally fired in 2011 
(ICC charges were confirmed, currently on trial along with Joshua Arap Sang; after 2013 became Vice President); Henry Kosgey 
was suspended due to corruption charges and reinstated in 2012 (ICC charges dropped), Uhuru Kenyatta resigned as 
minister of finance in 2012 but remained in the Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister (ICC charges confirmed, case collapsed 
in December 2014 due to lack of evidence and cooperation; after 2013 Kenyatta became President of Kenya); Secretary to the 
Cabinet Francis Muthaura resigned in 2012 (ICC charges initially confirmed, but later dropped in 2013). Charges against 
former police commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali were also dropped in 2012. An adequate local mechanisms to 
consider lower level charges of those involved in the post-election violence has still not been identified (Human 
Rights Watch 2011; Jepson et al. 2014, 22).  
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5.1.2 Negotiating an End to Violence: Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation 
 
Before discussing the mediation efforts from a special Panel, set up by the African Union (AU), early 
mediation attempts are briefly illustrated. Under the mediation guidance of the AU Panel a total of four 
Agendas were negotiated, as part of the agreement, which are presented in the following.  
 
Kenya had emerged as a bastion of stability and economic growth in the region. Consequently as the 
situation grew more violent, international attention gathered quickly. This included initial mediation 
efforts by South African Archbishop Desmond Tutu in early January, albeit to no avail. In addition, 
Ghanaian President and AU Chairman, John Kufuor, had immediately recognised how dangerous the 
situation was growing and called for an emergency meeting of the AU Commission, consulting members 
of the UN and other African heads of states (Jepson et al. 2014, 20). On the 8th January, Kufour arrived 
in Kenya, together with Benjamin Mkapa (former President of Tanzania), Joachim Chissano (former 
President of Mozambique), Ketumile Masire (former President of Botswana) and Kenneth Kaunda 
(former President of Zambia). Their visit and mediation attempts also proved to have little effect. 
Notably, Kibaki named a Cabinet during this time, which effectively ‘slammed the mediation door in 
President Kufuor’s face’ (Khadiagala 2008, 8). Kufuor however managed to get the two principals to 
agree to a mediation process and then called on Kofi Annan to take on the role of  an AU Special 
Advisor and Chief Mediator (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 189; Khadiagala 2008, 16). As a result, the 
African Union’s Panel of Eminent African Personalities (hereafter the AU Panel) was born, taking on 
key responsibilities.  
  
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, along with former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa 
and former first lady of Mozambique and South Africa, Graça Machel, chaired the AU Panel. Their 
mediation efforts began on the 22nd January 2008, with an orchestrated symbolic handshake between 
Kibaki and Odinga, though at this point the two did not discuss the violence or the election results. The 
formal launch of the dialogue with negotiation teams for each side was on the 29th January. Financial and 
technical support was provided by the UNDP and the Swiss Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 
(Wanyeki 2010; see also Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 10). Early stumbling points included the 
disagreement over what the mediation should actually be called, eventually settling on the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation or the KNDR (Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 11). A visit from 
Ugandan President Museveni as Chairman of the East African Community that coincided with Annan’s 
arrival was perceived as biased towards Kibaki - he had been one of the only heads of state to 
congratulate Kibaki on his electoral win (Khadiagala 2008, 7). As a result, the first major step taken by 
Kofi Annan was to ensure that his would be the sole mediation in order to avoid forum shopping 
(Annan and Griffiths 2009, 3; Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 189; Jepson et al. 2014, 44; Khadiagala 
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2008, 11). 102  Accordingly, Museveni left again. The international community quickly endorsed the 
mediation mission of the AU Panel and was later praised for its coordinated efforts on the matter 
(Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 8, 15; Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 6).  
 
Four main agendas were signed as a result of the KNDR. On the 1st February 2008, Agenda 1 was 
signed calling for an immediate stop to the violence and the restoration of fundamental rights and 
liberties (2008). A few days later, on the 4th February, Agenda 2 was signed, which addressed the 
humanitarian crisis in the wake of the violence (2008). Most notably this included addressing the plight 
of internally displaced people. Furthermore, the establishment of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation 
Commission (TJRC) was mentioned (Agenda 2: Part 2h) and confirmed under Agenda 4. After six weeks 
of negotiations Agenda 3, or the ‘Agreement on the Principles of Partnership of the Coalition 
Government’, was signed (2008).103 This was perhaps the most important agenda, at least in the short 
run, setting up a power-sharing interim coalition government, and creating the position of Prime 
Minister, which was given to Raila Odinga. Two deputy prime minister positions were also created by 
the agreement. In addition, the top two positions within each ministry were also split between the 
different parties and in the most sensitive ministries two Assistant Minister positions were created. As a 
result, the power-sharing cabinet became inflated with 40 ministers and 52 assistant ministers. 
 
The negotiations over this part of the agreement took the longest and were at times ‘tense and bitter’ 
(Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 11). Expert advisors and a retreat to Kilaguni, a lodge in Tsavo National 
Park, did little to ease the tension between the negotiation team, especially hardliners like Martha Karua 
(for PNU) and William Ruto (for ODM) (R. Cohen 2008). Eventually, Kofi Annan decided to call off 
the negotiations as they were fast sliding towards a deadlock. Instead, he called upon the two principals, 
and together with Benjamin Mkapa and Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete, finalised the agreement in 
what was later called the ‘five hour end game’ (Khadiagala 2008, 22–23). 
 
Finally, mediated by Nigerian Foreign Minister Oluyemi Adeniji because of the departure of Kofi 
Annan, Agenda 4 was signed on the 4th March (2008).  Agenda 4 promised to address long-term issues 
and solutions addressing legal, constitutional and institutional reform, poverty and inequality, 
unemployment, land reforms, national cohesion and unity, as well as accountability and impunity – in 
fact most issues that were considered root-causes of the violence (see above). Aside from constitutional 
reform, the Agenda also provided for the establishment of several bodies, including: 
                                                        
102 Though the civil society advocacy group that emerged during this time the Kenyans for Peace, with Truth and 
Justice claim they had originally called for one sole mediation team and the international community then followed 
suit (Kanyinga 2011, 100; see also Baldauf 2008c).  
103 This followed a previous agreement that had been signed on the 14th February by the negotiation team called 
‘How to solve a political crisis’ that confirmed a commitment to a political settlement to the crisis 
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 The Independent Review Commission (IREC), which became to be known as the Kriegler 
Commission after its Chair, set up to review the entire election process of 2007, especially the 
presidential election; 
 The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), which became to be known as 
Waki Commission after its Chair, set up ‘to investigate the facts and circumstances related to the 
violence … between December 28, 2007 and February 28, 2008’;  
 A Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC), tasked with the investigation of gross 
human rights violations and other historical injustices in Kenya between 1963 and 2008. 
 
The mediation team tried to not exclusively focus on the happenings of the day (i.e. by advising against a 
recount or new elections) and instead turning the focus of the conflict parties to finding solutions for the 
future (Jepson et al. 2014, 84). Agenda 4 clearly underlines the success of this. The official conclusion of 
the KNDR was on the 30th July 2008 after the negotiations regarding Agenda 4 were finalised. Though 
after the March signing of the Agenda, only details were left to be ironed out, as a result of which the 
number of sessions reduced, as did the momentum. As negotiators took up their positions in the 
cabinet, meetings only took place sporadically (Khadiagala 2008, 23–24). 104  During the period that 
followed, especially up to the next elections in 2013, Kofi Annan maintained the pressure for 
implementation by releasing statements on particular issues like the TJRC, establishing a Coordination 
and Liaison Office (CLO) in Nairobi and organising several review conferences (Jepson et al. 2014, 55; 
K53). An overview of the negotiation actors is given in the next section. 
 
5.1.3 The Negotiation Actors 
 
Apart from the two major conflict parties, Kibaki and Odinga, each side had their own negotiation team. 
In addition, after outlining briefly the mandate of the AU Panel, the other international actors are 
mentioned, before focusing on the CSAs in the subsequent section. 
 
At the behest of the AU Panel, Kibaki and Odinga appointed a team of four negotiators to take part in 
the mediation on their behalf. The PNU team was composed of Martha Karua, Sam Ongeri, Mutula 
Kilonzo and Moses Wetang’ula. All of the team apart from Sam Ongeri (who has a background in 
medicine) are lawyers. For the ODM the team was composed of Musalia Mudavadi, William Ruto, James 
Orengo and Sally Kosgei. In order to beef up the lawyers on his side, Odinga insisted on extending the 
list of negotiators to four from the initially planned three, so that James Orengo, a lawyer by trade, could 
also be included (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 7). 
 
                                                        
104 Items negotiated after March include the Statement of Principles on Long-Term Issues and Solutions (23 May 
2008) and the Agenda Item 4: Matrix of Implementation Agenda (30 July 2008) 
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The international community was involved in various ways as has been outlined previously. The 
engagement of the AU Panel had its roots, at least partially, in the doctrine of the responsibility to 
protect (R2P), which Annan had begun developing under his tenure as UN General Secretary. Further, 
Article 4(h) of the African Union’s Constitutive Act affirmed the right to intervene under certain 
conditions. Whilst the reiteration of the mediation in relation to the R2P concept had a huge symbolic 
impact (Jepson et al. 2014, 20–21; Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 2), the success of the mediation was also 
related to a combination of many different factors including not least international expertise and 
pressure. 
  
External experts were invited both in order to depoliticise the discussions and in order to help find 
solutions to challenges at hand (Jepson et al. 2014, 33). These included the German Deputy Foreign 
Affairs minister Gernot Erler in order to relate Germany’s experience with grand coalition governments 
and Hans Corell, a Swedish lawyer and diplomat, and former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs 
in the UN Secretariat, to provide legal expertise (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 12; Khadiagala 2008, 17). 
Pressure was also kept up by the international communities including statements of support for the work 
of the Panel by UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon and a visit by the US Secretary of State, 
Condoleeza Rice. The donor and development community also supported the efforts of the Panel, as 
well as coordinating their own efforts. This included coordination groups like the Democratic 
Governance Donor Group who agreed on a ‘no business as usual’ approach (Kanyinga and Walker 
2013, 9). Aside from various international groupings, the CSAs also played a major role, which is now 
outlined. 
 
5.1.4 Civil Society Actors and the KNDR 
 
Before illustrating the work of the two major coalitions of civil society during the peace negotiations, the 
emergence of civil society in Kenya is briefly reviewed. Two major groups are particularly active, namely 
church-based groups and human rights activists. The height of civil society momentum was arguably 
during the 2002 elections, since then the groups have faced problems co-optation into government etc.  
 
President Moi had ruled the country with an iron fist - no media and CSAs, let alone opposition political 
parties or politicians, were able to act or move freely. However, civil society groups emerged as a force 
for change during the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. Reasons for their emergence include the fact 
that donors saw them as a way to influence domestic politics and therefore incresingly directed aid to 
CSAs (Hornsby 2013, 630–631).105 In addition, groups allied themselves with opposition politicians and 
organised themselves collectively (Connan 2008, 312; Ndegwa 1996, 52). The emergence of the CSAs in 
                                                        
105 Though donor funding for civil society groups involved in for example election monitoring did not contribute 
to the development of the government administration, but more to the ‘privatisation’ of state functions (Connan 
2008, 321). A similar point was made on the “commercialisation of peace” (K51; see also K48). 
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Kenya during this time has been credited with giving momentum to the struggle for multiparty elections 
and later broader constitutional reform (Connan 2008, 310; Kanyinga 2011, 89; Noor 2014; Opalo 
2013). 
 
Two major groups were of particular importance, namely religious leaders and human rights activists. 
One the one hand, bold church leaders emerged as especially active in the 1990s, focusing social actions 
on the political sphere (Chacha 2010, 131). Groups like the National Council of Churches of Kenya 
(NCCK) and the Kenya Episcopal Conference joined the impetus for constitutional reform from the 
outset. Whilst churches played an important role in the first decade of reform, their position as 
supporters of the democratic opposition and defending human rights became more contentious because 
of their vehement loyalty to President Kibaki, a Catholic, after 2002 (Maupeu 2008a, 2008b, 282). Their 
strong commitment to him proved to be controversial when the results were disputed and violence 
broke out in 2007/8. 
 
On the other hand, human rights activists - with the front runners being the Law Society of Kenya, the 
International Commission of Jurists-Kenya Section and the Kenya Human Rights Commission - 
launched a group called the Kenya Tuitakayo (The Kenya we want) - Citizens Coalition for 
Constitutional Change in 1994. What was known in short as the 4Cs became a broad and influential 
steering committee of 43 members, who sought to facilitate dialogue between the government, 
opposition and civil society as well as conducting civic education campaigns. In early 1997, the 4Cs 
organised a National Convention, bringing together the three large bodies - NGOs, churches and 
opposition parties - which had criticised the regime.  
 
A high point for the pro-democracy movement came during the elections in 2002 when under a very 
broad multi-ethnic coalition the NARC managed to oust President Moi out of power, installing Kibaki 
in the most peaceful and democratic elections Kenya had experienced to date. Almost like a victim of its 
own success, many of the CSAs joined the new government (some as elected officials), which meant the 
civil society sector lost some of their brightest minds (Branch 2011, 256; Kanyinga 2011, 90; Noor 2014; 
Opalo 2013; K46; K48). The NARC split soon after their electoral victory, and consequently civil society 
suffered from a ‘paradigm paralysis’: They had been so focused as a force against Moi / KANU that 
after the 2002 elections they ‘lost … [their] … object of aggression’ and ‘became a mirror image of the 
wrangling coalition government: polarised and ethnicised’ (Ngunyi 2008, 8; see also Murunga 2011, 8–
9).106 Some commentators argue that civil society have never regained their momentum after 2002. 
Accordingly, the civil society section became reactive without a strong and consistent public voice (DAI 
2012, 3; see also Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 6). Others see the CSAs changing role as a more 
positive one - the constitutional reform process had transformed the groups into pressure groups, 
                                                        
106 Though Moi had already contributed to the polarisation of CSAs, by engaging only with some groups to the 
detriment of others. 
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accorded them a new position in the electoral process and a ‘more active and transversal role of 
criticising the actions of the regime’ (Connan 2008, 317; K2).  
 
In any case, from the time the violence broke out by late 2007, in civil society sector played an active 
role, despite not having a direct seat at the table. Two major coalitions of CSAs emerged in January 
2008, namely the Concerned Citizens for Peace (CCP) and Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice 
(KPTJ),107 which broadly associated themselves with the church movement and human rights movement 
respectively.  
 
The first coalition, the CCP, was led by Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, a seasoned diplomat and 
associate of the church movements like the NCCK; General Daniel Opande, a military man with 
extensive experience in UN peacebuilding missions and General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, who had extensive 
experience as a mediator in Sudan. The aim of the group was to lobby for an end to violence at all costs, 
if need be in the name of accepting electoral fraud. Other members included organisations like Peacenet 
and Nairobi Peace Initiative and the now deceased Peacebuilder Dekha Ibrahim Abdi. The first act of 
the group was to look for international attention, including the call to Desmond Tutu to try to mediate. 
Further actions of the CCP included media engagements and other innovative lobbying tools like public 
‘prayers for peace’ or getting a leading mobile phone operator to send a text message to all their 
subscribers, urging them to be peaceful. They also held an Open Forum in Nairobi where members of 
the public could attend and express their concerns. On the basis of this the CCP developed a Citizens 
Agenda for Peace, which they presented to the mediators (for more on the CCP see Connan 2008, 322; 
Kanyinga 2011, 94–101; Mwagiru 2008, 30, 61; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11, 23; K46).  
 
The second coalition, the KPTJ, counted over 30 organisations from the governance and human rights 
sector and individual academics, researchers or election monitors, under the leadership of the Kenya 
Human Rights Commission. The main aim was to demand for accountability and justice, including a call 
to stop police brutality and a recount of the votes, arguing that peace without justice or truth is not 
possible. The group was seen as more political in nature than the more pacifist minded CCP (Connan 
2008, 324; Kanyinga 2011, 94). The first manifesto from the group attributed the main cause of violence 
to the rigged elections. The Law Society of Kenya (a member of KPTJ) had by then already made an 
announcement rejecting the official results.108 The group also denounced police brutality and collected 
data on the violence (Connan 2008, 324–328). Using partners like the Red Cross, they developed an 
accurate count of the deaths that occurred and collected data on violence in order to help the efforts for 
                                                        
107 The group was originally named Kenyans for Peace, Truth and Justice but in reaction to the Concerned Citizens 
for Peace position of peace at all costs ‘more firmly cemented their counter position and renamed themselves as 
Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (emphasis added) by the end of January’ (Connan 2008, 329). According 
to one of founders of the KPTJ – Muthoni Wanyeki – this name change holds little relevance or analytical value 
(K55). 
108 The group released a detailed report by the end of January on the electoral fraud entitled ‘Countdown to 
deception: 30 hours that destroyed Kenya’ (Connan 2008, 329). 
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humanitarian relief (Wanyeki 2010). The group also helped to generate domestic pressure for a political 
settlement. One group member of the KPTJ for example, the influential Kenyan Private Sector 
Association met up with Kibaki and threatened that businesses will withhold taxes unless he agreed to 
negotiations (K49). Generally, the group was ‘more concentrated on observation of the process than on 
mobilisation of the masses … [and] … displayed itself more as a research and political analysis 
organisation’ (Connan 2008, 319). Indeed, KPTJ developed scenarios and recommendations that they 
shared with the mediators. The AU Panel met up with this group, as well as other CSAs both prior to 
the start of negotiations as well as throughout the process (Jepson et al. 2014, 17; Lindenmayer and Kaye 
2009, 7; McGhie and Wamai 2011, 15).  
 
Other smaller groups that were not always associated to the CCP or KPTJ also existed. This included 
most notably the Kenya Women’s Bi-Partisan Consultative Group who - at the behest of Graça Machel 
- held a one-day meeting with more than fifty women to discuss how women could pressure on the 
conflict parties, later presenting a memorandum to the mediation team (McGhie and Wamai 2011, 16, 
19; K55). Other groups include the Concerned Kenyan Writers (Wanyeki 2010) and the Kenya 
Association of Manufacturers (Jepson et al. 2014, 30). Civil society actors at the grassroots were also 
involved in more practical ways, albeit usually less documented. Rural Women Peace Link based in 
Eldoret for example initiated community dialogues for reconciliation during the height of the violence 
(McGhie and Wamai 2011, 17; see also K31; K44). Moreover, there was the Amani Mashinani Initiative, 
a conglomeration of a number of national-level human rights groups and their community-based 
counterparts from Nairobi’s informal settlements, who provided relief assistance and peace and 
reconciliation meetings with local leaders (Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 6).  
 
In retrospect, it is argued that CCP was particular influential in helping to reach Agenda 1 (a stop to 
violence) and KPTJ influenced Agenda 4 or the addressing of the long-term grievances. In other words 
‘the complex, contradictory and yet ultimately principled response of Kenya’s civil society and, 
eventually, private sector together with that of the diplomatic community and the rest of the world, 
worked’ (Wanyeki 2008, 97). Using the three features as heuristic tools, the constitutive components 
relevant to the Kenyan case are now traced, starting with collective concerns. 
 
5.2 Collective Concerns 
 
Having spelled out the details of Kenyan post-election violence, the National Dialogue that followed and 
the actors which were involved, including CSAs, the next step in this chapter is considering how peace 
negotiations become more legitimate, according to the first feature of the heuristic model: Collective 
concerns. According to this feature negotiations as a process become legitimatised if collective 
grievances or concerns are discussed and addressed by CSAs and included in the agreement. As before, 
the comprehensive process-tracing is carried out in three steps. Firstly, there is interpretative tracing of 
143 
 
what took place in order to consider the components that constituted the legitimisation process. It is 
confirmed that the process of legitimisation occurs because of the components of ending violence and a 
civilian counterbalance. Secondly, the causal conditions that enabled these constitutive components are 
traced, before discussing the context in a third step. 
 
5.2.1 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Ending Violence and a Civilian Counterbalance 
 
Like in the Liberian case study, this includes two sections, namely a discussion on general collective 
concerns and on the collective concerns that the CSAs actually addressed. 
 
5.2.1.1 What are the Collective Concerns? 
 
An end to violence was expressed as a major relief, much like in the Liberian case, making it a major 
grievance and in turn a part of the legitimisation process. Despite this relief, there was a widespread 
understanding that local concerns had not been addressed by the talks or the agreement, though there 
was some division as to whether this was because national concerns subsumed local ones or whether in 
fact local grievances actually existed at all.  
 
Ending the violent conflict, only deemed possible by introducing a political solution, was a major 
grievance. “Kenyans in the street everywhere had one agenda: stability. So yes [the KNDR was] limited 
in terms of participation” (K46), but nevertheless, it “was a relief” (K3). 109  This overwhelmingly 
consistent confession is further explained by one CSA in Eldoret: “It was a moment in time when Kenyans 
needed a rescue … the moment Raila and Kibaki shook hands the Kenyans found a reason to smile, we 
saw a new beginning” (K22). An opinion poll from April 2008, about a month after the conclusion of 
the power-sharing agreement, shows that 75% of respondents approved of the accord (Horowitz 2008, 
12). This reiterates the component of ending violence as constitutive of the legitimisation process. On a 
small side note, apart from ending violence another issue was raised. Namely, that the area where much 
of the violence took place, the Rift Valley, was “the breadbasket of the country” and that fighting 
needed to stop in order to ensure food security (K25; see also K22; K24; K26; K45). This also reiterates 
that ending violence can be interpreted in line with aspects of more positive peace like in the Liberian 
case, and not merely the absence of violence. In other words ending violence as a constitutive 
component is more than the “silence of the guns” and in both cases includes elements that seem to go 
beyond this. 
 
Whilst the cause of violence was interpreted as multifaceted, as interpreted previously, one key element 
was the political background, related to both the disputed election results and the alleged role of 
                                                        
109 See also K2; K7; K8; K5; K10; K11; K14; K15; K17; K19; K20; K21; K23; K24; K25; K26; K30; K32; K33; 
K34; K35; K36; K39; K40; K41; K45; K50; K53; K54; K55; KNM; KEM; KET; KEY; KNY. 
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politicians in instigating violence. Whilst this meant that a political solution at the national level was 
unavoidable, a further extension of this is perceived to be missing: “We wanted the leaders to come to 
the ground since most of the violence had been instigated by politicians” (K21; see also K20; K24; K22; 
K42). Another civil society actor in Eldoret spoke of a visit from President Kibaki to the region in 2011 
rather bitterly, as “too little, too late, people don't trust them anymore” (K31).110  
 
Broadly speaking, there was a consensus amongst most interlocutors that the National Dialogue that 
took place only discussed national political issues not local ones.111 To some this meant “peace has been 
hijacked by the elites,” as a result of which no true reconciliation can take place until local grievances had 
been addressed (K1).112 This perception of a lack of dialogue at the local level was reiterated in every 
single focus group. In addition, problems were argued to remain unaddressed “because grassroots 
people were not involved,” (K19). 
 
One of the most prominent concerns mentioned as unaddressed was the resettlement of IDPs. 113 
Whereas this issue was theoretically addressed under Agenda 2, the implementation has never been 
completely successful, even at the time of writing - seven years later. During the fieldwork in 2011, 
rumours were rife about ethnically biased repatriation, the perception being that only the Kikuyu group 
were benefiting from IDP programmes to the detriment of other ethnic groups. This was in all 
likelihood linked to the fact that the Kikuyu formed the largest IDP group in the immediate aftermath 
and many others were not formally registered as IDPs but fled to stay with family members and friends 
(see e.g. K4; International Crisis Group 2008, 18; South Consulting 2010a, 11). Further concerns 
identified as having been left out include the issue of land (K38; KNT; KEM; KEY); fully addressing 
ethnic reconciliation (K30; K37); gender-based violence (KEY; KET; KEM); impunity (K30); trauma 
(KNY; KEM); food shortages (KNM; KET; KEY); the interruption of business (KNM; KEM; KET) 
and the destruction and loss of properties (KNT; KNY; KEM; KET; KEY).114 
  
Like in Liberia, focus groups participants were asked to list the concerns or grievances they had during 
the time period of the post-election violence and then to answer separately whether they believed that 
these issues had been addressed during the National Dialogue, see Table 5.1 below.  
 
 
                                                        
110 Though according to the first monitoring report of the South Consulting Group, Kibaki and Odinga held 
several joint public meetings as early as in March 2008 where they urged Kenyans to coexist and live together in 
peace, including in the Rift Valley (South Consulting 2009b, 4). 
111 E.g. K13; K16, K22, K24; K26, K32, K33; K34; K36; K42; K49 
112 See also K19; K24, K31; K34; K35; K36; K37; K41; K44 
113 K4; K19; K24; K41; K49; KNT 
114 Karambu Ringera also claims that the process overlooked the root causes of conflict and excluded the voices of 
women, youth and civil society (2014, 174). In addition, the discussion of conflicts amongst pastoralists in the 
North of Kenya and secessionist’s claims at the coast were also left out (K53).  
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Table 5.1: List of Concerns and the Number Perceived to have been addressed during the Peace 
Negotiations According to Focus Group Discussants (Kenya 2011) 
 
Focus Group Number of Concerns Addressed 
Teachers Nakuru (KNT) 5 out of 11 
Youth Nakuru (KNY) 8 out of 15 
Market Women Nakuru (KNM) 10 out of 13 
Teachers Eldoret (KET) 6 out of 12 
Youth Eldoret (KEY) 6 out of 14 
Market Women Eldoret (KEM) 8 out of 15 
 
Only the Market Women in Nakuru were optimistic about the number of concerns addressed at the 
KNDR talks. Overall, according to the focus group participants, only an average of 53.5% of concerns 
had been addressed by the talks. The reasons for this mostly more negative perception than in Liberia 
can only be speculative, but interestingly the reasons given as to why concerns were not addressed, 
mirror those given in Liberia. Firstly, the unaddressed concerns were perceived to have been of a lower 
priority at the time of violence, such as “poor business” which was seen “as a minor issue since when 
the country was in crisis … business would not perform [anyway]” (KNM; this reasoning was reiterated 
in all groups). Secondly, some of the unaddressed concerns (like land) were thought to be too 
complicated to address right now (KNT; KEY; KEM; KET). Lastly, in some groups it was proposed 
that certain concerns were not addressed - like gender-based violence or food shortages - because the 
national level elite actors did not know they were happening, since they were not on the ground where 
the violence was taking place (KEY; KEM; KNY; for a similar point see Ringera 2014, 181). 
 
More generally, there were mixed perceptions on the reasons for not addressing local concerns, and if 
this was in fact the case at all. Indeed, a small number of those interviewed felt that local issues had been 
included, at least to a certain degree (K17; K32; K54). More frequently it was argued that because events 
in the Rift Valley were at the eye of the storm, ‘their’ issues were automatically included nationally.115 
Others still, praised the efforts of local peacebuilding efforts that had addressed any localised grievances 
or conflicts (K14; K22; K24; K42). Moreover, some of the major human rights organisations (often 
involved themselves) postulated that the negotiations were “pretty inclusive” (K42) and the agreement 
“very comprehensive” (K54; see also K46). The Agenda 4 issues, according to these interlocutors, were 
after all also local ones (K55). Government administrators and the MP Peris Siman were also quick to 
back up this point (K45; see also K17; K25; K29; K46). One differentiation that was often made 
however, was that issues had been addressed to a great extend within the KNDR - including local or 
locally important ones - but that they had stalled when it came to the implementation of these.116 
 
                                                        
115 K3; K15; K16; K24; K27; K30 
116 K1; K2; K6; K20; K21; K24; K26; K27; K32; K36; K37; K39; K40; K44; K46; K47; K49; K54; K55; KNT; 
KEY 
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Like in Liberia, there were also a number of interviewees who noted that all the collective concerns were 
national ones, which is why local grievances did not need to be discussed or included. One peacebuilding 
actor explains: “I haven’t seen anything unique to the Rift Valley which was not included” (K42).117 One 
of the negotiators, William Ruto, favoured the explanation that “there was a blend of local and national 
issues” (K52), though in his testimony to the Waki Commission he seems to support the idea of 
exclusive national concerns (CIPEV 2008, 75). This suggests an inconsistent stance on the matter of 
whether the concerns were ultimately local or national ones (or as I argue elsewhere, shows the two-level 
power game being played by Ruto; see Mehler et al. forthcoming). Whilst in Liberia, due to the 
inherently centralised nature of the state, local concerns were not deemed as important, in Kenya it 
seems to be that local concerns do exist but are much harder to separate from national ones. Whether 
the conflict concerned localised events of an essentially national conflict or whether truly local 
grievances do exist was the subject of much debate (see also Zanker, Simons, and Mehler 2015, 88). 
Consequently, there is a perception that local concerns were not addressed, like in Liberia, but the 
confessions suggest that this is - at least in part - detrimental to the legitimisation process. Since there is no 
clear conceptualisation of local concerns however, it remains an open question, to be revisited in the 
final theory on legitimate peace negotiations.  
 
The specific collective concerns that were addressed by the CSAs and ended up being included in the 
agreement are discussed next. 
 
5.2.1.2 Civil Society Actors Addressing Specific Collective Concerns 
 
Three broad collective concerns were addressed by the CSAs, namely the flawed election results (truth), 
the human rights violations (justice) and other long-term grievances and economic stability (peace). 
Individually and together the concerns offer a broad civilian counterpart to the National Dialogue and 
the agreement (most notably Agenda 4), which constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. In 
addition, the addressing of economic stability amends the constitutive component of ending violence to 
include a return to stability.  
 
Truth: Flawed Election Results 
 
One of the first and primary objectives of the civil society group KPTJ, was to highlight that there were 
serious concerns about the election results and the objectivity of the Electoral Commission of Kenya 
(ECK) (Connan 2008, 329). During the National Dialogue, Kofi Annan and his team went through the 
different options of a new vote or a recount with the negotiators from both conflict sides. In the interest 
                                                        
117 See also K2; K18; K25; K33; K34; K55. MP Margaret Kamar and Minister of Education in the interim cabinet 
argued that a mere political solution was needed at the time so local issues did not need to be addressed – at least in 
the short-term (K33; see also K20; K27; K39). 
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of ending the violence as soon as possible, the two sides eventually agreed on conducting a thorough 
investigation after the elections through the Kriegler Commission. The KPTJ group were one important 
side in raising this point, though by no means the only ones, as especially for the Odinga team this was 
also the primary point of contention.  
 
As the violence worsened over the weeks, KPTJ made a distinctive effort in collecting data on the deaths 
in an effort to create a record and ensure future accountability. The group carried out monitoring and 
documenting both the violence and the elections throughout this period, which ended up being one of 
their major contributions (Jepson et al. 2014, 30; Wanyeki 2010; K55). The monitoring strengthened 
their own position, both during the talks and later on when they were asked provide information to the 
Waki Commission on the post-election violence. The report from the Waki Commission lists the KPTJ 
as one of their partners and states more generally that civil society had provided background material, 
reports and witness statements detailing the patterns of human rights violations and violence (CIPEV 
2008, 5–6).  
 
Justice: Human Rights Violations 
 
Human rights violations and the need to address them, was discussed and eventually included in Agenda 
4, under the banner of justice and reconciliation. The KPTJ were quick to ask for any human rights 
violators or those committing violence to be held accountable. The question of legal accountability was 
left open to be dealt with by the Waki Commission. Because the decision to send names of suspects to 
the ICC was a hugely complex one and not directly part of the immediate KNDR, the collective nature 
of the ICC cases will not be discussed at length (see for example Sriram and Brown 2012). Suffice to say 
that in an initial survey undertaken by the South Consulting Group in March 2009, 86% of citizens most 
affected by the PEV were in favour of prosecution with a majority preferring action to be taken by the 
international community through The Hague (53%) (South Consulting 2009a, 27). In an interview 
conducted with long-term civil society activist Muthoni Wanyeki in January 2015, she states that by now 
the number one grievance of Kenyans today is accountability - both for the state and individuals (K55). 
By the last survey conducted in the run up to elections in early 2013, around 66% of Kenyans supported 
the prosecutions of post-election violence suspects by the ICC, though numbers were much lower in the 
Rift Valley (South Consulting 2013, 26). In fact, the cases were seen as intensely problematic amongst 
respondents in the Rift Valley who felt that too many perpetrators had been left out (K5; K8; K26; K46) 
or that the proceedings were biased to the detriment of specific ethnic groups.118 As such, the unsealing 
of the list of suspects by the then Chief Prosecutor Ocampo raised tensions, particularly in Eldoret 
because of the charges against William Ruto. 119  Nevertheless, at the time of the talks and in the 
                                                        
118 See K13; K28; K32; K33; K35; K36; K39; K43; K44; K45 
119 See K2; K3; K24; K25; K26; K27; K29; K30; K32; K40; K34; K37; K43; K44; K54 
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agreement, mentioning the human rights violations was a step in establishing a civilian counterbalance, 
to what was in this instance an otherwise politicised process. 
 
Moreover, considering the previous election-related violence and the decades of human rights abuses 
under former President Moi, it is plausible that the call for and creation of a TJRC to address long-term 
human rights violations was widely appreciated and similarly adds to the civilian counterbalance. The 
degree of support varied in terms of the detailed provisions, especially related to amnesty (e.g. South 
Consulting 2009b, 4). In a survey from March 2009, asking what would be the best way to pursue 
reconciliation, only 12% answered with a TJRC, behind ending tribalism (22%), more jobs (15%) and 
the prosecution of those guilty of committing post-election violence (14%) (South Consulting 2009a, 
19). Beyond advocating for truth and justice, the CSAs also addressed a number of further concerns 
related both to longer-term historical grievances and economic stability.  
 
Peace: Long-term Grievances and Economic Stability 
 
Peace as a collective concern was voiced as more than just ending violence, also being related to long-
term grievances and economic stability. The CCP was a forerunner in advocating for the cessation of 
violence. In addition to this, the KPTJ took on the post-election crisis as an opportunity to publicize and 
raise several long-term issues. 120  These concerns included constitutional and land reform, regional 
underdevelopment, poverty, unemployment and corruption, which the AU Panel labelled ‘historic socio-
political and economic grievances’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 18). Some of these concerns are evidently longer-
term issues: Corruption, poverty, unemployment or development is difficult to address in the urgency of 
a heated negotiation process, though the fact they were included as a concerns to be addressed under 
Agenda 4 already speaks of the unusual nature of this part of the agreement (see also Kanyinga and 
Walker 2013, 13). One of the most prominent concerns was the land issue, which overlaps to problems 
related to identities, economic opportunities, development and the resettlement of IDPs. In fact, argues 
one CSA: “Land will remain a factor for potential mobilisation as long as it stays a problem. We need to 
learn to deal with it in finality, otherwise can always spark up issues” (K12).121  
 
Economic stability was another concern addressed by the CSAs. Karambu Ringera proposes in a book 
chapter on the involvement of Kenyan women in peace processes, that women usually represent what 
she calls ‘bread and butter issues’ (2014, 180). Whilst this is arguably a little too simplified, the issue of 
economic stability was raised on several occasions. As such, participants in the focus groups mentioned 
concerns related to food shortages or businesses being shut down during the PEV (e.g. KNY; KNM; 
                                                        
120 Though Kofi Annan is widely credited to have mused during the KNDR process, that the Chinese character for 
‘crisis’ and ‘opportunity’ is the same, as a reminder that the process resolving the post-election crisis should also be 
used as an opportunity (Jepson et al. 2014, 18; see also Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009) 
121 See also K1; K2; K22; K26; K27; K31; K42; K44; K46; K54 
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KET; KEY; KEM). Arguments for stopping violence because of the Rift Valley being the ‘bread basket 
of the country’ have already been mentioned (K22; K24; K25; K26; K45). Many Kenyans continue to be 
persuaded that their very own economic success depends on an image of peace and stability of the 
country for investor confidence (Opalo 2013). The Kenyan business community has also traditionally 
been a powerful player with the capacity to influence politics (Barkan 2008). By mid-January, it was 
estimated the Kenyan economy was losing 80 million US Dollars a day as business shut down and 
tourists left the country (Baldauf 2008b). During the violent crisis therefore, private sector lobby groups 
- though partly reluctant at first - joined forces with the civil society actors calling on the parties to reach 
political settlements. This included joint advertisements at critical points during the negotiations from 
the Federation of Kenyan Employers and the Central Organisation of Trade Unions. Numerous hotels 
and tourists associations also voiced appeals for a cessation of violence - at all costs (Connan 2008, 323–
324). The Kenyan Association of Manufacturers was additionally particularly active in joining forces with 
the various civil society groups and participating in their scenario building (K55). Due to the nature of 
this short-lived period of violent conflict the private sector was still very much intact (as opposed to 
Liberia) which is why they were vested in finding a solution as fast as possible (Wanyeki 2010).  
 
The AU Panel recognised this important sector and Annan also met with business groups in the days 
prior to the start of the dialogue (Khadiagala 2008, 12). In this rather different type of violent conflict - 
short-term and intense - economic stability was of primary importance. This was recognised in all of the 
focus group in Kenya, where the outbreak in violence often explained in terms of the closing down of 
market places and a return to stability equally symbolised by a secure access to markets. Interestingly, 
focus groups in Liberia as well as in Burundi and DRC also indicate this link between economic activities 
and perceptions of peacefulness or security.122 Economic stability is thus not just a concern at the level 
of the business sector, but also amongst the populations of a country.  
 
Two conclusions can be drawn from this review of the collective concerns that were specifically 
addressed by CSAs. Firstly, the return to economic stability was obviously an important concern, 
particularly strongly voiced in the Kenyan setting of short-term violence, but not in fact unique to this 
case. It works on a similar basis regarding its legitimising function than ending violence. The overall 
process becomes legitimised because of the satisfaction it invokes in a return to (economic) stability 
alongside ending violence. Thus the constitutive component of ending violence is amended to ending 
violence alongside a return to stability. Secondly, the multi-faceted concerns addressed by CSAs once 
again prove that providing a civilian counterbalance both during the talks and afterwards constitutes a 
part of the legitimisation process. This confession underlines this: “Agenda 1 to 3 is for the politicians 
                                                        
122E.g. “[it is peaceful now] because I can wake up safely and go to the market to sell bitterball” (LGM; see also 
LGY; LGbM; LMT and LGbY_14). My colleague Claudia Simons (SWP) found similar results in her focus groups 
in the DRC and Burundi though they reflect more broadly speaking an understanding of peace related to a return 
to ‘normalcy’ or the carrying out of everyday activities.  
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only and Agenda 4 is owned by Kenyans” (K46). The very issues addressed by Agenda 4, covering truth, 
peace and justice, are those that potentially concern all Kenyans, beyond the demands for political power 
by conflict parties, and thus by definition a civilan counterbalance. The collective concerns addressed by 
the CSAs was carried out via press conferences, newspaper ads and monitoring reports were all part of 
the tireless campaigns to ensure that civilian voices were heard. These campaigns are revisited later in the 
chapter when discussing the feature of transparent communication. 
 
5.2.2 Causal Process-Tracing: Influence from Civil Society Actors 
 
The inherent power imbalance at the peace negotiations is further heightened by the fact that CSAs 
played no direct role in the KNDR, since the power imbalance can indirectly affect the legitimisation 
process. The following analysis traces in what ways actors are in fact able to influence the talks, in a way 
that enables the constitution of the legitimisation components of ending violence/return to stability and 
the civilian counterbalance.  
 
There are several ways in which CSAs were instrumental in enabling the components of ending violence 
/return to stability and civilian counterbalance. These causal conditions are shown in two clusters, 
namely on the thematic influence of CSAs on the one hand and on the lobby and pressure activities on 
the other hand. These are discussed in turn, before concluding with the major differences to Liberia. 
 
The first cluster of causal conditions relates to the thematic influence had by CSAs. Generally speaking, 
the influence of CSAs in addressing the range of collective concerns, despite no direct seat at the 
negotiation table, was widely confirmed.123 Praise for the CSAs and the role they played has come from 
many corners (e.g. Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 193; Barkan 2008; Connan 2008; Ringera 2014, 192). 
‘The panellists may not have gotten civil society into the negotiating room … but its impact was 
considerable’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 238). A member of the CPP later stated, “civil society was sufficiently 
influential, so that Kofi Annan acknowledged in the end that had it not been for the vibrancy of the 
Kenyan civil society, the political deadlock would have been longer” (K46). This can be interpreted as a 
comprehensive storyline. With the input of a vibrant civil society, the overall nature of the talks changed.  
Kofi Annan himself comments in his autobiography, that one of the ‘salient features of the mediation’ 
was the ‘active and continued engagement of all stakeholders … [including] civil society, religious 
groups, and the business community” (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 203; see also Paffenholz 2014a, 
83).  This engagement resulting in a thematic influence is most prominently shown by the lobbying for 
Agenda 4.  
 
                                                        
123 See K2; K42; K44; K46; K48; K53; K54; K55 
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It was widely repeated that the Agenda 1 can be attributed to the work of CCP (e.g. K42; K46; Kanyinga 
2011, 94–101; Mwagiru 2008, 30; 51; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11; 23) and Agenda 4 to 
KPTJ (e.g. K46; Kanyinga 2011, 94–104; Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 14). The final Agenda 4 agreement, 
acts as irrefutable evidence that the lobby work of CSAs paid off. A member of the KPTJ explains, 
“from the human rights perspective we got everything we wanted - Agenda 4 is an ingenious way of 
unlocking problems” (K49; see also K55). This makes the lobbying for Agenda 4 concerns a causal 
condition, effectively enabling the civilian counterbalance at the talks and in the agreement afterwards. 
In other words, because the very inclusion of Agenda 4 in the discussion and agreement was part of the 
civilian counterbalance, lobbying for these concerns pre-empts it. As a result, there is a potential causal 
pathway between lobbying for Agenda 4 and a civilian counterbalance. The lobbying for Agenda 4 
however also influenced the international actors; resulting in a causal conjunction, see Figure 5.1 below. 
This is detailed in the following.  
 
The cluster of causal conditions on the lobbying of international actors and conflict parties is more 
multi-faceted. At the most basic level, the CSAs were influential in lobbying international actors to get 
involved in the Kenyan peace negotiations and maintained this pressure throughout the talks. The CCP 
initially raised international alarm bells after they realised the ‘extent of division and mistrust in the 
country’ (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 22). According to other sources, the CCP also sought 
external help as their own mediation attempts where discarded by the ODM, because of the illustrious 
nature of Ambassador Kiplagat (Mwagiru 2008, 17; see also Khadiagala 2008, 12). In addition to the 
lobbying from the CCP, members of the Kenyan National Human Rights Commission (part of the 
KPTJ) travelled to an AU conference as well as to various European capitals, including Geneva, in mid-
January to raise awareness and in order to alert the UN on the alleged violation of human rights carried 
out by the Kenyan police, (Connan 2008, 332). Besides, the contacts that CSAs had to international 
actors were later used to keep up the pressure on the international actors throughout the talks. The 
journalist Scott Baldauf, who had unique access to the proceedings, describes rather illustratively how 
international pressure was kept up later in the process: 
 
‘Then, there's a knock on his [Benjamin Mkapa, Member of the AU Panel] hotel door. It's 
Lazaro Sumbeiywo, a retired Kenyan general, and Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat, a Kenyan 
career diplomat, both of whom helped mediate an end to Sudan's 20-year civil war. "You are 
not leaving," General Sumbeiywo tells Mkapa. "Now that we have got this problem, you will not 
leave. You have to get in touch with our leaders to agree to international mediation. We held 
him hostage in this hotel," Sumbeiywo recalls, with a chuckle. He had no doubt that Kenya 
needed international intervention to resolve the political impasse. It would start with 
Mkapa.’(Baldauf 2008c). 
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This indicates a smoking gun: At a particular moment in time, these two members of the CCP made sure 
that Mkapa would not leave Kenya without further attempts at mediation. Members of both the CCP 
and the KPTJ also met up with more of the international community including for example Ban-Ki 
Moon who visited in early February 2008 and other members of the diplomatic and aid community 
(Jepson et al. 2014, 23; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 24). Interestingly, according to one 
analysis, the influence of the CSAs recommendations and expert advice is also evident in the resolutions 
proposed by the US, UK and EU which opted for a similar language and approaches to those suggested 
by the KPTJ (Kanyinga 2011, 100). This also shows the link to the lobbying for Agenda 4 concerns as 
was previously suggested. Therefore, the lobbying for Agenda 4 together with the maintenance of 
international pressure also enabled the civilian counterbalance in an interactive configuration. As a result 
of this, there was a causal conjunction between the lobbying for Agenda 4 concerns and the 
maintenance of pressure on international actors, illustrated in Figure 5.1 below. This makes sense 
because (part of) the international actors were directly part of the negotiations and used their positions 
to present the Agenda 4 concerns that the CSAs were lobbying for. This mutual influence is why there is 
an interactive configuration.  
 
The civilian counterbalance was also possible because of the expert reports and monitoring by the CSAs. 
The CSAs were in fact especially influential in Kenya by giving extensive expert advice and monitoring 
and documenting the flawed elections and the violence. The monitoring reports, including audits of the 
election results in the most critical areas, served to develop the expert advice and pointed messages 
(Kanyinga 2011, 101). This was later used as evidence in the investigatory committees but also served as 
a reminder of atrocities, like in the Liberian case. Likewise, the scenarios and recommendations were 
passed on to the AU Panel and other international actors (K42; K49; K53; Jepson et al. 2014, 30; 
Khadiagala 2008, 12; Wanyeki 2010). The reports helped the Panel to contextualise the crisis, pay more 
attention to the long term causes of violence and formulate better responses and corrective measures in 
the negotiation process (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 193; Jepson et al. 2014, 29–30; Kanyinga 2011, 
101; Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 14; Paffenholz 2014a, 82; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 28; 
K49; Wanyeki 2010, 5). Though it seems that there is a rather direct causal pathway from the expert 
reports to the maintenance of pressure on international actors and finally to the civilian counterbalance, 
this is not the case. The CSAs did not have a direct seat at the table (like in Liberia) and as a result the 
intermediary role of the international community was especially important. Nonetheless, as shown 
previously, the maintenance of pressure on international actors worked in interactive configuration with 
the lobbying for Agenda 4 concerns by CSAs. Therefore, there is also a causal conjunction between the 
expert reports, international pressure and the civilian counterbalance.  
 
Similarly, there is a causal conjunction from the lobbying of international actors to the maintenance of 
pressure on the international actors (in interactive configuration with the lobbying for Agenda 4 
concerns) throughout the talks enabling the civilian counterbalance. This is confirmed by a smoking gun, 
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where two generals who were part of the CCP, jokingly threatened to keep one of the regional mediators 
Benjamin Mkapa hostage, unless he agreed to stay. These causal conditions for a civilian counterbalance, 
which together act in a causal conjunction, are all shown in Figure 5.1 below.  
 
Figure 5.1: Causal Conditions and Constitutive Components of Collective Concerns 
 
The influence of the lobby activities did not stop there. The expert reports also influenced the conflict 
actors themselves directly and indirectly via the international actors, enabling the ending of violence. The 
expert and monitoring reports also influenced the conflict parties to move from their more hard-line 
positions. Due to the growing evidence of election frauds and levels of violence, shown in the 
monitoring reports, the conflict actors had to agree to talks and eventually to a political solution. The 
expert reports therefore act in a causal pathway to pressuring the conflict parties to ending 
violence/return to stability, one of the constitutive components of legitimisations. There is however not 
a lot of evidence on this point, stronger is the indirect link through the international actors. As Muthoni 
Wanyeki, an active CSA member at the time of the National Dialogue recalls, the expert reports were 
one of the most ‘critical and effective roles played’ in to help the international community ‘leverage their 
call for a political settlement’ (2010, 4–5). Because the maintenance of pressure on international actors 
and the expert and monitoring reports both have individual causal strength for ending violence however, 
there was an additive configuration between the expert reports and the international pressure and the 
pressure on conflict parties, which in a causal pathway results in the political solution and therefore 
ending violence/ return to stability as depicted in Figure 5.1 above. 
 
The CSAs were also able to exert pressure on the conflict actors more generally, aside from via the 
expert reports. The CCP and KPTJ for example also put pressure on the conflict parties to talk to each 
other, with the initial brokering coming from the CCP, though this was rejected (K42; K49; Wanyeki 
2010). Another way this was carried out was by the KPTJ lobbying the head of the Catholic Church to 
talk to Kibaki who was a Catholic to get him to agree to talks (Kanyinga 2011, 97). Moreover, for the 
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part of the KPTJ, a particularly innovative action came from one of its members, the Kenyan Private 
Sector Association who held a meeting with Kibaki and threatened that all business stakeholders would 
withhold taxes unless he agreed to negotiations (K49; K55). Influence was also enforced by the CCP 
conducting meetings in the same hotel as the negotiations, the Serena Hotel. Some meetings chaired by 
Annan took place directly next door to the Coalition’s meeting, allowing for close interaction with the 
group and the negotiation process. Thus members of the CCP were able to have brief, informal chats 
with the negotiators of the two conflict sides and mediators ‘in the corridors of the Serena’ (e.g. K49; 
Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 23; 28). This strengthens the partial causal pathway between 
the pressure on the conflict parties and ending violence / return to stability. 
 
Regarding the temporal boundaries of the causal analysis, the time between violence breaking out and 
the talks starting is limited, blurring these two time periods. In addition, since a lot of the activities of the 
CSAs took place in both time periods, such as the monitoring and expert reports, a clear temporal 
division becomes superfluous. More important though, is the time period after the official talks had 
ended, well into the period of the interim government. By design, the CSAs kept up their involvement 
through the various institutions, which were formed by the Agenda 4 Agreement. This adds to the 
implementation period, which is further addressed when discussing the feature of transparent 
communication later in this chapter. With regard to the spatial boundaries of causality, the causal 
conditions occurred at the negotiations (e.g. lobbying for Agenda 4 mechanisms), in the informal setting 
surrounding the talks (e.g. jokingly threatening to lock in Mkapa) and beyond these specific negotiations 
in a more public arena. 
 
Lastly, in contrast to Liberia, the causal process-tracing shows a variation on why the components of 
legitimisation were possible, even though the end result was largely were the same. The differentiation in 
the causal conditions is not least because the basic conditions were different. There was no seat at the 
negotiation table for CSAs, and as a result no intra group communication was possible in the same way 
as in Liberia. Moreover, the influence on the conflict parties was less direct than in the Liberian case, 
mostly via the international actors, especially the mediation team. Considering the very expansive 
Agenda 4 items however, the influence was nevertheless substantial. This can be further explained by 
considering some context factors.  
 
5.2.3 Context Factors 
  
The context factors show reasons for both the influential position the CSAs were able to have (due to 
the encouragement from the mediator, personal relationships and previous reputation) but also what 
restricted them. The highly politicised nature of the talks was also mirrored amongst the CSAs 
themselves, which meant their agenda (or the collective concerns) became fragmented.  
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With regards to their influential position, firstly, the mediator played an important role by encouraging 
the participation of the CSAs. It was Kofi Annan who decided to directly engage with the CSAs 
(Paffenholz 2014a, 82). An assessment of the meditation recalls the ‘fearless’ approach on behalf of Kofi 
Annan, because he employed ‘civil society and the media in the course of a negotiation to encourage and 
sometimes criticize the parties’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 238). Kofi Annan consulted CSAs, and also believed 
this to be in the interest of the population. Meeting with the CSAs, was not only an information seeking 
venture but also as “a further calming measure, to encourage the public perception that a process was in 
swing that was in their interest, not just the politicians” (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 193; see also 
Annan and Griffiths 2009, 9; Jepson et al. 2014, 45). 
 
Secondly, the personal connections that civil society actors had, helped advance their participation and 
impact. Whilst patronage networks indubitably exist covering ‘the private sector, the churches, civil 
society … as well as the state itself’ (Hornsby 2013, 793; see also Ndegwa 1996, 111–112), the networks 
of CSAs during the PEV were focused much more externally. Thus, in contrast to Liberia, these are not 
so much personal connections to the conflict parties and other elites, but rather to the international 
community. This included personal ties existed to Desmond Tutu who was the first prominent 
intervener and to later members of the AU Panel, giving the various groupings particular access (Baldauf 
2008c; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 23; Wanyeki 2010, 11). Members of the KPTJ also had 
high-ranking connections through contacts that had previously been made in regional African bodies, as 
did the women groups to Graça Machel (see e.g. Connan 2008, 332; Wanyeki 2010, 11). Machel used her 
connections amongst the Kenyan CSAs to come up with a list of names for the bi-partisan Women’s 
Consultative Group which was meant to bring women together from both political sides (K55). 
 
Thirdly, the previous reputation of CSAs advanced their capacity to influence. The civil society groups 
who sprang to action during the Kenyan crisis were uniquely experienced and qualified to take on such a 
role due to their own work experiences domestically and abroad and their contacts (Jepson et al. 2014, 
237; Wanyeki 2010, 11). Generally, the civil society groups were respected by the international 
community and considered to carry public support (Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 14).  In addition, the 
CSAs positively reinforced their role by coming up with position papers and the like, which were useful 
to the mediation team (K46; K49) or using innovative actions like the Open Forum to give them 
leverage in their own legitimation. 
 
Concerning the factors that negatively affected the influence of the CSAs, to a degree political 
partisanship in Kenya is fluid. This is best illustrated by the fact that during the peace talks one of 
Kibaki’s negotiators, Mutula Kilonzo took time out in order to argue a civil case in court for one of his 
opponents in the negotiations, ODM’s Sally Kosgei (Baldauf 2008a). Nevertheless, despite this fluidity, 
the Kenyan negotiations were also characterised by a highly politicised context, which encompassed civil 
society actors (Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 6–7; McGhie and Wamai 2011, 8; K46; K48; K49; 
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K53;KEY; see also Noor 2014; Opalo 2013). This had a negative effect on the addressing of collective 
concerns, possibly reducing the contribution to the legitimisation of the process because of a civilian 
counterbalance. It would be ‘naïve to consider [the CSAs] as neutral’ (Connan 2008, 321). This 
politicisation of the CSAs was not necessarily along ethnic lines (though some would disagree, e.g. 
Barkan 2008), but rather along ideological lines (Kanyinga 2011, 103).  
 
On the one hand, there were the groups calling for a return to peace at all costs, even if this means 
foregoing an investigation into the election fraud elections. This included the more moderate CCP and 
the conservative churches (Kanyinga 2011, 94). The group was evidently popular amongst PNU 
sympathisers and had strong Christian overtones (Connan 2008, 322; see also Ibrahim Abdi and Wils 
2008, 8). On the other hand, there were those in search for truth and justice, including but not 
exclusively the KPTJ, which had obvious supporters amongst the ODM including Raila Odinga himself 
(Odinga and Elderkin 2013, 830).124 Firmly positioning themselves in opposition to the CCP, including 
the name change to with truth and justice, the group is seen to be much more progressive and radical (at 
least some elements) compared to the CCP (Connan 2008, 329; Kanyinga 2011, 95).  
 
Some of the civil society actors were firmly aware of this seemingly partisan division, noting they ‘have 
not been insulated from the general intensification of ethnic chauvinism’, and that ‘non-partisanship is 
critical if the outputs of human rights groups are to be seen to be credible’ (Kenya Human Rights 
Institute 2008, 6–7). Some have asserted these competing positions as misunderstood (Wanyeki 2010, 
10): Whilst there were difference in the approach and tactics used, at the time all the groups were 
working on the same broad goal - to end the violence and bring peace (K55). If anything, it seems to 
have been more of an issue of the political membership of individual persons rather than an overall 
politicisation of the CSAs (Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 7; Wanyeki 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, because of this division amongst the CSAs their agenda setting was at times fragmented 
and ‘seemed to be competing against each other. If they had worked together their agenda wouldn’t have 
been made peripheral to that of foreigners who acted in consultation and concertation’ (Mwagiru 2008, 
51–52; see also K46). This also evidenced in some of the interviews where members of KPTJ accused 
the CCP of reacting too quickly to the PEV with sinister connotations that they had known about the 
planning of violence prior to the actual outbreak (K49) or criticised their methods or tactics (Wanyeki 
2010).125 Members of the CPP in turn accused the KPTJ for having particular influence - also in the 
implementation conferences – only because they have more funding amongst them (K48). Dominique 
                                                        
124 At one point even Kofi Annan was accused of being biased in favor of the ODM, but he argues this was merely 
because they put forward more concrete ideas and proposals to work with (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 13; see also 
Khadiagala 2008, 21).  
125 For example, members of the CCP at one point brought water and flowers to the police at Uhuru National 
Park, which was seen as inappropriate due to the role of the state security agents during the violence (K55). 
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Connan summarises this polarisation as a ‘competition whose challenge was to find the legitimate 
representation of the crisis’ (2008, 322). 
 
One of the reasons for the polarisation in Kenya is because the CSAs still played a de facto opposition 
role. As such their position more generally speaking was still one of access to power (for opposition 
candidates) rather than political plurality. This also weakened their position in the eyes of the population 
(see also Connan 2008, 335). The historian Charles Hornsby argues that civil society activism in Kenya is 
‘not an alternative to politics, but politics by other means’ (2013, 587). The fact that CSAs did not agree 
on all points, however, can also simply show their plurality. Consequently, to some observers the overall 
context of the CSAs is not that politicised or competitive (K55). In contrast stands the fact however, 
that in the highly politicised environment civil society actors were not always able to act as independently 
as they may have wanted to. One of the major civil society election monitoring organisations, the 
‘Kenyan Domestic Observer Forum’, opted in fact to ‘harmonise’ their result to those of the ECK 
which meant an independent tally of the results was lost (Wanyeki 2010). Some civil society actors were 
more directly intimidated or threatened (K49; Connan 2008, 331; Kenya Human Rights Institute 
2008). 126  Despite the overall success in addressing collective concerns and ensuring a civilian 
counterbalance, there was at least some restriction to this, due to the polarised nature of CSAs. In the 
next section, the feature of legitimate representation is considered in the Kenyan example. 
 
5.3 Subjective Representation 
 
The second feature of the heuristic model, subjective representation, considers symbolic and descriptive 
forms of representation through an interpretation of the ways in which representation was spoken of as 
well as the legitimation strategies of specific actors. As before, the comprehensive process-tracing for 
this feature encompasses two levels analysis. Firstly, an interpretive overview of subjective representation 
confirms that feeling representing and recognised guarantors of legitimacy constitute two components of 
legitimisation. Overall however, the level of feeling represented was much lower than in Liberia and 
significantly the most important recognised guarantor of legitimacy is Kofi Annan and the AU Panel, 
rather than any of the CSAs. Secondly, the context factors are outlined.  
 
5.3.1 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Feeling Represented and Guarantors of Legitimacy 
 
Once again the involvement of the civil society actors has generally been equated to ensuring 
participation and interpreted as the ‘grassroots voices from Kenyan society’ (Lindenmayer and Kaye 
2009, 8). Nonetheless, tracing the representativeness of the CSAs in light of the heuristic feature of 
subjective representation shows that there is in fact little evidence that they represented the ‘grassroots 
                                                        
126 On a related noted some political or government actors were also keen to let me know that civil society were 
not to be trusted and regularly made up facts in order to maintain their funding (e.g. K4; K28; K45). 
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voices’. Detangling interpretations of representation gives a much more complex picture of what actually 
took place. It is confirmed that there are two components related to the feature of subjective 
representation that constitute the legitimisation process – feeling represented and recognised guarantors 
of legitimacy. In what ways this occurs is considered in three sub-sections on the interpretation of 
representation, the perceived importance of CSAs and the legitimation narrative of the AU Panel. 
 
5.3.1.1 Interpretations of Representation in Kenya 
 
Unlike the Liberian case, there was no understanding or shared suffering as an interpretation of 
representation. Moreover, when it came to neutrality, it was in fact shown that there was a negative 
effect of not feeling represented by religious actors because they were not neutral and deemed to be 
biased. Overall, there was no particularly strong indication of feeling represented, to the detriment of the 
legitimisation process, inversely confirming the component as constitutive of the legitimisation process.  
 
To start with, the understanding of suffering or shared experience as a representative quality was not 
found to be relevant in the Kenyan case. The fact that the CSAs were not working on a common 
understanding or shared experience to the general population was recognised by one group, who in a 
summary document of a meeting conducted in February 2008, state ‘the predominantly middleclass 
Kenyan human rights movement faces in a country gripped by radical inequality’ results in the ‘unease 
that human rights actors are not … especially concerned with the “voice” of the victims’ (Kenya Human 
Rights Institute 2008, 5–7; neither was this historically the case argues Ndegwa 1996, 52; see also K46). 
A middle class civil society based in Nairobi would not experience or understand the suffering unfolding 
in the country. Indeed, several times discussants in the focus groups mentioned grievances they found to 
be left unaddressed because “those who discussed the issues never knew what was happening locally” 
(KEY; see also KEM, KNY). The CSAs as a result - the underlying message supposes –were not able to 
provide this type of knowledge either. Further, whilst the groups may have carried out monitoring and 
recording of information work of considerable significance, they did not understand the suffering of the 
population like some of their Liberian counterparts. In the setting of Kenya however, where the violence 
was rather short-lived, this did not seem to matter as much. As such, the discussants themselves 
considered some of the grievances they had mentioned as “less important” to address at the time of the 
negotiations (all FGD). In any case, whilst some of the actors were not directly experiencing the 
violence, neither were all of Kenyans, as violence was limited to particular hotspots (e.g. D. Anderson 
and Lochery 2008).  
 
Moreover, the CSAs - like others - did not necessarily directly suffer from violence or food shortages, 
but presumably their own lives were also interrupted the whole country was in a state of shock and 
emergency. Unlike in other places, civil society and business groups stayed on when violence broke out. 
Besides, the CSAs were not always able to move freely in all areas of violence, which affected the 
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chances of mutual experiences or understanding of suffering (Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 5). 
Whilst some human rights organisations were very critical in reflecting on their own voice and looking to 
include subjective factors that they may not themselves have ‘suffered’ or a ‘true’ understanding thereof - 
the emphasis was always on the outcome. The representative quality of the ‘understanding or experience 
of suffering’ was as such, on the whole, neither upheld by the CSAs but nor was it perceived to be highly 
relevant. This is not the case for neutrality.  
 
For the church, their lack of perceived neutrality acted detrimentally to their own legitimation and as a 
result reinforces neutrality as a representative quality and feeling represented as a component 
constitutive of legitimisation. Having taken a strong position of support for Kibaki in the run-up to 
elections, the churches’ own legitimacy and social authority was limited when they called for peace 
during the violence (Chacha 2010, 129; Connan 2008, 324; Kanyinga 2011, 95). Whilst in the focus 
groups, there seems to be a much more positive picture of religious actors, this can be explained on the 
basis of individual local actors who had no influence at the national level. As a result, nationally, the 
church was not seen as a legitimate actor during the negotiation period, which restricted their ability to 
be seen as particular representative, to the detriment of the overall legitimisation process.  
 
Though the church had played an important role in the civil society movement in the 1990s, by the time 
of the 2007 elections and its aftermath the church was ethnically and politically tied up in maintaining 
the “Kikuyu hegemony” (K55).127 The church was heavily criticised as being partisan by the time it tried 
to tie itself to the peace movement during the post-election violence (Chacha 2010, 128–129; though 
Maupeu argues the church only ever played a role including during the election campaign, see 2008b, 
305). At best, the church was politicised, at worst directly involved in the conflict - reports were made of 
a pastor even calling people to take up arms, albeit in self-defence (Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 
4).128 In one focus group, participants even debated whether religious leaders had preached peace or 
incited violence (KNT). Moreover, the religious leaders had lost popularity and trust over the years, 
according to one youth group (KNY). The fact that the different religious communities were politically 
divided both amongst and between each other, even prior to the outbreak of violence, stands in strong 
contrast to the IRCL in Liberia.  
 
At first glance, an analysis of the focus groups questions this lack of neutrality or negative perception of 
church leaders. Like in Liberia, focus group participants were asked to list the most powerful leaders in 
their town, area or community and to later detail whether these very leaders were positive, negative or 
had a disputed impact on local peace. In five out of the six groups, participants mentioned religious 
                                                        
127 The churches’ pro-Kibaki stance was allegedly intensified by an alliance that Odinga had made to the Muslim 
communities (Connan 2008, 322). Much less is known about the position of the Muslim community at the time, 
probably because they were less outspoken. 
128 Though in a survey from South Consulting, only 1 per cent of respondents found religious leaders to be most 
responsible for encouraging conflicts compared to 77 per cent mentioning politicians (South Consulting 2009c, 5) 
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leaders in their listing of the most power leaders (the exception being the market women in Nakuru). In 
all of these groups religious leaders were listed as positive for local peace, see Table 5.2 below. In the 
group with teachers in Nakuru there was a heated debated on the topic and in the end five participants 
stated that religious leaders had preached peace, with four sticking to the idea that they had incited 
violence (KNT). In Eldoret, all groups were much more consistent in their opinion that religious leaders 
were positive for local peace. In this case however, they all listed someone specifically: Bishop 
Cornelious Korir. Bishop Korir was a well renowned preacher of peace and had accommodated up to 
10,000 internally displaced people in his church compound during the violence (KEM; KET; KEY; 
K43; Korir 2009, 8).  
 
Table 5.2: The importance of religious leaders according to the focus group discussants (Kenya 
2011) 
 
 List of most 
powerful 
actors 
includes 
religious 
leaders?129 
Positive/ 
Negative 
or 
Disputed 
for Local 
Peace130 
Who addressed the grievances (listed) at the peace 
talks?131 
Teachers 
Nakuru (KNT) 
Yes Positive Ministry of Education; Kofi Annan; Raila Odinga; 
Mwai Kibaki; William Ruto; Uhuru Kenyatta 
Youth Nakuru 
(KNY) 
Yes Positive ODM and PNU representatives, Jakaya Kikwete; Kofi 
Annan*; African Union president; civil society.  
Market Women 
Nakuru (KNM) 
No N/A Kofi Annan*; Graça Machel*; William Ruto; Martha 
Karua; James Orengo; Uhuru Kenyatta; Charity Ngilu 
(an MP) 
Market Women 
Eldoret (KEM) 
Yes Positive Kofi Annan*; Graça Machel*; Jakaya Kikwete*; 
Yoweri Museveni; Raila Odinga; Mwai Kibaki; Musalia 
Mudavadi; Martha Karua; William Ruto 
Teachers 
Eldoret (KET) 
Yes Positive Kofi Annan*; Graça Machel; Jakaya Kikwete; 
Benjamin Mkapa; William Ruto; Sally Kosgei(ODM); 
Musalia Mudavadi (ODM); Martha Karua (PNU); 
James Orengo (ODM); Sam Ongeri (PNU); Moses 
Wetang’ula (PNU) 
Youth Eldoret 
(KEY) 
Yes Positive Sally Kosgey; James Orengo; Martha Karua; William 
Ruto; Musalia Mudavadi; Raila Odinga; Mwai Kibaki; 
Jakaya Kikwete; Condoleeza Rice 
* These actors were thought to have been particularly concerned with the grievances that affected the 
participants themselves the most 
 
When asking the groups who had addressed their grievances at the talks however, none of them listed 
religious actors (see Table 5.2). This indicates that the religious leaders they were talking about were far 
removed from the national processes. People like Bishop Korir were locally very active, but had no 
impact on the national agreement. Korir describes his own work based on the realisation that ‘we needed 
                                                        
129 “Who are the most powerful actors in Nakuru/ Eldoret?” 
130 “Which of these actors are positive or negative or dispute with regard to local peace?” 
131 “What were the most important local issues during the post-election violence?  Were these issues addressed in 
the negotiations of the peace agreement? Who addressed them?” 
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to start again at the grassroots, to reach the actual perpetrators and victims of violence. We needed to 
facilitate Amani mashinani - peace in the village, not peace in urban hotels’ (2009, 2).   
 
This positive perception of grassroots activism does not, as a result, indicate the neutrality of the 
national church leaders. The problem was a structural one of the national church leadership rather than 
for individual religious leaders at the local level. Indeed the church on the whole does not even come 
close to the claims of neutrality that the IRCL in Liberia benefited from. As a result, the role of the 
church prior to the elections ‘weakened their moral authority and legitimacy to command an end to 
violence’ (emphasis added, see Kanyinga 2011, 95; see also Chacha 2010, 128). Whilst some of the 
authority of the church was regained, at least to the extent that Kofi Annan agreed to meetings with 
some of the church leaders on at least three occasions (Chacha 2010, 129),132 the overall message of their 
questionable position was clear.  
 
Similarly, one focus group participant notes that civil society in Kenya was not neutral and should 
therefore not have been included in the mediations (KEY). Whilst the focus group participants saw their 
religious leaders as overwhelmingly positive in their own local contexts, this does not necessarily reflect 
the national situation. In contrast, in Liberia participants spoke of the IRCL as well as their local 
religious leaders in terms of the positive impact the religious groups had on the legitimisation process. 
The perception of neutrality is a key ingredient to the legitimation of individual actors. This is further 
exemplified by considering one of the founding members of the CCP: Ambassador Kiplagat. Not 
withholding his own controversial role as Chairman of the TJRC in the years that followed, he was seen 
as biased from the outset and was therefore rejected as a domestic mediator from the start (Connan 
2008, 322–323; Khadiagala 2008, 12; Mwagiru 2008, 17). Not only does this confirm that the CSAs 
themselves were not all neutral, but it also reiterates the importance of neutrality as a representative 
quality ensuring a feeling of representation as a component constitutive of the legitimisation process. 
 
In a last point, it is shown that the overall feeling of being represented was much lower than in Liberia, 
to the detriment of the legitimisation process. The involvement of the CSAs during the Kenyan 
mediation has been characterised as speaking for the ‘voices of the grassroots’ and inclusion (Jepson et 
al. 2014, 125–126; Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 9) or more cautiously ‘the activists … all purported to 
be speaking on behalf of the citizens, and they may well have been’ (Mwagiru 2008, 51–52). 
Nevertheless, the interviews and focus group discussions suggest a much more differentiated picture.  
 
                                                        
132 The National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and Catholic bishops later apologized for having taken 
sides during the elections (Chacha 2010, 128–129). By the time a survey was conducted by South Consulting in 
2010, 82% of respondents from the most affected areas of violence were satisfied with the performance of 
religious leaders (South Consulting 2010b, 37).  
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Whilst there was engagement with the grassroots there was no real grassroots representation, at least not 
as part of the KNDR. The members of the CCP especially undertook such engagement with the 
grassroots. Innovative actions included prayers for peace as well as the text message send around the 
country urging people to stop all forms of violence (e.g. K46; K48). In addition, the Open Forum, held 
in Nairobi, from which a Citizens Agenda for Peace was developed, was another instance of citizen 
engagement. The Agenda was then presented to the mediators. The idea behind the Open Forum was 
that anyone who wanted to could attend and exchange thoughts, calling the event an ‘idea harvesting 
session’ (Concerned Citizens for Peace 2008, 2). Similar forums were also set up including the Nairobi 
Peace Forum, District Peace Forums and Listening Forums (e.g. Ibrahim Abdi 2009; Wachira, 
Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11). Further grassroots initiatives included ensuring decent burial and 
mourning ceremonies and making a flower memorial in Uhuru Park (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 
2010, 44–45). All this was done with plenty of media coverage and in order to keep up the momentum 
for peace. With the exception of the Open Forum however, these activities speaks much more of 
engaging with the grassroots rather than representing them. 
 
More concretely perhaps, localised activism with links to the grassroots did exist. These localised forms 
of CSAs were however not involved in the KNDR and contribute to peacebuilding activities only in 
their specific areas (e.g. Ibrahim Abdi and Wils 2008, 10–11; McGhie and Wamai 2011, 17; see also K4; 
K11; K22; K51; K54; Ngunyi 2008, 4; Odendaal 2010; Ringera 2014, 172). If anything, the CSAs in 
Nairobi were involved in the talks, with local organisations at best playing a role as monitors (K24).  As a 
result, “if they [the most affected people] were represented than they were represented by someone who 
didn’t even go to the people to get their opinion” explains a professor at Moi University in Eldoret when 
discussing the TJRC hearings (K35). The exclusion in the reform commissions and the lack of “healing 
and speaking opportunities at the grassroots” (K37) are rooted in similar findings about the civil society 
involvement during the peace talks. The fact that CSAs did not interact with the grassroots “punctures 
their [own] legitimacy” (K46).  
 
Whilst many of the national bodies have community based networks and ways to reach the victims of 
human rights abuses and conflict (K55), the CSAs involved in the mediation process, along with Kenyan 
civil society more generally, are widely perceived as urban-based elite actors: “the KPTJ and CCP were 
both urban-based elitists, who had no time to talk to the grassroots” (K48; see also K1; K32; K24; K46; 
Ringera 2014, 172). At the most extreme, according to the human rights advocate Reverend Timothy 
Njoya, Kenyan CSAs played an essentially ‘palliative and restorative role for … [the] … middle and 
upper groups, and an “informant” role for the region’, which meant they acted as a proxy to the state, 
pre-empted a political uprising and thus did the lower income groups a fundamental disservice (Wanyeki 
2010, 13). Whilst this is a rather radical interpretation, it does indicate a class gap amongst the civil 
society actors and the population.  
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As a result, it is not surprising that there is a feeling that local people were left out and not represented. 
Whilst some interviewees noted that the negotiation teams had representatives from the Rift Valley 
(K24; K25; K33) a more general view was that local people had been left out of the talks and as a result 
not represented.133 In fact, a few persons were specifically mentioned as ones that should have been 
invited, including (local) religious leaders, who “knew the problems they were facing. They were not just 
in Nairobi, sitting comfortably” (KET; see also KNM; KEY). This suggests, due also to a lack of 
grassroots representation, there was at least a reduction in the perception of feeling represented to the 
detriment of the legitimisation process. Therefore, to a large degree inversely, the component of feeling 
represented is confirmed as constituting a part of the legitimisation process. More than being 
representative, the CSAs were recognised as guarantors of legitimacy because of the acknowledgement 
of their importance. This is discussed next.  
 
5.3.1.2 The Acknowledgement of Importance 
 
The feature of subjective representation in the heuristic model is also made up of descriptive 
representation, as was argued at the outset. Nevertheless, there was also no concrete descriptive 
representation in the Kenyan case, if anything there was an acknowledgement of the importance of the 
groups, not least because of their expertise, which meant they became recognised guarantors of 
legitimacy, as a component of the legitimisation process. 
 
Compared to other peace processes, the participation of women was actually quite high, even at the 
formal negotiation table; nevertheless there is little evidence of descriptive representation. As Meredith 
McGhie and Njoki Wamai who have studied the participation of women in the KNDR, are quick to 
point out: Participation does not always translate into actual women’s agenda. Moreover, they 
differentiate between civil society representation and the representation of women within political or 
armed groups (2011, 7). Amongst civil society actors, the two broad groups also used descriptive 
representative qualities in different ways. For the CCP, the issue of women’s representation was 
discussed in terms of women being the first victims of the violence and the main guarantors of peace 
(Connan 2008, 333; see also Ringera 2014, 186). Women deposited flowers at the feet of armed 
policeman in Uhuru Park for example and similarly Machel was praised for her ‘feminine stamina and 
sharpness’ and called the ‘Mother of the Continent’ (Mburu 2008; Khadiagala 2008, 10; see also Baldauf 
2008a).  
 
For the KPTJ movement, the issue of womanhood was politicised in a different way by for example 
speaking out against harassment of female refugees in Naivasha, about which the police was doing little 
to stop (Connan 2008, 333–334). As such, the different groups used descriptive legitimation narratives 
                                                        
133 K1; K2; K20; K24; K36; K37; K46; KNT; KNY; KNM 
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but show no evidence for resulting in feeling represented or particularly evident symbolic attachment, 
resulting the actors being recognised as guarantors of legitimacy like in Liberia (see also Ringera 2014, 
176).  
 
The only exception comes from the approval of Graça Machel. She was pivotal in efforts that were 
made to try to come to a broader agenda in some of the groups, including at the Bi-Partisan Women’s 
Consultative Group, where she suggested a ‘spitting session’. During the inaugural meeting of the group, 
it was difficult to reach a consensus on the most important issues across ethical and political splits. On 
the advice of Graça Machel the group narrated all the issues that they were dividing them (that made 
them want to ‘spit’ at each other) and were then able to come up with a common list of grievances 
(McGhie and Wamai 2011, 19). Machel was recognised by two of the focus groups of market women as 
being one of those who had addressed their grievances with utmost seriousness, see Table 5.2 above 
(KNM; KEM). This indicates Machel as a recognised guarantor of legitimacy, as a component of the 
legitimisation process. This will be further interpreted in the next section on the self-referential 
legitimation narratives of the AU Panel. 
 
On another point, writing on the involvement of women in the negotiations process McGhie and 
Wamai propose that women representation in negotiations like Kenya is of importance, but on its own 
does not suffice. Rather, expertise and specific qualifications to address on gender issues in this instance 
is required (2011, 18). The relevance of expertise on gender issues points to a larger point: Expertise can 
be interpreted as an acknowledgement of importance, showing that whilst the CSAs may not have been 
interpreted as especially representative, they were important to the negotiations and therefore (at least in 
part) recognised guarantors of legitimacy. In other words, because CSAs were able to ensure the civilian 
counterbalance, partly because of their expertise (as discussed in Section 5.2.2 above), they guarantee the 
legitimacy of the process. This makes the distinction between feeling represented and recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy as two separate parts of the legitimisation process much clearer.  
 
The CSAs are considered to have made an impact, and an important one at that (Wanyeki 2010). Some 
of those involved in the civil society organisations were additionally seen as highly important and 
legitimate on their own accord, like Maina Kiai, head of the KNHRC at the time, and member of the 
KPTJ (Connan 2008, 326).134 In one of the first surveys from South Consulting, 58% of the public 
perceived non-state actors as likely to impact healing and reconciliation efforts (2009a, 18; see also 
Kahora 2008a, 158). Thus, argues a commissioner for the National Cohesion and Integration 
Commission “the civil society involvement did improve the legitimacy [of the KNDR], it built 
                                                        
134  The issue also brings up the balance between emotional reactions and the question of legitimation. One 
interviewee notes that Maina went to visit a Church in Eldoret during the violence. Here he was booed by the 
predominantly Kikuyu audience because he had by then openly spoken out “against Kibaki”. This argues the 
interlocutor, does not mean Maina was not legitimate but rather speaks for an emotional reaction (K49). It also 
reiterates the politicised nature of the Kenyan process. 
165 
 
confidence around it, really lobbied Kenyans” (K53). This confession at the very least acknowledges the 
importance of the CSAs. 
 
Beyond this, another founder of the KPTJ argues that whilst the members did perhaps not truly reflect 
the grassroots, the mere range of persons made the group quite “representative and participatory” (K49). 
However, only one of the focus groups lists civil society actors as having addressed their grievances at all 
(KNY). This would suggest that they are not acknowledged at all or are significant guarantors of 
legitimacy, but this a tricky argument to make, considering they never played a direct role at the KNDR. 
Thus, this aspect of the data becomes much more difficult to interpret, which is a context factor and is 
discussed further below. A much stronger recognised guarantor of legitimacy was Kofi Annan and the 
AU Panel, which will be discussed first.  
 
5.3.1.3 The Self-Referential Legitimation Narrative of the AU Panel 
 
In contrast to the Liberian case, no strong self-referential legitimation narratives can be found amongst 
the CSAs. One overwhelming message that came across nonetheless - confirming the component of 
recognised guarantors of as part of the legitimisation process - was the recognised self-referential 
legitimation narrative of Kofi Annan, his team and ‘an African solution for an African problem’ more 
generally. This self-referential legitimation is both a legitimation strategy (e.g. Barker 2001), as well as a 
perception of the legitimation. In other words, this legitimation strategy results in a perception of 
legitimacy and a symbolic attachment and therefore constitutes a part of the legitimisation process 
through the component of recognised guarantors of legitimacy. This is shown in the following. 
 
The leadership under the African Union is said to have ‘deepened the legitimacy of the entire mediation 
process’ (Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 8). The KNDR talks were fêted as a success of an African-led 
mediation of African unity as a trump to national exceptionalism (Baldauf 2008a; Jepson et al. 2014, 236; 
Khadiagala 2008, 10). Symbolically, this meant a reliance on the notion of ‘African solutions’ for ‘African 
problems’. Thus, it was the local and Kenyan Red Cross chapter that led the coordination of 
humanitarian relief and not the UN or an international relief agency (Wanyeki 2010, 3–4). Moreover, the 
AU Panel itself evoked an imaginary of African elders - the final negotiation round prior to the peace 
agreement involved ‘five elders for five hours ... all that was missing was the village tree’ (R. Cohen 
2008). At one point Graça Machel tells the negotiation room that her husband, Nelson Mandela, sends 
his wishes and ‘sought to remind them that all of Africa was watching the process’ (R. Cohen 2008; 
Odinga also remembers this in his autobiography; see Odinga and Elderkin 2013, 882). Kufuor initially 
proposed the AU Panel and its members to ‘assist the Kenyan brothers and sisters’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 
21) and Annan himself thought that the Kenyan parties would be more likely to invest in the process if 
the intervention came from a fellow African state rather than the US or UK (R. Cohen 2008; see also 
Jepson et al. 2014, 235–236; Annan and Griffiths 2009, 2; Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 189). In 
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summary, ‘the mandate was African, the panellists were African, and the style of the negotiation … was 
as African as a village council’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 236). Annan personified the mediations within the 
symbolic framing under African unity. One recollection underscores this, in a rather dramatic evocation 
of the talks:  
 
‘On one night, as the two teams strain to hear the soft-spoken Annan explain a point, a group 
of elephants leave the watering hole and creep up close to the lodge, as if they want to listen, 
too’ (Baldauf 2008c; see also Jepson et al. 2014, 243). 
 
Kofi Annan made some very clear indications of his own role in the process as particularly unique. In 
the foreword to a recent book on the KNDR, he states: ‘My deep engagement with this country turned 
into a labour of love - love for the Kenyan people and a fervent desire to see them achieve an enduring 
peace and prosperity’ (Kofi Annan in Jepson et al. 2014, xiii). Annan argues he was there to look for a 
solution, but a legitimate one where the grassroots would be involved through CSAs. He reiterates this 
point on numerous occasions, wanting to keep the process as transparent as possible through engaging 
the media as well as many different civil society actors (e.g. Annan and Griffiths 2009, 2; Connan 2008, 
330; Jepson et al. 2014, 232).  
 
Additionally, Annan personally links himself as a legitimate actor for the general population - a man 
acting for the benefit of ‘the people’. On leaving Geneva making his way to Nairobi, he explains 
‘protecting Kenya and keeping Kenya together was foremost on my mind - the people are dying’ (emphasis 
added here and throughout the following paragraph; Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18). Further, he opens 
the negotiations by stating that the AU Panel ‘had come to serve Kenya, not just its masters’ and wanted 
to ‘make it [the process] accountable to those who are most affected by the conflict’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 
233). During the talks, Annan publically calls on the parties to conclude an agreement ‘in the interest of 
Kenya and its people’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 39) and starts each negotiation session with a prayer, including 
on one occasion, ‘Lord, may you make the parties … see that they have an obligation to find, in the 
interest of all people of Kenya, this one accord’ (R. Cohen 2008; Jepson et al. 2014, 40). When pressuring 
on particular points, with the negotiation actors complaining ‘you are pushing us, we are breathless’, 
Annan retorts ‘I’m pushing you because people are dying’ (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 14). These self-
appointed efforts of incorporating the grassroots perspective and grievances last throughout. He urges 
Kibaki to set up a compensation fund for victims (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 10) and after the power-
sharing agreement had been signed, Annan recalls, he did not feel triumphant: ‘It had taken far too long. 
As they say in a Swahili proverb, “When the elephants fight it is the grass that suffers.” This is what had 
happened with all the people killed around us’ (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 201).  
 
Further, Annan staged symbolic events, most notably the initial handshake between the two principals 
Kibaki and Odinga after he first arrived (K22; see also Annan and Griffiths 2009, 4; Jepson et al. 2014, 
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233). This, he argued, was necessary to ‘send a message to the people’ and ‘to quell the desperate 
atmosphere’ (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 4; Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 192; Jepson et al. 2014, 25). 
Using positive language encouraged the conflict parties as well as helping to maintain public confidence 
(Jepson et al. 2014, 240). Adding to his own mythology, Annan called himself a ‘prisoner of peace’ 
during this time of negotiations, to symbolise how committed he was to staying in Kenya - despite his 
busy schedule - until a solution had been found (e.g. Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18; R. Cohen 2008; 
Khadiagala 2008, 10). The Chair was however careful to note that the ultimate responsibility was 
nevertheless with the political leaders in question since ‘no outsider can want peace more than the 
Kenyans’ (Baldauf 2008c; the Panel also urged the government to cover the cost of the negotiation as a 
sign for Kenyan responsibility; see Jepson et al. 2014, 33). Nevertheless, Annan was celebrated as the 
‘saviour of the nation’ (Khadiagala 2008, 25). He motivated his role as the ‘prisoner of peace’ by wanting 
to enact the responsibility to protect, R2P, in order to deepen a legacy he had first started working on 
when UN Secretary General (R. Cohen 2008; Jepson et al. 2014, 235–236). Deeply hurt by what had 
happened during the Rwandan genocide over a decade earlier, he was using this occasion to make amend 
and to show that through R2P things could be different (R. Cohen 2008).  
 
As in the Liberian case, the self-referential legitimation narrative becomes a sign for a recognised 
guarantor of legitimacy as a component constituting a part of the legitimisation process, when there is 
such widespread recognition. Annan goes to some length to publicise his position of legitimacy, showing 
his own legitimation strategy. More than that however, this self-referential legitimation is widely 
perceived as such. In his autobiography, Annan recalls and quotes at length from an open letter 
published in a newspaper in early February 2008, which had moved him deeply. The letter writer states: 
 
‘I … feel like a little girl again, begging daddy not to leave her alone in the dark, because a 
monster will eat her. Annan, you have seen the monster in this country ravage its own … you 
are the political-cum-peace mentor Kenyans never had. We endorsed your team long ago … 
you and gracious Graça … have struck a chord with Kenyans. You feel the suffering of the 
ordinary people’ (Mburu 2008; see also Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013). 
 
A number of observers back up this confession by stating for example ‘Annan announced [on 14th 
February] that he was prepared to stay as long as it took ... to the people of Kenya for whom he had 
come to epitomize hope, this was a message that he was as invested in the future of Kenya as they were’ 
(emphasis added, Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009, 17; see also Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18; R. Cohen 
2008). This was also repeated in interviews. “Kofi Annan was an acceptable personality to Africa, the 
international community and human rights activists” (K47), or, “when Kofi Annan came things were 
ok” (K38; see also K24). Out of six focus groups, five mention Kofi Annan specifically as someone who 
had addressed their grievances during the negotiations, see Table 5.2. Moreover, four of these groups 
further specified who out of all the actors that had addressed the grievances particularly had their 
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concerns and grievances in mind: All of them mentioned Annan, either exclusively (KNY; KET) or in 
combination with other members of the AU Panel (KNM; KEM). In addition, the one group that not 
had listed Annan specifically still noted the international mediators were those that had addressed their 
issues in contrast to their national politicians (KEY). One of the focus group participants amongst the 
market women in Eldoret elaborates: “If Kofi Annan never came, then peace could not have been 
achieved. His team was enough to solve these problems” (KEM; see also KEY). When South 
Consulting conducted a survey in 2010, 81% of respondents from the most affected areas of violence 
were satisfied with the performance of the ‘Kofi Annan Team’ (South Consulting 2010b, 37). 
 
Annan was also widely praised by the international community, which further strengthened his symbolic 
position. Analysts suggest for example that Annan’s very presence was one of the reasons that violence 
quickly reduced in February (R. Cohen 2008). In addition, his ‘extraordinary skill and dedication’, 
‘continental credibility’, ‘personal charisma’ and ‘moral authority’ was widely praised and was the subject 
of much inquiry as an example of a successful mediation process (see for example Horowitz 2008, 8; 
Jepson et al. 2014, 233; 237; Khadiagala 2008, 10). In a published interview with Annan’s co-worker at 
the Humanitarian Dialogue, his interviewer Martin Griffith finishes the interview by gushing ‘ … [your] 
intuitive appreciation and insight … [and] methodical planning … was extraordinarily productive, 
magical, so congratulations’ (Annan and Griffiths 2009, 18–19).  
 
The accolades were not exclusively for Kofi Annan but also for the entire AU Panel. Their role is 
thought to have been an invaluable one (Baldauf 2008b; R. Cohen 2008; Kanyinga and Walker 2013, 8). 
The other panellists strengthened Annan’s position: Graça Machel and Benjamin Mkapa (Baldauf 
2008a). Machel, as mentioned above, was praised in particular for her connection to women and 
‘feminine stamina’ and Mkapa for his regional expertise and familiarity with the principals and his charm 
and ease in communication (e.g. Khadiagala 2008, 10; KNM; KEM). Mkapa for example helped to 
translate important messages into Kiswahili at press conferences, which meant a larger proportion of the 
population could be reached (Jepson et al. 2014, 29; 243). In addition, Machel had extensive knowledge 
of the Kenyan situation due to her previous work as part of the African Peer Review Mechanism. More 
symbolically, Machel was seen as ‘the voice of passion and conscience’ with a ‘history of ... activism for 
the excluded (Jepson et al. 2014, 243; see also Baldauf 2008a; Mburu 2008). Machel stated that Kenya 
‘was divided and bleeding and that it was essential to bring the nation together in a place where all 
citizens had a sense of belonging’ (see also Baldauf 2008a, 37). In fact, the entire Panel had a clear 
message that they were mediating a negotiation for the benefit of an entire country, not just the political 
class (Jepson et al. 2014, 31).  
 
This was exemplified by a visit to some of the affected communities in the Rift Valley in order to see the 
scale of violence and destruction themselves. Machel hugged and cried with one of the women who had 
shared her story with her (Baldauf 2008a; see also Jepson et al. 2014, 25). Echoing the self-referential 
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legitimation narrative in Liberia, Machel was named ‘the Mother of the Continent’ in the previously cited 
open letter to a newspaper praising the AU Panel (Mburu 2008; see also Baldauf 2008a). There is, in 
summary, strong evidence to support the idea that the AU Panel itself evoked strong emotions of 
symbolic attachment, thus ensuring their place as recognised guarantors of legitimacy, itself a component 
in the legitimisation process. The symbolic attachment beyond merely feeling represented is illustrated 
by the images used to narrate his presence as ‘the prisoner of peace’ or ‘saviour of the nation’. Moreover, 
interviewees stating things such as “when Kofi Annan came things were ok” (K38) and the focus groups 
testimonies: “If Kofi Annan never came, then peace could not have been achieved” (KEM; see also 
KEY) also reiterates the symbolic attachment given to Annan and the Panel as recognised guarantors of 
legitimacy. According to this interpretation, the very presence of the Panel itself fundamentally shifted 
the possibility of finding a peaceful solution to end the post-election violence and come to a political 
power-sharing agreement.   
 
Lastly, even though no causal analysis is carried out for the feature of subjective representation, the 
temporal context of the constitutive analysis also expands from before the talks to afterwards. On the 
one end, Kofi Annan was perceived to be legitimate because of his standing as a humanitarian not least 
because of his former role as UN General Secretary. Graça Machel had a long-standing involvement in 
Kenya, not least due to her role as part of the Peer Review Mechanism. These prior experiences and 
roles all made an impact on the later symbolic attachment as guarantors of legitimacy, showing an ex-
ante temporal boundary of the legitimisation process. On the other end, all the documentation on the 
process afterwards, enhanced the self-referential legitimisation narrative of Kofi Annan and the AU 
Panel, confirming that an ex-poste legitimisation through the recognised guarantors of legitimacy is also 
constructed after the talks have come to an end. 
 
5.3.2 Context Factors 
 
The fact that there was weaker feeling of (being) represented than in Liberia can be related to a number 
of factors. As mentioned above, the CSAs did of course not play a direct role at the negotiations, which 
means they are less likely to contribute to the legitimisation of the process due to being particularly 
representative. Nonetheless, the CSAs did have significant influence in addressing some of the collective 
concerns as was shown previously, which is why to a degree they were accepted as guarantors of 
legitimacy due to their expertise. The historical context of CSAs and their practical problems of engaging 
with the grassroots however stands in the way of their overall representativeness. Moreover, the overall 
political context of elections and the infrastructures of Kenya affect the constitutive components of the 
legitimisation process. 
 
The history of the emergence of civil society suggests that many of the actors and organisations have 
acted as part of a political opposition. Civil society was most prominently able to mobilise a large 
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opposition to Moi in the 1990s. Since the decimation of the opposition in more recent years, their 
mobilisation capacity has become minimised (K55). The role taken on by civil society in these years of 
change and democratisation have been instrumental in constructing their own image. As constitutional 
were advanced and debated from 2002 onwards especially, the stances taken by civil society became 
politicised. For example, the ‘human rights movement is constantly re-interpreting its own legitimacy … 
problems of legitimacy may be traced to the public’s perception of the role of the movement played 
during the highly polarizing constitutional referendum in 2005’ (Wanyeki 2008, 8). 
 
Moreover, the success of civil society organisations in Kenya has always been related to external causes 
rather than its reflection of grassroots sentiments (Ndegwa 1996, 52). Consequently, there is a practical 
problem of properly engaging with the grassroots in the quick escalation of events. The CCP had some 
success with their Open Forum, but this too, was only in Nairobi. When asking one of the founding 
members of the KPTJ about the legitimacy of the members of the group he notes “there is no time to 
vet people when the country is going into anarchy” (K49; see also K46). Remarking on the difficulty of 
engaging with the grassroots without specific frameworks in place and the nature of the CSAs as 
oppositional-political entities, one CSA concludes; “civil society is not legitimate for legitimate reasons” 
(K46). In addition, whether the CSAs even need to engage with the grassroots can also be questioned.  
‘The bulk of Kenyan civil society spoke about, at, to, with those contesting for the state - and, in that 
sense, appealed to the state rather than to the people’ (Wanyeki 2010, 13). The population was after all 
considered to be the proxy, and not the cause of the violence. The argument for the legitimisation of a 
negotiation process does not necessitate the involvement of grassroots or the population because they 
are a cause of violence however. Inclusion arguments are made on other claims, namely that the violence 
still affects them. Yet the structural environment does play in a role in the sense of presenting alternative 
legitimate authorities through elected officials.  
 
The elections in 2007 saw a turnout of 69% - the highest there had been in Kenyan elections to date 
(though this is also where manipulation is likely to have taken place, see e.g. Cheeseman 2008, 177; 
Throup 2008, 296). As such, the conflict and the solution were sometimes perceived as a political one 
(K7; K39; K47; FNY). Furthermore, because of the “electric linkage” between national leaders and local 
level violence, the signing of the power sharing agreement had a positive effect all over the country 
(K53; see also K13; K42). Politicians were by far the most frequently mentioned locally powerful actors 
(and often surprisingly positive for local peace like William Ruto, see KEM; KET; the youth found him 
to be disputed - KEY). At least in part, political parties and actors can be seen as legitimate 
representatives at the talks because of their elected nature. Nevertheless, considering the disputed nature 
of the election outcome, the degree of this cannot be fully ascertained. In addition, at the talks they 
represented their own concerns for personal gains rather than a civilian counterbalance and therefore 
their representation does not significantly contribute to the legitimisation process. 
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Moreover, the question of political empowerment is also linked to that of the grassroots representation. 
The urban-rural divides will have an effect on how politics and a right to be involved are perceived. In 
Kenya, many destitute communities will undoubtedly be out of touch and far from political decision-
making processes including the legitimisation of the peace talks. There is still a lack of civic education 
(K19; K29; K31). In a workshop held in 2010 dedicated to reflecting on KNDR, a group of 35 civil 
society and political women realised that even they were not fully aware of the legal frameworks which 
could have supported their demands for inclusion in the process (Ringera 2014, 189). Yet, local 
processes of peacebuilding and political involvement do occur. Moreover, the Kenyan situation - 
including substantial development, economic growth and literacy - can simply not be compared to the 
Liberian case. Simply considering all the surveys undertaken by South Consulting shows the high(er) 
levels of political involvement and empowerment. One major difference is the media which is numerous 
and widely available in Kenya. This plays into the last feature - transparent communication - and is 
therefore discussed in the next section. 
 
5.4 Transparent Communication 
 
The Serena Hotel changed the name of one of the principal meeting rooms where the negotiations had 
taken place to ‘Amani Room’ (amani meaning peace in Kiswahili). A plaque at the entrance of the Amani 
Room now remembers the significance of the mediation (Baldauf 2008d; Jepson et al. 2014, 34). Whilst 
not everyone is likely to have the opportunity to pass by this room, it indicates an openness and 
transparency of the negotiations. Every Kenyan at least theoretically has the chance to know this is the 
place where the proceedings took place.  
 
This symbolic gesture holds meaning regarding the third feature of the heuristic model - transparent 
communication. This feature was abductively shown to be relevant in the last chapter on the Liberian 
peace negotiations. Because of the infrastructure in place in the Kenyan setting, there was a completely 
different environment for transparent communication to unfold. This allows for a more precise tracing 
of the constitutive components related to this feature as well as the causal conditions that enabled them. 
The comprehensive process-tracing encompasses is carried out in three steps. Firstly, an interpretive 
overview of transparent communication confirms that ensuring implementation constitutes a 
component of the legitimisation process. Instead of feeling included however, which was suggested to 
be a constitutive component in the previous case study, this is amended to feeling involved. This is 
shown by what I call ‘participative communication’. Secondly, the causal conditions that enabled these 
constitutive components are then traced, looking for the ways of communication. Thirdly, the context 
factors that play a role in the comprehensive process-tracing of transparent communication are 
discussed. 
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5.4.1 Constitutive Process-Tracing: Ensuring Implementation and Feeling Involved 
 
The extensive distribution of information in the Kenyan case confirms that ensuring implementation is a 
component that constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. The distribution of information also 
suggests that to an extent there is a feeling of involvement rather than feeling included. This is further 
expanded upon, shown to be component constitutive of a part of the legitimisation process in a second 
section of what I call ‘participative communication.’ Participative communication is either one-sided or 
dualistic and further allows the population to involve themselves in the negotiations process, without - 
necessarily - the input of the CSAs themselves. This shows another way of participation beyond 
representation by the CSAs.  
 
5.4.1.1 The Distribution of Information 
 
The distribution of information was much more extensive in Kenya, as can be shown with the density of 
information widely available. There were also communication efforts amongst the different CSAs, more 
than between each other.  
 
Position statements, manifestos and ads in newspaper made the goals and demands from the CSAs at 
this time very clear. This was aimed not only at the conflict parties, the mediators and to a lesser degree 
other CSAs, see below, but also the population itself. As a result, the CSAs and the media are said to 
have brought information to the grassroots (K42). For the most part, the information distribution 
concerned the messages of peace from CCP or the details of the election fraud or violence from the 
KPTJ. Other messages of information were more general. For example a series of ads running on two 
full newspaper pages, signed by an anonymous group called Kenyans for Peace and Progress explained 
the worthlessness of violence and published an inventory of the privileges of MPs including their salaries 
and bonuses. In conclusion, they urged: ‘Say no to unlawful political activities that will not feed, clothe, 
or educate your family.’ The announcement meant that ‘Kenyans were referred to their disillusions, their 
own misery and the powerlessness of political mobilisations in the resolving of daily challenges’ (Connan 
2008, 330–331). On top of these efforts from CSAs, detailed reporting of the progress of the KNDR 
was widely available in the newspapers and television programmes throughout the process. 
 
As a result, knowledge on the peace process, conflict resolution tools and details of historical injustices is 
rather abundant (e.g. K11). This is especially evident in the level of detail given on the peace talks in the 
focus groups. Referring back to Table 5.2, this shows a detailed list of those thought to have been 
present at the negotiations, according to the focus group participants. This is especially notable in 
comparison to the focus groups in Liberia where the same questions resulted in ‘the UN’ or 
‘international community’ instead of the detailed list of names and political affiliation (e.g. KET). 
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Intricate information is available on the mediation process, to the outright bizarre such as the presence 
of a herd of elephants who crept close to the mediation room when Kofi Annan spoke, in addition to 
many other facts and impressions detailed in articles and books on the topic (Baldauf 2008c; see also 
Jepson et al. 2014; Lindenmayer and Kaye 2009; Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010). Compared to 
Liberia case especially, very few of the interlocutors complained about the lack of knowledge of the 
proceedings (exceptions include K42; K53 and tend to focus more on a lack of civic education generally, 
e.g. K19; K24; K29; K31; K49).  
 
Due to the transparent media infrastructure, the civil society groups also had less need to communicate 
with each other. In any case, due to different and sometimes contradictory goals and ambitions of the 
major players, communication between the groups was limited to for example the KPTJ acknowledging 
the peace efforts of the church, or the Citizen’s Agenda from the CCP referencing ‘deep-rooted’ issues 
of truth and justice (Concerned Citizens for Peace 2008, 4; Connan 2008, 328).  However, information 
on the meetings, goals and aims was easier to receive not only for the population but also the different 
civil society groups. Hence, there was less of a need to directly communicate with each other. For 
example the Kenyan Human Rights Institute put together a half-day forum on the 1st February for 
‘human rights and governance specialists to reflect on the response of civil society groups to the crisis’ 
(2008, 2). The summary of the meetings is publically available on the Internet. Their collections of 
critique are therefore plausibly useful for other CSAs. 
 
The distribution of information meant that implementation becomes easier, which is a component that 
constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. Ensuring implementation is especially important in the 
Kenyan setting for the legitimising process, not just regarding the interim political power-sharing 
government, but the many Agenda 4 mechanisms that promised to address a variety of grievances or 
concerns. This included not the least the extensive reports released by the two inquiry commissions as 
well as further comprehensive reports from human rights organisations on the crisis and the mediation 
process which followed (e.g. Jepson et al. 2014, 58; Kenya Human Rights Institute 2008, 5). These 
reports gave an overview of what had happened and confirmed the existence of collective concerns to 
be addressed.  
 
Moreover, the CSAs took on a watchdog role to ensure implementation for which it needed to know 
details on the status of the reforms (K42; KNY). This was possible because the AU Panel decided to 
commission a regular monitoring and evaluation of the implementation status of the four agendas but 
especially Agenda 4. South Consulting, headed by a Kenyan academic, took on this task on a quarterly 
basis for a total of fifteen reports up to and including February 2013. Detailing not only the progress of 
the inquiry commissions and the institutional and legal changes made to advance implementation, South 
Consulting also conducted regular surveys to gauge public opinion on these events. These reports were 
therefore not only useful for information purposes (and findings could be discussed and reprinted in the 
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media) but also served as a tool for the CSAs to determine where they could focus their attention in the 
implementation process (Wanyeki 2010).  
 
This distribution of information was further promoted in the implementation period by annual 
conference conducted by the Kofi Annan Foundation, three times after the mediation had taken place 
between 2009-2011, which invited media stakeholders as well as all the CSAs. A website was dedicated 
to the process (http://www.dialoguekenya.org/) and guests at the conference were invited to use 
Twitter and other social media sites to report from the event. Moreover, a coordination office, the CLO, 
was set up to organise and monitor the implementation process. This CLO organised the conferences, 
the website, oversaw the monitoring reports from South Consulting and held numerous meetings with 
CSAs in order to discuss their coordination efforts in order to fully support implementation (Jepson et 
al. 2014, 57).  
 
This very transparent process ensured that the pressure on the conflict parties to implement the 
different Agendas and was kept up in the period after the agreement had been signed. The importance 
given to the implementation confirms this as a component constitutive of the legitimisation process. So 
much emphasis was put on the implementation phase it cannot be neatly separated from the negotiation 
process, at least not regarding the legitimisation process. This is shown also at least in part, to the 
detrimental nature the lack of implementation has on the legitimisation of the peace process as discussed 
under collective concerns previously.  
 
More than this, the distribution of information also provides for a feeling of involvement rather than 
inclusion as suggested by the previous Liberian case study. In that case, it was shown that a lack of 
information leads to a sense of exclusion. As a result, it was supposed that the distribution of 
information, when widely carried out, results in a feeling of inclusion. The Kenyan case illustrates 
however that the distribution of information if anything results in strengthening public confidence, 
which adds to a feeling of involvement rather than inclusion. Through the distribution of information, 
the public was incorporated into the pressure for a political solution and ensured the generation of 
‘domestic legitimacy’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 31). Wanyeki sums up the activities of the CSAs as 
“strengthening popular public appetite” (K55). The distribution of information ensured the 
strengthening of popular support for the process and as a result in the process. The more the process was 
popularised and strengthened, the more the process becomes legitimised because people feel involved. It 
cannot be argued that there was a feeling of inclusion, as the confessions that the process was “limited in 
terms of participation” (K46), or “at the time … everybody had to be given a voice. There ought to have 
been a popular consultation where everybody had a chance to talk” (K48) show. This call for 
consultation, which mirrors similar confessions in Liberia, further suggests that a widespread feeling of 
inclusion was absent. This revised component of feeling involved is discussed in more detail in the next 
section on participative communication. 
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5.4.1.2 Participative Communication 
 
Wanyeki stresses that CSAs ensure “legitimacy through participation” (K55). As was argued previously, 
subjective representation on its own, even in addition to the collective concerns, does not fully suffice to 
result in a sense of participation. This is why the feature of transparent communication was added. 
Based on the Liberian case study it was proposed that because the lack of information led to a sense of 
exclusion, the distribution of information would in turn lead to a sense of feeling of inclusion. The 
discussion of distribution of information from the Kenyan case, in the preceding section, shows 
nevertheless that more than anything there may be an enhanced sense of public confidence in the 
process, rather than inclusion. As a result, this leads to a sense of involvement rather than inclusion, as a 
component constituting to the legitimisation process. This is confirmed by what I label participative 
communication, traced in this section. In other words, participative communication, which can be either 
dualistic or one-sided, supports an interaction between the process and the population through forms of 
communication, partially including CSAs, which leads to a feeling of involvement, constituting a part of 
the legitimisation process. 
 
Dualistic participative communication is illustrated by the communicative engagement with the public at 
the behest of CSAs, which contributes to circular information flows. The best example comes from the 
Open Forum conducted by the CCP. From this Open Forum, the Citizens Agenda for Peace was 
developed which was then presented to the mediators. The idea behind the Open Forum was that 
anyone who wanted to could attend and exchange thoughts, also called an ‘idea harvesting session’ 
(Concerned Citizens for Peace 2008, 2). Similar forums were also set up including the Nairobi Peace 
Forum, District Peace Forums and Listening Forums (Ibrahim Abdi 2009; Wachira, Arendshorst, and 
Charles 2010, 11). The open invitation to all makes this a participatory process that further contributes 
to a circular information flow: Listening allows for information on collective concerns to be gathered. 
This information was then fed into the mediation process through the regular meetings between the 
CSAs and the mediators (see also “the Panel used what it heard;” Jepson et al. 2014, 238). In turn, 
information on the mediation was then redistributed to the public through the media - both by the CSAs 
and the AU Panel members, thus creating dualistic participative communication, see Figure 5.3 below. 
 
This dualistic participative communication opens up the discourse in the peace negotiations to anyone in 
the public who wants to participate, at least theoretically. The event was described as asking ‘anyone 
interested in saving Kenya to come’ (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11), suggesting that 
through attending a role is played in helping to save Kenya, and thus contributes to a feeling of 
involvement. For Habermas too, what counts is the theoretical participation, rather than the actual 
participation. The dualistic participative communication constitutes a part of the legitimisation process 
by allowing for a feeling of involvement. ‘Public approval and advocacy gave these documents 
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legitimacy’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 45). This statement makes the link between ‘public approval’, best 
ensured by the communication flow as described above, and the legitimacy of the agreement itself, 
presumably because of a feeling of involvement. 
 
Figure 5.3 Circular Communication Flows for Dualistic Participative Communication 
 
General 
Population 
CSAs (& Media) AU Panel 
 
The feeling of involvement is further illustrated by one-sided participative communication, which gives a 
sense of involvement simply by airing the grievances and explaining one owns suffering, whether 
symbolically, artistically or otherwise.  
 
Like in Liberia participants in the focus groups in Kenya noted in a final reflection session that they felt 
they had benefited from participating in the discussions themselves as a “learning process“ and a 
documentation of their “grassroots experiences“ (e.g. KEN). This suggests that any forms of 
expressions or reflections on the negotiation process give a sense of being involved or heard - even if 
this is rather symbolically. The story of Graça Machel crying and hugging a woman who had told her of 
her experiences of violence was given as an example of showing the proximity of Machel to the 
population as well as being deemed an important event in itself (that the woman was able to express her 
grievance). The ‘spitting session’ organised by Machel at a meeting of women from both political divides 
also gave an opportunity for people to air their grievances; giving them the sense they were involved in 
contributing to the collection of mutual concerns or grievances. Similarly, in another instance, a meeting 
held by women groups two years after the negotiations was framed as follows:  
 
‘Every story needed to be heard. Everyone needed to share their experiences in order for 
healing to begin. Everyone listened, cried and empathised. In the end there was a feeling of 
release, possibility of forgiveness and the beginning of healing as people hugged and comforted 
each other’ (Ringera 2014, 190). 
 
This shows that the externalisation of grievances, worries and experiences adds to a feeling of 
involvement, which personally legitimises the negotiation process. On a more practical and formalised 
level such expression of grievances took place within the framework of local peacebuilding dialogue (for 
examples of Local Peace Dialogues see e.g. Korir 2009; K11; K22; K54). Expressing grief and grievances 
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as a form of participative communication re-introduces the shared experience or understanding, which 
was not a representative quality of the CSAs, as discussed previously as part of the feature of subjective 
representation.  
 
The feeling of involvement as a component that constitutes a part of the legitimisation process is also 
shown by one-sided participative communication carried out through artistic expression. Examples of 
this include a photo exhibition ‘Kenya Burning’ which had been organised by an Arts Centre together 
with the CCP. A request was made to have these photos to be shown in the Parliament so that 
politicians would have to look at them as well (see Kahora 2008a, 79). This made the photo exhibition 
into a political event, trying to reiterate the responsibility of some of the MPs in the post-election 
violence. Furthermore, under the umbrella of the group, which called itself ‘Concerned Kenyan Writers’ 
a physical and virtual forum was provided for citizens to come to grasp with what had happened 
(Kahora 2008a, 2008b; Wanyeki 2010, 5). Initial responses included interactions by authors – largely 
amongst the Kenyan middle class - through social media forums. In addition, a collection of fiction and 
non-fiction stories on the post-election violence was also printed in an annual Kenyan literary collection 
called Kwani?.   
 
These reflections on what had happened and why, were published in two edited volumes from 2008. 
The editor of these two Kwani? editions, explains ‘we are in this business to tell the individual’s story as a 
citizen in the space called Kenya, his or her relationship to serikali or state or whatchamacallit … rather 
than to build one-characteristical narratives from sound-bites of Big Men’ (Kahora 2008a, 9). This 
confession underlines the commitment to telling another story beyond that of the politicians, one about 
and involving citizens. The two volumes collect stories, reports, interviews, poems, drawings and photos, 
seeking out to record and analyse stories from all sides of the conflict: ‘From people who threw stones, 
and people who had stones thrown at them; from farmers and nurses and hustlers, Luos and Kikuyus 
and Kalenjin … whatever name they went by, we wanted Kenyans to speak for themselves’ (emphasis added. 
Arno Kopecky in Kahora 2008b, 48). As can be seen in Image 5.1 below, pages in the volume document 
for example text messages send at the time of the post-election violence superimposed onto photos. In a 
very different way, these efforts express a civilian counterbalance to the otherwise politicised process, by 
allowing for the experiences or sufferings experienced to be vocalised. This contributes to a sense of 
feeling involved. 
 
With the aim of not forgetting what had happened in the short period of violence and reflecting on the 
bigger issues at stakes: ‘As writers…we have to look at what happened in the full-face. If there is any 
single reason this all happened, it is because we have refused to see, hear or listen’ (Binyavanga Wainaina 
in Kahora 2008b, 17). Such documentation and expression helped to come to terms with what had 
happened (the violence) but also with the negotiation process and therefore constitutes a part of the 
legitimisation through feeling involved. Other forms of communication used social media networks 
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including blogs, text messages and other forms of social media. Kenyans approached ‘social media as a 
way to get involved’ (Mäkinen and Kuira 2008, 329). The resulting sense of involvement constitutes a 
part of the legitimisation process.  
 
Figure 5.1: Artistic Expression of Grievances through copies of SMS and Photos in the Kwani? 
Collection (Kahora 2008b, 294–295) 
 
 
 
In conclusion, this one-sided type of participative communication enables the population to involve 
themselves in the process through expressing ideas, reflecting or more direct public engagement 
platforms. This gives a sense that the process goes beyond the immediate needs and claims to personal 
power of the major conflict parties and therefore constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. In the 
Liberian case, it was postulated that the distribution of information results in the legitimisation 
components of enforcing implementation and a feeling of inclusion. The Kenyan case study further 
accentuated this. Despite the more widespread distribution of information there was not a heightened 
sense of inclusion. If anything, the distribution of information provided for a sense of involvement. It 
was participative communication - which was not traced in the Liberian case - which enabled a feeling of 
involvement. The reasons why this revised component of the legitimisation process was possible is 
shown in the following section on the causal process-analysis.  
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5.4.2 Causal Process-Tracing: Ways of Communication 
 
The aim of the causal analysis as a part of the comprehensive process-tracing is to further an explanation 
of why the constitutive components are possible. In the previous causal process-tracing analyses, the 
focus was on the influence of the actors (as part of the heuristic feature of collective concerns) and here 
the analysis considers the way the actors communicated. The ways of communication are traced in two 
clusters, firstly by considering the causal conditions related to the distribution of information and 
secondly to the participative communication.  
 
The first cluster of causal conditions is therefore in relation to the distribution of information. This had 
a very clear impact in enabling the ensuring of the implementation as a component of the legitimisation 
process. The AU Panel, through the implementation reports by South Consulting they commissioned, 
the conferences they organised and the CLO they set up, most prominently ensured the implementation. 
In addition, the distribution of information also ensured the implementation because of public 
knowledge, which has been recognised by other literature on civil society involvement as was discussed 
in the introduction chapter. This is exemplified by this statement that can be interpreted as a comprehensive 
storyline: ‘Public approval and advocacy gave these documents legitimacy and put pressure on the political 
elites to implement them’ (Jepson et al. 2014, 45). Such public approval and knowledge is ensured by the 
circular communication flow, which was described previously. Because of this, the distribution of 
information in interactive configuration with circular communication flows enables the ensuring of 
implementation as a constitutive component. It is an interactive configuration because the distribution 
of information adds to the communication flow and vice versa. Therefore the distribution of 
information acting in causal conjunction with the communication flows helps to explain how ensuring 
the implementation was possible. Figure 5.4 illustrates this. It should also be noted that because the 
component of ensuring implementation can only happen after the peace negotiations have come to an 
end, the temporal boundary in this instance is clear and includes especially what happens afterwards. 
Spatially, the boundaries are also clearly beyond the negotiation space, in the public arena. 
 
Secondly, the distribution of information also enabled the feeling of involvement. After all, there was 
transparency around the negotiations because ‘people … had to own the process’ - as Annan explains 
(Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 193). This motivational confession is also reiterated by a Commissioner, 
from the later established National Cohesion and Integration Commission, who argues that “the civil 
society involvement did improve legitimacy, it built confidence around it [the KNDR], really lobbied 
Kenyans” (K53). As a result a causal pathway is shown between distribution of information and feeling 
involved, as illustrated in Figure 5.4 below. Because the distribution of information works in interactive 
configuration with the circular communication flows, as described above, the relationship to the feeling 
of involvement and enforcing implementation is a causal conjunction. 
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Figure 5.4: Causal Conditions and Constitutive Components of Transparent 
Communication
Causal Conditions                       Constitutive Components 
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The second cluster of causal conditions is on participative communication. Dualistic participative also 
enables the feeling of involvement. In interactive configuration with the circular communication flows, 
dualistic participation enables the feeling of involvement as a component constitutive of the 
legitimisation process, see Figure 5.4. As before since dualistic participation and the circular 
communication flow mutually constitute each other, they work in interactive configuration, and thus 
work together lead to a feeling of involvement in causal conjunction. The link to feeling involved is 
shown best by the confession regarding the Open Forum, described as asking ‘anyone interested in 
saving Kenya to come’ (Wachira, Arendshorst, and Charles 2010, 11). Because the circular 
communication flows relate back to the formal negotiation space, as was shown in the previous analysis 
above, the spatial boundaries are extended back to the negotiation space. 
 
Likewise, one-sided participative communication also enables a feeling of involvement because of a 
shared experience or understanding being voiced. The contribution of a shared experience, like woman 
who shares her experiences with Graça Machel, who hugs her and cries with her, reiterates the sense of 
involvement. This is because ‘every story needed to be heard, everyone needed to share their experiences 
for healing to being’ (Ringera 2014, 190). The need to share and express grievances and sentiments can 
be traced into a comprehensive storyline: Without this form of participative communication, the feeling of 
involvement becomes less feasible. One confession further substantiates this: “At the time … everybody 
had to be given a voice.” (K48). The relationship between one-sided participative communication and 
shared experience and understanding works in interactive configuration. This is because the shared 
experience or understanding is a product of the one-sided participative communication as well as 
enabling it. Overall, therefore instead of a causal pathway there is a causal conjunction between the two 
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conditions and feeling involved. As the voices expressed here often took place after the negotiations had 
ended, the temporal boundary beyond the signing of the agreement is confirmed.  
 
Lastly, there are two further causal effects, which are not directly related to the constitutive components 
of the features of transparent communication and therefore are not shown in Figure 5.4 above, but still 
merit mentioning. Firstly, because of the distribution of information there was pressure on the conflict 
parties. The public information campaign from the CSA groups (and the AU Panel) had the effect of 
making the hardliner position of the PNU unfeasible. Secondly, there was an impact in maintaining the 
pressure on the international actors. For example, information distribution changed the initially 
hysterical and uninformed global media coverage to a more nuanced position. Thus, the typical 
reduction to ‘ethnic violence’ became to be understood as political violence of an ethnic nature as a form 
of deliberate ethnicisation of politics in the Kenyan context (Wanyeki 2010, 5). As information added 
up, and international pressure grew in relation to a more comprehensive understanding, there was in 
turn more pressure on the conflict parties to participate in the process and to come to a political 
solution, as well as address some of the root causes of violence through Agenda 4. This pressure on the 
parties through information distribution was kept up after the agreement had been signed and also 
helped to ensure or put pressure on the implementation of the agendas. The effect of the distribution of 
information after the negotiations, ensured that attention remained from important stakeholders like the 
state, region and the rest of the international community, as a result of which there was further pressure 
of implementation (Jepson et al. 2014, 31, 45; Wanyeki 2010). Before giving an overview of the findings 
from the Kenyan case study, the context factors are briefly discussed as a further explanation of how the 
process was legitimised in relation to the feature of transparent communication. 
 
5.4.3 Context Factors 
 
Two factors contextualise (and explain) the feature for transparent communication: One related to the 
mediation teams’ support for transparent communication and the other to the media infrastructure in 
the country more generally. Kofi Annan committed himself to transparency, making sure that there was 
extensive media coverage and consultation with CSAs, because ‘not only did the people have the right to 
know what was going on, but they had to also own the mediation process if we were going to see the 
reform’ (Annan and Mousavizadeh 2013, 193; see also Annan and Griffiths 2009, 9). Mkapa, a former 
journalist himself, also encouraged media engagement and resulting transparency. By personally 
translating the press conferences from the AU Panel into Kiswahili a wider audience was reached 
(Jepson et al. 2014, 29). The importance that the AU Panel placed on transparency (also through 
disseminating important decisions and buying advertising space in newspapers) as well as the confession 
from Annan also further reiterates the link between transparent communication and legitimisation - 
through the constitutive component of feeling involved (see also Jepson et al. 2014, 28–29). 
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The media also played a particular role in the legitimisation process, with both negative and positive 
effects. Negative, because they reported faulty results at best and incited violence at worst (Ringera 2014, 
177). Positive because of the use of these communication networks to stay involved and participate 
(Mäkinen and Kuira 2008) but also because of the enhanced possibilities in the distribution of 
information of the mediation process and the violent conflict (K24; see also more generally Munyua 
2011).  The short-term nature of the conflict in Kenya meant that the state of the media infrastructure 
was much more robust, especially in comparison to Liberia. The willingness of the AU Panel to engage 
in transparency and the short-lived conflict and media infrastructure are sure to have affected the 
context of this feature. The media by themselves as well as by being used as a medium by the CSAs and 
the AU Panel distributed information on the accord and the implementation period. Considering the 
feature of transparent communication in the context of a stronger media served to indicate other 
constitutive components and a more comprehensive overview of the causal conditions that were not 
possible to trace in the Liberian case. 
 
5.5 Overview of Findings from the Kenyan Peace Negotiations 
 
On the basis of the revised heuristic model comprehensive process-tracing was carried out for the three 
features of collective concerns, subjective representation and transparent communication. For the most 
part, the components that were shown to be constitutive of the legitimisation process were confirmed. 
They included ending violence, which was extended to also include a return to stability, as well as a 
civilian counterbalance at the negotiations and in the agreement itself. Moreover, further components 
that were confirmed in this case study include the feeling of representation, the recognised guarantors of 
legitimacy and the ensuring of the implementation. The constitutive component of feeling included, 
which had been proposed in the Liberian case study, was notably changed to a feeling of involvement. 
This also highlights a more pro-active role for the beneficiaries of legitimacy, who can be involved in the 
legitimisation process, rather than the somewhat passive role they take on when (merely) feeling 
represented. 
 
Because of the infrastructure in place in the Kenyan setting, there was a completely different 
environment for transparent communication to unfold. This allowed for a more precise tracing of the 
constitutive components related to this feature, as well as the causal conditions that enabled them. This 
included an extensive analysis of what has been labelled ‘participative communication’. The causal 
analysis that explains why the feeling of involvement was enabled as a constitutive component of the 
legitimisation process was also much more comprehensive as a result. In addition, the causal analysis for 
collective concerns also showed that the CSAs were able to influence the collective concerns including 
the civilian counterbalance, despite not having a direct role at the table. With regards to the spatial 
boundaries, the negotiation space was still relevant (also as part of the feature of transparent 
communication), though for the most part the legitimisation occurred beyond the negotiation space. 
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One of the most significant findings comes from the idea of the actors in the legitimisation process. A 
direct Track I role is not necessary. Additionally, as was shown by one-sided participative 
communication: With regards to feeling involved, CSAs do not necessarily play a part. Lastly, one of the 
biggest differences in this case study to the Liberian one, comes from a self-referential legitimisation 
narrative for the benefit of the mediator Kofi Annan and the AU Panel rather than a CSA. These 
findings, summarised in Table 5.3 below, are the basis of the theory of legitimate peace negotiations, 
which is introduced in the next chapter.  
 
Table 5.3 Major Findings from Comprehensive Process-Tracing from the Case Study of the 
Kenyan Negotiations 
FEATURES OF THE HEURISTIC MODEL 
 Collective Concerns Subjective 
Representation 
Transparent 
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Constitutive 
Components 
 Ending 
violence/return to 
stability  
 Civilian 
counterbalance in 
negotiations and 
agreement  
 Feeling 
represented 
 Symbolic 
attachment to 
the guarantors 
of legitimacy 
 Ensuring 
implementation 
 Feeling involved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal 
Conditions 
 Pressure conflict 
parties 
 Maintenance of 
pressure on 
international actors 
 Expert and 
monitoring reports 
 Lobbying for 
agenda 4 concerns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 Distribution of 
information  
 Dualistic 
participative 
communication 
 Circular 
communication 
flows 
 One-sided 
participative 
communication 
 Contributing to 
understanding or 
shared experience of 
suffering 
 
 
 
 
 
Context 
Factors 
 Nature of personal 
networks to 
international actors 
 Politicised nature 
of civil society 
actors 
 Mediator 
encouraged 
inclusion 
 Reputation of 
CSAs 
 Centralised nature 
of state (merging of 
national and local 
concerns) 
 Politicised 
nature of civil 
society actors 
 Practical 
problems of 
engaging with 
grassroots 
 Type and 
duration of 
conflict  
 Political, economic 
and media 
infrastructure  
 Willingness of 
mediation team for 
transparency 
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Chapter 6 
 
A Theory of Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
6 A Theory of Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
 
The starting point for the research was to consider how peace negotiations become more legitimate and 
to explore the role that civil society actors play in this. Having considered two case studies of peace 
negotiations in detail in the previous two chapters, the final step in the abductive research process is to 
propose a theory of legitimate peace negotiations. The theory, induced from the comprehensive process-
tracing of the case studies, provides a theoretical argument for how peace negotiations become 
legitimised. I argue that peace negotiations are legitimised in a process of legitimisation that is based on 
outcome and participation-based characteristics. Civil society actors play a crucial role, yet a non-
exclusive role in this process. Lastly, the legitimisation process takes place simultaneously at the 
negotiations table and in the public arena. The three elements of the theory are now be discussed in turn, 
concluding with an overview of the theory and the contributions this makes to the literature on civil 
society involvement in peace negotiations.  
 
6.1 Outcome and Participation-Based Characteristics of Legitimisation 
 
In the following, the theory of legitimate peace negotiations is outlined regarding its major characteristics 
based on outcomes and participation. Notably, the theory addresses a process of legitimisation rather than 
the legitimacy of authority or a political system. In a first part, the two characteristics are detailed, before 
in a second section outlining the differences and overlaps to other theories of legitimacy.  
 
6.1.1 Two Characteristics of Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
 
The research of this dissertation started on the premise of two heuristic features of the legitimisation 
process, later amended to three features. These are collective concerns, transparent communication and 
subjective representation, and were heuristically used to trace the major components of the legitimisation 
process. If we consider these components in their totality, two major characteristics can be surmised: 
The components that constitute the legitimisation process are either based on outcomes or on 
participation.  
 
On the one hand, the three components of ending violence/return to stability, civilian counterbalance 
and ensuring implementation all speak to certain outcomes. According to the perception of the 
beneficiaries of legitimacy, the process becomes legitimised, because violence has come to an end, there 
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was a civilian counterbalance during the talks and in the final agreement and efforts were made towards 
ensuring implementation. The nature and explanations for the components changes slightly across cases, 
but the focus of legitimisation still remains on a certain outcome. Ending violence was conceptualised 
more broadly in terms of a positive peace in the Liberian case (i.e. ending violence and schools 
reopening) or with regards to economic stability in Kenya.  In other words, the process becomes 
legitimised because of the satisfaction invoked by the ending of violence, in its expansive interpretation 
as was shown in the case studies. The causal process-tracing regarding the civilian counterbalance shows 
that both a direct seat at the table for civil society in Liberia as well as the expert reports and monitoring 
from civil society actors who were not part of the negotiations in Kenya were effective in enabling the 
component. The exact ways the legitimisation process will unfold will differ, but the key take-away for 
the beneficiaries of legitimisation is what happens during and after the negotiations related to the role taken on 
by the civil society actors (and other actors, see below). The relationship between the features, 
components and characteristics of legitimisation is summarised in Figure 6.1 below. 
 
Figure 6.1: Features, Components and Characteristics of Legitimisation 
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On the other hand, the three components of feeling involved, feeling represented and recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy all speak to participation. Beneficiaries of legitimacy regard the process to have 
become legitimised because they are participating in the process themselves, through feeling represented, 
having identified guarantors of legitimacy and notably feeling involved. Again, the details of this are 
likely to differ for individuals and cases, but the emphasis is on the fact that the beneficiaries of 
legitimacy are somehow involved. Though feeling represented is one element, he or she is not merely 
‘represented’ at the peace negotiations, arguably a rather passive role, but can also be more actively 
participating. This is done through reflecting on the process in a variety of ways, including through 
photos, short stories and other outlets like in Kenya. In addition, the beneficiary can play a role in 
deciding whom they recognise as a guarantor of legitimacy. This can be based on characteristics of 
motherhood, like in the Liberian case, or the ‘prisoner of peace’ Kofi Annan like in Kenya.  
 
The theory does not presuppose a dichotomous measurement of legitimacy, as in yes there was 
legitimacy or there was not, but rather shows that more or less legitimacy is possible in a process of 
legitimisation made up of outcome and participation based-characteristics. Despite differences between 
the cases, the overall legitimisation of a process may still be similar. The two case studies of Liberia and 
Kenya differ on the scale and type of violence. Yet, with regards to the outcome-based characteristics of 
legitimisation, the interpretation was strikingly similar. Even though the violence in Kenya was less 
severe and much shorter than in Liberia (albeit with deep-set conflict roots), ending violence was 
overwhelmingly identified as a legitimising component in both cases. In addition, one negotiations 
process was highly militarised (Kenya) and the other politicised (Liberia), nevertheless in both instances 
a civilian counterbalance was traced to be a constitutive component. 
 
For the participation-based characteristics, there was more variation. The civil society actors did not play 
a direct role in the Kenyan case, which overall seemed to detrimentally affect the component of feeling 
represented. In contrast to Liberia however, there was broader possibilities of engaging with the 
negotiations, sharing grievances and reflections, resulting in stronger participative communication and 
because of this, the component of feeling involved. The existing infrastructure enhances the possibility 
of engagement through forms of communicative participation. When this is absent, like in Liberia, the 
lack of knowledge and participation was obvious.  
 
Lastly, because the Kenyan negotiations followed on from flawed elections, the potential set-up of 
participation through representation is entirely different to the Liberian one. In theory, elected politicians 
are of course representative, and because some of these also took part in the negotiations process, 
feeling represented is ensured. Due to the nature of the elections however, perceived as flawed by many 
Kenyans, the legitimacy of elected politicians can be questioned. Even more poignantly, at the time of 
the peace negotiations, the elected politicians acted in their own self-interest in order to access power 
and thus are not representative of the people at this moment in time. This is despite the fact some of the 
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population may have supported the stakes they were claiming. The difference and overlaps of the theory 
of legitimacy compared to those of other scholars is discussed in the next section. 
 
6.1.2 Overlaps and Differences to Previous Theories on Legitimacy 
 
The policy-orientated study of Conciliation Resources defines legitimate negotiations as the extent of 
popular support for both the process itself and the outcome, arguing for participation, inclusion and 
representation (Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014, 6–7).  This clearly overlaps with the outcome and 
participation-based characteristics of legitimisation processes. The theory introduced here however is a 
theoretical argument based on a detailed empirical study that goes far beyond the study done by 
Conciliation Resources. In addition, the theory also more generally accentuates other pre-existing 
theories of legitimacy. This is because the theory of legitimate peace negotiations addresses a process of 
legitimisation rather than the legitimacy of authority or a political system, marking its differentiation to 
previous theories on the topic of legitimacy.  
 
At first glance, the two characteristics of legitimisation show overlaps to precedent notions of legitimacy 
in addition to the definition from Conciliation Resources. After all, the literature on the role of civil 
society in peace negotiations speaks of legitimacy in terms of a ‘public agenda’ (an outcome) and 
‘broader participation’ (Barnes 2002, 12; Belloni 2008, 199; McKeon 2004). In addition, the system 
analytical view on legitimacy speaks of inputs and outputs (Easton 1965; Scharpf 1997, 2009). Regarding 
the civil society literature however, the meaning of participation goes beyond the presumed 
inclusion/representation definition. For sure, Track II and parallel public forums are discussed in some 
of the literature (e.g. Paffenholz 2014a; Ron 2010), but for the most part they consider forums with civil 
society actors, and not necessarily broader elements of the population. Furthermore, a circular argument 
is made for the public agenda, with a public agenda creating a legitimate process, and a legitimate process 
contributing to the public agenda. The process nature of legitimisation is upheld by the theory proposed 
here, but the outcome-based characteristics are more expansive than a ‘public agenda’ as an output, 
rather speaking to how such a public agenda may be created. This is also why it is not simply a results-
based output, versus a representation-based input of the characteristics based on participation.  
 
The system analytical view on legitimacy also does not sufficiently translate what is meant with the 
outcome and participation-based characteristic. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, the outcome-
based characteristic concerns more than just an output or ‘achieving the goals ... citizens collectively care 
about’ (Scharpf 1997, 19). Most notably the component of the civilian counterbalance, by its very 
definition, considers the civilian counterbalance during the negotiations as well as in the final agreement. 
Put differently, in parts the process of negotiations was legitimised because civil society actors involved 
in negotiations in Accra were taking a position directly in contrast to the other self-interested parties to 
the negotiations. As the civil society representative Nohn Kidau argued, when she wanted to get a seat at 
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the table, “the political parties have their policy interests to fight for; the warring parties are interested in 
getting what they can for themselves. Who is going to be there for the rest of the people?” The 
outcome-based characteristic for this element is not so much what came out as a result of her 
participation (which is another element) but rather the civilian counterbalance at this moment in time.  
 
Secondly, the participation-based characteristics of legitimisation are based on the same ideas of 
inclusivity and representation as the input side of a system analytical view, but it further develops this. 
As was argued for the amended heuristic model on legitimate peace negotiations in Chapter 4, 
participation has thus far been inadequately conceptualised. Expanding on the idea of participation, 
opens up ideas of communication and transparency that are more fairly thought of as throughput than 
an input (e.g. Schmidt 2013). In the Kenyan case, the different types of participation were further 
developed, in light of what I termed “participative communication”. Self-expression and reflections on 
the negotiations, in artistic forms or otherwise, contributed to the legitimisation process. Such forms of 
participative communication take place mostly after a peace agreement has been signed, yet 
retrospectively legitimise the process; and thus are neither an input nor an output. This brings me to the 
third reason why the system analytical view does not wholly reflect the theory of legitimate peace 
negotiations proposed. 
 
Peace negotiations and the legitimisation process thereof, are conceptualised as an ad-hoc, dynamic and 
non-institutionalised process of peace negotiations. This stands in contrast to ideas on procedural 
legitimacy or system analytical legitimacy, which presuppose a long-standing and institutionalised process 
or procedure (Easton 1965; Luhmann 1983; Scharpf 1997, 2009). Because of the type of process, the 
theory on legitimate peace negotiations does not focus on how to institutionalise participation. Nor does 
it make assumptions on the procedural nature of the negotiations regarding how specific elements 
resulting in the outcome should be addressed. By its very definition the theory on legitimate peace 
negotiations leaves the ways of reaching an outcome and ways of participation open. It may suggest two 
broad characteristics, and even the components that constitute the legitimisation process, but 
acknowledges that the contextual nature will always change the details of the ways this happens, in 
different cases just as much for different individuals. This reiterates the idea of ‘grounded legitimacy’ 
previously introduced, which aims to avoid universal normatively but accepts that contextual values and 
ideas will affect the legitimisation process in question. 
 
The literature with the most overlaps to the theory of legitimate peace negotiations comes from the 
Habermasian public sphere and deliberative democracy, which argues that something can become 
legitimised if it is deliberated upon, deciding on the common good, by a group of people who represent 
the free and fair participation of all. In fact, Habermas addressed discourse and communication 
throughout his work, beyond the initial foundations in the public sphere (e.g. 1991, 1993, 1996, 1997). 
For example, when discussing the foundations of law, Habermas proposes that ‘only those laws count as 
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legitimate to which all members of the legal community can assent in a discursive process’ (1996, 110). 
Whilst Habermas assumes a formal decision-making body, it nevertheless presumes ‘deliberation and 
discourse … open to input from civil society’ (Finlayson 2005, 116). The deliberative element of 
discourse as well as communication informs both the features of collective concerns and transparent 
communication, and as a result has repercussions for the outcome and participation-based characteristics 
of legitimisation. 
 
In contrast to Habermas however, the outcome-based characteristic of legitimisation places less 
emphasis on the discourse itself than on the ‘rational common good’ result of the act of deliberation. 
Habermas thoughts on the public sphere and deliberative democracy moreover serve much more as an 
ideal, with little empirical embedding (on a similar note see Finlayson 2005, 118). Steven Crowell argues 
that the Habermasian public sphere is a ‘counterfactual ideal whose normative force derives not from 
social reality but from communicative practices’ (2012, 148). This is why he prefers to focus on a less 
‘rationalistic version of his [Habermas] legitimation strategy - one that links argumentation processes of 
meaning constitution’ (Crowell 2012, 148). This holds more potential for this research, but the focus of 
this research is not so much on the way of discourse than it is on the results of this. In the practical 
application of peace negotiations, the discourse argument itself just informs the type of discussion had 
(with civilian actors) and the results during the talks and afterwards with regards to for example a civilian 
counterbalance.  
 
Habermas places little emphasis on who actually carries out the rational discourse (beyond the fact that 
these persons are theoretically free and fair representatives), focusing on the way the discourse is carried 
out, what repercussions this has and how this interacts with other discourses, i.e. the ‘weak public’ of 
civil society, versus the ‘strong public’ of formal politics. Whilst the latter point is relevant for the civil 
actors and the type of role they have, the legitimisation process itself does not change because the civil 
society have a potentially ‘weaker’ role. As was shown in both cases, despite power imbalances and the 
very setting of negotiations favouring one set of actors over others, civil society actors were influential in 
addressing collective concerns, which affected the legitimisation process with regards to the outcome-
based legitimisation. What remains, is the lack of emphasis that Habermas places on the actors carrying 
out the discourse. In the theory of legitimate peace negotiations, actors, too, play a crucial role, albeit a 
non-exclusive one. This is discussed next. 
 
6.2 The Non-Exclusive Role for Civil Society Actors in the Legitimisation Process 
 
Actors like civil society are no doubt involved in both the outcome and participation-characteristics of 
the legitimisation process, as has been shown throughout the thesis. Nevertheless, the type of role civil 
society actors have in the participation-based characteristics of legitimisation is different to what the 
current literature assumes. This is because civil society actors are not ubiquitous in the legitimisation 
process, since they are not involved in all parts of the legitimisation process. In addition, the actors are 
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to a certain degree interchangeable - as was shown for the constitutive component of recognised 
guarantor of legitimacy. This is outlined in the next sections, as well as further discussing the political 
agency of the guarantors of legitimacy and the meaning of the ‘local’ in relation to the beneficiary of 
legitimacy.  
 
6.2.1 Actors in the Legitimisation Process 
 
The basis of the literature on which this research is based on, argues that when civil society takes part in 
peace negotiations, the negotiations become more legitimate and as a result the agreement that follows is 
more likely to last (e.g. Barnes 2002; Paffenholz 2014a; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). Sustainable 
peace is possible because of civil society involvement making the peace negotiations more legitimate. 
This research has questioned this idea, by discerning what exactly the legitimisation process entails. 
Importantly, and therefore the second part to the theory on legitimate peace negotiations, the exclusive 
role of the civil society actors in the legitimisation process has been questioned. From the empirical case 
studies it was shown that peace negotiations do not necessarily become more or less legitimate solely 
because of the involvement of civil society actors, in relation to the participation-based characteristics of 
legitimisation. Firstly, participation can also ensue through alternative ways to mere representation by 
civil society actors such as for example one-sided participative communication through the artistic 
expression of grievances. Secondly, other actors, including the mediators can also act as guarantors of 
legitimacy.  
 
On the first point, the active role of the beneficiary of legitimacy in the legitimisation process as part of 
the participation-based characteristics is best highlighted by the elements of participative 
communication. In the Kenyan case, beneficiaries could feel involved in the negotiation process, 
constituting a part of the legitimisation process. This engagement happened in two ways. Either ordinary 
civilians could participate in the Open Forum set up by a civil society group, in order to air their 
grievances and help contribute to the Citizens Agenda for Peace. Alternatively, and this time with no 
civil society involvement, persons were involved in the process by simply expressing their concerns, 
impressions and reflections on the process artistically or otherwise. This included for example artistic 
forms of expressing narratives such as the Kenyan ‘Kwami?’ books, as illustrated by Image 5.1 in the 
previous chapter. In essence, this part of the legitimisation process comes from within. This also 
highlights a more pro-active role for the beneficiaries of legitimacy, who can involve themselves in the 
legitimisation process, rather than the somewhat passive notion of feeling represented.  
 
The onus on participation through communication in contributing to legitimisation has been recognised 
by other scholars. In a completely different setting, Bougeanvilleans seeking independence from Papua 
New Guinea were recorded to have spent large parts of peace negotiations singing and praying. Volker 
Boege explains that these may be ‘activities that, from a internationals’ point of view, can easily be 
192 
 
misjudged as folkloristic … [but] … are expressions of commitment and trust and can be more powerful 
than mere spoken or written words,’ in order to make the negotiations more ‘acceptable and legitimate’ 
(2012, 97). Subsequently, at least in part the empirical construction of legitimacy is related to 
participative communication, which does not necessitate the involvement of civil society actors at all.  
 
In addition, when civil society actors do play a role for the participation-based characteristics, they are to 
a degree interchangeable. What matters is not so much who they are, but rather how they are perceived, 
amounting to being representative or recognised guarantors of legitimacy, both of which are 
components that constitute a part of the legitimisation process. In the Kenyan case, overwhelming 
evidence points to the recognition of a self-referential legitimation narrative from Kofi Annan, the AU 
Panel and ‘an African solution for an African problem.’ The mediation team was perceived just as 
legitimate, if not more so, than the civil society actors. They were a recognised guarantor of legitimacy, 
and thus contributed a part in the legitimisation process. As a woman writes to a national newspaper ‘we 
endorsed your team long ago … you and gracious Graça [Machel] … have struck a chord with Kenyans. 
You feel the suffering of the ordinary people” (Mburu 2008). In summary, civil society involvement in 
peace negotiations cannot be automatically equated to more legitimacy. The legitimisation process can 
involve actors as guarantors of legitimacy that are not civil society actors, and also involve 
communication channels that involve no guarantor of legitimacy at all. 
 
With regards to the outcome-based characteristics of legitimate peace negotiations, the civil society 
actors play a more distinctive and if you will ‘traditionally’ accepted role, by contributing to the civilian 
counterbalance and so on. Concerning the participation-based characteristics civil society can play a role 
as guarantors of legitimacy more generally, but do not do so exclusively, as is shown by the dotted arrow 
in Figure 6.2 below. In addition, the beneficiary of legitimacy can also actively contribute in the ways 
outlined previously. 
 
Figure 6.2: The Role of Actors in the Theory of Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
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This finding and theoretical conclusion also means a distancing from the literature on sources of 
legitimacy and legitimation strategies, because they do not on their own give a holistic picture of the 
legitimisation process. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, a (relatively) newer field of legitimacy 
research has emerged that considers the legitimation of authority as an observable activity, through the 
study of self-justifying characteristics of rulers (e.g. Barker 2001). Authorities are engaged in activities of 
their own legitimation. In my own work however, the self-referential legitimation narratives shown in 
the empirical chapters are not solely an activity of legitimation or a strategy as such. The civil society 
actor or mediator has no time to work on a long legitimation strategy to make herself seem more 
legitimate to the beneficiaries of legitimacy. Of course, the prior reputation of the actor plays a role as 
was shown in the case studies, but when the ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised peace 
negotiations process starts, their self-referential legitimisation is either recognised or it is not.  
 
Though the legitimisation process itself goes beyond the time period of the negotiations themselves, this 
is still the key moment in the legitimisation process, and usually takes no longer than a matter of weeks 
or months. This makes the legitimation narratives of the guarantors different to legitimation strategies 
used by authorities or leaders to enforce their own legitimacy over much longer periods of time (Barker 
2001; Schatzberg 2001). In other words, whilst a study of the narratives as a strategy might help explain 
reasons why the actors are perceived as legitimate (as mothers, as ‘African peers’), they do not by itself 
explain the legitimation process.  
 
The same limitation goes for the literature on the sources of legitimacy (e.g. Weber 1978b). Considering 
the sources of legitimacy of actors may help to provide an understanding of why certain actors are 
perceived as legitimate, related to reasons of history, tradition, charisma etc., but on its own this does not 
offer a theory of the broader legitimisation process. Both the empirical approaches to legitimacy by 
Weber, Easton and the more normative approach by Beetham, all consider legitimacy in terms of 
persons of authority and power and how this justified - be it empirically, legally, morally, or normatively. 
Whilst civil society actors play a role - though not an omnipotent one - they are not by any means 
formalised or in positions of power or authority. In fact, by their very definition these are non-powerful 
actors in the negotiations setting, representing the population. Thus, the legal validity of power (as 
discussed by Beetham 1991); the structural sources of legitimacy (as proposed by Easton 1965) and the 
rational-legal source of legitimacy (Weber 1978b) can simply not apply here. However, the personal 
source of legitimacy which Easton proposes along with Weber’s personal sources of legitimacy, both 
traditional and charismatic, go some way to showing why specific actors come to be perceived as 
legitimate. The charismatic nature of some of the civil society actors and other legitimate actors is 
beyond doubt, including the IRCL in Liberia and Kofi Annan in Kenya. The relevance of tradition is 
shown to degrees, most notably in the consideration of women in Liberia through the recognised self-
referential legitimation narrative, which confirms the studies of empirical legitimacy by Steady (2011) and 
Schatzberg (2001). Since the civil society actors are not equated to outright legitimacy however, as has 
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been shown throughout the empirical chapters and for the theory of legitimate peace negotiations, the 
literature reviewed is nonetheless only partially relevant.  
 
In conclusion, the process of peace negotiations becomes more legitimate not because the civil society 
actors are seen as legitimate authorities or legitimising a political system, but because on the basis of 
outcome and participation-related characteristics, negotiations become legitimised. In terms of agency, 
both guarantors and beneficiaries of legitimacy play a part in this, though not exclusively. The two forms 
of agency of both the guarantors and beneficiaries of legitimacy are further discussed in the next two 
sections.  
 
6.2.2 The Political Agency of the Guarantors of Legitimacy 
 
The process-orientated theory of legitimacy emphasises outcomes and participation over specific actors; 
yet indubitably actors are involved. These actors do not emerge from a political vacuum, nor can they 
remain completely apolitical by taking part in the negotiation process - in whatever form. Jacob 
Bercovitch notes that “mediation should not be confused with altruism; mediators are usually cognizant 
of their own interests and they have motives, consciously expressed or not, that they wish to see 
promoted or protected” (1996, 9). The same can be said for civil society actors.  
 
At the most basic level, this is because of jobs and other benefits these actors receive after participating 
in the process. Civil society organisations themselves are made up of individuals, who may be perceived 
as more or less legitimate themselves, yet overall they are a heterogeneous group of actors. Nonetheless, 
actors have frequently been erroneously tarred with the same brush. This has repercussions that go in 
two separate directions: Firstly, the role of civil society actors in peace negotiations and peace processes 
is simplified with one stroke as ‘positive’ and ‘legitimate’ obfuscating more complex legitimisation 
processes (notable exceptions include McClintock and Nahimana 2008; Pearce 2011). Secondly, as soon 
as any civil society actor is seen as ‘politicised’, all of the civil society are rejected in one stroke. Perhaps 
civil society cannot act as well as they intend as their subsumed into the politics of the other actors or are 
co-opted by them. This was the case in the DRC where some civil society actors received monetary gifts 
or promises of future political positions in return for political favours (Paffenholz 2014a, 79), an 
accusation which was also mirrored in Liberia. As was shown in both case studies, the civil society actors 
under review were accused and found to be political and politicised entities. This should however not be 
surprising. Speaking of peacebuilding interventions, Jarat Chopra and Tanja Hohe note “there is never a 
vacuum of power on the ground” (2004, 298). Something similar could be said about the civil society 
actors: Yes, the actors are involved - and without a doubt genuinely at times - in representing collective 
concerns and so on, but this does not mean that they act in a political vacuum.  
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Neutrality is part of the constitutive component of legitimisation of feeling represented, but this does 
not mean that overall all civil society actors or other guarantors of legitimacy for that matter, will be 
neutral at all times. Nor that being political and not neutral by definition is necessarily detrimental to 
legitimisation either. A guarantor of legitimacy can be overtly political and take a stance - but the political 
stance can be different to that of the conflict parties or represent a particular grievance and thus the 
group can be acknowledged for their importance.135 Civil society actors come with a certain background, 
experience and relation to others. For example even WIPNET - which perhaps is the most ‘genuine’ 
grassroots organisation of all of the civil society actors reviewed in this work - did not emerge out of a 
vacuum. Several of the women involved, participated in extensive training on the role of women in 
peacebuilding after UN Security Resolution 1325 (Alaga 2011a, 9). A more differentiated picture of civil 
society actors, acknowledging their political nature, would allow for a better understanding of 
legitimisation processes (see also Ferguson 1994). 
 
In conclusion, the guarantors of legitimacy are not exempt from networks of power and politics, but this 
does not have to be to the detriment of the legitimisation process, as long as they are still contributing to 
the feeling of representation or recognised as guarantors of legitimacy etc. Granted, the influence and 
power-hold of the guarantors of legitimacy is likely to be less than that of the conflict parties but this 
does not mean it is entirely absent either as has been shown throughout. The meaning of power and 
politics may simply pertain to different features. Civil society actors may for example not be involved in 
the political agendas of the conflict actors, but tangled in other power struggles or political movements.  
 
6.2.3 The Meaning of the “Local” and the Beneficiary of Legitimacy 
 
One of the most puzzling finding in this dissertation has been on the disregard and distinction of ‘local 
grievances’, which contrasts to much of the literature from critical peacebuilding on the role of local 
peacebuilding processes (e.g. Lidén, Mac Ginty, and Richmond 2009; Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013; 
Richmond and Mitchell 2011). Especially in the Liberian case, the fact that local concerns were not 
addressed was not perceived to be a detriment to the legitimisation process. This was only partially 
confirmed in the Kenyan setting. To make matters more complicated, the same cannot be said for ‘local’ 
representation, viewed as missing in both cases and as a result acting detrimentally for the legitimisation 
process. The meaning of the ‘local’ is not the focus of the research question, and I argued elsewhere that 
‘the incoherence and complexity of the local sphere … [has been largely ignored], as well as the power 
relations through which it is characterized, particularly with regard to the legitimacy of actors and 
concepts. Power and authority are in fact locally as contested as on the national level’ (Simons and 
Zanker 2014, 14). The discussions on local grievances and local representation do however reveal two 
                                                        
135 In fact, argues Autessere, the neutrality of expatriates can help to deteriorate their relationship to the intended 
beneficiaries (2014b, 235–236). 
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further issues of note regarding the beneficiary of legitimacy. Namely, the meaning of representation in 
addition to the importance of political empowerment. 
 
On the first issue, the current ideas of representation pertaining especially to descriptive representation 
can be questioned (see e.g. Phillips 1995; Randall 2007). It was shown that descriptive representation is 
not of significance in contributing to the legitimisation of the peace negotiations. Nonetheless, 
descriptive representation is still frequently used rhetorically for peace processes, notably in relation to 
women. Women are often seen as passive victims of the wars. They merit inclusion, it is argued, because 
of this victimhood and because women are seen to be a personification of empathetic peacebuilding 
characteristics. When women are giving a role to play in a negotiation process or even peacebuilding 
processes more generally, they are often accused of not being representative of the population or 
grassroots (e.g. Kamau 2013, 201; McGhie and Wamai 2011, 10; Ringera 2014, 175; 187). The same 
standard is not as vehemently applied for other types of civil society actors. Whilst descriptive 
characteristics can be important in for example self-referential legitimation narratives, this does not make 
them the basis of representation. Some of the civil society actors in Liberia celebrated their womanhood, 
focusing on their roles as ‘mothers’ and ‘sisters’ bringing the conflict actors to their senses. This was 
however not so much translated into a representative quality for female beneficiaries of legitimacy, but 
constituted a part of the legitimisation process by being recognised guarantors of legitimacy. This 
recognition was widely perceived by men and woman of all ages, classes and occupations, and relates 
back to a symbolic attachment to the women in question. This prevalence of symbolic representation 
over descriptive allows for the fluidity and constructed nature of identities to be taken into consideration 
(Kamau 2013, 194–195; McGhie and Wamai 2011, 10; Sabaratnam 2013, 20). As such, the beneficiaries 
expect more of representation than mere descriptive qualities. The interpretation of the feature of 
subjective representation has given a more detailed picture of the meaning of representation. 
 
On the second issue, who in fact are our beneficiaries of legitimacy? From the outset, they were 
conceptualised as the general population who are the ones to potentially benefit from a more legitimate 
process, despite the difficulties of defining population and the somewhat artificial nature of separating 
between the beneficiaries and guarantors of legitimacy. Additionally, assuming that a minimum of 
political engagement is necessary for participating in the legitimisation process, are all beneficiaries 
equally politically engaged? No, many authors on legitimacy would argue, discussing the ‘audience’ of 
legitimacy. Elite groups simply have a greater control of power resources and tend to be more engaged 
in political processes than the general population (e.g. Alagappa 1995, 23–28; Fishman 1990, 437; Gilley 
2009, 9). This would mean that those beneficiaries interacting with the civil society representatives and 
informing themselves on the process of negotiations are also likely to be elites. The fear would be that in 
actual fact what is being created is an intra-elite mechanism: Elites make up both the guarantors and the 
beneficiaries of legitimacy. In other words, those feeling represented or involved are simply other elites 
participating in the legitimisation process. Take for example the Open Forum, where anyone ‘who 
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wanted to save Kenya’ was invited to attend in order to discuss and contribute to the Citizens Agenda 
for Peace. The first point of exclusion was the fact it was conducted in Nairobi. The second point of 
exclusion is who would realistically have time, be informed and feel comfortable in marching down to a 
five-star hotel to take part in such an Open Forum? When it comes down to it, the legitimisation process 
is intrinsically related to questions of political empowerment.  
 
This question of political empowerment - and related citizenship debates - is affected by contextual 
difference, not least in relation to historic and current governance systems. In Liberia the country has a 
history of centralisation, where the sub-national level tends to be ignored and receive little to no public 
goods. In Kenya, the governance structure was highly centralised for a long time, and whilst there are 
governance structures in place, regional disparities exist (see also Zanker, Simons, and Mehler 2015). 
Historical governance is likely to have an effect on the type of concerns raised and the involvement of 
the population in the legitimisation process. In highly centralised countries only a small number of 
people are likely to be involved - and used to being involved - in decision-making processes, and can 
consequently enjoy the full prerogatives of citizenships. The rest remain uninvolved (Sawyer 2005, 185; 
see also Mamdani 1996). This is linked to political empowerment which in turn is inherently linked to 
knowledge, and thus has at least something to do with practical concerns of access to media, public 
goods and the time and space to engage with a political process. Sawyer underlines this by arguing 
‘participation cannot meaningfully enhance individual and societal well-being and demonstrate 
ownership prerogatives without enlightenment’ (2005, 184). The lack of knowledge of the peace 
agreement and the role of civil society actors in Liberia spells out a vicious circle: Without political 
empowerment less knowledge is demanded, without more knowledge about the negotiation process 
political empowerment is less likely to grow. Even when there are more public goods available, and 
space to express and hear of political concerns, like in Kenya, when ‘people feel exploited …. or 
excluded … it is not surprising that “exit” often seems a better option than “voice”’ (Edwards 2009, 
105). This debate on empowerment and autonomy has much older roots, and many critical thinkers have 
addressed it over the years. Often the autonomy of individuals (to get involved in political processes) is 
thought of in terms of the Kantian concept of Mündigkeit. For Habermas more emancipation, 
empowerment or Mündigkeit leads to better, more democratic institutions - relating back to his thoughts 
on a deliberative democratisation process (see Finlayson 2005, 15). As a result, political empowerment is 
both a prerequisite to a legitimatisation process (again the extent is debatable) and a result of it.  
 
6.3 Legitimisation at the Negotiations and in the Public Arena 
 
In the description of the methodology of this research, it was argued that the causality reviewed as part 
of the comprehensive process-tracing pertains to a possibilistic causality (see Chapter 3). Because of a 
constructivist ontology, the causal reasoning with regards to the reasons why the legitimisation 
components were possible is bounded within temporal and spatial contexts. The temporal fluidity found 
in the case studies reiterates the process-based nature of legitimisation. In addition, tracing the spatial 
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contexts shows that rather than a big difference between the type of role played by civil society actors 
(directly or indirectly part of the negotiations) there are two dimensions to the legitimisation process: At 
the negotiations and in the public arena. This is the subject of the following discussion.  
 
6.3.1 Temporal Fluidity 
 
At first, the temporal boundaries of legitimate peace negotiations may seem as quite clear-cut, namely 
that the peace negotiations in Liberia took place between June and August 2003 and in Kenya between 
January and February 2008. In fact, it was shown that the temporal context of legitimisation goes beyond 
the negotiations themselves, and additionally includes the time period before the negotiations started and 
afterwards. This is shown be reviewing the causal analysis of the features of collective concerns and 
transparent communication. 
 
With regards to the feature of collective concerns, a civilian counterbalance during the talks and in the 
final agreement constitutes one component of the legitimisation process, in addition to ending violence. 
In Liberia, the time period before the talks was essential for this component, with the civil society actors 
lobbying citizens, conflict parties and international and regional actors alike, pre-empting the later 
civilian counterbalance. In the Kenyan case, more important was the time period after the official talks 
had ended, well into the period of the interim government. By the design of the agreement signed, the 
civil society actors kept up their involvement through the various institutions, which were formed by the 
Agenda 4 Agreement. In addition, the component of ending violence does not have a strict temporal 
context only after the negotiations have ended. In the Kenyan case for example, the legitimising 
component of ending violence did not take place after the peace talks had come to an end, but with the 
signing of the first of a total of four Agendas, right at the beginning of the talks.136 This underlines the 
fluid nature of the temporal boundaries of legitimisation, reiterated by the blurring of time periods 
between violence breaking out (pre-negotiation phase) and the talks starting (negotiation phase), also in 
Kenya. 
 
Concerning the components traced as part of the feature of transparent communication, these were 
more strictly limited to the period during and after the talks, since the feature itself entails making the 
talks themselves more transparent. Mostly, the components of ensuring implementation and feeling 
involved occurred after the negotiations had come to an end. This is particularly evident for the one-
sided participative communication as part of the component of feeling involved, namely through the 
artistic the expression of grievances or reflections - like the collection of stories, photos and poems in 
the ‘Kwami?’ Book series in Kenya, which were written, drawn, and expressed partly both during the 
talks, but for the most part afterwards.  
                                                        
136 In Liberia a ceasefire was also signed at the beginning of the talks, but this was later broken.  
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There was no causal analysis of the feature of subjective representation, as epistemologically this would 
not be possible for something so perception-based. Nonetheless, the temporality of the components was 
shown in the constitutive analysis. Both what happens before and after the actual negotiation period 
plays a role for the two components of feeling represented and recognised guarantors of legitimacy. For 
example, civil society actors like the IRCL in Liberia were perceived as representative because of the 
neutrality they had shown throughout the 1990s, that is before the actual negotiations started. Inversely, 
in Kenya the church had long dismantled its own credibility by openly supporting one side of the 
political conflict, Kibaki, long before the elections and the violence that followed took place, affecting 
their chances of being representative before the talks had even started. In the case of the recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy, the narratives relating to this were at least partially constructed after the talks 
had ended. All the documentation on the process afterwards, enhanced the self-referential legitimisation 
narrative of Kofi Annan and the AU Panel, confirming the possibilities of ex-poste legitimisation. The 
same can be observed for the picture of WIPNET praying for peace a decade after the talks had come to 
an end, under the caption ‘This, too, is Liberia’ (see Image 4.1 in Chapter 4).  
 
Viewed together, three temporal stages are relevant but also fluid. This confirms the nature of 
negotiations as a process that is ad-hoc, dynamic and non-institutionalised. The next section considers 
the spatial boundaries of legitimisation. 
 
6.3.2 Two Dimensions of Legitimisation 
 
In theory, the spatial boundaries are more analytically important than the fluid temporality outlined 
previously. This is because of existent literature, which differentiates between Track I and Track II 
negotiations and the different types of roles that civil society actors can play (e.g. Barnes 2002; 
Paffenholz 2014a; Paffenholz, Kew, and Wanis-St. John 2006). Empirically however, in terms of the 
legitimisation process, there was not much difference in whether there was a direct seat or not at the 
negotiations table. In fact, legitimisation occurs both at the negotiations (whether formally or informally) 
and as part what is taking place in the broader public arena. In the Liberian case this public arena is 
easier to draw in a sense because it is not in Ghana but rather in Liberia and perhaps to a lesser degree 
amongst the Liberian diaspora. Nonetheless, many of the Liberian diaspora were also living in refugee 
camps in Ghana (and other neighbouring countries) and therefore this spatial boundary is not as clear-
cut. In Kenya, both the formal and informal setting and the public arena are all located in the same 
country, even largely in Nairobi, and to an extent in one hotel - the Serena Hotel. It was in this place 
where most of the negotiations took place, where the CCP met and where the Open Forum was 
conducted. The spatial boundaries of legitimisation are not necessarily in a single geographic place 
however, like Kenya, Liberia or Ghana or one hotel, or even in a particular space of legitimisation, i.e. at 
the formal talks or informally. Rather, the legitimisation occurs simultaneously in two dimensions - the 
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negotiation and in the wider public arena. Reviewing the spatial context from the causal analysis of the 
different features shows these two dimensions.  
 
The spatial context of the feature of collective concerns is best shown by re-considering the causal 
conditions that explain the legitimising component of a civilian counterbalance. The conditions occurred 
as part of the formal negotiations, exemplified by the lobbying for naming the interim leader as 
chairperson by the IRCL in Liberia, or the expert reports from civil society at the official talks in Kenya. 
In the latter instance, a strong argument can be made to show that a differentiation between a Track I, 
Track II or even a purely informal role, does not necessarily make much of a difference on the levels of 
influence actors can have in ensuring the unfolding of a civilian counterbalance as part of the 
legitimisation process. Moreover, many of the actions resulting in the civilian counterbalance took place 
informally, surrounding the negotiations. This includes the Liberian civil society actors talking to the 
conflict parties in the bathrooms or the threat by WIPNET to get naked. In Kenya, informal influence 
on the peace talks was for example played out by the light-hearted threat to lock in Mkapa into his hotel 
room, unless he agreed to stay for the mediation. More than that, the component of a civilian 
counterbalance included some type of interaction with civilians beyond the negotiations, as best shown 
by the mass mobilisation in Liberia, which in the run-up helped to build up the pressure for a civilian 
counterbalance.  
 
With regards to the components traced as part the feature of transparent communication, they indicate 
that legitimisation occurs both in the negotiation space and the dimension beyond this. For example, 
because the circular communication flows relate back to the formal negotiation space, as was shown in 
the case of the Open Forum, this constitutes an integral component of the legitimisation process both 
with respect to the negotiation context and the public arena. For the most part however, the component 
of feeling involved and ensuring implementation takes place in the broader public setting.  
 
There was no causal analysis for subjective representation, which occurs in the wider public arena. In 
other words, feeling represented or recognising guarantors of legitimacy all takes place in this public 
setting, not as part of the negotiations. The same can be said for feeling involved, with the exception of 
dualistic participative communication. As described above, the Open Forum and the circular 
communication flows of dualistic participative communication show an interaction between the 
dimensions of negotiations and the public arena. Two initial conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the 
participation-based characteristics of legitimisation occur for the most part in the public arena. Secondly, 
some of the legitimisation process takes place in the interaction of the two dimensions. The two 
dimensions are shown in Figure 6.3 below. 
 
Overall the outcome-based characteristics of legitimisation are broadly speaking part of the negotiations 
sphere (ending violence, civilian counterbalance and ensuring implementation). Importantly, the 
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legitimisation in the negotiations occurs in a similar manner whether there is a direct seat at the table or 
not, i.e. as Track I or Track II actors respectively. In Kenya, civil society actors did not have a direct seat 
at the negotiation. Yet, a civilian counterbalance still resulted from the more indirect role of the Kenyan 
civil society actors, who lobbied the conflict actors and the negotiations far from the official table. Much 
the same, the Liberian civil society actors as official delegates were able to contribute to a civilian 
counterbalance, just in different ways, yet the outcome was similar.  
 
Figure 6.3: The Two Dimensions of Legitimisation 
 
 
  
 
The type of role played by civil society actors in the negotiations also does not hold particular results for 
the legitimisation in the public arena. The Kenyan civil society sector was not part of the talks directly, 
and there was a reduced sense of feeling represented. Nonetheless, due to their expertise they were also 
at least partially perceived as recognised guarantors of legitimacy. In addition, the lack of feeling 
represented was counteracted by the mediation team in Kenya (Kofi Annan and the AU Panel) who 
were perceived to have been recognised guarantors of legitimacy. Alternatively, take the Liberian case: 
There was a direct role for civil society actors at the table, and arguably a heightened sense of being 
represented because of this. More important however was the symbolic attachment to the grassroots 
mobilisation campaign WIPNET, who did not even have a direct seat at the negotiations table.  
 
Finally, one way of considering the public arena comes from revisiting Easton’s system analysis of 
political life. One of the major ‘categories’ of his system analysis is what he calls the environment. He 
argues that we should think of political life ‘as a system of behaviour embedded in an environment to the 
influences of which the political system is exposed and in turn reacts’ (emphasis added, Easton 1965, 
18). This includes both intra-societal environments (ecological system, biological system, personality 
system, social system) and extra-societal environments (international political system, international 
ecological system, international social system) (Easton 1965, 21–25). Whilst some parts of his idea of 
environment adds more to the context factors, which have been outlined throughout the chapters, the 
notion is useful because of his argumentation that what he calls the political system is ‘adaptive and need 
not just react in a passive or sponge-like way to the environmental influences’ (Easton 1965, 18). This 
confirms the interaction between the two dimensions where legitimisation occurs - both at the 
negotiations and in the public arena. Additionally, by arguing that the legitimisation process occurs both 
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with reference to the negotiations and the public arena, the fluid, moving and constructed space of the 
legitimisation process is underlined. 
 
6.4 Summary and Major Contributions of the Theory of Legitimate Peace Negotiations 
 
The theory of legitimate peace negotiations considers a process of legitimisation on the basis of three 
assumptions. Firstly, a process like peace negotiations becomes legitimised because of outcome and 
participation-based characteristics. What happens during and after the negotiations with regards to 
ending violence, ensuring implementation and a civilian counterbalance are the outcome-based 
characteristics. The participation-based characteristics include representation, but also recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy because of symbolic attachment and involvement in the negotiations. This 
involvement moves the beneficiaries of legitimacy from a more passive role to an active one. Secondly, 
civil society actors are not ubiquitous to the legitimisation process. Regarding the participation-based 
characteristics of legitimisation, they are not involved in all elements attributable to this. Further, the 
actors are themselves to a degree interchangeable. The third assumption of the theory on legitimate 
peace negotiations is that the legitimisation process takes place on two dimensions - at the negotiations 
and in the public arena. At some points the two are likely to interact with each other.  
 
Where does the theory of legitimate peace negotiations in relation to the other theories of legitimacy? To 
date the study of legitimacy has been attempted by scholars from all spectrums of the social sciences and 
humanities, not merely political scientists but also psychologists, sociologists and a great many 
philosophers. Despite the many studies, and the influential nature of some of these works, the idea and 
conceptualisation of legitimacy is still heavily contested. This is especially the case for processes outside 
the formal political spectrum or institutionalised procedures and those not concerned with studies of 
authority and power. The theory proposed contributes to the legitimacy debate for four reasons. 
 
Firstly, the theory is process-orientated, which few theorists pick up. When they do, this is not on the 
type of process like negotiations, which takes place on an ad-hoc basis, is non-institutionalised and 
dynamic. Secondly, participation and the participation-based characteristics of participation are 
conceptually more expansive than representation, which has been the unspoken assumption of 
participation in much of the literature to date. Thirdly, the two characteristics related to the outcome and 
participation go further than the input and output models of legitimacy proposed by system analysts. 
Both the characteristics occur throughout all stages of the legitimisation (related to the temporal fluidity) 
and the outcome-based characteristics are not exclusively translatable to outputs. Lastly, civil society 
actors may play an important role in the legitimisation process, but it is not a ubiquitous one. There are 
parts of the legitimisation process where they do not take part at all, and to an extent who the actors 
actually are is interchangeable. In the next and final chapter, the major findings from the entire 
dissertation is summarised and discussed in terms of the contributions to other scholarly debates, 
practical implications and future research questions. 
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Chapter 7 
 
Final Conclusions 
7 Final Conclusions 
 
As has been argued by political scientists for quite some time, dynamics in world politics have changed 
since the end of the Cold War. This especially concerns how wars come to an end, including a 
preference for negotiated settlements and peace deals rather than outright military victories. Call furthers 
this argument, stating that during this time, there has been a growing trend of inclusive political 
settlements (2012). Yet, a lot of the research has focused only on the conflict parties of such inclusive 
settlements. Revisiting this question of inclusivity regarding legitimacy, ‘the master research question of 
political science’ (Jost and Major 2001, 4), is both timely and salient. The research has repercussions not 
only for the literature on legitimacy and civil society involvement in peace negotiations, but also more 
broadly speaking on peacebuilding literature, as well as resulting in practical implications. In a final 
conclusion, the research findings are summarised, before addressing the contributions made for other 
scholarly debates and the practical implications that can be drawn from the research. 
 
The question of how peace negotiations become more legitimate and whether civil society plays a role in 
this legitimisation process has been addressed throughout this dissertation. The research question is 
based on a strand of literature that has considered the role of civil society in negotiations, coming to the 
conclusion that when civil society is involved in the talks - especially with a direct seat at the negotiations 
table - the agreements that follow are more sustainable, not least because the negotiations become more 
legitimate (e.g. Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008). It has been argued however, that this 
research makes theoretical and conceptual assumptions that necessitate further clarification and research. 
Theoretically, a jump is made from ‘public buy-in’ or participation to legitimacy without explaining how 
this actually takes place. Conceptually, legitimacy and even participation are only superficially elaborated 
upon. Participation is discussed regarding the types of roles that civil society can play but not how this 
actually affects the legitimisation process. Simply equating participation with legitimacy does not spell 
out a conceptual, empirical or theoretical understanding of how such legitimisation processes work. This 
gap in the literature is addressed in this dissertation. The findings are summarised in the following 
section. 
 
7.1 How Do Peace Negotiations Become More Legitimate? 
 
The role of civil society actors and how they make peace negotiations more legitimate, as well as the 
legitimisation process of negotiations more generally has been presented using an abductive research 
design. Using a heuristic model of legitimisation as a starting point, which was later amended on the 
basis of comprehensive process-tracing of two case studies, the research concluded with a theory of 
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legitimate peace negotiations. The original heuristic model considered two features of legitimisation, 
namely subjective representation and collective concerns. They had been deduced especially from the 
ideas on the public sphere and deliberative democracy. In the abductive research process, a lack of 
knowledge in the Liberian case was shown to have been detrimental to the legitimisation process in a 
way not covered by the previous two features of the heuristic model, thereby revealing a further feature 
of the legitimisation process labelled transparent communication.  
 
On the basis of this extended heuristic model, comprehensive process-tracing was conducted. 
Comprehensive process-tracing is a method adapted from other forms of process-tracing which 
combines a constructivist ontology with a plural epistemology. This allows for a delineation of what 
constitutes the legitimisation process (through constitutive components) and why this was possible (the 
causal conditions). First of all therefore, the constitutive components of the legitimisation process were 
traced. For the features of collective concerns and transparent communication a causal analysis traced 
the conditions that enabled the constitutive components in a second step the, focusing on the influence 
and ways of communication of the actors. The causal analysis was not carried out for subjective 
representation, as this is epistemologically implausible for something so perception-based. In a third 
step, the context factors were discussed for all three features. 
 
In total, six components were shown to be constitutive of the legitimisation process: Ending violence, a 
civilian counterbalance to the negotiations and in the agreement, feeling represented, recognised 
guarantors of legitimacy (because of symbolic attachment), feeling involved and ensuring 
implementation. The constitutive component of feeling included, which had been proposed in the 
Liberian case study, was changed to a feeling of involvement as a result of the Kenya case study. This 
was because of the infrastructure in place in the Kenyan setting, as a result of which there was a 
completely different environment for transparent communication to unfold. This allowed for a more 
precise tracing of the constitutive components as well as the causal conditions that enabled them. For 
example, the constitutive analysis showed an additional factor to consider under the feature of 
transparent communication, which has been labelled ‘participative communication’. This factor 
considers the participation of persons in the legitimisation process through communication, and was a 
key point in the development of the theory of legitimate peace negotiations, which proposes that civil 
society actors are not ubiquitous to the legitimisation process.  
 
The causal analysis for the feature of collective concerns detailed the ways that civil society actors can 
and are involved in terms of ending violence and more importantly in ensuring a civilian counterbalance 
both during the peace talks and afterwards. The causal analysis was carried out within temporal and 
spatial boundaries, as the definition of causality was one of possibilistic causality, in line with the 
constructivist ontology introduced at the beginning. The analysis of the temporal boundaries confirmed 
that peace negotiations do become more legitimate because of a process of legitimisation. This is 
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because, temporally the legitimisation process is fluid and starts from the stage before the peace 
negotiations start, including the actual negotiation and continues to the period afterwards. The analysis 
of the spatial analysis was significant for the theory of legitimate peace negotiations, which is 
summarised further below. First however, Table 7.1. below shows all the major causal conditions, 
constitutive components and context conditions that were traced as part of the comprehensive process-
tracing.  
 
Table 7.1 Major Findings from Comprehensive Process-Tracing from the Two Case Studies  
FEATURES OF THE HEURISTIC MODEL 
 Collective 
Concerns 
Subjective 
Representation 
Transparent 
Communication 
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Constitutive 
Components 
 Ending violence 
/ return to 
stability  
 Civilian 
counterbalance 
in negotiations 
and agreement  
 Feeling represented 
 Recognised  
guarantors of 
legitimacy 
 Ensuring 
implementation 
 Feeling involved 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causal 
Conditions 
 Pressure 
conflict parties 
 Maintenance of 
pressure on 
international 
actors 
 Expert and 
monitoring 
reports 
 Lobbying for 
Agenda 4 
concerns 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
 Distribution of 
information  
 Dualistic 
participative 
communication 
 Circular 
communication 
flows 
 One-sided 
participative 
communication 
 Contributing to 
understanding or 
shared experience of 
suffering 
 
 
 
 
 
Context 
Factors 
 Personal 
networks of 
CSAs 
 Politicised 
nature of civil 
society actors 
 Mediator 
encouraged 
inclusion 
 Reputation of 
CSAs 
 Governance 
System 
 Politicised nature of 
civil society actors 
 Practical problems of 
engaging with 
grassroots 
 Type and duration of 
conflict  
 Political, economic 
and media 
infrastructure  
 Willingness of 
mediation team for 
transparency 
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Whilst the conceptualisation of peace negotiations has from the start been an ad-hoc, dynamic, non-
institutionalised process, which was confirmed,  not suited to a dichotomous assessment of legitimate / 
illegitimate or a measurable legitimacy, there are some differences in the two processes studied in terms of 
the overall legitimisation. In Liberia, there was a heightened sense of ‘feeling represented’ than in Kenya, 
though this is not because of the formal role for civil society actors. Rather, the grassroots nature and 
mass mobilisation campaign of the WIPNET group made this group be perceived as particular 
representative and more importantly as recognised guarantors of legitimacy (along with other women 
groups). In Kenya, the civil society groups never claimed to be grassroots representatives but rather 
focused on their professional expertise for the inputs they made. In contrast, in Kenya there was a more 
widespread sense of ‘feeling involved’, supported by the stronger infrastructure including the media and 
internet resources, which facilitated the distribution of information and in turn participative 
communication. This was less feasible in the Liberian case, where although efforts were made to spread 
information on the peace agreement and the content, this was evidently not widespread enough across all 
geographic and socio-economic boundaries. Concerning the civilian counterbalance to the talks and the 
agreement, there does not seem to be large difference in the two cases, despite the fact that the civil 
society actors did not play a direct role in the peace negotiations in Kenya. The Kenyan civil society actors 
still made a significant impact in providing a civilian counterbalance in the agreement, as evidenced in 
Agenda 4 which encompassed broad institutional frameworks to address historical grievances, the flawed 
elections, violence and other constitutional and legal issues. With regard to the casual analysis, there are 
slight variations between Kenya and Liberia, but surprisingly the constitutive components of legitimisation 
broadly speaking remained the same despite the contextual differences.  
 
A further interesting finding from the comprehensive process-tracing is that a lack of local concerns was 
perceived not to affect the legitimisation process, especially in Liberia. Nevertheless, the same does not 
hold for ‘local’ representation, whose exclusion seems to act in detriment to the legitimisation process. 
Moreover, representation went far beyond descriptive representation, and did not necessarily exclusively 
speak to civil society actors, which is why not all the recognised guarantors of legitimacy were members of 
civil society.  
 
One of the most significant findings comes from this idea of the actors in the legitimisation process. This 
was shown most evidently in the Kenyan case study. A direct Track I role is not necessary to influence the 
civilian counterbalance as previously mentioned. In addition, on the basis of one-sided participative 
communication it was shown that civil society actors are not even involved in all aspects of the 
legitimisation process. People expressing their impressions, grievances and reflections on the negotiations, 
artistically or otherwise, enabled the feeling of involvement, which constituted a component of the 
legitimisation process. Lastly, one of the biggest differences in this case study to the Liberian one, comes 
from a self-referential legitimisation narrative for the benefit of the mediator Kofi Annan and the AU 
Panel rather than a civil society actor.  
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Following on from the comprehensive process-tracing of the two case studies, a theory on legitimate 
peace negotiations was proposed. The theory of legitimate peace negotiations considered a process of 
legitimisation on the basis of three assumptions. First of all, a process like peace negotiations becomes 
legitimised because of outcome and participation-based characteristics. The outcome is based on what 
happens during and after the negotiations with regards to legitimisation components of ending violence, 
ensuring implementation and a civilian counterbalance. The participation-based characteristics include 
representation, but also recognised guarantors of legitimacy because of symbolic attachment and 
involvement in the negotiations. This involvement moves the beneficiaries of legitimacy from a more 
passive role to an active one. Second, civil society actors are not ubiquitous to the legitimisation process. 
Regarding the participation-based characteristics of legitimisation, they are not involved in all elements 
attributable to this. This was noted in the previous paragraph and concerns expressions and reflections on 
the negotiations, irrespective of the involvement of civil society actors. Additionally, the actors are 
themselves to a degree interchangeable. This is based on the findings regarding Kofi Annan as a guarantor 
of legitimacy. Lastly, the third assumption of the theory on legitimate peace negotiations is that the 
legitimisation process takes place on two dimensions - at the negotiations and in the public arena. At some 
points the two dimensions can interact with each other. The participation-based characteristics of 
legitimisation mostly take place in the public arena and the outcome-based characteristics at the 
negotiations. 
 
This theory on legitimate peace negotiations makes a significant advance in contributing to an 
understanding of how peace negotiations become more legitimate. Some elements like the impact on 
enforcing implementation (e.g. Bell and O’Rourke 2007, 31; Nilsson 2012, 247; Wanis-St. John and Kew 
2008, 23), influencing conflict actors (e.g. Belloni 2008; Paffenholz 2014a, 74) or improving the content of 
the agreement (e.g. Barnes 2002, 12; Wanis-St. John and Kew 2008, 23) are not new and have been 
recognised by previous literature. The theory on legitimate peace negotiations nonetheless, calls for a 
process-orientated understanding of legitimisation at both the negotiations and in the public arena, thus 
far not recognised in the literature. Theoretically the two characteristics related to the outcome and 
participation goes further than the input and output models of legitimacy proposed by system analysts. In 
addition, the idea of participation in peace negotiations is conceptually more expansive than 
representation, which has been the unspoken assumption in much of the literature to date. Furthermore, 
the more nuanced role for civil society actors has not been addressed in terms of the legitimisation effect 
this may have. Lastly, and more generally, the three heuristic features of legitimacy (collective concerns, 
subjective representation and transparent communication) and the six constitutive components of 
legitimisation along with the causal conditions that enable them, provide empirical and analytical depth to 
the topic, which has hitherto been missing. In the next section, the contributions to further related 
scholarly debates are discussed.  
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7.2 Contributions of the Dissertation to Related Scholarly Debates 
 
A brief overview surmises the importance of this research on literature beyond that on legitimacy and civil 
society involvement, of which the contribution has already been noted above and in the last chapter. First, 
the literature on civil society in peace negotiations is a subset of the negotiations literature, which has long 
been focused on trying to differentiate between inclusive and exclusive peace negotiations (e.g. Lanz 
2011). This dissertation has strengthened the focus on actors other than the conflict actors, whose 
behaviours have long been studied, as well as international mediators (Cunningham 2011; Sisk 2010; 
Zaum 2013). Second, it was shown that descriptive representation is not as relevant in the empirical reality 
of the context as could be argued. Symbolic types of representation are in fact the most relevant, which 
confirms previous research on representation in the African context (Mehler 2011; Randall 2007; 
Schatzberg 2001; Steady 2011). 
 
Third, regarding the literature on power-sharing, which has been the type of peace negotiations this 
dissertation considered, to date much research has focused on whether power sharing agreements 
contributes to sustainable peace or not, the verdict of which is still out there (e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 
2007; Tull and Mehler 2005). The dynamics of power-sharing negotiations have been studied almost 
exclusively with regard to the major conflict actors and important international mediators. Here too, the 
actors holding lesser power, who have nevertheless been shown as influential, have received little 
attention. Newer research on power-sharing agreements is going in the direction of looking at the effects 
on power relations. Whilst this also considers broader social implications of power-sharing agreements, 
the research does not deliberate the legitimacy of the agreement by addressing how power dynamics 
unfold at the negotiation stage (see Hartzell and Mehler forthcoming). In terms of the legitimisation 
process, the fact whether a country is more democratic or not does not make much of a difference. To 
recap, there is an argument that civil society inclusion is even more important the less democratic a 
country is in order to counterbalance a lack of representation (Nilsson 2012; Wanis-St. John and Kew 
2008). Because power-sharing agreements are by definition undemocratic, or can have negative effects on 
long-term democratisation, it was argued this is a particularly important reason for studying them. 
However, it was shown that even though elections had taken place prior to the violence and negotiations 
in case of Kenya, a civilian counterbalance was no less important. The preliminary finding would be as a 
result that for power-sharing peace negotiations, the democratisation argument becomes obsolete as the 
process will still need to be legitimised according to a similar process. More research is necessary to 
expand on this argument.  
 
The most important contribution of the theory of legitimate peace negotiations however, beyond studies 
of legitimacy, is on peacebuilding. Negotiations that lead to a peace agreement are a vital step in any 
peacebuilding process. Without it, the wider process of peacebuilding cannot even begin. Whilst in the 
earlier years of peacebuilding research, much attention has been paid to the nature of international 
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interventions, elections as well as other institutions for peace known broadly as liberal peacebuilding, more 
recently efforts have turned to addressing the different actors involved in peacebuilding, questions of 
ownership and alternative forms of peacebuilding. This latter focus, known as the local turn because of its 
focus on ‘local’ actors as part of critical peacebuilding studies, also provides the broader context of this 
research. This is because of the ontological and epistemological assumptions made for the research of this 
dissertation, the overall critical nature of the question and the notions of representation and ownership 
that it touches upon.  
 
The critical peacebuilding literature has often concentrated on the outcome of specific policies or 
interventions often resulting in so-called hybrid institutions (Boege 2012; Mac Ginty 2010), peacebuilding 
at the (somewhat vague) everyday level (Richmond 2009a; Richmond and Mitchell 2011) or the actors 
involved and their interaction in attempts at ownership (Autesserre 2014b; Donais 2012). When 
peacebuilding processes have been considered, it has been on the actor interaction level, recording 
instances of resistance, adaptation or acceptance amongst others (de Heredia 2012; Mac Ginty 2012; 
Richmond 2012). The process of legitimisation has to date not been considered. As a result, there are 
several points of specific contribution to critical peacebuilding studies that the study of legitimisation in 
the context of negotiation makes. 
 
The theory of legitimate peace negotiations is especially relevant for the work on local ownership and 
critical peacebuilding studies more generally. As is shown in the following, first of all, legitimisation 
processes like negotiations work on a multi-scalar level, which means that that there is not simply an 
exclusively local or an exclusively national process. Second, what contributes to ownership is a process 
where there is an interaction between the guarantors and the beneficiaries of legitimacy. Even if the 
guarantors (e.g. civil society actors) essentially contribute more to the outcomes of legitimisation, the 
population or beneficiaries also need to be involved via participation. Third, acknowledging the multi-
scalar nature of peacebuilding and the construction of ownership means that agents like civil society do 
not need to be equated to tools of liberal peacebuilding. Moreover, the active part of the construction of 
ownership from the beneficiary comes to the forefront, calling for emancipatory peacebuilding. These 
three points are outlined in more detail below.  
 
Firstly, the multi-scalar nature of peacebuilding is shown by the theory of legitimate peace negotiations 
and the empirical studies of the last chapters. That is, peacebuilding processes occur simultaneously on 
several scales, interacting with each other. These different scales, at the national and local level are not a 
place but a type of peacebuilding process. A negotiation process between the major conflict actors is on a 
national scale, but local peacebuilding committees may also be addressing other important dimensions of 
conflict, albeit at a local scale. Much of the research on peacebuilding either focuses on national processes 
or actors or community-based activities exclusively, yet these are multiple scales of peacebuilding that 
contribute to each other respectively. 
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Time and time again there was a return to the question of who the grassroots are and what they want. The 
Liberian case shows that whilst ‘local’ concerns did not play a particularly important role during the peace 
talks, this was not necessarily to the detriment of the peacebuilding process. Nevertheless, the lack of local 
representation led to a sense of feeling excluded. How do these people interact with the peace process at 
the national level? And how do infrastructure and governance traditions play into the role of a beneficiary 
of legitimacy? The general lack of ‘local’ concerns (and representatives for that matter) has already been 
explained in relation to the governance structures of the countries in question. There is also a false 
dichotomy in relation to place. ‘Local’ concerns - if they do exist - are not only taking place in rural 
settings or outside the capital as an exclusive space of rule and power. In fact both Monrovia and Nairobi 
are large urban areas with a heterogeneous mixture of people residing there who are equally able to have 
and do have ‘local’ concerns.  
 
A spatial differentiation amongst legitimacy beneficiaries can thus be redundant at times as was shown in 
the discussion on the two dimensions of legitimisation in the previous chapter. Rather it is a question of 
scale. Does the process in question - here negotiations - adequately deal with conflicts that really matter to 
the population and is thereby legitimised? The negotiation and public arena of legitimisation deals with the 
national negotiation process that as an end goal still aims to end violence amongst conflict parties. This is 
of immense importance for the individual living in Ganta or Eldoret, but does not mean that on another 
scale, dual processes of reconciliation and peacebuilding are not started in these very places. These can 
also have an effect on how the national process is viewed and legitimised or is a completely separate 
process. Case in point here is the perception of Bishop Korir as a positive actor in Eldoret (Kenya), due to 
his peacebuilding work there, though nationally religious actors were seen as partisan. The outcome and 
participation-based characteristics of legitimisation at the negotiations and hence national scale has been 
shown, whether something similar takes place at the local level is a question for future research. As such, 
the primary focus here is on the scale of national negotiations process but the process itself is multi-scalar 
and will always take place at multiple levels. As I argue elsewhere:  
 
‘Proposing the liberal-local binaries as is often done in critical peacebuilding research disengages 
from the reality at hand. If we are to understand peacebuilding dynamics we will need to map the 
complex multi-directional processes of adaptation that take place between different actors and 
rationalities in the peacebuilding environment’ (Simons and Zanker 2014, 15). 
 
Similarly, local ownership can also be constructed on multiple scales, which will further help to move 
beyond the sometimes unhelpful distinction and overlap between international, national and local actors.  
 
Secondly, local ownership or public buy-in or participation is about making a process or an event or even 
a project legitimate to its beneficiaries, is in essence a construction of legitimacy. This is not new (e.g. 
Funk 2012; Lederach 1997), but the type of agency shown is. In other words, the interaction between 
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guarantors and beneficiaries of legitimacy adds to the perception of local ownership, whereby the 
beneficiary also participates in an active manner - and sometimes even on their own. This active nature of 
the beneficiary of legitimisation is useful in showing that a legitimisation process can - at least in parts - be 
constructed from the bottom. Moreover, when there is an interaction between the guarantor and 
beneficiary, this can even be constructed symbolically if need be. Here, just to show how this construction 
of local ownership fails, it is interesting to cite at length a story collected by Autesserre in her book on 
international interveners: 
 
‘A political affairs officer with the UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, for instance, deplored that 
his colleagues always try to play up their contributions in conflict negotiations. He saw several 
deals collapse ‘just because it was said that the agreement had been reached thanks to external 
interveners’ - such as the European facilitators or UN peacekeeping sections - ‘and thus the 
parties in conflict did not want to implement it because, from the start, from their point of view, 
the agreement was dictated by an outsider.’ In contrast, he emphasized that other initiatives, 
which came from the same intervening organisations but kept the external contributions as 
discreet as possible and emphasized local initiatives, were much more successful’ (2014b, 233). 
 
As has been shown in this work, participation means more than just representation or collective concerns 
being addressed. Feelings of being involved are essential to a legitimising process and this is also useful for 
understanding local ownership. In that sense, local ownership is both active and constructed. 
 
Consequently, and this is the third point, even if there is a liberal international community, or even if we 
presume civil society, at least the civil society that is involved in peace negotiations, to be tools of liberal 
peacebuilding, this does not matter, as long as the beneficiaries of legitimacy are involved in the 
negotiations through the participation-based characteristics of the legitimisation process. This counteracts 
critique in critical peacebuilding that accuses civil society to be a tool of liberal peacebuilding.  
 
Critical scholarship tries to avoid dominant narratives that result in hegemonic discourse. In this 
discussion, civil society is seen as contributing to a hegemonic discourse (Christie 2012, 201–202). The 
political nature of agency for guarantors of legitimacy, discussed in the last chapter, would support this as 
a possibility. However, if the focus is on accepting the multi-scalar nature of peacebuilding processes and 
the interactive construction of legitimacy than the hegemonic nature of these liberal peacebuilding actors 
can be avoided. The emphasis is, at least in parts on the active contribution by the beneficiaries of 
legitimacy. Developing this finding could further alleviate the tension between needing external technical, 
logistical support and the fact this can weaken local ownership (see Odendaal 2010, 41). In addition, it 
contributes a move into arguing not for communitarian peacebuilding (where the local level is involved 
amongst others) but for emancipatory peacebuilding, where the process is one of its own making and 
persons are involved in constructing the overall legitimisation of the process. Emancipatory peacebuilding 
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calls for a new social contract through discourse and practice (Richmond 2010, 28–30). This dissertation 
shows how this can be done, through the comprehensive process-tracing of the case studies and the final 
theory of legitimate peace negotiations.  
 
These implications for peacebuilding research need to be expanded in more detail in future research. The 
dissertation is concluded with a discussion on future research, but first some of the practical implications 
of the research for policy makers are addressed. 
 
7.3 Practical Implications 
 
In International Relations, just as relevant for peacebuilding research, there is a division amongst those 
seeking to do ‘problem solving’ and those who want to be ‘critical’. Some critical scholars argue that 
problem solving research can (inadvertently) play into power hegemonies (e.g. Guevara 2014; Mac Ginty 
and Richmond 2013). I argue however, that even though the research of this dissertation is mostly based 
in critical research foundations, this does not mean that problem solving approaches should be shunned 
either. The very motivation of conducting such research is to contribute to a better understanding of 
legitimisation, local ownership and peace building process - not just in theory but also in their practical 
application.  
 
Much of the previous research on this topic feeds directly into policy documents or advice (e.g. Barnes 
2009; Ramsbotham and Wennmann 2014; Zanker 2013). This research also has obvious practical 
implications, even though the ‘quality’ of legitimacy of the two cases itself is not the subject matter, and is 
arguably not possible to assess due to the nature of legitimacy as a subjective belief in it. Most importantly, 
the research conducted for this dissertation suggests that by simply including civil society, the negotiations 
and the agreement that follows will not automatically become legitimised. This means that more time must 
be spend reflecting not only on inclusion which is the current trend in policy advice (who are these civil 
society actors? how are they included? how much pressure can they exert?), but also on the other factors 
that play a role.  
 
In fact, civil society actors have been shown to be crucial to the legitimisation process, but not 
ubiquitously. One implication from this is that more attention needs to the paid to the nuanced agency 
they have. Peace negotiations and the larger peacebuilding process are inherently political and should be 
recognised as such. Exerting the moral value of civil society actors misses the point. Whilst working with 
certain groups might be easier (and can positively affect the legitimisation process) flexibility in 
inclusionary mechanisms would be useful. One way is to strengthen the interaction between civil society 
actors along the multi-scalar peacebuilding processes. More interaction on these levels would mean that 
further groups can be involved (at a local level), albeit in different manners. Finding ways to open up the 
discourse would be a way to acknowledge that groups are heterogeneous both between each other and 
over time.  
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Going back to the idea of inclusion of civil society actors at the peace negotiations, it has been shown that 
they can provide a civilian counterbalance to the otherwise militarised or politicised proceedings and for a 
sense of being represented, irrelevant of whether they take part as Track I or Track II actors. The type of 
role therefore is not that important, at least not with regards to the overall legitimisation process. In both 
the cases studied, the mediators played a positive role in encouraging such involvement. Therefore, a lot 
will inevitably come back to the mediation team and how they choose to handle the negotiations. 
 
One of the biggest problems in peace negotiations is the vertical dilemma - how do you ensure inclusion 
yet provide effectiveness? How do you even think about inclusion in a process so delicate and highly 
fraught like the on-going attempts for a solution to the civil war in Syria? The good news is that 
metaphorically speaking not all eggs need to be put in one basket. Aside from what happens at the 
negotiations, more emphasis can be placed on the public arena of legitimisation. This also means that 
what happens after the process is crucial in order to contribute to the legitimacy of peace agreements.  
 
Providing information and transparency not only ensures additional pressure for implementing peace 
agreements but also gives a process public confidence, contributing to the feeling of involvement, which 
constitutes a part of the legitimisation process. This would include forums for participation, where citizens 
can express their grievances and priorities. One example of this was the Open Forum in Kenya, which was 
conducted only in Nairobi. Strengthening these types of discussions forums would greatly enhance the 
potentials for legitimisation in peace processes. This also includes forums after the peace agreement has 
been signed, in order to spread the information on the agreement and negotiations. In both Kenya and 
especially Liberia, the fact that there had been no widespread information campaigns after the talks had 
taken place, was widely lamented. In Kenya, with a solid media infrastructure such distribution of 
information was much easier. Television, newspapers, radios, not to speak of social media tools were all 
used in order to spread and access information. In Liberia this is more difficult, but radio coverage has 
been quite widely spread in the post-conflict years, so some infrastructure does exist. What seems to have 
been prevalent however is that with the end of the war, the focus shifted immediately to the post-war 
complexities of peacebuilding, rather than focusing in detail on the peace agreement that had been signed. 
This is part of a political culture in Liberia were little efforts have been made with regards to 
memorialization-creation (on this point see Weah 2011). As has been shown in the case study however, 
there is an interest in finding out more of the peace negotiations and the role taken up by different actors 
including civil society. 
 
Most significantly, the active role of the population concerning the legitimisation process needs to be 
strengthened. This was one of the most interesting findings presented in this work, and opens up a new 
angle of participation, which has not received as much attention, especially in terms of legitimisation 
processes. As a result, encouraging additional ways to express grievances, reflections and thoughts - be it 
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in an artistic way or otherwise - helps to further legitimise the peace negotiations and make advances in 
the overall peacebuilding process. This opens the door for international organisations or donors to offer 
additional input beyond that of the immediate concern of the mediators. In terms of the timing, this can 
also take place after the agreement has been signed.  
 
Legitimate peace negotiations cannot be achieved by simply ticking a few boxes. They are on-going, 
dynamic processes and must be recognised as such in order to move forward in achieving legitimate and 
sustainable peace processes. 
 
7.4 Future Research 
 
This research has given detailed empirical observations on specific experiences of peace negotiations in 
Liberia and Kenya, drawing theoretical conclusions as a result. Not only have two very different cases 
been considered in detail and from an entirely new perspective, but advances have been made in trying to 
understand how peace negotiations become more legitimate. Nevertheless, several avenues of future 
research remain, which will be briefly mentioned in the following. 
 
Firstly, considering other experiences of peace negotiations with another set of different context factors 
would further strengthen or develop the theory advanced here. This should also include cases where civil 
society played no role at all around the negotiations, in order to consider the importance of the other 
factors of legitimisation, which are not related to the dimension of negotiations.  
 
Secondly, in order to further test the theory of process legitimisation, the theory could be applied to a 
different process altogether, in peacebuilding and perhaps even beyond. Considering whether the theory 
developed allows an understanding of how an individual peacebuilding project is legitimised or something 
like security sector reform would apply the broad elements to a different context, but strengthen the 
understanding of process legitimisation beyond peace negotiations. 
 
Thirdly, as discussed previously, the outcome and perception-based characteristics of legitimisation at the 
negotiations and thereby the national scale has this far been presented. What about simultaneous 
peacebuilding and negotiation processes happening on a local scale? How do the different scales interact 
in peacebuilding more generally?  
 
Fourthly, more research is needed to understand who the ‘grassroots’ population or the ‘local’ are. What 
role do political empowerment and ideas of citizenship play in relationship to legitimisation? Why is 
descriptive representation, which has received so much attention especially in feminism research, so 
redundant in the setting of peace negotiations? What role does trust play in ensuring subjective 
representation? 
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With rich empirical data including over 100 interviews and 12 focus groups with market women, teachers 
and youth and an especially adapted research method, this dissertation has made strides in advancing the 
understanding of how peace negotiations become more legitimate. Using the method of comprehensive 
process-tracing, which permitted both a constitutive and a causal analysis, the empirical data was studied 
carefully. The three features of legitimacy of the heuristic model and most notably the six components 
that together constitute the legitimisation process have singled out new and additional factors in relation 
to the debate on civil society participation in peace negotiations that were previously not recognised. The 
biggest finding has been that civil society is not exclusively responsible for ensuring legitimisation. From 
this, a theory of legitimate peace negotiations was developed. The theoretical innovation with regards to 
already existing theories on legitimacy is that it does not address authority or systems but a process of 
legitimisation. According to the theory, a legitimisation process is made up of outcome and participation-
based characteristics, where civil society actors play a crucial but not exclusive role. Moreover, the 
legitimisation takes place at the negotiations and in a public arena. Using the combination of the 
comprehensive process-tracing of the two case studies and the theory on legitimate peace negotiations, 
advances have been made to show how peace negotiations can become more legitimate. This also has 
repercussions for other scholarship, especially that of peacebuilding and legitimacy.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Extra Tables 
 
Table 1: Power-sharing Agreements and Civil Society Signatories in Africa between 1999-2010, 
taken from Mehler (2009) and extended from the UCDP Database.  
 
Power-Sharing Agreement Civil Society Signatories 
Angola (4 April 2002) None 
Burundi (8 October 2003) None 
Burundi (4 December 2008) None 
Central African Republic (21 June 2008) None 
Chad (14 December 2003) None 
Chad (24 December 2006) None 
Chad (25 October 2007) None 
Cosmoros (17 April 2001) None 
Cote d’Ivoire (14 January 2003) None 
Cote d’Ivoire (4 March 2007) None 
Djibouti (12 May 2001) None 
Democratic Republic of Congo (19 April 2002) Yes – 45 representatives of civil society 
Democratic Republic of Congo (23 March 2009) None 
Liberia (18 August 2003) Yes - 5 representatives of civil society as witnesses 
Mali (4 July 2006) None 
Sierra Leone (7 July 1999) None (they played a role but did not sign) 
Somalia (29 January 2004) None 
Somalia (26 November 2008) None 
Sudan (9 January 2005) None 
Sudan (5 May 2006) None 
Sudan (23 February 2010) None 
 
 
Table 2: Peace Agreements to end the Liberian Civil War 1990-1996 (own compilation using Adebajo 
2002a; Alao, Mackinlay, and Olonisakin 1999; Dupuy and Detzel 2008) 
 
Peace Agreement Significant Provisions 
Banjul Agreement August 1990 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee decides to establish ECOMOG to enforce a 
ceasefire in Liberia, Taylor refuses to take part in talks until Doe steps down 
Banjul Agreement October 1990 Interim Government is established by ECOWAS, to be headed by Amos Sawyer 
Bamako Agreement November 
1990 
Ceasefire agreement is signed between NPFL and Doe’s soldiers; Sawyer sworn in as 
interim head of state 
Banjul Agreement December 
1990 
Additional agreement is signed by Interim Government, NPFL and Doe loyalists 
Lomé Accord 
February 1991 
Ceasefire agreement; ECOMOG is to draw up buffer zones and deploy throughout the 
country. NPFL promises to disarm and set up an Interim Government 
Yamoussoukro I Accord August 
1991 
NPFL leader Taylor meets up with Interim Government Chairman Amos Sawyer, they sign 
(various) agreements 
Yamoussoukro II Accord August 
– September 1991 
Further agreement is signed by the NPFL and Interim Government under the auspices of 
Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny 
Yamoussoukro III Accord 
August – September 1991 
Further agreement is signed by the NPFL and Interim Government under the auspices of 
Ivorian President Houphouet-Boigny 
Yamoussoukro IV Accord 
October 1991 
Programme of disarmament to be enforced by ECOMOG set up, establishment of a new 
civil society based interim government and an elections commission. Taylor signs but then 
goes on to set up his own parallel government 
The Geneva Ceasefire July 1993 Ceasefire agreement is signed by ULIMO; NPFL and the Interim Government 
Cotonou Accord July 1993 The most comprehensive of all agreements in the 1990s provides for an expanded 
ECOMOG; the formation of a UN observer mission - UNOMIL; mechanisms for DDR 
(including amnesty for all fighters) and the establishment of the Liberia National 
Transitional Government (LNTG), with an executive Council representing key warring 
factions, and elections to be held in 1994. This is a turning point where the inclusion of 
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faction leaders at all costs crystalizes, leading the way towards further fragmentation and 
splinter groups. Agreement is signed by NPFL and ULIMO 
Akosombo Agreement 
September 1994 
ULIMO splinters into ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J so a new agreement is needed. The 
agreement is signed by the NPFL, ULIMO-K and AFL, but not by other groups (including 
ULIMO-J, LPC; LDF etc.). It is seen as a supplement to the Cotonou Agreement. A new 
executive Council is created, and the requirement of consensus decision-making in the 
council was removed. The agreement is opposed by civil society groups 
Accra Clarification December 
1994 
Renewed Ceasefire, confirmation of commitment to the Akosombo Agreement; this time 
signed by all groups and a 5-member Council of State including a member of civil society 
and a traditional chief 
Abuja Agreement 
August 1995 
Confirms the agreements from Cotonou onwards, new ceasefire agreement. Creation of Six 
member (executive) Council of State with various rebel members, as well as a Chairman. 
The Council now includes the warring parties and a civil society representative and a 
member of the electoral college 
Abuja Supplement Accord 1996 Replaces the (ineffective) Chairperson of the Abuja Agreement. The threat of sanctions if 
the peace is broken is added, including freezing of assets and a travel ban within ECOWAS 
countries. A war crimes tribunal is also included as a possibility. The last agreement, Abuja 
II, is signed and agreed to by eight groups, most prominently the NPFL, ULIMO- K, LPC, 
AFL, ULIMO-J and LDF. It also includes even smaller factions like the NPFL-CRC 
(National Patriotic Front of Liberia Central Revolutionary Council) and LNC (Liberia 
National Conference). 
 
 
Table 3: Power-Sharing in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2003 
 Ministries 
(Annex 4 Section 4 and 5) 
 
Seats in the 
NTLA  
(Annex 2 
Section2) 
Autonomous Agencies and 
Administrative Bodies 
(Annex 4 Section 12) 
Public Corporations 
(Annex 4 Section 9 and 
10) 
Government of 
Liberia 
(Charles 
Taylor faction) 
Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications; 
Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare; Ministry of 
National Defense; Ministry 
of Planning and Economic 
Affairs; Ministry of Internal 
Affairs 
12 Bureau of the Budget; National Security 
Agency 
Liberia Broadcasting 
System; Liberia Electricity 
Corporation; Liberia 
Petroleum Refining 
Corporation; Liberia Water 
and Sewer Corporation  
LURD Ministry of Finance; 
Ministry of Justice; Ministry 
of Labor; Ministry of 
Transport; Ministry of State 
12 National Investment Commission; 
General Service Agency 
 
Liberia Free Zone 
Authority; Liberian 
Telecommunications 
Corporation; Liberian 
Produce Marketing 
Corporation; National 
Ports Authority  
MODEL Ministry of Agriculture; 
Ministry of Commerce; 
Ministry of Lands, Mines 
and Energy; Ministry of 
Public Works; Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
12 Liberia Refugee Repatriation and 
Resettlement Commission; Bureau of 
Maritime Affairs 
Agriculture, Corporative 
Development Bank; 
Forestry Development 
Authority; Roberts 
International Airport; 
National Social Security 
and Welfare Corporation  
Political 
Parties and 
Civil Society 
Ministry of National 
Security; Ministry of 
Education; Ministry of 
Gender and Development; 
Ministry of Information; 
Ministry of Rural 
25 (18 to the 
political 
parties and 
the 
remaining 7 
amongst 
Bureau of Immigration and 
Naturalization; Independent National 
Human Rights Commission; Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, National 
Elections Commission; Governance 
reform Commission; Bureau of General 
Agriculture Industrial 
Training Board; Liberia 
Domestic Airport 
Authority; Liberia Mining 
Corporation; Liberia 
National Lotteries; Liberia 
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Development; Ministry of 
Youth and Sports 
civil society 
members). 
The 15 
remaining 
seats were 
divided 
amongst the 
counties. 
Auditing, Bureau of State Enterprises; 
Center for National DOC and Records; 
Civil Service Agency; Corporative 
Development Agency; John F. Kennedy 
Memorial Medical Center; Contracts and 
Monopolies Commission; Liberia 
National Police Force; the National 
Bureau of Investigation; National Fire 
Services; National Food Assistance 
Agency 
Rubber Development Unit; 
Liberia National Oil 
Company; Monrovia 
Transit Authority; National 
Housing and Savings Bank; 
National Housing 
Authority; National 
Insurance Corporation of 
Liberia 
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List of Interviews and Focus Group Discussions Liberia 
 
Overview 
The following classifications are used in order to anonymize the interviewees: 
 Local Government Official: This includes town councillors, administrators, assistants, 
superintendents and mayors all related to the daily functioning of local government (not elected). 
I mention senior officials by position. 
 
 Political Party Employee: This includes those who work for political parties or politicians, 
usually in an assisting function or as a regional general secretary. 
 
 Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member: This includes persons working for 
human rights and peacebuilding organisations in their main capacity, despite possible crossovers 
to other categories. There were also a few development organisations, which I include here in a 
generous interpretation of peacebuilding. The views they expressed were their own and not 
necessarily related to their organisation or work.  The interviewees worked for the following 
organisations (in alphabetical order): Carter Center, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, Foundation for 
International Dignity (FIND), Foundation For The Restoration of Democracy and Human Rights (FORD-
HR), Norwegian Refugee Council; UNDP; USAID and Peacebuilding Resource Center. Some of the human 
rights and peacebuilding organisations are mentioned by name as the interviewees did not mind 
this. Nevertheless, views are still not necessarily ones of their organisations, but rather their own. 
These organisations include:  Inter-Religious Council of Liberia, International Alert, MARWOPNET; 
WANEP and WIPNET. 
 
 Women Leader: Women leader includes those that describe themselves as such, usually heading 
groups (sometimes elected) that work with female empowerment, literacy campaigns etc. 
 
 „Intellectual’: This was a prominent intellectual, who took part in the peace talks, but in an 
advisory role. The person does not wish to be identified. 
 
The following is relevant background information from some of the on-the-record interview: 
 
 Ranney Jackson: He was a diaspora civil society leader who attended the CPA; a former 
superintended of Bong County (2006 – 2011) and at the time of the first interview a presidential 
candidate. By the time of the second interview he was working as a Deputy Minister in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs 
 
 Zawolo Z. Zuagele:  He is a civil society member as well as a politician. At the time Liberty Party 
Chairman 
 
Most of the interviews and focus groups cited in this work were conducted between June – August 2011 
and for those the year is not mentioned in the code. For those from 2013 and 2014 the year is mentioned 
in the code.  
 
Interviews and FGD 
Interviewee / FGD Code Date Location 
Teacher L1 22/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Local Government Official L2 23/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Political Party Employee L3 24/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L4 24/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Junior Senator Bong County Franklin Siankor L5 25/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L6 28/06/2011 Gbarnga 
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Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L7 28/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Local Government Official (Development Superintendent) L8 28/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Religious Leader L9 29/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Local Government Official (Mayor) L10 29/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L11 30/06/2011 Gbarnga 
Women Leader L12 01/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L13 01/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Youth Leader L14 01/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Local Government Official L15 02/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Parliamentary Representative Gbarnga George Morbah L16 03/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Local Government Official L17 04/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Ranney Jackson L18 04/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Mandingo Leader L19 04/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L20 05/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Local Government Official (Superintendent) L21 07/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L22 13/07/2011 Ganta 
Political Party Employee L23 13/07/2011 Ganta 
Youth Leader L24 14/07/2011 Ganta 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L25 14/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official (Chairman City Council) L26 15/07/2011 Ganta 
Political Party Employee L27 15/07/2011 Ganta 
Parliamentary Representative Rebecca Nohn Kidau L28 17/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official (District Commissioner) L29 18/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official L30 18/07/2011 Ganta 
Women Leader L31 18/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official (Mayor) L32 19/07/2011 Ganta 
Zawolo Z. Zuagele L33 20/07/2011 Ganta 
Political Party Employee L34 20/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official L35 20/07/2011 Ganta 
Religious Leader L36 21/07/2011 Ganta 
Youth Leader L37 22/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official (Former Mayor) L38 22/07/2011 Ganta 
Mandingo Spokesperson L39 25/07/2011 Ganta 
Local Government Official L40 25/07/2011 Ganta 
Inter-Religious Council of Liberia (IRCL) L41 03/08/2011 Monrovia 
Senior Senator Bong County Jewel Howard Taylor L42 04/08/2011 Monrovia 
Sheikh Kafumba F. Konneh (former Chairman IRCL) L43 08/08/2011 Monrovia 
MARWOPNET (Amelia Ward) L44 08/08/2011 Monrovia 
International Alert L45 09/08/2011 Monrovia 
The New African Research and Development Agency L46 09/08/2011 Monrovia 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L1_13 15/08/2013 Monrovia 
Governance Commission Staff Member L2_13 15/08/2013 Monrovia 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L3_13 16/08/2013 Monrovia 
„Intellectual’ L4_13 17/08/2013 Monrovia 
Former Parliamentary Representative Rebecca Nohn Kidau L5_13 19/08/2013 Monrovia 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member L6_13 30/08/2013 Gbarnga 
Liberia Women’s Initiative (Mary Brownell) L7_13 12/09/2013 Monrovia 
WIPNET Staff Members L8_13 12/09/2013 Monrovia 
WANEP Staff Member L9_13 12/09/2013 Monrovia 
Professor Debey Sayndee, University of Liberia L10_13 17/09/2013 Monrovia 
Asatu Bah-Kenneth, founding member WIPNET L11_13 18/09/2013 Monrovia 
Gyude Bryant (former Interim Chairperson) L12_13 20/09/2013 Monrovia 
Ranney Jackson L1_14 02/02/2014 Gbarnga 
MARWOPNET (Amelia Ward) L2_14 10/02/2014 Monrovia 
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Focus Group Discussion Teachers (7 participants) LGbT 09/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Focus Group Discussion Youth (6 participants) LGbY 10/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Focus Group Discussion Market Women (6 participants) LGbM 08/07/2011 Gbarnga 
Focus Group Discussion Teachers (8 participants) LGT 27/07/2011 Ganta 
Focus Group Discussion Youth (7 participants) LGY 28/07/2011 Ganta 
Focus Group Discussion Market Women (7 participants) LGM 29/07/2011 Ganta 
Focus Group Discussion Youth (7 participants) LGbY_14 22/01/2014 Gbarnga 
Focus Group Discussion Teachers (9 participants) LMT 05/02/2014 Monrovia 
 
 
 
List of Interviews and Focus Group Discussions Kenya 
 
Overview 
The following classifications are used in order to anonymize the interviewees: 
 
 Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member: This includes persons working for 
human rights and peacebuilding organisations in their main capacity, despite possible crossovers 
to other categories. There were also a few development organisations, which I include here in a 
generous interpretation of peacebuilding. The views they expressed were their own and not 
necessarily related to their organisation or work. The interviewees worked for the following 
organisations (in alphabetical order): Centre for Conflict Resolution; Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy Eldoret; International Organisation of Migration; Justice and Peace Commission; Kenya Human 
Rights Commission; Kenya Land Alliance; Reconcile; National Council Of Churches of Kenya; NPI-Africa; 
Mercy Corps; North Rift Theatre Ambassadors; Peace Corps Nakuru; PeaceNet; Rural Women Peace Link: 
Usalama Reforms Forum. 
 Senior Local Government Administration Official: This includes persons who are working for 
the administrative sector of the local government in a senior capacity. For purposes of protecting 
the sources the individual districts within Eldoret are not named. The positions of those 
interviewed (in alphabetical order) are: District Commissioners Eldoret; District Commissioner Nakuru; 
Regional Provincial Commissioner; Provincial Commissioner Rift Valley Province. 
 
 Local Government Administration Official: This includes persons who are working for the 
administrative sector of the local government. For purposes of protecting the sources the 
individual wards or divisions within the Nakuru and Uasin Gushin Districts are not named. The 
positions of those interviewed (in alphabetical order) are: Deputy Town Clerk; Division Officer Nakuru 
District; Senior Division Officer Nakuru District; Information Officer Nakuru Municipality, Town Planner 
Eldoret Municipality; Ward Chiefs. 
 
 Political Party Employee: This includes those who work for political parties or politicians, in 
assisting function, constituency programme officers, campaign managers. 
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 Former National Politician: This is a formerly very prominent politician in national politics who 
still holds a strong power –hold locally, though he is now involved in business entrepreneurism 
 
 Muthoni Wanyeki is a human rights activist and political scientist. She is currently Regional 
Director of Amnesty International in East Africa and was formerly the Executive Director of the 
Kenya Human Rights Commission and former Executive Director of the African Women's 
Development and Communication Network (FEMNET).  
 
Further, note that there are several interviews with employees at human rights and monitoring bodies that 
are part of the government administration and have not been further anonymised. The views of those 
interviewed are however their own and not necessarily related to their organisation or work.  These 
organisations include the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, National Steering Committee on Peace and 
the National Commission on Cohesion and Integration. 
 
All interviews and focus groups were conducted between October – December in 2011 therefore the year 
is not mentioned in the code. The exception is the last interview (K55), which was conducted via 
telephone in January 2015. 
 
Interviewee / FGD Code Date Location 
Academic (Political Science) Nairobi University K1 15/10/2011 Nairobi 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K2 17/10/2011 Nakuru 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K3 19/10/2011 Nakuru 
Senior Local Government Administration Official K4 19/10/2011 Nakuru 
Business Entrepreneur K5 19/10/2011 Nakuru 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K6 19/10/2011 Nakuru 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K7 21/10/2011 Nakuru 
Senior Local Government Administration Official K8 21/10/2011 Nakuru 
Local Government Administration Official K9 21/10/2011 Nakuru 
Local Government Administration Official K10 24/10/2011 Nakuru 
Local Government Administration Official K11 24/10/2011 Nakuru 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K12 25/10/2011 Nakuru 
Local Government Administration Official K13 25/10/2011 Nakuru 
Political Party Employee K14 25/10/2011 Nakuru 
Local Government Administration Official K15 31/10/2011 Nakuru 
Elected Nakuru Town Councillor K16 31/10/2011 Nakuru 
Elected Nakuru Town Councillor K17 01/11/2011 Nakuru 
Business Entrepreneur K18 01/11/2011 Nakuru 
Appointed Nakuru Town Councillor K19 02/11/2011 Nakuru 
Former National Politician K20 02/11/2011 Nakuru 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K21 07/11/2011 Eldoret 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K22 07/11/2011 Eldoret 
Local Government Administration Official K23 07/11/2011 Eldoret 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K24 08/11/2011 Eldoret 
Senior Local Government Administration Official K25 09/11/2011 Eldoret 
Political Party Employee K26 09/11/2011 Eldoret 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K27 09/11/2011 Eldoret 
Political Party Employee K28 10/11/2011 Eldoret 
Senior Local Government Administration Official K29 10/11/2011 Eldoret 
Senior Local Government Administration Official K30 15/11/2011 Eldoret 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K31 16/11/2011 Eldoret 
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Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K32 19/11/2011 Eldoret 
Magaret Kamar MP Eldoret East/Minister of Education K33 20/11/2011 Eldoret 
Mayor Eldoret Town Municipality K34 21/11/2011 Eldoret 
Academic (Philosophy & Religion) Moi University K35 22/11/2011 Eldoret 
Academic (Philosophy & Religion) Moi University K36 22/11/2011 Eldoret 
Appointed Eldoret Town Councillor K37 22/11/2011 Eldoret 
Elected Eldoret Town Councillor K38 23/11/2011 Eldoret 
Chairman of Kalenjin Council of Elders K39 23/11/2011 Eldoret 
Local Government Administration Official K40 23/11/2011 Eldoret 
Elected Eldoret Town Councillor K41 24/11/2011 Eldoret 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K42 24/11/2011 Eldoret 
Religious Leader (Bishop Cornelius Korir) K43 24/11/2011 Eldoret 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K44 25/11/2011 Eldoret 
Peris Chepchumba Siman (MP Eldoret South) K45 29/11/2011 Nairobi 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K46 29/11/2011 Nairobi 
Kenya National Commission on Human Rights K47 30/11/2011 Nairobi 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member/ Member CCP  K48 01/12/2011 Nairobi 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member/ Member and 
Co-Founder KPTJ 
K49 01/12/2011 Nairobi 
Lee Kiyanjui (MP Nakuru) K50 01/12/2011 Nairobi 
National Steering Committee on Peace K51 02/12/2011 Nairobi 
William Ruto (MP Eldoret North) K52 07/12/2011 Nairobi 
Commissioner; National Commission on Cohesion and Integration K53 07/12/2011 Nairobi 
Human Rights and Peacebuilding Civil Society Member K54 08/12/2011 Nairobi 
Muthoni Wanyeki K55 30/01/2015 Phone 
Focus Group Discussion Teachers (9 participants) KNT 26/10/2011 Nakuru 
Focus Group Discussion Youth (10 participants) KNY 27/10/2011 Nakuru 
Focus Group Discussion Market Women (10 participants) KNM 28/10/2011 Nakuru 
Focus Group Discussion Market Women (9 participants) KEM 17/11/2011 Eldoret 
Focus Group Discussion Teachers (7 participants) KET 18/11/2011 Eldoret 
Focus Group Discussion Youth (7 participants) KEY 19/11/2011 Eldoret 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
225 
 
Questions Template Interviews 
(Conducted in Liberia, Kenya and via telephone between 2011-2015) 
 
Peace Agreement General 
 
 What was your impression of the XX Peace Agreement? 
 
o How do you think it improved matters? 
 
o Do you think there were some issues which were left out?  
 If yes, how do you think they affected the durability of the peace? 
 If yes, do you think there are others actors who could have addressed these? 
 
o Did any issues of XX/local matters get taken into consideration at the negotiations? 
 Which actors represented these/made sure they got included? 
 
o According to you were any local issues/grievances included in the agreement XX? 
 Why were those issues included? 
 Why were these issues left out? 
 Should they have been included? 
 
 Do you think local grievances should play a role in national peace agreements? 
 
o EITHER Which kind of local grievances might be important to include in a Peace Agreement? 
Who could make sure these grievances are included? 
o OR Why do you think local grievances do not need to be considered in national peace agreements? 
 
 Were any actors in the national peace agreement from XX? Which actors were these?/ Who was 
included?  
o Do you think this had an effect on XX, and if yes, what happened/changed? 
 
Own Role of CSAs at Negotiations 
 
 How would you define or explain your organisation? 
 
 At what time did you join the peace talks? Who was there from your organisation? 
 
o Who invited you? 
o Why did you go? 
o What other civil society organisations were present? When did they come? Which individuals were 
part of these particular organisations? Who was part of the official delegates? 
o Where you immediately given a seat at the table? How did you get to have one? 
 
 What role did you play during the negotiations of the peace agreement? 
o What responsibilities were you given?  
 
 Why do you think you were given these ones? 
 What about other organizations?  
 
o How much influence do you think you had? 
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 Why do you think you were influential on this matter? 
 What (if anything) had an effect on reducing your influence/that of other civil society 
organizations? 
 
 What aspects of the agreement were because of issues you/your organisation addressed? 
 
o Who else was behind these issues? Did you work together on these or separately? 
o What issues did you address that were left out? Why do you think this was the case? 
o Did you interact with the conflict actors / the mediators 
 
 Do you feel like that you represented the grievances of certain sections of the population?  
 
o Which parts of the population do you feel you represented?  
o Why do you think you were in a position to represent these? 
o How did you make sure to know what their grievances were to be addressed? 
o What is your understanding of representation?  
 
 How did you interact with the other civil society members? Which ones more which ones less? Why? 
 
 How did you interact with the other political parties? How and in what ways did their interests 
overlap? 
 
 How would you describe the relationship between civil society and political parties generally and 
especially at the time? 
 
 What efforts did you / your organisation make to communicate about your role afterwards? 
 
o Who was the audience? 
o Do you think there is a possibility that not everyone was able to hear about what happened? Why 
not? Does it matter? 
 What did you try to communicate and why do you think this was important? 
o Did you tell anyone about the role you had afterwards? Did you think it was important? Why 
(not)? 
 
 How do you think your input affected the long-term implementation of the peace agreement? 
o What issues that weren’t included in the peace agreements could have improved the 
implementation period? 
 
Civil Society in Peace Negotiations General 
 
 What kind of civil society groups were involved in the peace negotiations? 
 
 If you had to sum up the negotiations in one sentence how would you do this? 
 
 Do you think the role of CS increased the legitimacy of the negotiations? How? Why not? 
 
 Do you think it’s more important for CS to play a role during the negotiation period or the 
implementation period? 
 
 What efforts were made to bring the negotiations process / agreement to the grassroots? Who made 
them? 
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 Do you think the XX CS is representative of the conflict-affected population? In what ways do they 
represent them? 
 
 How much participation of the grassroots was there in the implementation period? 
 
 Do you think there was “local ownership” of the negotiations process? 
 
Peace Process General 
 
 How would you define legitimacy? Why? Where does this definition come from 
 
 If you could design/improve/change the peace process what would you do? 
 
 
 
Questions Template Focus Groups 
 
Extracts of Questions analysed for this Dissertation 
(Conducted in Liberia and Kenya in 2011) 
 
• What is the first thing that comes to your mind when you think of the XX Peace Negotiations 
and Agreement?  
• How do you think the local population was affected by the agreement? 
• Who are the most powerful actors in XX? 
• Which actors are positive or negative with regard to local peace? Why? 
• What were the most important local issues during the war?  
• Were these issues addressed in the negotiations of the peace agreement? 
• Who addressed them? 
• How well did these actors address these questions? 
• Were there other actors who should have addressed them? 
• Which issues remain today?  
• Were these left out of the CPA? Why do you think this was the case? 
• Who should address these issues? 
• Which actors should have addressed these during the peace negotiations? 
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